Airworthiness & Safety Post Haddon-Cave
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How do we feel the overall airworthiness and safety of our platforms has been affected by these changes [in response to Haddon-Cave]?
Me: The Safety Case is flawed, it doesn't demonstrate the aircraft is safe.
Person in authority: Yes, but you don't know it's unsafe, do you?
Me: No b-b-but but-b-but ...
Person in authority: Case closed.
Me:
The biggest change I have seen is in the number of MoD Safety Managers who have left or want to leave their posts. And the difficulty in replacing them.
Small Spinner writes:
As tucumseh has pointed out the training and ability of those people in the PTs responsible for airworthiness decisions are the areas that need to be addressed asap.
Others have pointed out how its very scary making airworthiness decisions, but Accountable Managers in the civil sector make them daily, so what makes it so traumatic for those responsible in the PTs (as long as they have the appropriate training).
Others have pointed out how its very scary making airworthiness decisions, but Accountable Managers in the civil sector make them daily, so what makes it so traumatic for those responsible in the PTs (as long as they have the appropriate training).
Most if not all of the MoD Safety Managers I have known have been very well-motivated and worked incredibly hard. But a number of them have just not been that competent unfortunately. Conversely, in my opinion and based on the limited scope of my interaction with them (i.e., safety!), most of the more senior technical people in PTs have been well-motivated, worked incredibly hard ... and been very competent. I'd like to see some of them in a properly remunerated and respected Safety Manager role and I think that would have a very positive effect on safety of the relevant aircraft.
The trouble with the MOD is that they don't appear to believe in safety, or recognise its value as a tangible commodity for prolonging their aircraft's lives.
All MOD know is that they've been told to "do it", by H-C et al, and now they have to find yet more money for some pink-and-fluffy MAA-type safety idea that no-one in charge really wants to do. (they're probably way to clever for that anyway..)
Pity. It could have been so good with all that military will-power working away so hard - trying to improve someone else's lives!
Squidlord - Safety Managers for Airlines - £90K+ - and they say NO when they need to.
All MOD know is that they've been told to "do it", by H-C et al, and now they have to find yet more money for some pink-and-fluffy MAA-type safety idea that no-one in charge really wants to do. (they're probably way to clever for that anyway..)
Pity. It could have been so good with all that military will-power working away so hard - trying to improve someone else's lives!
Squidlord - Safety Managers for Airlines - £90K+ - and they say NO when they need to.
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The problem is based, primarily, in the fact that those tasked with airworthiness have no vested interest in it's success. They need to be teamed with pilots and fly their charges close to the edge regularly. Then safety and airworthiness would have meaning to them rather than just being a list of pounds that need to be spent.
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AA
The problem is based, primarily, in the fact that those tasked with airworthiness have no vested interest in it's success. They need to be teamed with pilots and fly their charges close to the edge regularly. Then safety and airworthiness would have meaning to them rather than just being a list of pounds that need to be spent.
You don't have to fly in it to make sound judgements on items or components installed on an aircraft, or make sound judgements on a corroded part, you just need to ask the right questions of the SMEs (designers), if you don't know yourself. You also have to be able to divorce yourself from the financial implications (sometimes more difficult to say than to do), and you have to have ownership / authority to tell the bean counters that this is the way it will be. Training is a pre-requisite.
One of the best quotes from H-C is sadly this:
A process-dependent, paper-reliant, ‘box-ticking’ safety culture has developed in the MOD. Any large, complex, hierarchical ‘top-down’ organisation which measures itself by strict adherence to procedures can become a slave to process and paperwork, and find false comfort in compliance and complexity. The MOD has not been immune from these pathogens. A process-dependent and paper-reliant culture has developed, particularly within DE&S and IPTs, which led to a shift away from proper risk analysis and ownership towards a ‘box-ticking’ approach to the management of safety and Airworthiness. Compliance with process and form-filling has taken the place of sound judgment.
It can also be the last bastion of any company, forced into compliance, but cutting costs across all areas.
The problem is based, primarily, in the fact that those tasked with airworthiness have no vested interest in it's success. They need to be teamed with pilots and fly their charges close to the edge regularly. Then safety and airworthiness would have meaning to them rather than just being a list of pounds that need to be spent.
