Gulf Tornado/Patriot
Military Airworthiness is what it suggests, ie it is separate from, and different in many ways to, its Civilian cousin. The reason that you need a fully integrated failure warning in a Military IFF fit could not be made more clear than with this avoidable Fatal Air Accident. We have been told that it was so fitted on the F3 variant. Rather than look for Fairies on Pin Heads to count, let us just agree that the lack of it here meant that this variant was that bit more vulnerable if the slices of Swiss Cheese started their dreaded shuffling. You might well label this as Fitness For Purpose, it really makes no difference to the outcome. Never mind the lessons that the USA should learn, that is for them to get on with, the obvious lesson for us is to make sure that our combat aircraft are in future made fully airworthy militarily, which includes being fit for purpose. The only way to get to that far off place is to have a fully independent MAA and MAAIB ASAP, separated from each other and from the MOD. Anything less and the same sorry avoidable accidents will continue to be unavoided.
make sure that our combat aircraft are in future made fully airworthy militarily, which includes being fit for purpose.
I think most would agree that "fitness for purpose" would include an assessment of a platforms ability to operate & survive in a hostile environment.
If you check the regs however, under the MAA02 Master Glossary, the definition of "Air Safety" here...
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/C260E...itialIssue.pdf
is quite clear...
Air Safety
Is the state of freedom from unacceptable risk of injury to persons, or damage, throughout the life cycle of military air systems. Its purview extends across all Defence Lines of Development and includes Airworthiness, Flight Safety, Policy, Regulation and the apportionment of Resources. It does not address survivability in a hostile environment.
Of course platforms should be fit for purpose, but lets not get that confused as something that is part of airworthiness.
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Yes, and I think that follows on from Courtney's earlier point about mission and safety critical. Thank you for the link too. I love the fact that this new MAA document refers to an 'aerodrome'. I suppose it's technically correct, but Collins declared the term obsolete earlier this year. Also interesting to note that the definition of Airworthiness Directive is "intentionally blank". Should we read anything into that?
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Thankfully Collins isn't an aviation regulator, EASA and the CAA still refer to them as aerodromes so it's nice to see the MAA using standard terminology.
The hostile action of which you speak is included in the list of defined threats against which a Threat Assessment is conducted during Design and Development (as opposed to the TA before missions).
It is important to look at this subject in 3 distinct phases. 1. Attaining airworthiness, before Release to Service. This is a mandatory pre-requisite to; 2. Maintaining it and 3. Fitness for Purpose, which is actually what you speak of as it is an operational term in this sense. Crucially, the Safety Case MUST reflect the Build Standard in all 3 phases (which by definition means the BS must be maintained, which is the basic failure reported by MoD(PE) (to AMSO) in January 1988 the ARTs (to CAS and RAF Chief Engineer) from 1992. However, the regulations acknowledge that in exceptional circumstances the Safety Case may not reflect the actual Build Standard of individual aircraft or operational circumstances/emerging roles. The Apache rescue is an excellent example. But, they are crystal clear in that, regardless of whether it is a DA mod or a Service mod, the basic airworthiness must be attained and demonstrated in the first place. UORs allow circumvention of much torturous hoop jumping forced upon procurers, but not the airworthiness regs. I have never come across a case where it wouldn’t have been quicker just to follow the regs in the first place. In fact, the nature of UORs (where cost is less of an issue) means affordability is seldom an issue.
For example, the first two defined threats in the Def Stan are “inert projectiles” and “incendiary projectiles”. That implies hostility on someone’s part! Consider the C130 XV179 case. If these projectiles result in a fire risk, the defined mitigation is to fit Explosive Suppressant Foam. Note: You don’t have to think of the threat/risk, it is defined and so is the mitigation. The reader is pointed to MoD(PE) standards from the early 1980s. (e.g. DTD 5624, March 1981 and DTD 5627, April 1982). Both apply to fire suppression in Fuel Tanks and Dry Bays. That they existed in the first place means the risk was identified and funding committed to mitigation in, at least, the 1970s. That they were superseded meant someone was on top of their game and ensuring they were up to date. So far, so good. Implement these simple regs and you are well on the way.
What went wrong, and the Tornado, Chinook, Nimrod, Sea King etc cases share this common theme to a greater or lesser extent, is that the regulations were not implemented. THAT is why Haddon-Cave was commissioned, following ACM Loader’s statement to this effect in the XV230 BoI report.
What compounded this failure in each case, and what MoD refuse to address, is experienced staffs, both in Boscombe and MoD(PE), identified the risks, notified those responsible of their legal obligations AND the required mitigation – and were shown the door.
What further compounded these cases was MoD proceeded to lie through their back teeth and deny events which were a simple matter of record. Back to C130. In court they denied knowledge of ESF, saying it only came to their attention after the event. The legal people representing the families and the Coroner were singularly unimpressed when handed the aforesaid MoD specifications. Same on Chinook FADEC. MoD said “Not Safety Critical”. Lord Philip was handed the MoD policy directive from 1989 which proved it was. (DUS(DP)/924/11/2/9 dated 14th December 1989). I imagine he wasn’t impressed with MoD either. And so on. The individual cases are bad enough, but the cumulative effect and failure to “learn lessons” is appalling.
I could almost forgive the failure to integrate IFF failure warnings if it was a last minute, rush job, and the aircrew were warned. It wasn’t. I can even understand an inexperienced Project Manager or Engineering Authority initially overlooking it from the contract. After all, CDP ruled in 1996 he no longer required engineering experience in MoD – something Bernard Gray is now trying to overturn. We know typical IFF contracts didn’t seek a demonstration of installed performance, because the response from the IFF office was a child-like “It works on the bench so it’ll work on the aircraft” – if you don’t know what the installed performance is, how can you note any Limitations in the RTS? (In fact, the failure to integrate failure warnings is so fundamental it is not a Limitation, it is an Operational Constraint, meaning it is flagged at a much higher level and DEC are obliged to staff a requirement to remove it). However, what is truly unforgivable is the automatic response from two 2 Stars upon being notified aircrew were at risk due to failure to integrate failure warnings. They literally turned their backs and walked away, yet they were the last line of defence, supposedly providing “management oversight”. Overlook, more like. Their actions are reflected in the culture we see today in MoD, which Bernard Gray says he is trying to overcome. Best of luck mate.
