No cats and flaps ...... back to F35B?
The USMC has a long corporate memory of the "big navy" air cover leaving them unprotected at Guadalcanal apart from the Cactus Air Force. Plus, for a small scale bespoke intervention, a MAU is a lot cheaper to deploy than a CBG - even if one were available.
As for the USAF; well, they've been trying to actively kill the A10 since birth (because it isn't an F16...) so there's no little irony in them now templating its role and capabilities against F35B. I do think the USAF should be looking at a genuine A10 replacement - one that doesn't need first day LO, can carry a decent weaponload, good endurance and is affordable to both buy and operate. Surely there's a place for something between AT6 and F35A?
FWIW, I can forsee a future where the RAF buys F35A as the Typhoon replacement so we have a one-type FJ fleet circa 2030.
As for the USAF; well, they've been trying to actively kill the A10 since birth (because it isn't an F16...) so there's no little irony in them now templating its role and capabilities against F35B. I do think the USAF should be looking at a genuine A10 replacement - one that doesn't need first day LO, can carry a decent weaponload, good endurance and is affordable to both buy and operate. Surely there's a place for something between AT6 and F35A?
FWIW, I can forsee a future where the RAF buys F35A as the Typhoon replacement so we have a one-type FJ fleet circa 2030.
GK121/Engines -
An issue with both the F-35 and the V-22, from the Marine viewpoint, was that the service bought into two false promises.
One was that, because of multi-service commonality and a consequently large buy, they could get the extras - stealth in one case, tilt-rotor speed in the other - for no extra money.
The other was that the extras would be delivered with no schedule risk or performance compromise.
In the case of the V-22, the other services walked away and continued to buy helicopters, leaving the Marines with an aircraft that (most of the time) is an expensive helicopter.
In the case of the JSF (and here is part of KBrockman's answer) the rest of the operators are stuck with a compromised design (for example, short, broad body, complex structure, small wing, heavy and expensive engine) while the Marines have an aircraft that is expensive to acquire and operate and marginal on bring-back.
Historically (to address GK's point) there was a time when a small jet force on the MAGTF was the answer to a lot of scenarios - little if any air opposition and no threat to the ships - and the AV-8A/B was never that expensive of a program, in absolute and relative terms. It was also small enough that forward/austere/going ashore ops could be contemplated.
F-35B is a lot more money. (If the Harrier had cost more than a contemporary CV fighter it would never have been contemplated.) It's a lot more demanding in terms of logistics on land (no 1000-foot runways are being talked about, GK). And the likely opposition will not be headed by a squadron of rusty MiGs, but will range from insurgent rockets and mortars and counter-logistics operations to MANPADS, mobile SAMs and sea-skimmers carried on trucks.
Hence the question: Where's the scenario that calls for a few F-35Bs?
An issue with both the F-35 and the V-22, from the Marine viewpoint, was that the service bought into two false promises.
One was that, because of multi-service commonality and a consequently large buy, they could get the extras - stealth in one case, tilt-rotor speed in the other - for no extra money.
The other was that the extras would be delivered with no schedule risk or performance compromise.
In the case of the V-22, the other services walked away and continued to buy helicopters, leaving the Marines with an aircraft that (most of the time) is an expensive helicopter.
In the case of the JSF (and here is part of KBrockman's answer) the rest of the operators are stuck with a compromised design (for example, short, broad body, complex structure, small wing, heavy and expensive engine) while the Marines have an aircraft that is expensive to acquire and operate and marginal on bring-back.
Historically (to address GK's point) there was a time when a small jet force on the MAGTF was the answer to a lot of scenarios - little if any air opposition and no threat to the ships - and the AV-8A/B was never that expensive of a program, in absolute and relative terms. It was also small enough that forward/austere/going ashore ops could be contemplated.
F-35B is a lot more money. (If the Harrier had cost more than a contemporary CV fighter it would never have been contemplated.) It's a lot more demanding in terms of logistics on land (no 1000-foot runways are being talked about, GK). And the likely opposition will not be headed by a squadron of rusty MiGs, but will range from insurgent rockets and mortars and counter-logistics operations to MANPADS, mobile SAMs and sea-skimmers carried on trucks.
Hence the question: Where's the scenario that calls for a few F-35Bs?
