68th Anniversary of the Nuremberg Raid
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Bomber Command's crews were denied a separate campaign medal (despite being eligible for theAir Crew Europe Star and France and Germany Star) and, in protest at this establishment snub to his men, Harris refused a peerage, the sole commander-in-chief not made a peer in 1946
Sorry Chug.... you can't ask not to continue this topic in the same post as giving incorrect information.
W.
Wensleydale:
Whereas Wikki is correct? The offer of a baronetcy to Harris by Attlee is not, AFAIK, anything more than an allegation, or is there something more substantial than Wikki's or, with all due respect, your word for it? Similarly Harris's alleged refusal, on the grounds that such a title would be meaningless in Africa where he intended to retire, is purely anecdotal. I still believe that the Realpolitik of the time was that our enemies were now our allies and our allies likely to be our enemies. Ennobling the man who had lain waste to Germany needlessly (here I play Devil's Advocate) was hardly going to encourage the Germans to embrace democracy and man the ramparts by our side. Likewise the Soviets would see that as an own goal and exploit it, especially in their own zone of East Germany. I very much doubt if such an offer was ever made, or if it were it was done so in such a manner as to ensure refusal.
The truth is, subject to your rebuttal, that we will never know, and in truth the baubles handed out or otherwise to VSO's in 1946 are of little consequence compared to the big lie that the British (as compared to the US) Bombing Campaign 1939-45 was a failure and did not significantly contribute to Allied Victory. Of course there were mistakes, reverses and, ironically of all, raids that went too well for people's comfort. Of course the prevalent view among the enthusiasts, including Harris, that conventional bombing alone could win a war was proved wrong. But the bombing offensive, both by night and by day, contributed greatly to eventual victory, and in my view was an essential ingredient of it.
Sorry Chug.... you can't ask not to continue this topic in the same post as giving incorrect information.
The truth is, subject to your rebuttal, that we will never know, and in truth the baubles handed out or otherwise to VSO's in 1946 are of little consequence compared to the big lie that the British (as compared to the US) Bombing Campaign 1939-45 was a failure and did not significantly contribute to Allied Victory. Of course there were mistakes, reverses and, ironically of all, raids that went too well for people's comfort. Of course the prevalent view among the enthusiasts, including Harris, that conventional bombing alone could win a war was proved wrong. But the bombing offensive, both by night and by day, contributed greatly to eventual victory, and in my view was an essential ingredient of it.
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Chug,
I'd like to offer an alternative view that might help.
Very few people ever assert that Bomber Command's campaign in WW2, which was marked by quite extraordinary heroism, was 'a failure' or that it 'did not significantly contribute to Alled victory'. If that view is aired, it's an extreme one, and certainly does not have the legs to be a 'big lie'.
The more uncomfortable truth, and the reasons, in my view, that Harris didn't get an honour, are three fold. First, he failed to achieve his stated and promised aim to win the war by the sole means of breaking the German civilian population's will to fight on. Secondly, when it became clear that he was not going to succeed (opinions vary, but around late 43 represents a common view), and his superiors told him to change tactics, he refused point blank. Thirdly, and the source of most of the controversy, is the fact that by mid 1944 the RAF's tactics of area bombing German cities with the aim of killing and demoralising the civilian industrial workforce were becoming profoundly uncomfortable for senior politicians and many military commanders to live with.
You could quite rightly accuse them of moral cowardice, you certainly couldn't ever accuse Harris of wavering in his aims and methods. But by late 1944, Harris's failure to recognise that he was not going to meet his promises, and switch Bomber Command to precision targets led to what some distinguished commentators have called a 'bombing competition' with the USAAF which rained thousands of tons of high explosive on already shattered German cities. The Air Staff wanted it stopped, but Harris refused.
In this context, it's hardly surprising that he was roughly treated by Churchill and the Air Staff he had treated so roughly for most of the war.
I'd like to repeat, though, that none of these arguments undermine the reputation of the aircrew of Bomber Command. They fought an amazingly tough campaign with the best equipment they could get at the time, suffering losses second only to German U-Boat crews. WW2 was a total war, and every part of the British war effort played it's part. Churchill understood that, probably better than anyone else.