It is important to look at this subject in 3 distinct phases. 1. Attaining airworthiness, before Release to Service. This is a mandatory pre-requisite to; 2. Maintaining it and 3. Fitness for Purpose, which is actually what you speak of as it is an operational term in this sense. Crucially, the Safety Case MUST reflect the Build Standard in all 3 phases (which by definition means the BS must be maintained, which is the basic failure reported by MoD(PE) (to AMSO) in January 1988 the ARTs (to CAS and RAF Chief Engineer) from 1992. However, the regulations acknowledge that in exceptional circumstances the Safety Case may not reflect the actual Build Standard of individual aircraft or operational circumstances/emerging roles. The Apache rescue is an excellent example. But, they are crystal clear in that, regardless of whether it is a DA mod or a Service mod, the basic airworthiness must be attained and demonstrated in the first place. UORs allow circumvention of much torturous hoop jumping forced upon procurers, but not the airworthiness regs. I have never come across a case where it wouldn’t have been quicker just to follow the regs in the first place. In fact, the nature of UORs (where cost is less of an issue) means affordability is seldom an issue.
For example, the first two defined threats in the Def Stan are “inert projectiles” and “incendiary projectiles”. That implies hostility on someone’s part! Consider the C130 XV179 case. If these projectiles result in a fire risk, the defined mitigation is to fit Explosive Suppressant Foam. Note: You don’t have to think of the threat/risk, it is defined and so is the mitigation. The reader is pointed to MoD(PE) standards from the early 1980s. (e.g. DTD 5624, March 1981 and DTD 5627, April 1982). Both apply to fire suppression in Fuel Tanks and Dry Bays. That they existed in the first place means the risk was identified and funding committed to mitigation in, at least, the 1970s. That they were superseded meant someone was on top of their game and ensuring they were up to date. So far, so good. Implement these simple regs and you are well on the way.
What went wrong, and the Tornado, Chinook, Nimrod, Sea King etc cases share this common theme to a greater or lesser extent, is that the regulations were not implemented. THAT is why Haddon-Cave was commissioned, following ACM Loader’s statement to this effect in the XV230 BoI report.
What compounded this failure in each case, and what MoD refuse to address, is experienced staffs, both in Boscombe and MoD(PE), identified the risks, notified those responsible of their legal obligations AND the required mitigation – and were shown the door.
What further compounded these cases was MoD proceeded to lie through their back teeth and deny events which were a simple matter of record. Back to C130. In court they denied knowledge of ESF, saying it only came to their attention after the event. The legal people representing the families and the Coroner were singularly unimpressed when handed the aforesaid MoD specifications. Same on Chinook FADEC. MoD said “Not Safety Critical”. Lord Philip was handed the MoD policy directive from 1989 which proved it was. (DUS(DP)/924/11/2/9 dated 14th December 1989). I imagine he wasn’t impressed with MoD either. And so on. The individual cases are bad enough, but the cumulative effect and failure to “learn lessons” is appalling.
I could almost forgive the failure to integrate IFF failure warnings if it was a last minute, rush job, and the aircrew were warned. It wasn’t. I can even understand an inexperienced Project Manager or Engineering Authority initially overlooking it from the contract. After all, CDP ruled in 1996 he no longer required engineering experience in MoD – something Bernard Gray is now trying to overturn. We know typical IFF contracts didn’t seek a demonstration of installed performance, because the response from the IFF office was a child-like “It works on the bench so it’ll work on the aircraft” – if you don’t know what the installed performance is, how can you note any Limitations in the RTS? (In fact, the failure to integrate failure warnings is so fundamental it is not a Limitation, it is an Operational Constraint, meaning it is flagged at a much higher level and DEC are obliged to staff a requirement to remove it). However, what is truly unforgivable is the automatic response from two 2 Stars upon being notified aircrew were at risk due to failure to integrate failure warnings. They literally turned their backs and walked away, yet they were the last line of defence, supposedly providing “management oversight”. Overlook, more like. Their actions are reflected in the culture we see today in MoD, which Bernard Gray says he is trying to overcome. Best of luck mate.
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Who Gets the Vexatious Vote?
DV
I am surprised that nobody has come back regarding your treatment by MOD under the FoIA – your post 93 refers. I am equally surprised that after so many years of forgetting that the truth will always out as it now has started to on Chinook, Hercules, Nimrod, Sea King etc MOD again appears to be assuming that they can be judge and jury and hence get away with hiding behind their own “self-serving” interpretation of the rules. You do not say what action you intend to take, but it seems to me that you do not have to take this ruling “lying down”.
As I am sure you know, but for the benefit of other readers, Section 14 of the Act states:
14. Vexatious or repeated requests.
(1)Section 1(1) does not oblige a public authority to comply with a request for information if the request is vexatious.
(2)Where a public authority has previously complied with a request for information which was made by any person, it is not obliged to comply with a subsequent identical or substantially similar request from that person unless a reasonable interval has elapsed between compliance with the previous request and the making of the current request.
There is no special definition of the meaning of “vexatious” within the FoIA (or indeed “reasonable”), but if we now look at some top level legal definitions it is clear that MOD’s letter to you is probably nothing to do with your alleged “abuse” of the FoIA, but, as you say yourself, is about keeping the lid on Pandora’s box. Indeed their statement that all future requests for information from you re Nimrod engineering and airworthiness are already considered to be “vexatious” would anyway appear to be contrary to section 14 (2) of the Act.
