TSR-2 Files
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Once the force went low level the FF Vulcans would have been hard pushed to cover Moscow and as far as I am aware any coverage would have been the Blue Steel Victors and Vulcans - with 5 aircraft on QRA.
The low level launch of the Blue Steel meant a much closer approach to the target but the missile flight path would then be inside the SA1/2 envelope. It was the missile that was more vulnerable, not the aircraft.
Of course the aircraft was the back up if the Blue Steel went U/S - very sporty doing a popup attack.
Join Date: Nov 2004
Location: UK
Posts: 932
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Is there any truth in that the Americans wanted TSR-2 cancelled? As it was so advanced for it's time that the Americans feared the Soviets would improve their air defences. Therefore America would have lost its supremacy.
I suppose cancelling the TSR-2 also removed a competitor for their F-111 exports too.
I suppose cancelling the TSR-2 also removed a competitor for their F-111 exports too.
The US offered the RAAF F-111C on terms that the UK couldn't match - because the benefits of scale were so profound - and that knocked 30 out of a total TSR-2 projected build of 180. It's worth recalling that even after TFX went horribly wrong, the USN cancelled the F-111B and F-111D was built in tiny numbers, that they still built 550+ F-111s.
The interesting counterfactual - which in fairness to Dennis Healey couldn't possibly have been foreseen in April 1965 - was that if TSR-2 had continued, and *if* it had had a trouble-free development (which given the complexity of the Nav/Attack system was by no means a certainty), and had successfully entered squadron service by 1970, then by 1968/69 when F-111 was in huge trouble - weight, engines, avionics, horizontal stabilisers falling off - would the USAF would have taken TSR-2 on a licence basis, as they would do with Harrier in the same timescale?
My hunch is "probably", given how effective TSR-2 could've been in SE Asia as well as in Europe, but there are an awful lot of "ifs" in this.
S41
Last edited by Squirrel 41; 25th Oct 2013 at 21:46.
Join Date: Nov 2004
Location: UK
Posts: 932
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Once the force went low level the FF Vulcans would have been hard pushed to cover Moscow and as far as I am aware any coverage would have been the Blue Steel Victors and Vulcans - with 5 aircraft on QRA.
The low level launch of the Blue Steel meant a much closer approach to the target but the missile flight path would then be inside the SA1/2 envelope. It was the missile that was more vulnerable, not the aircraft.
The low level launch of the Blue Steel meant a much closer approach to the target but the missile flight path would then be inside the SA1/2 envelope. It was the missile that was more vulnerable, not the aircraft.
Of course the aircraft was the back up if the Blue Steel went U/S - very sporty doing a popup attack.
What was the plan - to toss an unserviceable Blue Steel from low-level? How reliable was Blue Steel when carried?S41
[QUOTE] S41: would the USAF would have taken TSR-2 on a licence basis, as they would do with Harrier in the same timescale?
My hunch is "probably", given how effective TSR-2 could've been in SE Asia as well as in Europe, but there are an awful lot of "ifs" in this. [QUOTE]
S41,
I would say not a snowball's chance in hell would the Yanks have taken TSR2.
Sure problems plagued TFX/F-111 development, wing carry-through box being a major one, but engines and auto systems (like CG fuel transfer). The final snapshot is:
F-111A - used unsuccessfully in SEA ops in 1967, but very successfully by 474TFW in SEA on "Linebacker II" in 1972. Some later modded to EF-111A "Spark Vark".
F-111B - cancelled by USN, who then used some systems in F-14.
F-111C - RAAF F-111A, delivery delayed 5 years until 1973, mainly due to carry-through box testing.
F-111D - first digital attempt, miserable failure, spent a lot of time on the ground.
F-111E - upgraded F-111A, equipped 20TFW at Upper Heyford.
F-111F - best of the breed, good digital avionics, more power in the donks, equipped 48TFW at Lakenheath.
F-111G - FB-111A later transferred from SAC to TAC, some to RAAF.