I'd suggest that trying now, at this distance, to try to judge the Bomber Command offensive as 'decisive', crucial', 'essential' or whatever other adjective can be found, probably detracts from the rightful remembrance of brave mens' efforts. And the RAF needs to grow a slightly thicker skin when people nowadays offer their views of a 'total war' which contained many thousands of examples of organised cruelty. On all sides.
Best Regards as ever
Engines
I'd like to offer an alternative view that might help.
Very few people ever assert that Bomber Command's campaign in WW2, which was marked by quite extraordinary heroism, was 'a failure' or that it 'did not significantly contribute to Alled victory'. If that view is aired, it's an extreme one, and certainly does not have the legs to be a 'big lie'.
The more uncomfortable truth, and the reasons, in my view, that Harris didn't get an honour, are three fold. First, he failed to achieve his stated and promised aim to win the war by the sole means of breaking the German civilian population's will to fight on. Secondly, when it became clear that he was not going to succeed (opinions vary, but around late 43 represents a common view), and his superiors told him to change tactics, he refused point blank. Thirdly, and the source of most of the controversy, is the fact that by mid 1944 the RAF's tactics of area bombing German cities with the aim of killing and demoralising the civilian industrial workforce were becoming profoundly uncomfortable for senior politicians and many military commanders to live with.
You could quite rightly accuse them of moral cowardice, you certainly couldn't ever accuse Harris of wavering in his aims and methods. But by late 1944, Harris's failure to recognise that he was not going to meet his promises, and switch Bomber Command to precision targets led to what some distinguished commentators have called a 'bombing competition' with the USAAF which rained thousands of tons of high explosive on already shattered German cities. The Air Staff wanted it stopped, but Harris refused.
In this context, it's hardly surprising that he was roughly treated by Churchill and the Air Staff he had treated so roughly for most of the war.
I'd like to repeat, though, that none of these arguments undermine the reputation of the aircrew of Bomber Command. They fought an amazingly tough campaign with the best equipment they could get at the time, suffering losses second only to German U-Boat crews. WW2 was a total war, and every part of the British war effort played it's part. Churchill understood that, probably better than anyone else.
I'd suggest that trying now, at this distance, to try to judge the Bomber Command offensive as 'decisive', crucial', 'essential' or whatever other adjective can be found, probably detracts from the rightful remembrance of brave mens' efforts. And the RAF needs to grow a slightly thicker skin when people nowadays offer their views of a 'total war' which contained many thousands of examples of organised cruelty. On all sides.
Best Regards as ever
Engines
Engines thank you for your clear and concise resume of what might be called the perceived view of the Bomber Offensive and of Harris's role in it. It has of course the great advantage to everyone else involved, including Churchill and Portal, of letting them off the hook of any criticism of the offensive and pinning it all on Harris. You say that:
Let us just think about that. There was one sure way for them to get their way, whatever that might be, and that was to have him replaced. Churchill had no compunction in taking such arbitrary decisions, and broke the reputations of various Generals at a stroke. Yet Harris was allowed to go on seemingly defying Allied Directives and direct orders. Well, that is the conventional wisdom, but I don't buy it. He was very clear about the night bombing campaign. It was of necessity a blunt instrument. Precision targets were the province of the likes of 617 Sqn, and most of theirs were daylight ones anyway. Main Force was a blunt instrument, whose losses meant that its crews had little or no time to finesse their skills before they too fell victim to the grim statistics. Whole cities could be missed (including the subject of this thread) and others or dummy ones bombed in error. He was too good a commander to belittle his crews abilities, but he was realistic enough to know that they did best what he had them go on doing, busting cities. That alone greatly disrupted production and transportation. If the Air Staff were not impressed that suave War Criminal Speer certainly was, for he knew the enormous resources that had to be committed to the Defence of the Reich and thus withheld from the Eastern Front.
You are right of course, there were great misgivings about the offensive, from rival Commands, other Services, and not least from his own Chaplain in Chief. But who would have done different and why was nobody appointed to do so in his place?