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Interesting read this,
U.S. House Votes Against Terminating F-35B, V-22 | Defense News | defensenews.com
U.S. House Votes Against Terminating F-35B, V-22 | Defense News | defensenews.com
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LO,
You raise some important points, so happy to respond - hope this is of some interest.
First, multi-service commonality - not quite the same for the two programmes. V-22, as I'm sure you know, was an Army led programme for all four services, with buys anticipated from the Army, USAF, USN and USMC. The Army bailed out early on, USN fell by the wayside, leaving USMC as largest buyer to run the programme. USAF is still in the programme, by the way, with CV-22. Aircraft much the same for all customers.
If you think the USMC are trying to use the V-22 as a helicopter you are, I am afraid, incorrect. It will be used as a tilt rotor, and a key challenge is getting the users to understand what that means. I'd bet on the USMC working it out. USAF are pressing ahead with SF missions that exploit the platform's performance, and my bet going forward is that these will supplant many of the conventional helicopter SF missions.
JSF was always aimed at being a larger number of partners, but buying three distinct aircraft from one family. Just like Typhoon, a larger buy, especially international, lowers unit cost and also (importantly) makes it more difficult to cancel. Things get 'political'. Air Forces love that last bit. (Does anyone seriously think we'd still be paying for so many Typhoons for the RAF if it hadn't been multi-national?).
Risk and cost - no doubt that V-22 carried lots of risk, but in areas where they really didn't expect it - namely structure weight. The tilt rotor technology hasn't caused them major issues. F-35 has also suffered really serious cost escalation, but it's most visible technical risk was always seen to be the STOVL platform. In fact, it's probably the software that's going to cause most problems now.
Your point about how commonality has compromised F-35 design has some justification, in so far as any aircraft design is a compromise to some extent. Typhoon is really an out and out AD aircraft, and a very good one. But it has sacrificed air to ground capability to get that. F-35 was, from the start, and explicitly, a multi-role aircraft, a 'strike fighter', with exploitation of LO built in. That has driven key features including internal weapons bays, which have a massive effect on layout and structure. The fuselage is not short, it's just really, really broad, under the wing. It's effective wing area is actually very large.
Where the LM team did come unstuck was in not having the right weight estimation tools to cope with an airframe that had large holes and bays in it. On top of that, some of the detailed structural design was, well, uninspired to say the least. Those issues got fixed (as far as they were able) during the weight reduction effort.
It might be useful to remember the US background to JSF. They were looking at the wreckage of no less than four failed combat aircraft programmes. The common features, as seen by the Pentagon, were twin engined designs (grew too big to afford) and single service requirements that generated single role aircraft which were unsaffordable. The push was therefore to go for a single engined design to fill a wide range of roles and accept the compromises that this would involve. They had to take a decision that would take 20 years to work out. I think they deserve some credit for trying.
USMC F-35B CONOPS do envisage forward strips, I think the strip length is 1200 ft. (Could be 1500, not sure). Short landings, short take offs. No vertical work. Logistics at that site are not very demanding, given their concept of ops, which is to launch from the ship and land at a bare strip ready for call forward for CAS by Marine units.
The best answer I could give to your question (where's the scenario?) is to go look up some of the openly published USMC material that's out there. You probably won't agree with it, but as ever, it's your right to disagree. Evalu8ter makes a very good point - the USMC have long memories and are going to fight hard to retain USMC owned air for true CAS missions to support 'the Marine'. They are certainly NOT going to go relying on the Air Force any time soon.
They have solid political support and massive public support. That is why, for some time, I have offered the opinion that the F-35B is highly unlikely to be cancelled.
Best Regards as ever,
Engines
You raise some important points, so happy to respond - hope this is of some interest.
First, multi-service commonality - not quite the same for the two programmes. V-22, as I'm sure you know, was an Army led programme for all four services, with buys anticipated from the Army, USAF, USN and USMC. The Army bailed out early on, USN fell by the wayside, leaving USMC as largest buyer to run the programme. USAF is still in the programme, by the way, with CV-22. Aircraft much the same for all customers.
If you think the USMC are trying to use the V-22 as a helicopter you are, I am afraid, incorrect. It will be used as a tilt rotor, and a key challenge is getting the users to understand what that means. I'd bet on the USMC working it out. USAF are pressing ahead with SF missions that exploit the platform's performance, and my bet going forward is that these will supplant many of the conventional helicopter SF missions.
