Chug,
I'm very sorry that I might have inadvertently misled you in setting out my views on Harris's 'non ennoblement' without laying out the context. My apologies. Perhaps I can set out my views, at a little length.
For the record. I did not and do not accuse Harris or anyone else of conducting a 'murderous campaign'. I also very much agree that the combined Alled bomber offensives caused huge material losses to the German war economy.
But the records show, at least in my view, that Harris was a wholly determined and convinced proponent of using area bombing of civilian populations to achieve swift and total victory. His views and approach chimed perfectly with three significant developments in late 1941.
The first was the RAF's realisation, prompted by a civil servant's report (the 'Butt' report), that it was unable to prosecute a precision attack against selected German industrial targets. The only targets they could reliably hit were whole cities. Nor could its aircraft defend themselves against enemy fighters by day. These were, to say the least, uncomfortable surprises for the RAF Air Staff (and other nations air forces), as they negated the strategy of 'air power' that had been developed after WW1.
The second was an assessment by the then Chief Scientist (Cherwell) that 'de-housing' the German civilian population (a euphemism to beat most) would cause serious loss of morale and damage to the German war effort. This gave a rationale for the area bombing campaign.
Third, and most importantly, Churchill wanted to hit the Germans as hard as he could in any way he could. In 1941, Bomber Command was the only way that Britain could 'give it them back' after the Blitz. In my view, the man ultimately responsible for the area bombing campaign was Churchill - and given the moral dimension, it had to be.
Britain had to fight. All it could hit back with, without being beaten by the German Army on the ground, was Bomber Command. And what they could do was hit large German cities at night. In 1941 and 1942, that was more than enough.
Harris was the man for the hour - and I'll put it on record that I see him as one of Britain's finest warfighting service commanders. He gave Bomber Command a mission they could do, the rationale for it, and the drive to 'see it through', and he deserves huge credit for that, along with his commanders and aircrew. He was ruthless, focussed and dedicated.
The problems with the area bombing offensive arose (in my view) in mid to late 1943, when the Nuremberg raid showed that hitting cities deep in Germany would involve loss rates higher than even Bomber Command could bear. At the same time, the USAAF was getting into its stride and starting a huge air battle that would cause more damage to the Luftwaffe than any other Allied measure. The planning for the D-Day invasion was also starting. The war was changing.
It's here that Harris's total focus on winning the war by area bombing alone worked against him, and led to the controversy that had rumbled ever since. The records show that he stoutly resisted anything that diverted forces from laying waste to the cities, (including Overlord) and by early to mid 1944 he was seriously out of step with the overall strategy for the war. It's on the record that Portal wanted him to divert effort to precision raids on industrial targets, and Harris threatened to resign if he were made to do that. Portal gave way, but Churchill didn't sack him. Why not?
My view - the Bomber Command effort had been a totemic morale booster for the weary British public, as well as a major contribution to damaging Germany. Sacking Harris in mid 44 would have been a political bombshell, and Churchill made the political judgement that if the Air Staff weren't going to, he did not need to set it off. I think that was the right decision, but it allowed Harris to carry on bombing the cities when he should have moved to industrial targets. By that time, Bomber Command was quite capable of more accurate bombing, and Speer's own diaries record that a lack of Alled focus on key plants allowed him to carry on producing munitions into late 44. (One reason that Bomber Command was a 'blunt instrument' in 1941 and 1942 had been the RAF's lack of effort in developing precision navigation techniques, such as the German 'X-Gerat and 'Knickbein' systems - not just 'necessity').
Harris was not, in my view, 'betrayed'. The way that Churchill (and others) moved away from area bombing in 1944 and onwards was unseemly to say the least, but was high politics. Harris wasn't the first warfighting commander in history to fall foul of politics, and won't be the last. Had he 'bent with the wind' in 44 and obeyed Portal, lives would have been saved and Bomber Command's reputation made less controversial. But he couldn't bend - it wasn't in his nature.
Just once more - these views don't, for one second, mean that I don't accord the highest respect to Bomber Command's crews.
Best Regards as ever,
Engines.