This is a story of betrayal. He did not defy his orders, on the contrary he carried them out as best he could. But those who issued those orders created this myth of a rogue commander conducting his own murderous campaign in defiance of his superiors, in order to evade the moral censure that only blossomed with the security and safety of peace. That is a comment on them, from Churchill downwards, rather than on him. It is sad that so many of them were, and are still, of his own Service.
The Air Staff wanted it stopped, but Harris refused.
You are right of course, there were great misgivings about the offensive, from rival Commands, other Services, and not least from his own Chaplain in Chief. But who would have done different and why was nobody appointed to do so in his place?
This is a story of betrayal. He did not defy his orders, on the contrary he carried them out as best he could. But those who issued those orders created this myth of a rogue commander conducting his own murderous campaign in defiance of his superiors, in order to evade the moral censure that only blossomed with the security and safety of peace. That is a comment on them, from Churchill downwards, rather than on him. It is sad that so many of them were, and are still, of his own Service.
Perhaps in direct attrition the Bombing campaign could be called a failure, however the very fact that it continued must mean it had some significance or impact?
The assets that the Axis diverted to deal with Bomber Command must have been significant (withdrawal of Fighter wings and numerous batteries of Air Defence Artillery from Russia which allowed the Russians to commence Offensive Ops). ISTR that an often quoted reason for the continuation of the Bomber offensive was to placate Russia as they were insisting on a Second front which we were hopelessly ill prepared for?
The assets that the Axis diverted to deal with Bomber Command must have been significant (withdrawal of Fighter wings and numerous batteries of Air Defence Artillery from Russia which allowed the Russians to commence Offensive Ops). ISTR that an often quoted reason for the continuation of the Bomber offensive was to placate Russia as they were insisting on a Second front which we were hopelessly ill prepared for?
You make a very good point, timex. Not only were Luftwaffe units withheld from the Eastern Front, but from the potential Western one as well. The D-Day troops had much to worry about but could at least be reassured that if they heard or saw an aircraft it would be one of ours. It was a damn close run thing anyway, so factoring in the missing Luftwaffe could have meant the difference between success and failure. Air superiority in the West had been bloodily one beforehand in the skies over Germany by day and night. A difficult concept for a sailor or a Tommy to grasp, meat and drink for any airman though, or so you would think. As to the Eastern Front, Kursk was the vital battle, where quantity had a quality all of its own, as the good Generalissimo said. Much is made of the increase in Nazi war production under round the clock bombing, but the point is that it didn't increase nearly enough, despite dispersal, despite civilian mobilisation, despite the brutal use of slave labour. Another vital effect of the bombing campaign. It is the final outcome that matters, and that was the invasion of the Reich from the East and the West. Both depended on Harris's lags. It was a war winning campaign.
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Chug,
I'm very sorry that I might have inadvertently misled you in setting out my views on Harris's 'non ennoblement' without laying out the context. My apologies. Perhaps I can set out my views, at a little length.
For the record. I did not and do not accuse Harris or anyone else of conducting a 'murderous campaign'. I also very much agree that the combined Alled bomber offensives caused huge material losses to the German war economy.
But the records show, at least in my view, that Harris was a wholly determined and convinced proponent of using area bombing of civilian populations to achieve swift and total victory. His views and approach chimed perfectly with three significant developments in late 1941.
The first was the RAF's realisation, prompted by a civil servant's report (the 'Butt' report), that it was unable to prosecute a precision attack against selected German industrial targets. The only targets they could reliably hit were whole cities. Nor could its aircraft defend themselves against enemy fighters by day. These were, to say the least, uncomfortable surprises for the RAF Air Staff (and other nations air forces), as they negated the strategy of 'air power' that had been developed after WW1.
The second was an assessment by the then Chief Scientist (Cherwell) that 'de-housing' the German civilian population (a euphemism to beat most) would cause serious loss of morale and damage to the German war effort. This gave a rationale for the area bombing campaign.
Third, and most importantly, Churchill wanted to hit the Germans as hard as he could in any way he could. In 1941, Bomber Command was the only way that Britain could 'give it them back' after the Blitz. In my view, the man ultimately responsible for the area bombing campaign was Churchill - and given the moral dimension, it had to be.