JSF was always aimed at being a larger number of partners, but buying three distinct aircraft from one family. Just like Typhoon, a larger buy, especially international, lowers unit cost and also (importantly) makes it more difficult to cancel. Things get 'political'. Air Forces love that last bit. (Does anyone seriously think we'd still be paying for so many Typhoons for the RAF if it hadn't been multi-national?).
Risk and cost - no doubt that V-22 carried lots of risk, but in areas where they really didn't expect it - namely structure weight. The tilt rotor technology hasn't caused them major issues. F-35 has also suffered really serious cost escalation, but it's most visible technical risk was always seen to be the STOVL platform. In fact, it's probably the software that's going to cause most problems now.
Your point about how commonality has compromised F-35 design has some justification, in so far as any aircraft design is a compromise to some extent. Typhoon is really an out and out AD aircraft, and a very good one. But it has sacrificed air to ground capability to get that. F-35 was, from the start, and explicitly, a multi-role aircraft, a 'strike fighter', with exploitation of LO built in. That has driven key features including internal weapons bays, which have a massive effect on layout and structure. The fuselage is not short, it's just really, really broad, under the wing. It's effective wing area is actually very large.
Where the LM team did come unstuck was in not having the right weight estimation tools to cope with an airframe that had large holes and bays in it. On top of that, some of the detailed structural design was, well, uninspired to say the least. Those issues got fixed (as far as they were able) during the weight reduction effort.
It might be useful to remember the US background to JSF. They were looking at the wreckage of no less than four failed combat aircraft programmes. The common features, as seen by the Pentagon, were twin engined designs (grew too big to afford) and single service requirements that generated single role aircraft which were unsaffordable. The push was therefore to go for a single engined design to fill a wide range of roles and accept the compromises that this would involve. They had to take a decision that would take 20 years to work out. I think they deserve some credit for trying.
USMC F-35B CONOPS do envisage forward strips, I think the strip length is 1200 ft. (Could be 1500, not sure). Short landings, short take offs. No vertical work. Logistics at that site are not very demanding, given their concept of ops, which is to launch from the ship and land at a bare strip ready for call forward for CAS by Marine units.
The best answer I could give to your question (where's the scenario?) is to go look up some of the openly published USMC material that's out there. You probably won't agree with it, but as ever, it's your right to disagree. Evalu8ter makes a very good point - the USMC have long memories and are going to fight hard to retain USMC owned air for true CAS missions to support 'the Marine'. They are certainly NOT going to go relying on the Air Force any time soon.
They have solid political support and massive public support. That is why, for some time, I have offered the opinion that the F-35B is highly unlikely to be cancelled.
Best Regards as ever,
Engines
On paper this looks impressive, but land based so not relevant
Demonstration Supports Independent Upgrade of Future Sovereign Payloads on Predator B
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While I enjoy the (sometimes) informed debate it is rather moot arguing B vs C for UK now. Unless the B is cancelled for some reason I don't see another change on the horizon.
Start a thread for the die-hard C fanboys titled 'why we should have gone for C; oh, and bring back the Bucc too!!'
Start a thread for the die-hard C fanboys titled 'why we should have gone for C; oh, and bring back the Bucc too!!'
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While I enjoy the (sometimes) informed debate it is rather moot arguing B vs C for UK now. Unless the B is cancelled for some reason I don't see another change on the horizon.
Everyone in the UK thought Harry Rednapp was a stone walled certainty for the England Manager's job, just like folks are saying the US Marines are untouchable, but with a National Debt heading towards $18 trillion and going up by $3.96 billion per day then surely one day the penny will drop and drastic decisions might have to be made?
I'd suggest the land based Rafale was slightly over-engineered in order to retain as much commonality as possible with the M.
As Engines I believe has pointed out there are HUGE issues regarding the software for the 'B'
Losing the foreign sales would also be a significant lost of income to the US economy.
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Peter We - the number of countries who would only buy Dave-B is pretty small - Italian and Spanish navies? (On the unlikely assumption that these two countries will be able to afford a £100m STOVL strike fighter.)