Vexatious: A legal action or proceeding initiated maliciously and without Probable Cause by an individual who is not acting in Good Faith for the purpose of annoying or embarrassing an opponent.
Probable Cause: Apparent facts discovered through logical inquiry that would lead a reasonably intelligent and prudent person to believe that an accused person has committed a crime, thereby warranting his or her prosecution, or that a Cause of Action has accrued, justifying a civil lawsuit.
Good Faith: Honesty; a sincere intention to deal fairly with others.
Cause of Action: The fact or combination of facts that gives a person the right to seek judicial redress or relief against another. Also, the legal theory forming the basis of a lawsuit.
I guess you would not see your requests as failing any of these “tests”. As before it would seem that MOD continues to forget the old adage that “when you are in a hole you should stop digging” – yet every time they unjustifiably try to silence or ignore someone like you with what you and many others would see as doubtful “legal” rulings MOD makes the hole larger – the classic from a few years ago was, of course, their interpretation (or rather misinterpretation) of the employment laws applying to pregnant servicewomen! But they have the legal and other resources to allow them to get away with it most (but not all) of the time! However, on the assumption that you do not accept that your requests are in any way vexatious and are following a logical theme (as opposed to wildly “lashing out” which could be seen as vexatious) I presume your next “port of call” will be the Information Commissioner with a request that he confirms that you are indeed not a vexatious “litigant” – since in the UK it is normally the “judge” (in this case the Information Commissioner) who would decide this and not an organisation like MOD.
I am surprised that nobody has come back regarding your treatment by MOD under the FoIA – your post 93 refers. I am equally surprised that after so many years of forgetting that the truth will always out as it now has started to on Chinook, Hercules, Nimrod, Sea King etc MOD again appears to be assuming that they can be judge and jury and hence get away with hiding behind their own “self-serving” interpretation of the rules. You do not say what action you intend to take, but it seems to me that you do not have to take this ruling “lying down”.
As I am sure you know, but for the benefit of other readers, Section 14 of the Act states:
14. Vexatious or repeated requests.
(1)Section 1(1) does not oblige a public authority to comply with a request for information if the request is vexatious.
(2)Where a public authority has previously complied with a request for information which was made by any person, it is not obliged to comply with a subsequent identical or substantially similar request from that person unless a reasonable interval has elapsed between compliance with the previous request and the making of the current request.
There is no special definition of the meaning of “vexatious” within the FoIA (or indeed “reasonable”), but if we now look at some top level legal definitions it is clear that MOD’s letter to you is probably nothing to do with your alleged “abuse” of the FoIA, but, as you say yourself, is about keeping the lid on Pandora’s box. Indeed their statement that all future requests for information from you re Nimrod engineering and airworthiness are already considered to be “vexatious” would anyway appear to be contrary to section 14 (2) of the Act.
Vexatious: A legal action or proceeding initiated maliciously and without Probable Cause by an individual who is not acting in Good Faith for the purpose of annoying or embarrassing an opponent.
Probable Cause: Apparent facts discovered through logical inquiry that would lead a reasonably intelligent and prudent person to believe that an accused person has committed a crime, thereby warranting his or her prosecution, or that a Cause of Action has accrued, justifying a civil lawsuit.
Good Faith: Honesty; a sincere intention to deal fairly with others.
Cause of Action: The fact or combination of facts that gives a person the right to seek judicial redress or relief against another. Also, the legal theory forming the basis of a lawsuit.
I guess you would not see your requests as failing any of these “tests”. As before it would seem that MOD continues to forget the old adage that “when you are in a hole you should stop digging” – yet every time they unjustifiably try to silence or ignore someone like you with what you and many others would see as doubtful “legal” rulings MOD makes the hole larger – the classic from a few years ago was, of course, their interpretation (or rather misinterpretation) of the employment laws applying to pregnant servicewomen! But they have the legal and other resources to allow them to get away with it most (but not all) of the time! However, on the assumption that you do not accept that your requests are in any way vexatious and are following a logical theme (as opposed to wildly “lashing out” which could be seen as vexatious) I presume your next “port of call” will be the Information Commissioner with a request that he confirms that you are indeed not a vexatious “litigant” – since in the UK it is normally the “judge” (in this case the Information Commissioner) who would decide this and not an organisation like MOD.
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Wow, Tuc, as ever a very informative and well-informed post. I wouldn't argue with anything you say there. However, (you knew that was coming, don't worry, just a perspective), from this pilot's point of view, I know there are imperfections in every system we are asked to operate and we could spend our lives trying to eliminate every gramme of risk from them. Personally, I accept a level of risk and understand the areas where a system (usually an aircraft, in my case) fall short of ideal, especially on operations.
Now, that is not to say that I do not (as I said) fully concur that the MoD has a huge duty of care. Quite rightly and this thread has highlighted numerous areas where they have, allegedly, fallen short. But there must be a balance and an acceptance by those that take the Queen's five pence that there is, at times, an element of risk, often due to budgetary constraints et al.
We could be in danger of regulating our aircraft out of the air or making new systems so expensive that we can no longer afford an air force.
I am playing devils advocate a little here, although I may be less risk averse than some. Bottom line for me is, yes, MoD's duty of care must be applied and enforced, but I would hate us to become so bound by regulation that it impedes our ability to get on with our job.
Reading this back, I may have slightly over-stated my case, but I hope you can see my point.
Now, that is not to say that I do not (as I said) fully concur that the MoD has a huge duty of care. Quite rightly and this thread has highlighted numerous areas where they have, allegedly, fallen short. But there must be a balance and an acceptance by those that take the Queen's five pence that there is, at times, an element of risk, often due to budgetary constraints et al.