Britain had to fight. All it could hit back with, without being beaten by the German Army on the ground, was Bomber Command. And what they could do was hit large German cities at night. In 1941 and 1942, that was more than enough.
Harris was the man for the hour - and I'll put it on record that I see him as one of Britain's finest warfighting service commanders. He gave Bomber Command a mission they could do, the rationale for it, and the drive to 'see it through', and he deserves huge credit for that, along with his commanders and aircrew. He was ruthless, focussed and dedicated.
The problems with the area bombing offensive arose (in my view) in mid to late 1943, when the Nuremberg raid showed that hitting cities deep in Germany would involve loss rates higher than even Bomber Command could bear. At the same time, the USAAF was getting into its stride and starting a huge air battle that would cause more damage to the Luftwaffe than any other Allied measure. The planning for the D-Day invasion was also starting. The war was changing.
It's here that Harris's total focus on winning the war by area bombing alone worked against him, and led to the controversy that had rumbled ever since. The records show that he stoutly resisted anything that diverted forces from laying waste to the cities, (including Overlord) and by early to mid 1944 he was seriously out of step with the overall strategy for the war. It's on the record that Portal wanted him to divert effort to precision raids on industrial targets, and Harris threatened to resign if he were made to do that. Portal gave way, but Churchill didn't sack him. Why not?
My view - the Bomber Command effort had been a totemic morale booster for the weary British public, as well as a major contribution to damaging Germany. Sacking Harris in mid 44 would have been a political bombshell, and Churchill made the political judgement that if the Air Staff weren't going to, he did not need to set it off. I think that was the right decision, but it allowed Harris to carry on bombing the cities when he should have moved to industrial targets. By that time, Bomber Command was quite capable of more accurate bombing, and Speer's own diaries record that a lack of Alled focus on key plants allowed him to carry on producing munitions into late 44. (One reason that Bomber Command was a 'blunt instrument' in 1941 and 1942 had been the RAF's lack of effort in developing precision navigation techniques, such as the German 'X-Gerat and 'Knickbein' systems - not just 'necessity').
Harris was not, in my view, 'betrayed'. The way that Churchill (and others) moved away from area bombing in 1944 and onwards was unseemly to say the least, but was high politics. Harris wasn't the first warfighting commander in history to fall foul of politics, and won't be the last. Had he 'bent with the wind' in 44 and obeyed Portal, lives would have been saved and Bomber Command's reputation made less controversial. But he couldn't bend - it wasn't in his nature.
Just once more - these views don't, for one second, mean that I don't accord the highest respect to Bomber Command's crews.
Best Regards as ever,
Engines.
I'm very sorry that I might have inadvertently misled you in setting out my views on Harris's 'non ennoblement' without laying out the context. My apologies. Perhaps I can set out my views, at a little length.
For the record. I did not and do not accuse Harris or anyone else of conducting a 'murderous campaign'. I also very much agree that the combined Alled bomber offensives caused huge material losses to the German war economy.
But the records show, at least in my view, that Harris was a wholly determined and convinced proponent of using area bombing of civilian populations to achieve swift and total victory. His views and approach chimed perfectly with three significant developments in late 1941.
The first was the RAF's realisation, prompted by a civil servant's report (the 'Butt' report), that it was unable to prosecute a precision attack against selected German industrial targets. The only targets they could reliably hit were whole cities. Nor could its aircraft defend themselves against enemy fighters by day. These were, to say the least, uncomfortable surprises for the RAF Air Staff (and other nations air forces), as they negated the strategy of 'air power' that had been developed after WW1.
The second was an assessment by the then Chief Scientist (Cherwell) that 'de-housing' the German civilian population (a euphemism to beat most) would cause serious loss of morale and damage to the German war effort. This gave a rationale for the area bombing campaign.
Third, and most importantly, Churchill wanted to hit the Germans as hard as he could in any way he could. In 1941, Bomber Command was the only way that Britain could 'give it them back' after the Blitz. In my view, the man ultimately responsible for the area bombing campaign was Churchill - and given the moral dimension, it had to be.
Britain had to fight. All it could hit back with, without being beaten by the German Army on the ground, was Bomber Command. And what they could do was hit large German cities at night. In 1941 and 1942, that was more than enough.