You don't have to fly in it to make sound judgements on items or components installed on an aircraft, or make sound judgements on a corroded part, you just need to ask the right questions of the SMEs (designers), if you don't know yourself. You also have to be able to divorce yourself from the financial implications (sometimes more difficult to say than to do), and you have to have ownership / authority to tell the bean counters that this is the way it will be. Training is a pre-requisite.
One of the best quotes from H-C is sadly this:
A process-dependent, paper-reliant, ‘box-ticking’ safety culture has developed in the MOD. Any large, complex, hierarchical ‘top-down’ organisation which measures itself by strict adherence to procedures can become a slave to process and paperwork, and find false comfort in compliance and complexity. The MOD has not been immune from these pathogens. A process-dependent and paper-reliant culture has developed, particularly within DE&S and IPTs, which led to a shift away from proper risk analysis and ownership towards a ‘box-ticking’ approach to the management of safety and Airworthiness. Compliance with process and form-filling has taken the place of sound judgment.
It can also be the last bastion of any company, forced into compliance, but cutting costs across all areas.
It isn't only the high level problems,the safety culture within Squadron & line maintenance is way off kilter.
The engineers have been tacitly encouraged for so long to break & bend the rules that its the norm.Speaking to engineers of all ranks below ENGO,the response in the main is " if we followed procedure it would never get off the ground";So what ! In maintenance the belief has been fostered that 'Can Do' just means get it done.Eng's attitude to the "Can Do Safely" campaign is pretty cynical.
The engineers have been tacitly encouraged for so long to break & bend the rules that its the norm.Speaking to engineers of all ranks below ENGO,the response in the main is " if we followed procedure it would never get off the ground";So what ! In maintenance the belief has been fostered that 'Can Do' just means get it done.Eng's attitude to the "Can Do Safely" campaign is pretty cynical.
Last edited by woptb; 21st May 2011 at 00:14.
WOPTB,
That you for that statement - it sort of confirms what my friends say - about the sort of ethos, born in the "war-effort" styled line operations, that is now seen to be contaminating the very organisations that are supposed to correct those 'work-around' errors - the contracted base maintenance organisations. Apparently, a Harrier was once given a BDR-type electrical repair, done by a serviceman on a major maintenance check. (Instead of being repaired properly IAW the AMM - and all that...)
Although, to be quite honest, those companies are so "in-bed" with their sole customers that they too don't know what good looks like and are too worried about career and business reputations to look elsewhere for inspiration.
As SS says, the tick-box "safety" systems only give minimalist lip-service to the intentions and don't help anyone in the long run - except to tick boxes!
It has long been thought that Line Operators only go for getting the next hour's flight ready, and not to worry about how the aircraft is degrading in the slightly longer term. Simply put...a 15 minute "Do something" fix to get the crate turned around , and not the 4 hour remedy to get rid of the problem.
I'm also told the above is not helped by crews holding back faults until the end of flying or, dare I say, the weekend (?) This is also indicative of crude and slack safety management affecting the crew enough to grow the "we'll manage it ourselves" attitude in their mis-belief that they are still flying-Gods.
That you for that statement - it sort of confirms what my friends say - about the sort of ethos, born in the "war-effort" styled line operations, that is now seen to be contaminating the very organisations that are supposed to correct those 'work-around' errors - the contracted base maintenance organisations. Apparently, a Harrier was once given a BDR-type electrical repair, done by a serviceman on a major maintenance check. (Instead of being repaired properly IAW the AMM - and all that...)
Although, to be quite honest, those companies are so "in-bed" with their sole customers that they too don't know what good looks like and are too worried about career and business reputations to look elsewhere for inspiration.
As SS says, the tick-box "safety" systems only give minimalist lip-service to the intentions and don't help anyone in the long run - except to tick boxes!
It has long been thought that Line Operators only go for getting the next hour's flight ready, and not to worry about how the aircraft is degrading in the slightly longer term. Simply put...a 15 minute "Do something" fix to get the crate turned around , and not the 4 hour remedy to get rid of the problem.