We could be in danger of regulating our aircraft out of the air or making new systems so expensive that we can no longer afford an air force.
I am playing devils advocate a little here, although I may be less risk averse than some. Bottom line for me is, yes, MoD's duty of care must be applied and enforced, but I would hate us to become so bound by regulation that it impedes our ability to get on with our job.
Reading this back, I may have slightly over-stated my case, but I hope you can see my point.
JB,
Very useful. I may be able to shed a little light here. I was in a Head Quarters when FoI became an issue to us. The rule was to destroy anything we didn't actually need, including documents and emails, on the grounds that if we didn't have them we couldn't release them to an FoI requester.
While I don't think our part of the organization was trying to evade the Act, it was clear to me (assuming I read the signals correctly) that the Centre was very nervous about it. Instructions about how long we had to respond and under what circumstances we could legitimately decline were very clear.
A view I have held for many years is that it's very easy to think of the RAF of the MoD as "them". There is no corporate "them". It's a bunch of people in a job for a couple of years in most cases. Especially those that have to deal with FoI requests. Mostly those desk officers scrabble around to find an answer, but often feel uncomfortable being the one to let something slip - often not fully understanding the politics/sensitivity of the issue. So they revert to safe mode and pull out one of the standard responses.
All the above is not to say that there a many pieces of information that the MoD would rather keep to themselves - PRESUMABLY, but I cannot state that for certain.
Fortunately, I don't have to deal with that sort of thing any more.
Courtney
Very useful. I may be able to shed a little light here. I was in a Head Quarters when FoI became an issue to us. The rule was to destroy anything we didn't actually need, including documents and emails, on the grounds that if we didn't have them we couldn't release them to an FoI requester.
While I don't think our part of the organization was trying to evade the Act, it was clear to me (assuming I read the signals correctly) that the Centre was very nervous about it. Instructions about how long we had to respond and under what circumstances we could legitimately decline were very clear.
A view I have held for many years is that it's very easy to think of the RAF of the MoD as "them". There is no corporate "them". It's a bunch of people in a job for a couple of years in most cases. Especially those that have to deal with FoI requests. Mostly those desk officers scrabble around to find an answer, but often feel uncomfortable being the one to let something slip - often not fully understanding the politics/sensitivity of the issue. So they revert to safe mode and pull out one of the standard responses.
All the above is not to say that there a many pieces of information that the MoD would rather keep to themselves - PRESUMABLY, but I cannot state that for certain.
Fortunately, I don't have to deal with that sort of thing any more.
Courtney
DV
I am surprised that nobody has come back regarding your treatment by MOD under the FoIA – your post 93 refers. I am equally surprised that after so many years of forgetting that the truth will always out as it now has started to on Chinook, Hercules, Nimrod, Sea King etc MOD again appears to be assuming that they can be judge and jury and hence get away with hiding behind their own “self-serving” interpretation of the rules. You do not say what action you intend to take, but it seems to me that you do not have to take this ruling “lying down”.
As I am sure you know, but for the benefit of other readers, Section 14 of the Act states:
14. Vexatious or repeated requests.
(1)Section 1(1) does not oblige a public authority to comply with a request for information if the request is vexatious.
(2)Where a public authority has previously complied with a request for information which was made by any person, it is not obliged to comply with a subsequent identical or substantially similar request from that person unless a reasonable interval has elapsed between compliance with the previous request and the making of the current request.
There is no special definition of the meaning of “vexatious” within the FoIA (or indeed “reasonable”), but if we now look at some top level legal definitions it is clear that MOD’s letter to you is probably nothing to do with your alleged “abuse” of the FoIA, but, as you say yourself, is about keeping the lid on Pandora’s box. Indeed their statement that all future requests for information from you re Nimrod engineering and airworthiness are already considered to be “vexatious” would anyway appear to be contrary to section 14 (2) of the Act.
Vexatious: A legal action or proceeding initiated maliciously and without Probable Cause by an individual who is not acting in Good Faith for the purpose of annoying or embarrassing an opponent.
Probable Cause: Apparent facts discovered through logical inquiry that would lead a reasonably intelligent and prudent person to believe that an accused person has committed a crime, thereby warranting his or her prosecution, or that a Cause of Action has accrued, justifying a civil lawsuit.
Good Faith: Honesty; a sincere intention to deal fairly with others.
Cause of Action: The fact or combination of facts that gives a person the right to seek judicial redress or relief against another. Also, the legal theory forming the basis of a lawsuit.
I guess you would not see your requests as failing any of these “tests”. As before it would seem that MOD continues to forget the old adage that “when you are in a hole you should stop digging” – yet every time they unjustifiably try to silence or ignore someone like you with what you and many others would see as doubtful “legal” rulings MOD makes the hole larger – the classic from a few years ago was, of course, their interpretation (or rather misinterpretation) of the employment laws applying to pregnant servicewomen! But they have the legal and other resources to allow them to get away with it most (but not all) of the time! However, on the assumption that you do not accept that your requests are in any way vexatious and are following a logical theme (as opposed to wildly “lashing out” which could be seen as vexatious) I presume your next “port of call” will be the Information Commissioner with a request that he confirms that you are indeed not a vexatious “litigant” – since in the UK it is normally the “judge” (in this case the Information Commissioner) who would decide this and not an organisation like MOD.
I am surprised that nobody has come back regarding your treatment by MOD under the FoIA – your post 93 refers. I am equally surprised that after so many years of forgetting that the truth will always out as it now has started to on Chinook, Hercules, Nimrod, Sea King etc MOD again appears to be assuming that they can be judge and jury and hence get away with hiding behind their own “self-serving” interpretation of the rules. You do not say what action you intend to take, but it seems to me that you do not have to take this ruling “lying down”.