Harris was the man for the hour - and I'll put it on record that I see him as one of Britain's finest warfighting service commanders. He gave Bomber Command a mission they could do, the rationale for it, and the drive to 'see it through', and he deserves huge credit for that, along with his commanders and aircrew. He was ruthless, focussed and dedicated.
The problems with the area bombing offensive arose (in my view) in mid to late 1943, when the Nuremberg raid showed that hitting cities deep in Germany would involve loss rates higher than even Bomber Command could bear. At the same time, the USAAF was getting into its stride and starting a huge air battle that would cause more damage to the Luftwaffe than any other Allied measure. The planning for the D-Day invasion was also starting. The war was changing.
It's here that Harris's total focus on winning the war by area bombing alone worked against him, and led to the controversy that had rumbled ever since. The records show that he stoutly resisted anything that diverted forces from laying waste to the cities, (including Overlord) and by early to mid 1944 he was seriously out of step with the overall strategy for the war. It's on the record that Portal wanted him to divert effort to precision raids on industrial targets, and Harris threatened to resign if he were made to do that. Portal gave way, but Churchill didn't sack him. Why not?
My view - the Bomber Command effort had been a totemic morale booster for the weary British public, as well as a major contribution to damaging Germany. Sacking Harris in mid 44 would have been a political bombshell, and Churchill made the political judgement that if the Air Staff weren't going to, he did not need to set it off. I think that was the right decision, but it allowed Harris to carry on bombing the cities when he should have moved to industrial targets. By that time, Bomber Command was quite capable of more accurate bombing, and Speer's own diaries record that a lack of Alled focus on key plants allowed him to carry on producing munitions into late 44. (One reason that Bomber Command was a 'blunt instrument' in 1941 and 1942 had been the RAF's lack of effort in developing precision navigation techniques, such as the German 'X-Gerat and 'Knickbein' systems - not just 'necessity').
Harris was not, in my view, 'betrayed'. The way that Churchill (and others) moved away from area bombing in 1944 and onwards was unseemly to say the least, but was high politics. Harris wasn't the first warfighting commander in history to fall foul of politics, and won't be the last. Had he 'bent with the wind' in 44 and obeyed Portal, lives would have been saved and Bomber Command's reputation made less controversial. But he couldn't bend - it wasn't in his nature.
Just once more - these views don't, for one second, mean that I don't accord the highest respect to Bomber Command's crews.
Best Regards as ever,
Engines.
Engines, no need to apologise, indeed quite the contrary given the erudite post which I must now attempt to respond to. It seems that our view of Harris and BC is identical until your identified scene shift in 1943. As regards Nuremberg, as others have already stated here, it was a tragedy for BC, but hardly typical so I would not regard it as a marker in the sense that you seem to.
You say that in 1944:
That, I'm afraid is where I must respectfully differ with you. Granted we had more aids by then, particularly for the Path Finders, but they could be and were compromised by the enemy. Other than greater numbers and better aircraft, Main Force had not changed to the degree that it could successfully switch targets from cities without even more innocent German cows going to the fairy dairy land. It was a case of "If it ain't bust don't fix it" in my view. It would have taken a seismic shift to daylight escorted bombing a la the USAAC to really improve bombing accuracy, and even then the cows were still vulnerable, just less so.
I suppose I must declare an interest here. I have no family connections to the RAF, let alone BC. Indeed my Dad was an RA LAA TA Bdr on Bofors who shot planes down for a living, or would have done if he had not become an early guest of the Mikado. I was however on Hastings, which any wartime aircrew, particularly Navs, would have felt quite at home in. We soldiered on with the old girls because we were promised "jam tomorrow" in the form of the AW681, which of course never happened. I remember the Sig informing the Captain as we approached the Hawaiian ADIZ that we were to report Tacan Gate Delta.
"Tell him we don't carry TACAN, Sig"
"He says to call established on the VOR 185 Radial"
"Negative VOR, Sig"
By this time Captain and Navigator were in conference.
"He wants to know what aid you will use, then"
"Tell him the Radio Range, Sig, and we'll call him established inbound on it."
