Fox3 & Dervish
You’re both right.
Lack of CWS will have been recorded by OR as an Operational Constraint in the aircraft Constraints Document – a process that OR manages. Only an idiot would categorise it as anything other than “Critical” and “Safety” related. Even without the latter, OR would be duty bound to run an Alternative Assumption to fund the programme. In this case it is clear they did, because by 1996 the CWS programme had matured to such a degree that, on MoD’s own admission, much of what used to be called Development was no longer required. That is, the technology had matured.
Then, we have a 1998 Board Submission to OR(RAF) himself seeking approval to proceed. (Again, withheld from SI). Depending on cost, OR (a 1 Star) may have had to escalate this - around this time all our financial delegations had been slashed and his probably had too. This cutting of delegated powers is what causes many of the delays Fox3 mentioned. It is a stealth savings measure (at the expense of safety). Note: I’m simplifying it a bit as the RAF’s Resources and Programmes beancounters would be involved. All R&P branches saw it as their job to waive the red card, and withdraw only if OR had someone good enough to argue the case and the balls to stick their neck out. This is THE major flaw in the process; made worse because it relies on civilian staffs that no longer exist. Your own people should be there to help, not hinder and cost lives.
The gap between 1996 and 1998 is as yet unexplained but I’ve seen worse, due to OR usually being pretty busy (and seldom trained for the job!). Also, in the late 90s, it had been 10 years since the process Dervish talks of had been widely implemented, which is 4 or 5 generations in terms of tour lengths, training and experience. What you saw in the late 90s was probably someone who knew the proper process and was still around. I can guess the job you’re thinking of.
Another factor is the implementation of this process (i.e. to clear Constraints, if possible, even if higher level committees haven’t approved them) was a function of civilian “Requirements Managers” when these posts were in HQs, not DPA/DE&S. The posts were progressively militarised from 1988, and then disappeared as a savings in about 1991; so, again, you rely on the odd civilian who used to do these jobs. The last one retired a few years ago. The “Requirements Managers” you see nowadays do about 10% of the original job, and aren’t taught the other 90% so don’t know it isn’t being done.
What you experienced in the late 90s (Dervish) would be a rare event by then. But it is easy enough to do; a major problem in today’s DE&S would be finding someone junior enough with the right experience. In the 80s it was a routine competence before you were senior enough to get a junior job in MoD(PE). At the beginning of every reporting year you’d be given a list of “Special Tasks” in addition to your normal TORs, which would mainly consist of uncleared Constraints. Someone mentioned £50M. I don’t know if that is what CWS would have cost in Tornado, but that kind of figure would be routine to (what is now called) a civilian Grade D. Today, that concept would frighten almost every member of DE&S, up to and including Bernard Gray. This was all the subject of a submission to DPA Deputy Chief Executive (a 3 Star, David Gould) in January 2000. He didn’t reply. It came about as a result of the Public Accounts Committee criticising DPA, and our senior staffs (3 and 4 Stars) not understanding their own processes sufficiently well to know what their answer should be.
Clearly, all this has been withheld from the SI because they, and of course the MAA (who would be party to the withholding), get these dates and history completely and utterly wrong. This gives you a major clue. Someone is being protected. The key is that the SI, as usual, isn’t allowed to dig deeper, and the MAA is there to make sure they don’t get very far if they do. As a result, there are major holes in the report; which looks good but has little substance. There are many recommendations, but no understanding of why they became necessary. Again, this is a recurring theme. Rafts of recommendations that can be summarised as “implement mandated policy”. In other words, the perpetrators are free to carry on and do it again.
And we haven’t even discussed the fact that all this should be in the Risk Register and Safety Case, and reflected in a very restrictive Release to Service. Funny how the MAA don’t mention this.
As ever, the above comes with a health warning. MoD has dumbed down so much you’ll be hard pressed to find anyone left who understands it.
Hope this helps!