The practical problem when faced with this situation (and remember, this is not hypothetical, because the failure to integrate IFF warnings was flagged in 1998) is what happens when the project office refuse to correct the design, pay off the contract and walk away. There are a number of formal and informal routes. Informal resolution is better on a one-off failure. But this example had pan-MoD implications, because if they didn’t do the job properly on one aircraft, it is likely others were affected too. In this case, informal didn’t work because (a) they refused and (b) the 2 Star backed them up.
On my aircraft, muggins here agreed to ignore orders and make his aircraft safe. I had no control over the others; specifically, the Tornado office didn’t reply. But what to do about the overarching problem?
One route is the Constraints Working Groups for each aircraft. The user or Boscombe (RWTS in my case; same thing in practice) flags the fact they are vulnerable to friendly fire because they have no failure warnings. The CWG in conjunction with the likes of Warfare Centres decide if this is a Limitation or a Constraint. If the former, the user is sent away to develop a work-a-round. (Don’t fly in controlled air space?!). If the latter, it is tagged Critical, Major or Minor. (This is essentially the same process as the risk/ALARP discussion on Nimrod). If Critical, then DEC gets an automatic action to run a requirement to remove the Constraint. This is the answer to the oft asked question from Front Line – How do we influence procurement? Crucially, you also have Health and Safety Constraints. This one is a double whammy; both Critical and H&S. Getting approval to remove it should be a no brainer.
But not only is this a systemic failure, it is a serious cultural failure. And more than one CWG is involved, so the Chair, usually a lowly SO2, has to trigger the Conflict Resolution process. Usually 3 Tier, in this case he needs to find the DEC officer in charge of all aircraft carrying IFF, as a single directive is needed. The problem must be set out on paper in the form of a Board Submission (or Business Case in today speak) and staffed through about 6 ranks to this head DEC chap. The submission goes something like this: “Project office refused to make aircraft functionally safe, and paid off contract saying it was. 2 Star agreed this was fine and dandy. Please get him over-ruled. Request approval to commit £XXM to pay the company a second time. Oh, and switch on Legal, we want to sue them”. (Side note: Tread carefully. 4 Star supports him. He’s got a history, it’s not a one-off aberration. See Nimrod and Chinook). The result is every single officer in that staffing chain drops a brick and spends the rest of their tour trying to ignore it. The experienced ones bat it back to the poor sod who flagged it (me, not the CWG SO2), because the rules say they can. The 2 Star DEC never gets to hear of the problem, aircraft get shot down and people die. The major effort then becomes – for God’s sake don’t let the BoI, Coroner or families know. In fact, more effort goes into that damage limitation, the cost of which would have solved the problem on Day 1.
This cultural failure has been mentioned in numerous highly critical reports. Bernard Gray has been banging on about it. It is one reason he wants to get the private sector more involved – he hopes that culture doesn’t exist there, in the sense a company will have no qualms about submitting a costed proposal to make an aircraft safe or operationally effective at a fair and reasonable cost. But, does this merely delay the inevitable? Who makes the decision to commit MoD funding in his model? Companies routinely submit such proposals anyway. The system already relies on their proactive input. The problem is that the mandated formal contracts to provide continuous cover (and hence expertise) to maintain the Build Standard are no longer let. They are seen as a waste of money. And this is a failure to maintain that Standard.
This gets back to the “Co-ordinating Authority” concept, reiterated by Gray on Radio 4 (although it’s not clear if he knew he was reiterating). Had there been an appointed System Co-ordinating Design Authority (SCDA), as mandated, then this problem would have been flagged earlier than Boscombe did (to me). In this case, the “system” to be co-ordinated is IFF, Comms (audio warnings), aircraft (visual warnings) and any other system on the Interface Control Boundary. Three different companies – you appoint someone to co-ordinate, with formal contractual links to the others. It is the basis of all systems integration, and is simple. Companies want this degree of control exercised over their kit. It cost little, as there is very little materiel cost, mainly manpower. What is the crucial difference in this process? The answer is that if one invokes the mandated Def Stan (now cancelled without replacement!) the SCDA or DA is given delegated powers to commit MoD funding to resolve safety problems. MoD staffs are taught, wrongly, that committal of funding requires MoD approval. For very good reason the exception is (was) safety related.
Bottom line. What is likely to be proposed by Bernard Gray is actually a return to the tried and tested (and extant, but ignored) mandated policy. The model will be expanded as it will encompass initial procurement activities, but the basis is there (if you have an old copy of the Def Stan, especially Book 2, Specs 5 and 19. i.e. What we expect you to do, and how to cost it). Full circle. To avoid avoidable problems, implement existing regulations. No wheel reinventing required Bernard. Your practical problem is that, because the Chief Engineer ditched this system, you have very few who remember how to do it. THAT should be the focus of initial consultancy contracts. Not WHAT to do, but HOW to resurrect the mandated process.
Just thought I’d post this in case anyone thought I didn’t have a solution on offer! I’d be interested in the thoughts of anyone caught up in this system today. Long time since I worked in it (mainly because it’s a long time since anyone on MoD was allowed to!). Of course, there is more to it, but the framework is there already and much of it is already filled in. It’s the template for Time, Cost and Performance and always has been.