And so it was as we went back and forth from Christmas Island. At the end of the detachment the captain was asked to sign a disclaimer, to the effect that he had now, or in the future, no further requirement for the Diamond Head Radio Range which had no notified users for years, until we came by, and was scheduled for demolition.
I only tell this rambling tale to try to bring home the very limited navigational capability of that aircraft in the 60s let alone the 40s. The Nav had a compass, ASI, API, OAT, Radio Compass, Drift Sight, Sun Gun and Gee. With those they did wonders and circumnavigated the globe. We could put SEAC packs into a jungle clearing smaller than a football pitch, but only by day, of course.
Harris performed the art of the possible. Others had clever ideas that indeed would have hit the German War Machine harder, if they had worked. Harris knew they wouldn't. "Tell them we'll stick to bombing cities, Sig."
You say that in 1944:
By that time, Bomber Command was quite capable of more accurate bombing
I suppose I must declare an interest here. I have no family connections to the RAF, let alone BC. Indeed my Dad was an RA LAA TA Bdr on Bofors who shot planes down for a living, or would have done if he had not become an early guest of the Mikado. I was however on Hastings, which any wartime aircrew, particularly Navs, would have felt quite at home in. We soldiered on with the old girls because we were promised "jam tomorrow" in the form of the AW681, which of course never happened. I remember the Sig informing the Captain as we approached the Hawaiian ADIZ that we were to report Tacan Gate Delta.
"Tell him we don't carry TACAN, Sig"
"He says to call established on the VOR 185 Radial"
"Negative VOR, Sig"
By this time Captain and Navigator were in conference.
"He wants to know what aid you will use, then"
"Tell him the Radio Range, Sig, and we'll call him established inbound on it."
And so it was as we went back and forth from Christmas Island. At the end of the detachment the captain was asked to sign a disclaimer, to the effect that he had now, or in the future, no further requirement for the Diamond Head Radio Range which had no notified users for years, until we came by, and was scheduled for demolition.
I only tell this rambling tale to try to bring home the very limited navigational capability of that aircraft in the 60s let alone the 40s. The Nav had a compass, ASI, API, OAT, Radio Compass, Drift Sight, Sun Gun and Gee. With those they did wonders and circumnavigated the globe. We could put SEAC packs into a jungle clearing smaller than a football pitch, but only by day, of course.
Harris performed the art of the possible. Others had clever ideas that indeed would have hit the German War Machine harder, if they had worked. Harris knew they wouldn't. "Tell them we'll stick to bombing cities, Sig."
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Chug,
Thanks for your informative reply. I'm very happy if we differ - it's a free forum and all the better for it. And I have the utmost respect for anyone who flew long range transport in those days with minimal nav aids.
But the issue you highlight is the central one - did Bomber Command go for the cities because it was all they could effectively hit, or because they believed that killing the industrial workforce (and to be clear, they were told to aim for the population centres instead of industrial areas) was faster way to end the war? The first answer is an honest one, and true. But the second one is the one Harris believed in, to his very core. And therein lies the question that remains so sensitive.
In 1943, the USAAF and Bomber Command had been unable to agree on a fully joint offensive (Pointblank). The USAAF claimed that they could conduct a precision bombing offensive against industrial targets - in reality, their accuracy wasn't much better than Bomber Command's. But they aimed at industrial targets, not housing. Harris would not bend, and threw his forces against the largest German population centres furthest east - especially Berlin - and came up short. He could have aimed at industrial centres, but chose not to. he would still have killed civilians - just not on purpose.
By late 43, it was clear to Churchill and Eisenhower that the Aliies would have to invade Europe and defeat the Wermacht on the ground to win the war. Harris (and Spaatz) are on record as opposing Overlord and claiming that 'one more push' would cause Germany to collapse. Harris, because he claimed that morale was about to collapse (it wasn't) and Spaatz because he claimed he had destroyed the german economy's ability to fight on (he hadn't).
Here's my point - both the Allied bomber commanders were, unfortunately, unable to see that their rhetoric (victory through air power alone) was not matched by reality (victory with air power making a huge contribution). That made the job of the Supreme Commander much harder in late 44 and early 45.
Not a thing in this thread takes away from one second the honour and tributes due to Bomber Command aircrew, and all aircrew who fought so gallantly.