As I am sure you know, but for the benefit of other readers, Section 14 of the Act states:
14. Vexatious or repeated requests.
(1)Section 1(1) does not oblige a public authority to comply with a request for information if the request is vexatious.
(2)Where a public authority has previously complied with a request for information which was made by any person, it is not obliged to comply with a subsequent identical or substantially similar request from that person unless a reasonable interval has elapsed between compliance with the previous request and the making of the current request.
There is no special definition of the meaning of “vexatious” within the FoIA (or indeed “reasonable”), but if we now look at some top level legal definitions it is clear that MOD’s letter to you is probably nothing to do with your alleged “abuse” of the FoIA, but, as you say yourself, is about keeping the lid on Pandora’s box. Indeed their statement that all future requests for information from you re Nimrod engineering and airworthiness are already considered to be “vexatious” would anyway appear to be contrary to section 14 (2) of the Act.
Vexatious: A legal action or proceeding initiated maliciously and without Probable Cause by an individual who is not acting in Good Faith for the purpose of annoying or embarrassing an opponent.
Probable Cause: Apparent facts discovered through logical inquiry that would lead a reasonably intelligent and prudent person to believe that an accused person has committed a crime, thereby warranting his or her prosecution, or that a Cause of Action has accrued, justifying a civil lawsuit.
Good Faith: Honesty; a sincere intention to deal fairly with others.
Cause of Action: The fact or combination of facts that gives a person the right to seek judicial redress or relief against another. Also, the legal theory forming the basis of a lawsuit.
I guess you would not see your requests as failing any of these “tests”. As before it would seem that MOD continues to forget the old adage that “when you are in a hole you should stop digging” – yet every time they unjustifiably try to silence or ignore someone like you with what you and many others would see as doubtful “legal” rulings MOD makes the hole larger – the classic from a few years ago was, of course, their interpretation (or rather misinterpretation) of the employment laws applying to pregnant servicewomen! But they have the legal and other resources to allow them to get away with it most (but not all) of the time! However, on the assumption that you do not accept that your requests are in any way vexatious and are following a logical theme (as opposed to wildly “lashing out” which could be seen as vexatious) I presume your next “port of call” will be the Information Commissioner with a request that he confirms that you are indeed not a vexatious “litigant” – since in the UK it is normally the “judge” (in this case the Information Commissioner) who would decide this and not an organisation like MOD.
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documen...d_requests.pdf
It would be interesting to see, verbatim, the wording of the FOI requests that DV has submitted, and how many, how often.
Given some posts here I suspect he may have unwittingly have given them a sound basis upon which to invoke section 14.
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JFZ90,
Even if you are right about MOD possibly having a case, and I am certainly not accusing you of being wrong, it is surely a decision for the Information Commissioner to rule on - I am sure MOD will make their points forcefully enough!
JB
Even if you are right about MOD possibly having a case, and I am certainly not accusing you of being wrong, it is surely a decision for the Information Commissioner to rule on - I am sure MOD will make their points forcefully enough!
JB
Even if you are right about MOD possibly having a case, and I am certainly not accusing you of being wrong, it is surely a decision for the Information Commissioner (IC) to rule on - I am sure MOD will make their points forcefully enough!
Tuc,
Thankyou for your detailed replies! I am reassured by your views on Bernard Gray, but how confident are you that our current crop of VSOs can cut themselves free of the influence of the retired 'big beasts' that did all the damage in the first place? And I presume that you see the re-instatement of the Chief Engineer position as A Good Thing?
Thankyou for your detailed replies! I am reassured by your views on Bernard Gray, but how confident are you that our current crop of VSOs can cut themselves free of the influence of the retired 'big beasts' that did all the damage in the first place? And I presume that you see the re-instatement of the Chief Engineer position as A Good Thing?
Mach Two
Thank you.
I agree. My point is that many of the risks you are asked to take have often been identified, the mitigation determined to be achievable quickly and at less cost, but the more costly and less timely route taken to protect certain individuals. Or, in the case of IFF warnings, no action at all. I abhor that approach, mainly because people I regarded as friends have died unnecessarily.
Easy Street
Thank you as well.
Hmm. You know what I’m going to say. Alcock was Chief Engineer and, because he was double hatted as AML, his name is all over the systemic airworthiness failings that led directly to so many deaths. If pressed, he may have an explanation, but his ludicrous letters to the press suggest otherwise and the later ARTs tell a story. Nothing was done. It is always about people and their willingness to do the right thing. In my experience, there aren’t many in MoD. The decision Alcock had to make upon receipt of, for example, CHART (Chinook, Puma, Wessex) in August 1992 was simple. Do I rescind the policy to rundown airworthiness (issued in my name in 1991!), or ignore the Inspector of Flight Safety’s recommendations. He did not choose wisely. A 1st year apprentice or a 40 year veteran 3 Star could make that decision – I’d vote for the apprentice if he stood up and did the right thing. In fact, the issues would be fresher in his mind because he’s taught them before being allowed near a toolbox! I know what my first day consisted of. A film of a post mortem, the message being “This is what happens if you F*** UP”. (But 2 years earlier I’d been to the real thing, which is a starker message!).
Thank you.
But there must be a balance and an acceptance by those that take the Queen's five pence that there is, at times, an element of risk, often due to budgetary constraints et al.
Easy Street
Thank you as well.
And I presume that you see the re-instatement of the Chief Engineer position as A Good Thing?
Last edited by tucumseh; 29th Dec 2011 at 20:16.
The practical problem when faced with this situation (and remember, this is not hypothetical, because the failure to integrate IFF warnings was flagged in 1998) is what happens when the project office refuse to correct the design, pay off the contract and walk away. There are a number of formal and informal routes. Informal resolution is better on a one-off failure. But this example had pan-MoD implications, because if they didn’t do the job properly on one aircraft, it is likely others were affected too. In this case, informal didn’t work because (a) they refused and (b) the 2 Star backed them up.