So yes, probs in the late 1960s, but the USAF was getting on top of them and had solved by 1970-71, which enabled a Wing-strength opnl deployment to SEA in 1972.
Brits feel the TSR2 was cutting edge and the panacea for their role and for export. But it was markedly overweight, due to antiquated analogue avionics, heavier than those of its contemporary (the F-111A). I saw the TSR2 on static at Duxford in the early 1970s, and I thought at the time, 'my god this looks old'. IF TSR2 had ever entered RAF service, its initial avionics performance would probably been as unreliable as Jag's NAVWAS. It probably would have gone through a digital MLU (with kit similar to what went into MRCA/Tornado), but as Tornado would not then have been ordered, TSR2 would have required replacement in the 1990s. (Also, in this scenario, the RAF Bucc would not have been ordered either - much to the disappointment of many here.)
My hunch is "probably", given how effective TSR-2 could've been in SE Asia as well as in Europe, but there are an awful lot of "ifs" in this. [QUOTE]
S41,
I would say not a snowball's chance in hell would the Yanks have taken TSR2.
Sure problems plagued TFX/F-111 development, wing carry-through box being a major one, but engines and auto systems (like CG fuel transfer). The final snapshot is:
F-111A - used unsuccessfully in SEA ops in 1967, but very successfully by 474TFW in SEA on "Linebacker II" in 1972. Some later modded to EF-111A "Spark Vark".
F-111B - cancelled by USN, who then used some systems in F-14.
F-111C - RAAF F-111A, delivery delayed 5 years until 1973, mainly due to carry-through box testing.
F-111D - first digital attempt, miserable failure, spent a lot of time on the ground.
F-111E - upgraded F-111A, equipped 20TFW at Upper Heyford.
F-111F - best of the breed, good digital avionics, more power in the donks, equipped 48TFW at Lakenheath.
F-111G - FB-111A later transferred from SAC to TAC, some to RAAF.
So yes, probs in the late 1960s, but the USAF was getting on top of them and had solved by 1970-71, which enabled a Wing-strength opnl deployment to SEA in 1972.
Brits feel the TSR2 was cutting edge and the panacea for their role and for export. But it was markedly overweight, due to antiquated analogue avionics, heavier than those of its contemporary (the F-111A). I saw the TSR2 on static at Duxford in the early 1970s, and I thought at the time, 'my god this looks old'. IF TSR2 had ever entered RAF service, its initial avionics performance would probably been as unreliable as Jag's NAVWAS. It probably would have gone through a digital MLU (with kit similar to what went into MRCA/Tornado), but as Tornado would not then have been ordered, TSR2 would have required replacement in the 1990s. (Also, in this scenario, the RAF Bucc would not have been ordered either - much to the disappointment of many here.)
Join Date: Aug 2007
Location: Cheshire
Posts: 30
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The RAF requirement to sustain M2.2 for 45 mins and the insistence on 1000 payload range, led to huge cost overuns and delays on the Olympus programme alone. At the very least £1 million for each mile of the last 100 miles
according to Stanley Hooker in his book 'not much of an engineer', great read.
according to Stanley Hooker in his book 'not much of an engineer', great read.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
)According to a Research Branch study*, when a powered launch was not possible a BS could be released with a popup manoeuvre similar to the YS2. Unlike the YS2 the BS was a low-drag shape and its ballistic properties approach that of an ideal bomb. Time of fall is reduced but forward travel is increased.
To ensure blast over pressure was less than 1.5 psi the BS would need to be released in level flight from 11,000 feet.
In theory the aircraft would enter a rapid climb about 11.5 miles from the target, push over, and fly level for about 2 miles with release around 2 miles rom the target.
In training, to get better scores, this was subjected to creep back with that level flight portion increased to 5 miles or more. The time from exposure to bomb detonation was between 140 seconds down to 120 seconds. It was assessed that a well trained and alerted SA2 crew could achieve a kill within 118 seconds.
Close!
* Oct 1963
Last edited by Pontius Navigator; 26th Oct 2013 at 09:17.
