Chug,
I'd like to offer an alternative view that might help.
Very few people ever assert that Bomber Command's campaign in WW2, which was marked by quite extraordinary heroism, was 'a failure' or that it 'did not significantly contribute to Alled victory'. If that view is aired, it's an extreme one, and certainly does not have the legs to be a 'big lie'.
The more uncomfortable truth, and the reasons, in my view, that Harris didn't get an honour, are three fold. First, he failed to achieve his stated and promised aim to win the war by the sole means of breaking the German civilian population's will to fight on. Secondly, when it became clear that he was not going to succeed (opinions vary, but around late 43 represents a common view), and his superiors told him to change tactics, he refused point blank. Thirdly, and the source of most of the controversy, is the fact that by mid 1944 the RAF's tactics of area bombing German cities with the aim of killing and demoralising the civilian industrial workforce were becoming profoundly uncomfortable for senior politicians and many military commanders to live with.
You could quite rightly accuse them of moral cowardice, you certainly couldn't ever accuse Harris of wavering in his aims and methods. But by late 1944, Harris's failure to recognise that he was not going to meet his promises, and switch Bomber Command to precision targets led to what some distinguished commentators have called a 'bombing competition' with the USAAF which rained thousands of tons of high explosive on already shattered German cities. The Air Staff wanted it stopped, but Harris refused.
In this context, it's hardly surprising that he was roughly treated by Churchill and the Air Staff he had treated so roughly for most of the war.
I'd like to repeat, though, that none of these arguments undermine the reputation of the aircrew of Bomber Command. They fought an amazingly tough campaign with the best equipment they could get at the time, suffering losses second only to German U-Boat crews. WW2 was a total war, and every part of the British war effort played it's part. Churchill understood that, probably better than anyone else.
I'd suggest that trying now, at this distance, to try to judge the Bomber Command offensive as 'decisive', crucial', 'essential' or whatever other adjective can be found, probably detracts from the rightful remembrance of brave mens' efforts. And the RAF needs to grow a slightly thicker skin when people nowadays offer their views of a 'total war' which contained many thousands of examples of organised cruelty. On all sides.
Best Regards as ever
Engines