Chug, I'm going to halt here, not because I don't want to exchange any more views, but because I think I've set out my stall. You have yours and I respect it absolutely.
Very best regards
Engines.
Thanks for your informative reply. I'm very happy if we differ - it's a free forum and all the better for it. And I have the utmost respect for anyone who flew long range transport in those days with minimal nav aids.
But the issue you highlight is the central one - did Bomber Command go for the cities because it was all they could effectively hit, or because they believed that killing the industrial workforce (and to be clear, they were told to aim for the population centres instead of industrial areas) was faster way to end the war? The first answer is an honest one, and true. But the second one is the one Harris believed in, to his very core. And therein lies the question that remains so sensitive.
In 1943, the USAAF and Bomber Command had been unable to agree on a fully joint offensive (Pointblank). The USAAF claimed that they could conduct a precision bombing offensive against industrial targets - in reality, their accuracy wasn't much better than Bomber Command's. But they aimed at industrial targets, not housing. Harris would not bend, and threw his forces against the largest German population centres furthest east - especially Berlin - and came up short. He could have aimed at industrial centres, but chose not to. he would still have killed civilians - just not on purpose.
By late 43, it was clear to Churchill and Eisenhower that the Aliies would have to invade Europe and defeat the Wermacht on the ground to win the war. Harris (and Spaatz) are on record as opposing Overlord and claiming that 'one more push' would cause Germany to collapse. Harris, because he claimed that morale was about to collapse (it wasn't) and Spaatz because he claimed he had destroyed the german economy's ability to fight on (he hadn't).
Here's my point - both the Allied bomber commanders were, unfortunately, unable to see that their rhetoric (victory through air power alone) was not matched by reality (victory with air power making a huge contribution). That made the job of the Supreme Commander much harder in late 44 and early 45.
Not a thing in this thread takes away from one second the honour and tributes due to Bomber Command aircrew, and all aircrew who fought so gallantly.
Chug, I'm going to halt here, not because I don't want to exchange any more views, but because I think I've set out my stall. You have yours and I respect it absolutely.
Very best regards
Engines.
Indeed, Engines, I agree that it's time to draw stumps. Let others make of our two stalls what they will. I utterly endorse your tribute to Bomber Command's Aircrew. The courage to face that maelstrom night after night is humbling, and one can only marvel at it. That is the theme of this thread, and the right note to end on, agreed.
Regards,
Chug
Regards,
Chug
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
May I enter the debate with trepidation. Like Chug I have also navigated the Hastings. I have also navigated the Lancaster, but the question really is about target sets.
And industrial target has many layers. There is the means of power and the dams raid was an example of a strike against that target. Then there is the product, the means of production, and equally important the work force.
Area bombing could destroy the product, it could disrupt the factories and as importanly, disrupt or kill the work force.
A raid that was I believe successful in most of these targets was Peenemunde. Had the Peenemunde target been in a city then the city would have been bombed.
And industrial target has many layers. There is the means of power and the dams raid was an example of a strike against that target. Then there is the product, the means of production, and equally important the work force.
Area bombing could destroy the product, it could disrupt the factories and as importanly, disrupt or kill the work force.
A raid that was I believe successful in most of these targets was Peenemunde. Had the Peenemunde target been in a city then the city would have been bombed.
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Pontius,
Breaking my own rule,butt to respond.
Peenemunde was a special raid, as set out on the official RAF history site. It was, quoting the site, 'the only occasion in the second half of the war where the whole of Bomber Command attempted a precision raid by moonlight'. It was Pathfinder led, and employed a number of special tactics. Losses were 6.7%.
Area bombing was a totally different tactic, and the one employed in the vast majority of Bomber Command operations after 1941. You are right that an industrial target has many layers, the key is which layer area bombing centred on. There was official obfuscation at the time, and some downright untruths, but the records show clearly that the aiming points were the residential areas of the cities, not the industrial areas. The incendiary loads dropped were optimised to set densely packed housing alight, and were less effective against factories.
The primary objective was, to use Cherwell's phrase, to 'de-house' the industrial workforce. What it really meant was to kill so many of them that the survivors would not work. Destruction of factories was a by-product, and in any case was largely assigned to the USAAF after 1943.