Once the force went low level the FF Vulcans would have been hard pushed to cover Moscow and as far as I am aware any coverage would have been the Blue Steel Victors and Vulcans - with 5 aircraft on QRA.
Of course the aircraft was the back up if the Blue Steel went U/S - very sporty doing a popup attack.
exmap
Last edited by Yellow Sun; 26th Oct 2013 at 08:54.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
YS, the primary QRA target for Plan B - at least 5 aircraft - was Leningrad. At that time there were only 7 aircraft of QRA. Draw your own conclusions.
Moscow would have been in range for aircraft with the double-tank fit.
At one point it was planned at that one route for Leningrad would require a single drum tank. This was seen as a severe technical limitation as it required that one QRA aircraft at Waddo and a spare were both so fitted. At the behest of the stn cdr I had to get Bomber Command to change the routing.
That particular mission was routed through the back door so to speak.
Probably not, but it was the question of the British psychic. I believe our near allies were not as picky. I know when NEAF introduced a new plan that meant we had only sufficient fuel for post-target plus 10 minutes flight. It brought a gasp from the audience when we were briefed and we were not happy bunnies. Logically it would have been no worse than landing in Iran or further east.
Moscow would have been in range for aircraft with the double-tank fit.
At one point it was planned at that one route for Leningrad would require a single drum tank. This was seen as a severe technical limitation as it required that one QRA aircraft at Waddo and a spare were both so fitted. At the behest of the stn cdr I had to get Bomber Command to change the routing.
That particular mission was routed through the back door so to speak.
The survivability quotient for was pretty low, but by that time did it really matter?
Last edited by Pontius Navigator; 26th Oct 2013 at 11:15.
TSR2 - materials?
I recall working for someone who had been around at BAC during the TSR2 years. His take - from a production engineering/materials point of view - was that they were pushing the boundaries on the materials side, including proposed use of exotic flavours of aluminium alloys (including an early Al-Li, IIRC?), driven mainly by the need to save weight, which given the problems we were having with Al-Li alloys at the time of the conversation (mid-80s) was a bit sobering. He felt that there were going to be big, and costly, problems to be overcome in getting production aircraft out of the door and into full service. With regards to the destruction of the jigs etc, his point of view was this: if ANY components, tools or jigs were left on the shop floor, the work force would've carried on working on it, regardless of instructions (there was no other immediate work), and so it was necessary not just to remove said items but also to destroy them.
PBW
PBW
Correct - as noted the TSR2 had analog-digital hybrid systems. The F-111A was mostly analog, the F-111D/Mk II was a "didge too far" and the E/F - the only models used in combat after VN - had a hybrid fit.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Sep 2013
Location: Grimsby
Posts: 129
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
TSR-2 Files
It just seems crazy to invest that much time, effort, talent, and of course money taking the project up to (early) flight-testing status. To have such luminaries as Beamont/Dell/Knight giving positive feedback from the cockpit. To have what could obviously evolve into an extremely effective piece of kit...and
then pull the plug on it.
It doesn't seem to have any logical explanation. But then I suppose that sentence could be written on the gravestone of the once highly capable and innovative British aircraft industry in general.
Thanks for the replies by the way, all interesting material. I'm sure we've not seen the last of this subject.
then pull the plug on it.
It doesn't seem to have any logical explanation. But then I suppose that sentence could be written on the gravestone of the once highly capable and innovative British aircraft industry in general.
Thanks for the replies by the way, all interesting material. I'm sure we've not seen the last of this subject.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Nimrod, just a handful of years later had a state of the art digital system. It had a massive 8k of 16bit core storage. While this was in Nimrod about 5 years later it had been in service with the Chieftain tank before that.
IMHO a big problem would have been navigation and bombing accuracy. It would have relied on a side scan radar system which, by definition, would provide a fix at less than real time. Even if the navigation degradation was very small, say 0.2 deg per hour at 15 minute fix frequency the error fix to fix at 1080 kts (600 yards per second) would be over half a mile.