On my aircraft, muggins here agreed to ignore orders and make his aircraft safe. I had no control over the others; specifically, the Tornado office didn’t reply. But what to do about the overarching problem?
One route is the Constraints Working Groups for each aircraft. The user or Boscombe (RWTS in my case; same thing in practice) flags the fact they are vulnerable to friendly fire because they have no failure warnings. The CWG in conjunction with the likes of Warfare Centres decide if this is a Limitation or a Constraint. If the former, the user is sent away to develop a work-a-round. (Don’t fly in controlled air space?!). If the latter, it is tagged Critical, Major or Minor. (This is essentially the same process as the risk/ALARP discussion on Nimrod). If Critical, then DEC gets an automatic action to run a requirement to remove the Constraint. This is the answer to the oft asked question from Front Line – How do we influence procurement? Crucially, you also have Health and Safety Constraints. This one is a double whammy; both Critical and H&S. Getting approval to remove it should be a no brainer.
But not only is this a systemic failure, it is a serious cultural failure. And more than one CWG is involved, so the Chair, usually a lowly SO2, has to trigger the Conflict Resolution process. Usually 3 Tier, in this case he needs to find the DEC officer in charge of all aircraft carrying IFF, as a single directive is needed. The problem must be set out on paper in the form of a Board Submission (or Business Case in today speak) and staffed through about 6 ranks to this head DEC chap. The submission goes something like this: “Project office refused to make aircraft functionally safe, and paid off contract saying it was. 2 Star agreed this was fine and dandy. Please get him over-ruled. Request approval to commit £XXM to pay the company a second time. Oh, and switch on Legal, we want to sue them”. (Side note: Tread carefully. 4 Star supports him. He’s got a history, it’s not a one-off aberration. See Nimrod and Chinook). The result is every single officer in that staffing chain drops a brick and spends the rest of their tour trying to ignore it. The experienced ones bat it back to the poor sod who flagged it (me, not the CWG SO2), because the rules say they can. The 2 Star DEC never gets to hear of the problem, aircraft get shot down and people die. The major effort then becomes – for God’s sake don’t let the BoI, Coroner or families know. In fact, more effort goes into that damage limitation, the cost of which would have solved the problem on Day 1.
This cultural failure has been mentioned in numerous highly critical reports. Bernard Gray has been banging on about it. It is one reason he wants to get the private sector more involved – he hopes that culture doesn’t exist there, in the sense a company will have no qualms about submitting a costed proposal to make an aircraft safe or operationally effective at a fair and reasonable cost. But, does this merely delay the inevitable? Who makes the decision to commit MoD funding in his model? Companies routinely submit such proposals anyway. The system already relies on their proactive input. The problem is that the mandated formal contracts to provide continuous cover (and hence expertise) to maintain the Build Standard are no longer let. They are seen as a waste of money. And this is a failure to maintain that Standard.
This gets back to the “Co-ordinating Authority” concept, reiterated by Gray on Radio 4 (although it’s not clear if he knew he was reiterating). Had there been an appointed System Co-ordinating Design Authority (SCDA), as mandated, then this problem would have been flagged earlier than Boscombe did (to me). In this case, the “system” to be co-ordinated is IFF, Comms (audio warnings), aircraft (visual warnings) and any other system on the Interface Control Boundary. Three different companies – you appoint someone to co-ordinate, with formal contractual links to the others. It is the basis of all systems integration, and is simple. Companies want this degree of control exercised over their kit. It cost little, as there is very little materiel cost, mainly manpower. What is the crucial difference in this process? The answer is that if one invokes the mandated Def Stan (now cancelled without replacement!) the SCDA or DA is given delegated powers to commit MoD funding to resolve safety problems. MoD staffs are taught, wrongly, that committal of funding requires MoD approval. For very good reason the exception is (was) safety related.
Bottom line. What is likely to be proposed by Bernard Gray is actually a return to the tried and tested (and extant, but ignored) mandated policy. The model will be expanded as it will encompass initial procurement activities, but the basis is there (if you have an old copy of the Def Stan, especially Book 2, Specs 5 and 19. i.e. What we expect you to do, and how to cost it). Full circle. To avoid avoidable problems, implement existing regulations. No wheel reinventing required Bernard. Your practical problem is that, because the Chief Engineer ditched this system, you have very few who remember how to do it. THAT should be the focus of initial consultancy contracts. Not WHAT to do, but HOW to resurrect the mandated process.
Just thought I’d post this in case anyone thought I didn’t have a solution on offer! I’d be interested in the thoughts of anyone caught up in this system today. Long time since I worked in it (mainly because it’s a long time since anyone on MoD was allowed to!). Of course, there is more to it, but the framework is there already and much of it is already filled in. It’s the template for Time, Cost and Performance and always has been.
On my aircraft, muggins here agreed to ignore orders and make his aircraft safe. I had no control over the others; specifically, the Tornado office didn’t reply. But what to do about the overarching problem?
One route is the Constraints Working Groups for each aircraft. The user or Boscombe (RWTS in my case; same thing in practice) flags the fact they are vulnerable to friendly fire because they have no failure warnings. The CWG in conjunction with the likes of Warfare Centres decide if this is a Limitation or a Constraint. If the former, the user is sent away to develop a work-a-round. (Don’t fly in controlled air space?!). If the latter, it is tagged Critical, Major or Minor. (This is essentially the same process as the risk/ALARP discussion on Nimrod). If Critical, then DEC gets an automatic action to run a requirement to remove the Constraint. This is the answer to the oft asked question from Front Line – How do we influence procurement? Crucially, you also have Health and Safety Constraints. This one is a double whammy; both Critical and H&S. Getting approval to remove it should be a no brainer.