Israel wanted some as a mix/match with -As (IIRC). We have decided it is a cunning plan as we won't make the savings to refit CVF. Maybe the Aussies (off the Canberra LHD) or the Japanese (off their Hyuga-class "not carriers").
But these sales will be peanuts, and no reason at all for the US to continue with the -B unless the USMC really needs it.
S41
Israel wanted some as a mix/match with -As (IIRC). We have decided it is a cunning plan as we won't make the savings to refit CVF. Maybe the Aussies (off the Canberra LHD) or the Japanese (off their Hyuga-class "not carriers").
But these sales will be peanuts, and no reason at all for the US to continue with the -B unless the USMC really needs it.
S41
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From glojo
When the UK faced similar nationally challenging issues in the 60s and 70s the RN (even with their hugely powerful lobby) lost the conventional carriers (because they were deemed too expensive). Such speculation, especially as it relates to duplication in the US military, could just as easily have the axe fall everywhere but the USMC because, for example, conventional carriers remain hugely expensive.
Personally, I think the F35 will enter service in all its models, and so many will be manufactured over the next 30 years as to make our little discussion seem like your standard southern British Bed and Breakfast...quaint and full of English charm.
with a National Debt heading towards $18 trillion and going up by $3.96 billion per day then surely one day the penny will drop and drastic decisions might have to be made?
Personally, I think the F35 will enter service in all its models, and so many will be manufactured over the next 30 years as to make our little discussion seem like your standard southern British Bed and Breakfast...quaint and full of English charm.
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Full Screen/HD should get a few WAFUs salivating.
A pity most of those currently serving will likely not sit in the driver's seat.
Daft question:
Why, if we could live with Invincible Class sized carriers for the Harrier, do we need something as big as the Queen Elizabeth Class for yet another VSTOL? Surely we could have had a smaller, cheaper alternative; and more of them, with less aircraft on each. A case of fewer eggs being deposited in one (floating) basket. Or do we simply blame the French?
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Originally Posted by ""LowObservable
Historically (to address GK's point) there was a time when a small jet force on the MAGTF was the answer to a lot of scenarios - little if any air opposition and no threat to the ships - and the AV-8A/B was never that expensive of a program, in absolute and relative terms. It was also small enough that forward/austere/going ashore ops could be contemplated.
F-35B is a lot more money. (If the Harrier had cost more than a contemporary CV fighter it would never have been contemplated.) It's a lot more demanding in terms of logistics on land (no 1000-foot runways are being talked about, GK). And the likely opposition will not be headed by a squadron of rusty MiGs, but will range from insurgent rockets and mortars and counter-logistics operations to MANPADS, mobile SAMs and sea-skimmers carried on trucks.
Hence the question: Where's the scenario that calls for a few F-35Bs?
F-35B is a lot more money. (If the Harrier had cost more than a contemporary CV fighter it would never have been contemplated.) It's a lot more demanding in terms of logistics on land (no 1000-foot runways are being talked about, GK). And the likely opposition will not be headed by a squadron of rusty MiGs, but will range from insurgent rockets and mortars and counter-logistics operations to MANPADS, mobile SAMs and sea-skimmers carried on trucks.
Hence the question: Where's the scenario that calls for a few F-35Bs?
Yes, they could just replace all their Hornets with F-35C... but there would have been no money whatsoever for developing a Harrier replacement, as the only way the politicians (and the other services) would allow development of a Harrier replacement is as part of a joint "replace everything" program.
Look into the history of JSF... ASTOVL was originally a separate program, as was MRF, JAST, CALF, etc.
The USMC was running ASTOVL while the USAF was running MRF... they were merged into CALF, which was subsumed into JAST when it was decided that CALF would also include the USN's F/A-18 replacement.
Congress demanded that the programs be combined, with any fighter or attack aircraft (other than F-22) not rolled into that "all-purpose aircraft" program to be canceled!
JSF.mil > History > Pre-JAST
What is commonly known today as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program had its origination in several programs from the late 1980s and early 1990s. Over the years, several tactical aircraft acquisition programs have attempted to deliver new warfighting capabilities to the U.S. Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and our close allies. A brief summary of these preceding programs is provided below:
Multi-Role Fighter (MRF) 1990-1993
The U.S. Air Force’s MRF program began in 1991 as a relatively low-cost F-16 replacement. Similar in size to the F-16, the MRF was to have been a single-seat / single-engine aircraft, with a unit flyaway cost in the range of $35 to $50 million.