IMHO a big problem would have been navigation and bombing accuracy. It would have relied on a side scan radar system which, by definition, would provide a fix at less than real time. Even if the navigation degradation was very small, say 0.2 deg per hour at 15 minute fix frequency the error fix to fix at 1080 kts (600 yards per second) would be over half a mile.
Join Date: Nov 2012
Location: UK East Anglia
Age: 66
Posts: 678
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
John Forbat
PN,
There is a good description of the TSR2 Nav Bombing system in the John Forbat book. ISBN 978 0 7524-3919-9
too heavy on wiggly amps for me to fully take in. many of the references relate to papers in the Brooklands museum. The epilogue describes how some of the systems went on to be used in MRCA (Tonka) and the Nimrod 1.
My copy is signed by the author in Nov 08.
Drag
There is a good description of the TSR2 Nav Bombing system in the John Forbat book. ISBN 978 0 7524-3919-9
too heavy on wiggly amps for me to fully take in. many of the references relate to papers in the Brooklands museum. The epilogue describes how some of the systems went on to be used in MRCA (Tonka) and the Nimrod 1.
My copy is signed by the author in Nov 08.
Drag
Join Date: Feb 2013
Location: England
Posts: 924
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It was too expensive. We didn't need it. Labour took over a set of books that were totally unbalanced.
Please remember the TSR had, like all defence equipment, to be paid from the taxpayers purse.
In the early into mid into late 1960s.!!.....
Most people had outside toilets, no central heating, no bank account, were still paying off WW2... and on and on. We were too poor.
And in the final analacist, er... we didn't need it. History proved that.
Healey and Callaghan and Wilson were right.
Please remember the TSR had, like all defence equipment, to be paid from the taxpayers purse.
In the early into mid into late 1960s.!!.....
Most people had outside toilets, no central heating, no bank account, were still paying off WW2... and on and on. We were too poor.
And in the final analacist, er... we didn't need it. History proved that.
Healey and Callaghan and Wilson were right.
Join Date: Feb 2013
Location: England
Posts: 924
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
But you will never get the books. Far too hot. As everyone knows, when it comes to spending on war toys Conservatives good, Labour bad, yes?!
That's the way its always spun despite being utter balls!
That's the way its always spun despite being utter balls!
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
HS, yes, except that it seems to be labour that bought the kit and not the Tories.
Join Date: Jul 2006
Location: bristol
Age: 56
Posts: 1,051
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
There is another political theory for its cancellation.
There is a tale of a certain Brit PM being 'got at' while on a visit to Russia.
After this visit many subtle but long lasting changes occurred in the UK, and the unions gained in power. The Americans clearly didn't want competition, but then nor did the Warsaw Pact.
This story does come from credible sources IMHO, but could not be proven either way as no one would gain from admitting any of it.
If the cancellation was not purely on rising cost, or the 'fixed price Concorde data research contract offer' after cancellation, wasn't down to U.S. Influence over the Brit loan from the IMF, and couldn't be put down to there being no need for manned bombers, then it has to be something else.
I'm no conspiracy theorist, and am happy to believe it was due to a group of people with massively inflated egos and a over developed sense of self importance (politicians) who just didn't like it or wanted to do something to boast about later.
There is a tale of a certain Brit PM being 'got at' while on a visit to Russia.
After this visit many subtle but long lasting changes occurred in the UK, and the unions gained in power. The Americans clearly didn't want competition, but then nor did the Warsaw Pact.
This story does come from credible sources IMHO, but could not be proven either way as no one would gain from admitting any of it.
If the cancellation was not purely on rising cost, or the 'fixed price Concorde data research contract offer' after cancellation, wasn't down to U.S. Influence over the Brit loan from the IMF, and couldn't be put down to there being no need for manned bombers, then it has to be something else.
I'm no conspiracy theorist, and am happy to believe it was due to a group of people with massively inflated egos and a over developed sense of self importance (politicians) who just didn't like it or wanted to do something to boast about later.
Tabs please !
massively inflated egos