But not only is this a systemic failure, it is a serious cultural failure. And more than one CWG is involved, so the Chair, usually a lowly SO2, has to trigger the Conflict Resolution process. Usually 3 Tier, in this case he needs to find the DEC officer in charge of all aircraft carrying IFF, as a single directive is needed. The problem must be set out on paper in the form of a Board Submission (or Business Case in today speak) and staffed through about 6 ranks to this head DEC chap. The submission goes something like this: “Project office refused to make aircraft functionally safe, and paid off contract saying it was. 2 Star agreed this was fine and dandy. Please get him over-ruled. Request approval to commit £XXM to pay the company a second time. Oh, and switch on Legal, we want to sue them”. (Side note: Tread carefully. 4 Star supports him. He’s got a history, it’s not a one-off aberration. See Nimrod and Chinook). The result is every single officer in that staffing chain drops a brick and spends the rest of their tour trying to ignore it. The experienced ones bat it back to the poor sod who flagged it (me, not the CWG SO2), because the rules say they can. The 2 Star DEC never gets to hear of the problem, aircraft get shot down and people die. The major effort then becomes – for God’s sake don’t let the BoI, Coroner or families know. In fact, more effort goes into that damage limitation, the cost of which would have solved the problem on Day 1.
This cultural failure has been mentioned in numerous highly critical reports. Bernard Gray has been banging on about it. It is one reason he wants to get the private sector more involved – he hopes that culture doesn’t exist there, in the sense a company will have no qualms about submitting a costed proposal to make an aircraft safe or operationally effective at a fair and reasonable cost. But, does this merely delay the inevitable? Who makes the decision to commit MoD funding in his model? Companies routinely submit such proposals anyway. The system already relies on their proactive input. The problem is that the mandated formal contracts to provide continuous cover (and hence expertise) to maintain the Build Standard are no longer let. They are seen as a waste of money. And this is a failure to maintain that Standard.
This gets back to the “Co-ordinating Authority” concept, reiterated by Gray on Radio 4 (although it’s not clear if he knew he was reiterating). Had there been an appointed System Co-ordinating Design Authority (SCDA), as mandated, then this problem would have been flagged earlier than Boscombe did (to me). In this case, the “system” to be co-ordinated is IFF, Comms (audio warnings), aircraft (visual warnings) and any other system on the Interface Control Boundary. Three different companies – you appoint someone to co-ordinate, with formal contractual links to the others. It is the basis of all systems integration, and is simple. Companies want this degree of control exercised over their kit. It cost little, as there is very little materiel cost, mainly manpower. What is the crucial difference in this process? The answer is that if one invokes the mandated Def Stan (now cancelled without replacement!) the SCDA or DA is given delegated powers to commit MoD funding to resolve safety problems. MoD staffs are taught, wrongly, that committal of funding requires MoD approval. For very good reason the exception is (was) safety related.
Bottom line. What is likely to be proposed by Bernard Gray is actually a return to the tried and tested (and extant, but ignored) mandated policy. The model will be expanded as it will encompass initial procurement activities, but the basis is there (if you have an old copy of the Def Stan, especially Book 2, Specs 5 and 19. i.e. What we expect you to do, and how to cost it). Full circle. To avoid avoidable problems, implement existing regulations. No wheel reinventing required Bernard. Your practical problem is that, because the Chief Engineer ditched this system, you have very few who remember how to do it. THAT should be the focus of initial consultancy contracts. Not WHAT to do, but HOW to resurrect the mandated process.
Just thought I’d post this in case anyone thought I didn’t have a solution on offer! I’d be interested in the thoughts of anyone caught up in this system today. Long time since I worked in it (mainly because it’s a long time since anyone on MoD was allowed to!). Of course, there is more to it, but the framework is there already and much of it is already filled in. It’s the template for Time, Cost and Performance and always has been.
tuc
I've a little smile on my face. I can just see MoD getting back from xmas leave, having scanned pprune as usual for their policy ideas. The great "idea" is actually long standing policy, we've been found out, quick we have to change the report and rebrand everything under a new name. Hilarious.
I've a little smile on my face. I can just see MoD getting back from xmas leave, having scanned pprune as usual for their policy ideas. The great "idea" is actually long standing policy, we've been found out, quick we have to change the report and rebrand everything under a new name. Hilarious.
Bernard Gray has been banging on about it. It is one reason he wants to get the private sector more involved – he hopes that culture doesn’t exist there, in the sense a company will have no qualms about submitting a costed proposal to make an aircraft safe or operationally effective at a fair and reasonable cost
I would like to put forward a slightly different angle on this. Caveat: this does not necessarily reflect my views, it's just stuff I saw in 30 years as an RAF AD pilot and later as a desk/staff/trials officer.
During the period we're discussing here the Defence budget was tighty squeezed (I know, show me a time when it hasn't been). Like the late 70s and early 80s the Government's decission to buy Trident put a huge strain on the budget and took money away from other programmes. In fact, it lead to a lot of deep cuts - mainly for the Navy who were "lucky" the Falklands happened when they did (don't bother rising to that, you know what I mean).
Similarly, in the late 80s and 90s there was another programme that should (or maybe, COULD) have been well run and reasonably straight forward, but it wasn't. It was EUROFIGHTER and the dreadful politics involved in a four-nation (five to start with, but maybe I can come back to that another time) consortium and possilby 400 sub-contractors led to it eating increasingly huge amounts of cash, sucking money out of the UK defence budget.
As with so many of these programmes/projects, the MoD started to wonder if it was worth it and a number of well-respected senior people started to suggest that the money needed to be spent elsewhere. We even ran COEIAs (Combined Operational Effectiveness and Investment Appraisal for those not familar), which either showed the required political answer or sometimes failed to support the military case. But the answer was very blunt, "you're buying it, it comes out of defence spending and that's it!" I paraphrase, by the way.