The MRF Program was managed by the Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. ASC hosted a planning meeting with industry in October 1991, and issued a Request For Information (RFI) with responses due in January 1992. The major U.S. aircraft manufacturers began to conduct concept and design studies for the MRF at their own expense. A formal program start was expected around 1994. The MRF was expected to replace a large number of F-16s reaching the end of service life. The MRF might also have replaced Air Force A-10s and Navy F/A-18C/Ds. Therefore, providing large numbers of aircraft affordably was a higher priority for the MRF Program than any specific capability enhancements.
However, the post-Cold War defense drawdown made the F-16 service life situation considerably less critical. A reduction in the total number of U.S. Air Force fighter wings meant that the existing aircraft would not be replaced one-for-one. Furthermore, F-16 aircraft flying hours were reduced, allowing F-16s to remain in service longer than originally projected.
In August 1992, the MRF program was effectively put on hold. Due to budget pressures and the Air Force’s commitment to the F/A-22 program, sufficient funding for a new program start did not appear likely until around 2000. Until then, it was expected that MRF activity would proceed at a low level. Meanwhile, the Air Force intended to continue production of Block 50 F-16s. By early 1993, however, the MRF’s projected IOC had slipped to 2015. Shortly thereafter, the BUR canceled the MRF Program.
Advanced Short Take-Off/Vertical Landing (ASTOVL) 1983-1994
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) began a program in 1983 to begin looking at the technologies available to design and manufacture a follow-on supersonic replace for the AV-8 Harrier. The program, known as ASTOVL, would eventually lead become a joint U.S.-U.K. collaboration. In 1987 the results of the ASTOVL program made clear that the technologies available were not yet advanced enough to generate a replacement that the U.S. and U.K. would have been satisfied with. At this time, DARPA secretly approached the Lockheed Skunk Works in the hopes that they would be able to develop an aircraft like they had hoped would have appeared from the first phase of ASTOVL. Lockheed told DARPA that they had some ideas that could be matured and that, if they were successful would meet the goals that DARPA was trying to achieve. At the same time, DARPA continued with ASTOVL Phase II as a cover for the covert work being done at the Skunk Works.
i. STOVL Strike Fighter (SSF) 1987-1994
In the late 1980s the Lockheed Skunk Works was involved in a classified, non-acknowledged program with NASA Ames that looked into the feasibility of designing a stealthy supersonic STOVL fighter. This was a cooperative program that utilized the assets of NASA (wind tunnels, personnel, super-computers, etc.) along with the expertise of the Lockheed Skunk Works in designing stealthy air vehicles. The results from this highly classified program proved that a SSF could be successfully flown. Management at the Lockheed Skunk Works was convinced that the SSF design could be sold to both the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy. (The U.S. Navy (NAVAIR) is the procuring office for Marine Corps aircraft.) The Skunk Works proposed a teaming between the USAF and the USN. The services agreed, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between the services and the SSF program began to come out of the black.
ii. Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter (CALF) 1993-1994
The ASTOVL/SSF concepts were originally seen as developing a replacement for the U.S. and U.K. Harrier jump-jet. As the ASTOVL/SSF concepts became multi-service with the suggestion of multiple variants, the program was re-christened as the Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter (CALF). The management of the CALF program was handed by DARPA due to the experimental nature of the concept. DARPA was also managing the ASTOVL program, which was used by the SSF program as their unclassified, white-world cover story.
The CALF program's aim was to develop the technologies and concepts to support the ASTOVL aircraft for the USMC and Royal Navy (RN) and a highly-common conventional flight variant for the U.S. Air Force.
Although the CALF program was organized upon a suggestion from Lockheed, the government still wanted multiple contractors involved in the program. Initially, the only two contractors involved were Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas. Boeing later approached DARPA and offered to meet DARPA's financial contribution if they were allowed onto the program.
Under the auspices of the CALF program,
The CALF program has also been called the Joint Attack Fighter (JAF).
Multi-Role Fighter (MRF) 1990-1993
The U.S. Air Force’s MRF program began in 1991 as a relatively low-cost F-16 replacement. Similar in size to the F-16, the MRF was to have been a single-seat / single-engine aircraft, with a unit flyaway cost in the range of $35 to $50 million.
