Originally Posted by ""LowObservable
Historically (to address GK's point) there was a time when a small jet force on the MAGTF was the answer to a lot of scenarios - little if any air opposition and no threat to the ships - and the AV-8A/B was never that expensive of a program, in absolute and relative terms. It was also small enough that forward/austere/going ashore ops could be contemplated.
F-35B is a lot more money. (If the Harrier had cost more than a contemporary CV fighter it would never have been contemplated.) It's a lot more demanding in terms of logistics on land (no 1000-foot runways are being talked about, GK). And the likely opposition will not be headed by a squadron of rusty MiGs, but will range from insurgent rockets and mortars and counter-logistics operations to MANPADS, mobile SAMs and sea-skimmers carried on trucks.
Hence the question: Where's the scenario that calls for a few F-35Bs?
The problem is that the USMC could not just buy a direct "low-intensity-only" replacement for AV-8B for the amphibs and a "high-intensity-capable" replacement for the Hornet. Two new aircraft programs were not politically possible.
Yes, they could just replace all their Hornets with F-35C... but there would have been no money whatsoever for developing a Harrier replacement, as the only way the politicians (and the other services) would allow development of a Harrier replacement is as part of a joint "replace everything" program.
Look into the history of JSF... ASTOVL was originally a separate program, as was MRF, JAST, CALF, etc.
The USMC was running ASTOVL while the USAF was running MRF... they were merged into CALF, which was subsumed into JAST when it was decided that CALF would also include the USN's F/A-18 replacement.
Congress demanded that the programs be combined, with any fighter or attack aircraft (other than F-22) not rolled into that "all-purpose aircraft" program to be canceled!
JSF.mil > History > Pre-JAST
What is commonly known today as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program had its origination in several programs from the late 1980s and early 1990s. Over the years, several tactical aircraft acquisition programs have attempted to deliver new warfighting capabilities to the U.S. Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and our close allies. A brief summary of these preceding programs is provided below:
Multi-Role Fighter (MRF) 1990-1993
The U.S. Air Force’s MRF program began in 1991 as a relatively low-cost F-16 replacement. Similar in size to the F-16, the MRF was to have been a single-seat / single-engine aircraft, with a unit flyaway cost in the range of $35 to $50 million.
The MRF Program was managed by the Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. ASC hosted a planning meeting with industry in October 1991, and issued a Request For Information (RFI) with responses due in January 1992. The major U.S. aircraft manufacturers began to conduct concept and design studies for the MRF at their own expense. A formal program start was expected around 1994. The MRF was expected to replace a large number of F-16s reaching the end of service life. The MRF might also have replaced Air Force A-10s and Navy F/A-18C/Ds. Therefore, providing large numbers of aircraft affordably was a higher priority for the MRF Program than any specific capability enhancements.
However, the post-Cold War defense drawdown made the F-16 service life situation considerably less critical. A reduction in the total number of U.S. Air Force fighter wings meant that the existing aircraft would not be replaced one-for-one. Furthermore, F-16 aircraft flying hours were reduced, allowing F-16s to remain in service longer than originally projected.
In August 1992, the MRF program was effectively put on hold. Due to budget pressures and the Air Force’s commitment to the F/A-22 program, sufficient funding for a new program start did not appear likely until around 2000. Until then, it was expected that MRF activity would proceed at a low level. Meanwhile, the Air Force intended to continue production of Block 50 F-16s. By early 1993, however, the MRF’s projected IOC had slipped to 2015. Shortly thereafter, the BUR canceled the MRF Program.
Advanced Short Take-Off/Vertical Landing (ASTOVL) 1983-1994
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) began a program in 1983 to begin looking at the technologies available to design and manufacture a follow-on supersonic replace for the AV-8 Harrier. The program, known as ASTOVL, would eventually lead become a joint U.S.-U.K. collaboration. In 1987 the results of the ASTOVL program made clear that the technologies available were not yet advanced enough to generate a replacement that the U.S. and U.K. would have been satisfied with. At this time, DARPA secretly approached the Lockheed Skunk Works in the hopes that they would be able to develop an aircraft like they had hoped would have appeared from the first phase of ASTOVL. Lockheed told DARPA that they had some ideas that could be matured and that, if they were successful would meet the goals that DARPA was trying to achieve. At the same time, DARPA continued with ASTOVL Phase II as a cover for the covert work being done at the Skunk Works.
i. STOVL Strike Fighter (SSF) 1987-1994
In the late 1980s the Lockheed Skunk Works was involved in a classified, non-acknowledged program with NASA Ames that looked into the feasibility of designing a stealthy supersonic STOVL fighter. This was a cooperative program that utilized the assets of NASA (wind tunnels, personnel, super-computers, etc.) along with the expertise of the Lockheed Skunk Works in designing stealthy air vehicles. The results from this highly classified program proved that a SSF could be successfully flown. Management at the Lockheed Skunk Works was convinced that the SSF design could be sold to both the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy. (The U.S. Navy (NAVAIR) is the procuring office for Marine Corps aircraft.) The Skunk Works proposed a teaming between the USAF and the USN. The services agreed, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between the services and the SSF program began to come out of the black.
ii. Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter (CALF) 1993-1994
The ASTOVL/SSF concepts were originally seen as developing a replacement for the U.S. and U.K. Harrier jump-jet. As the ASTOVL/SSF concepts became multi-service with the suggestion of multiple variants, the program was re-christened as the Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter (CALF). The management of the CALF program was handed by DARPA due to the experimental nature of the concept. DARPA was also managing the ASTOVL program, which was used by the SSF program as their unclassified, white-world cover story.
The CALF program's aim was to develop the technologies and concepts to support the ASTOVL aircraft for the USMC and Royal Navy (RN) and a highly-common conventional flight variant for the U.S. Air Force.
Although the CALF program was organized upon a suggestion from Lockheed, the government still wanted multiple contractors involved in the program. Initially, the only two contractors involved were Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas. Boeing later approached DARPA and offered to meet DARPA's financial contribution if they were allowed onto the program.
Under the auspices of the CALF program,
The CALF program has also been called the Joint Attack Fighter (JAF).
JSF.mil > History > JAST
What is known today as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program was originally known as the Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) Program. The goal of the JAST program was not to have developed a new aircraft, but instead it was to mature the technologies that a new series of tactical aircraft could use.
JAST was chartered to mature technologies, develop requirements, and demonstrate concepts for affordable next-generation joint strike warfare. As JAST plans took shape, it became apparent that JAST would be funding one or more concept demonstrator aircraft starting in 1996–about the time the ASTOVL program planned to enter its Phase III (full-scale flight demonstrators). The ASTOVL project, as an advanced concept for a future joint-service strike/fighter, appeared consistent with the JAST charter. It was therefore agreed by the management of both programs, that JAST would become the U.S. service “sponsor” for the flight demonstration phase of ASTOVL, if Phase II were successful and if the concept appeared to be able to satisfy the requirements of at least two of the three U.S. services participating in JAST. However, FY95 budget legislation passed in October 1994 by the U.S. Congress directed that ASTOVL be merged into JAST immediately.