I'm also told the above is not helped by crews holding back faults until the end of flying or, dare I say, the weekend (?) This is also indicative of crude and slack safety management affecting the crew enough to grow the "we'll manage it ourselves" attitude in their mis-belief that they are still flying-Gods.
No, it is indicative of the pressures to maintain availability of aicraft when poor spares provision inevitably means an aircraft waiting U/S in the hangar when it could still be flown with some operational limitations.
In some fleets, the poor skygods get so little flying when not on ops they are far more likely to carry snags rather than lose a whole day's flying to a minor fault.
In some fleets, the poor skygods get so little flying when not on ops they are far more likely to carry snags rather than lose a whole day's flying to a minor fault.
But is the reason for the lack of spares (apart from diversions to other Operators) because the real faults are being hidden, delayed, deferred, robbed and the quick "fixes" are being done time and again, leading to the wrong spares being procured?
25% less only accounts for the Bulk of things you purchase.
And Bulk doesn't matter if your just buying the wrong things - the things guys are hiding the snags with - rather than the items needed to fix the fault.
If there's no orders placed for replacement/repaired parts - production could stop and Lead Times increase...
...and I've read Haddon-Cave too. In fact I now have my fellow employees read parts of it as an HF lesson!
And Bulk doesn't matter if your just buying the wrong things - the things guys are hiding the snags with - rather than the items needed to fix the fault.
If there's no orders placed for replacement/repaired parts - production could stop and Lead Times increase...
...and I've read Haddon-Cave too. In fact I now have my fellow employees read parts of it as an HF lesson!
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VR,
"and who can forget that little wonder called resource account budgeting."
Well, at least the Cost of Capital Charge (COCC) element is no more, abolished by a recent FI.
"and who can forget that little wonder called resource account budgeting."
Well, at least the Cost of Capital Charge (COCC) element is no more, abolished by a recent FI.
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I don't think spares shortages are particularly to do with problems being 'hidden'. Any ADFs due to spares shortages should (!) have an associated demand placed... At least any I signed did, admittedly in the knowledge that some bits might not turn up for six months or more. Spares shortages are as old as the hills, and could obviously be solved by stocking shed loads of everything at every site. But that's expensive, so we do it less and less. Increasingly, availability or capability gets compromised as a result... But not convinced I ever saw spares shortages directly affect airworthiness. It might have cost lives because we didn't have a frame for the task when no amount of bodge tape would put Humpty together again and enable a safe ADF or Lim, but that's a different argument.
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SS:
There is nothing that focuses the mind like fear. Make them fly them regularly like the men who are tasked to. One days flying a month isn't too much to ask from a bean counter. Let's see them fly what they pay for. It's not unfair, unreasonable or illogical.
As to "corroded parts"... If they are getting corroded that quickly then someone didn't order the stuff from someone reputable... Back to making the bean counters fly what they pay for... If the useless bastiges won't fly them then the crews don't have to... Then the point might finally hit home at MoD and we won't waste so many useful lives on the dimwitted decisions of useless wasters sat in nice safe offices in London.
You don't have to fly in it to make sound judgements on items or components installed on an aircraft, or make sound judgements on a corroded part, you just need to ask the right questions of the SMEs (designers), if you don't know yourself. You also have to be able to divorce yourself from the financial implications (sometimes more difficult to say than to do), and you have to have ownership / authority to tell the bean counters that this is the way it will be. Training is a pre-requisite.
As to "corroded parts"... If they are getting corroded that quickly then someone didn't order the stuff from someone reputable... Back to making the bean counters fly what they pay for... If the useless bastiges won't fly them then the crews don't have to... Then the point might finally hit home at MoD and we won't waste so many useful lives on the dimwitted decisions of useless wasters sat in nice safe offices in London.
As to "corroded parts"... If they are getting corroded that quickly then someone didn't order the stuff from someone reputable.
The cadmium plating on aluminium connector shells required a minimum of 7.5 microns to give the required protection. The main supplier was not making sufficient machining allowance on the threads so that any parts plated with the specified thickness would not fit together. When my company tried to secure that business the manufacturer refused to introduce the allowances and we turned the business down. Most other connector manufacturers did make proper allowances.