The MRF Program was managed by the Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. ASC hosted a planning meeting with industry in October 1991, and issued a Request For Information (RFI) with responses due in January 1992. The major U.S. aircraft manufacturers began to conduct concept and design studies for the MRF at their own expense. A formal program start was expected around 1994. The MRF was expected to replace a large number of F-16s reaching the end of service life. The MRF might also have replaced Air Force A-10s and Navy F/A-18C/Ds. Therefore, providing large numbers of aircraft affordably was a higher priority for the MRF Program than any specific capability enhancements.
However, the post-Cold War defense drawdown made the F-16 service life situation considerably less critical. A reduction in the total number of U.S. Air Force fighter wings meant that the existing aircraft would not be replaced one-for-one. Furthermore, F-16 aircraft flying hours were reduced, allowing F-16s to remain in service longer than originally projected.
In August 1992, the MRF program was effectively put on hold. Due to budget pressures and the Air Force’s commitment to the F/A-22 program, sufficient funding for a new program start did not appear likely until around 2000. Until then, it was expected that MRF activity would proceed at a low level. Meanwhile, the Air Force intended to continue production of Block 50 F-16s. By early 1993, however, the MRF’s projected IOC had slipped to 2015. Shortly thereafter, the BUR canceled the MRF Program.
Advanced Short Take-Off/Vertical Landing (ASTOVL) 1983-1994
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) began a program in 1983 to begin looking at the technologies available to design and manufacture a follow-on supersonic replace for the AV-8 Harrier. The program, known as ASTOVL, would eventually lead become a joint U.S.-U.K. collaboration. In 1987 the results of the ASTOVL program made clear that the technologies available were not yet advanced enough to generate a replacement that the U.S. and U.K. would have been satisfied with. At this time, DARPA secretly approached the Lockheed Skunk Works in the hopes that they would be able to develop an aircraft like they had hoped would have appeared from the first phase of ASTOVL. Lockheed told DARPA that they had some ideas that could be matured and that, if they were successful would meet the goals that DARPA was trying to achieve. At the same time, DARPA continued with ASTOVL Phase II as a cover for the covert work being done at the Skunk Works.
i. STOVL Strike Fighter (SSF) 1987-1994
In the late 1980s the Lockheed Skunk Works was involved in a classified, non-acknowledged program with NASA Ames that looked into the feasibility of designing a stealthy supersonic STOVL fighter. This was a cooperative program that utilized the assets of NASA (wind tunnels, personnel, super-computers, etc.) along with the expertise of the Lockheed Skunk Works in designing stealthy air vehicles. The results from this highly classified program proved that a SSF could be successfully flown. Management at the Lockheed Skunk Works was convinced that the SSF design could be sold to both the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy. (The U.S. Navy (NAVAIR) is the procuring office for Marine Corps aircraft.) The Skunk Works proposed a teaming between the USAF and the USN. The services agreed, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between the services and the SSF program began to come out of the black.
ii. Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter (CALF) 1993-1994
The ASTOVL/SSF concepts were originally seen as developing a replacement for the U.S. and U.K. Harrier jump-jet. As the ASTOVL/SSF concepts became multi-service with the suggestion of multiple variants, the program was re-christened as the Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter (CALF). The management of the CALF program was handed by DARPA due to the experimental nature of the concept. DARPA was also managing the ASTOVL program, which was used by the SSF program as their unclassified, white-world cover story.
The CALF program's aim was to develop the technologies and concepts to support the ASTOVL aircraft for the USMC and Royal Navy (RN) and a highly-common conventional flight variant for the U.S. Air Force.
Although the CALF program was organized upon a suggestion from Lockheed, the government still wanted multiple contractors involved in the program. Initially, the only two contractors involved were Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas. Boeing later approached DARPA and offered to meet DARPA's financial contribution if they were allowed onto the program.
Under the auspices of the CALF program,
The CALF program has also been called the Joint Attack Fighter (JAF).
What is known today as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program was originally known as the Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) Program. The goal of the JAST program was not to have developed a new aircraft, but instead it was to mature the technologies that a new series of tactical aircraft could use.