Hope this helps
Best regards as ever,
Engines
Breaking my own rule,butt to respond.
Peenemunde was a special raid, as set out on the official RAF history site. It was, quoting the site, 'the only occasion in the second half of the war where the whole of Bomber Command attempted a precision raid by moonlight'. It was Pathfinder led, and employed a number of special tactics. Losses were 6.7%.
Area bombing was a totally different tactic, and the one employed in the vast majority of Bomber Command operations after 1941. You are right that an industrial target has many layers, the key is which layer area bombing centred on. There was official obfuscation at the time, and some downright untruths, but the records show clearly that the aiming points were the residential areas of the cities, not the industrial areas. The incendiary loads dropped were optimised to set densely packed housing alight, and were less effective against factories.
The primary objective was, to use Cherwell's phrase, to 'de-house' the industrial workforce. What it really meant was to kill so many of them that the survivors would not work. Destruction of factories was a by-product, and in any case was largely assigned to the USAAF after 1943.
Hope this helps
Best regards as ever,
Engines
The primary objective was, to use Cherwell's phrase, to 'de-house' the industrial workforce. What it really meant was to kill so many of them that the survivors would not work. Destruction of factories was a by-product, and in any case was largely assigned to the USAAF after 1943.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Engines, you had no need of rebuttal
Peenemunde was only a discrete target because it was not in a city.
Had the Peenemunde target been in a city then the city would have been bombed.
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One cannot fully understand the strategy of Bomber Command without looking at some "experimental" raids that went on in early 1942 following the introduction of the Lancaster. These raids include the precision daylight attack on the MAN factory in Augsburg when 7 out of 12 Lancasters were lost. This famous raid was folowed 3 weeks later by a precision low level night attack on the Heinkel factory in Warnemunde where 16 Lancasters (out of a force of 214 aircraft which also attacked Rostok) were directed to attack the factory from very low level between Z+ 50 mins and Z+ 60 mins - only 2 of 44 Sqn's Lancasters survived from this raid - four failed to return. Of the surviving aircraft, one attacked from a height of 70 ft! (the other was coned by searchlights and the pilot climbed when he was blinded by the light - he went round again and bombed from 2,500 ft which he considered much safer despite the intense flak). The Waddington aircraft each carried an extra navigator to act as a bomb aimer (in the early days, the Navigator left his seat to lay under the nose gunner to drop the bombs) so that the low level attack could take place without the navigator playing musical chairs (S/L Nettleton's surviving Lancaster from Augsburg used the same extra crew member).
No 44 Sqn from Waddington had lost 9 Lancasters from 12 sent out over a short period to attack precision targets which could only be done (at that time) at low level. There is little wonder at the lack of enthusiasm for precision attacks at Command after these experiments.
No 44 Sqn from Waddington had lost 9 Lancasters from 12 sent out over a short period to attack precision targets which could only be done (at that time) at low level. There is little wonder at the lack of enthusiasm for precision attacks at Command after these experiments.
Harris doesn't even mention the Nuremburg raid in his critique 'Bomber Offensive'. However, after the raid on Augsburg (qv), Willy Messerschmitt moved his Research Bureau to the site of the NATO School in Oberammergau (near his home town of Murnau), where up to 5000 staff from all over Europe beavered away on radical transonic designs - none of which went into production because of the massive dislocation due to the progressive collapse of the transport infrastructure and the necessity to disperse production.
Irrespective of what modern day commentators think of Arthur Harris, in 'Bomber Offensive' he makes some very compelling arguments on the development of the weapons, aircraft and crews necessary to conduct an all-out offensive. There are modern 'Lessons Identified' in what he wrote 65 years ago.
Irrespective of what modern day commentators think of Arthur Harris, in 'Bomber Offensive' he makes some very compelling arguments on the development of the weapons, aircraft and crews necessary to conduct an all-out offensive. There are modern 'Lessons Identified' in what he wrote 65 years ago.
Last edited by Whenurhappy; 3rd Apr 2012 at 06:17. Reason: confused Nurnburg mit Augsburg