Anyway, the result was that lots of other programmes lost out. None was cancelled (or maybe few were cancelled) as they were all deemed necessary to maintaining capability, meeting our senior ally's requirements, improving personnels' protection/comms, etc. I think you may recognise some of those projects.
So, what I'm speculating about is that cash was even tighter than normal, there were hundreds of "essential" programmes going on whilst a huge, additional black hole was sucking the life out of the budget. I went to many meetings where numerous ways of improving combat ID, personal protection, new radios, the SA80, etc, etc, were discussed and PMs (and their predecessors) had to accept funding holes to keep their projects moving - albeit slowly and, in many cases, in a less than ideal form. Future spending was taken "at risk" in the hope that money would appear from nowhere. It was a standard way of doing things and is what left us with the £38 billion black hole. Not because projects were pushed forward unwisely, but because the Government wanted them, but wouldn't guarantee the cash (that will attract some flack, I suspect). So many projects, mods, STFs, UORs were fighting for cash and most lost out to the big one. Tornado IFF M4 was caught in this same trap.
I am not defending or criticising the actions of anyone here, just opening another side to the discussion. But I would say this. Look at the criticism here (let alone anywhere else) for installing, incompletely, a life-saving piece of kit. Done by people, for all sorts of motives, some honourable, some self-serving I'm sure. Imagine the public response if, for example, the guy running the body armour procurement had said, "Well, it's not properly funded, we can't guarantee it's perfect so we'll cancel it for now."
I know I'm being dramatic and over-simplifying things, but only to make a point. I await slings and arrows for this, but just reporting what I saw. I learnt that this is not an ideal world. Of course, before then, I thought it was!
During the period we're discussing here the Defence budget was tighty squeezed (I know, show me a time when it hasn't been). Like the late 70s and early 80s the Government's decission to buy Trident put a huge strain on the budget and took money away from other programmes. In fact, it lead to a lot of deep cuts - mainly for the Navy who were "lucky" the Falklands happened when they did (don't bother rising to that, you know what I mean).
Similarly, in the late 80s and 90s there was another programme that should (or maybe, COULD) have been well run and reasonably straight forward, but it wasn't. It was EUROFIGHTER and the dreadful politics involved in a four-nation (five to start with, but maybe I can come back to that another time) consortium and possilby 400 sub-contractors led to it eating increasingly huge amounts of cash, sucking money out of the UK defence budget.
As with so many of these programmes/projects, the MoD started to wonder if it was worth it and a number of well-respected senior people started to suggest that the money needed to be spent elsewhere. We even ran COEIAs (Combined Operational Effectiveness and Investment Appraisal for those not familar), which either showed the required political answer or sometimes failed to support the military case. But the answer was very blunt, "you're buying it, it comes out of defence spending and that's it!" I paraphrase, by the way.
Anyway, the result was that lots of other programmes lost out. None was cancelled (or maybe few were cancelled) as they were all deemed necessary to maintaining capability, meeting our senior ally's requirements, improving personnels' protection/comms, etc. I think you may recognise some of those projects.
So, what I'm speculating about is that cash was even tighter than normal, there were hundreds of "essential" programmes going on whilst a huge, additional black hole was sucking the life out of the budget. I went to many meetings where numerous ways of improving combat ID, personal protection, new radios, the SA80, etc, etc, were discussed and PMs (and their predecessors) had to accept funding holes to keep their projects moving - albeit slowly and, in many cases, in a less than ideal form. Future spending was taken "at risk" in the hope that money would appear from nowhere. It was a standard way of doing things and is what left us with the £38 billion black hole. Not because projects were pushed forward unwisely, but because the Government wanted them, but wouldn't guarantee the cash (that will attract some flack, I suspect). So many projects, mods, STFs, UORs were fighting for cash and most lost out to the big one. Tornado IFF M4 was caught in this same trap.
I am not defending or criticising the actions of anyone here, just opening another side to the discussion. But I would say this. Look at the criticism here (let alone anywhere else) for installing, incompletely, a life-saving piece of kit. Done by people, for all sorts of motives, some honourable, some self-serving I'm sure. Imagine the public response if, for example, the guy running the body armour procurement had said, "Well, it's not properly funded, we can't guarantee it's perfect so we'll cancel it for now."
I know I'm being dramatic and over-simplifying things, but only to make a point. I await slings and arrows for this, but just reporting what I saw. I learnt that this is not an ideal world. Of course, before then, I thought it was!
Last edited by Courtney Mil; 30th Dec 2011 at 17:32.
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I am an outsider looking in on this tragic and very sad event and I guess in an ideal World every aircraft, every ship, every soldier would have all the very latest equipment that is so desperately needed to fight and survive when in a hostile environment. Sadly none of us live in this Shangri-La type world and these horrific events happen. I could post a lists of deaths that were avoidable but we are all aware of these many incidents.
The posts I regularly read on this thread feel me with pride to see the dedication and commitment of those that are determined to expose the truth, but what is the 'truth'? Should we refuse to deploy unless we are fully equipped with all the equipment we deem necessary, or do we up anchor and fight the good fight with what we have?
Our World is certainly not ideal, I wish it were and I am guessing we all know exactly where Courtney is coming from and every word of that post must surely be thought provoking?
John
The posts I regularly read on this thread feel me with pride to see the dedication and commitment of those that are determined to expose the truth, but what is the 'truth'? Should we refuse to deploy unless we are fully equipped with all the equipment we deem necessary, or do we up anchor and fight the good fight with what we have?
Our World is certainly not ideal, I wish it were and I am guessing we all know exactly where Courtney is coming from and every word of that post must surely be thought provoking?
John