JAST was chartered to mature technologies, develop requirements, and demonstrate concepts for affordable next-generation joint strike warfare. As JAST plans took shape, it became apparent that JAST would be funding one or more concept demonstrator aircraft starting in 1996–about the time the ASTOVL program planned to enter its Phase III (full-scale flight demonstrators). The ASTOVL project, as an advanced concept for a future joint-service strike/fighter, appeared consistent with the JAST charter. It was therefore agreed by the management of both programs, that JAST would become the U.S. service “sponsor” for the flight demonstration phase of ASTOVL, if Phase II were successful and if the concept appeared to be able to satisfy the requirements of at least two of the three U.S. services participating in JAST. However, FY95 budget legislation passed in October 1994 by the U.S. Congress directed that ASTOVL be merged into JAST immediately.
JAST was chartered to mature technologies, develop requirements, and demonstrate concepts for affordable next-generation joint strike warfare. As JAST plans took shape, it became apparent that JAST would be funding one or more concept demonstrator aircraft starting in 1996–about the time the ASTOVL program planned to enter its Phase III (full-scale flight demonstrators). The ASTOVL project, as an advanced concept for a future joint-service strike/fighter, appeared consistent with the JAST charter. It was therefore agreed by the management of both programs, that JAST would become the U.S. service “sponsor” for the flight demonstration phase of ASTOVL, if Phase II were successful and if the concept appeared to be able to satisfy the requirements of at least two of the three U.S. services participating in JAST. However, FY95 budget legislation passed in October 1994 by the U.S. Congress directed that ASTOVL be merged into JAST immediately.
Why, if we could live with Invincible Class sized carriers for the Harrier, do we need something as big as the Queen Elizabeth Class for yet another VSTOL?
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So I wonder who will emerge as the new WEBF of the JSF thread, continuously banging on about this for years hence forth?! Just like Harrier, CVS, Nimrod and nice pensions, the decisions been made so let's get over it and move on or you risk all sounding like a whining Pegasus engine.
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As far as I understand it , the F35B is also supposed to give Air support with its
cannon and other weapons, a task for which it probably is not very well suited ?
Didn't they(USAF/NAVY/MARINES) , at one point, contemplated using more specialised systems for that task?
I seem to remember that they came up with that refitted cropduster, and also a further evolution of the good old BRONCO, more specifically the new OV-10X.
Looking back 30 years ago, it was rather succesfully (the Bronco , that is) deployed from the LHD's at that time without the aid of CAT's and cables.
I could imagine a small amount of them (6 or 8) on board the CVF's and the latest US LHD's could be of great help to the F35B, making it able to perform the tasks it is best suited for without having to 'abuse' them for a role for which they certainly are not well suited.
and the cropduster;
cannon and other weapons, a task for which it probably is not very well suited ?
Didn't they(USAF/NAVY/MARINES) , at one point, contemplated using more specialised systems for that task?
I seem to remember that they came up with that refitted cropduster, and also a further evolution of the good old BRONCO, more specifically the new OV-10X.
Looking back 30 years ago, it was rather succesfully (the Bronco , that is) deployed from the LHD's at that time without the aid of CAT's and cables.
I could imagine a small amount of them (6 or 8) on board the CVF's and the latest US LHD's could be of great help to the F35B, making it able to perform the tasks it is best suited for without having to 'abuse' them for a role for which they certainly are not well suited.
and the cropduster;
At the risk of sounding like a whining pegasus
Is it proposed that the F35 B does not use the Lift Fan/vectored nozzle during a ski jump take off ?
Just asking as I always assumed that the B would use its stovl lift components for a ski jump take off - until I saw a comment on another forum recently !
So thought I would ask the experts on here
Is it proposed that the F35 B does not use the Lift Fan/vectored nozzle during a ski jump take off ?
Just asking as I always assumed that the B would use its stovl lift components for a ski jump take off - until I saw a comment on another forum recently !
So thought I would ask the experts on here
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Why, if we could live with Invincible Class sized carriers for the Harrier, do we need something as big as the Queen Elizabeth Class for yet another VSTOL?
OV-10X seems a bit pointless when we have all these helicopter types. Wiki also mentions that no pilot has ever survived ditching, which isn't encouraging.
A160 Hummingbird, another potential AEW platform.
A160 Hummingbird, another potential AEW platform.