Compared to modern automotive plating specifications the DEF specs for electroplating are a joke in that they allow too many defective parts.
Spares
The airworthiness regulations, quite rightly, require capital and resource to carry out all activities.
That is, lack of resources always directly affects airworthiness. In the first instance, to attain airworthiness, materiel and financial provision must be made and the initial spares procured to the correct specification in the correct quantity. In seeking authority to proceed through each project phase (never mind signing the airworthiness Release), one must demonstrate the ability to support the fleet and maintain airworthiness through-life.
The process then moves into the “maintaining airworthiness” phase and the provision and procurement (two entirely different things) of these spares is constantly refined based on experience. The lack of a given spare does not render the aircraft or fleet unairworthy, but it is indicative of a key failure in the system. It becomes a Risk and the Risk Manager must ensure mitigation is in hand. If the mitigation fails, or is too slow, then the Risk is escalated. In parallel, he must consider cumulative effect of numerous such “minor” risks. The higher risks associated with spares are poor specification, quality assurance/control, cheap and nasty cheapest is best and so on.
Of course, by far the biggest risk here is the Risk Manager (or anyone) flagging these problems and being told to shut up, **** off and find another job. (An ethos practiced by MoD regimes throughout the last 20-odd years and condoned by successive Ministers).
Airworthiness comprises 4 pillars; Safety Management System, Standards, Compliance and Independence. The above example knocks all 4 on the head straight away, leaving MoD’s airworthiness system rocking inelegantly on a fulcrum of perfectly balanced incompetence.
That is, lack of resources always directly affects airworthiness. In the first instance, to attain airworthiness, materiel and financial provision must be made and the initial spares procured to the correct specification in the correct quantity. In seeking authority to proceed through each project phase (never mind signing the airworthiness Release), one must demonstrate the ability to support the fleet and maintain airworthiness through-life.
The process then moves into the “maintaining airworthiness” phase and the provision and procurement (two entirely different things) of these spares is constantly refined based on experience. The lack of a given spare does not render the aircraft or fleet unairworthy, but it is indicative of a key failure in the system. It becomes a Risk and the Risk Manager must ensure mitigation is in hand. If the mitigation fails, or is too slow, then the Risk is escalated. In parallel, he must consider cumulative effect of numerous such “minor” risks. The higher risks associated with spares are poor specification, quality assurance/control, cheap and nasty cheapest is best and so on.
Of course, by far the biggest risk here is the Risk Manager (or anyone) flagging these problems and being told to shut up, **** off and find another job. (An ethos practiced by MoD regimes throughout the last 20-odd years and condoned by successive Ministers).
Airworthiness comprises 4 pillars; Safety Management System, Standards, Compliance and Independence. The above example knocks all 4 on the head straight away, leaving MoD’s airworthiness system rocking inelegantly on a fulcrum of perfectly balanced incompetence.
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Tuc
Airworthiness comprises 4 pillars; Safety Management System, Standards, Compliance and Independence. The above example knocks all 4 on the head straight away, leaving MoD’s airworthiness system rocking inelegantly on a fulcrum of perfectly balanced incompetence.
Beautifully put.
Though not a message to inspire anything other than dread.
Airworthiness comprises 4 pillars; Safety Management System, Standards, Compliance and Independence. The above example knocks all 4 on the head straight away, leaving MoD’s airworthiness system rocking inelegantly on a fulcrum of perfectly balanced incompetence.
Beautifully put.
Though not a message to inspire anything other than dread.
SS
What should really fill people with dread is the fact I have a briefing paper to (a former) PUS telling him I am the only person in MoD who believes it right to implement mandated airworthiness and financial probity regulations. (I know I'm not, but I'm still in the minority).
With each change of Minister I seek a statement, through my MP, that they either reject this notion or continue to agree. The last 6 have stated, in writing, they are content with previous rulings; most recently last month.
I pity the MAA. This is the ethos they have to fight against every day. I believe they are horrified at what Personnel say in these briefings. (Yes, they forgot to redact the paper when it was provided to my MP). As for the Ministers who can't see the effect this is having on their Department.....
Though not a message to inspire anything other than dread.
What should really fill people with dread is the fact I have a briefing paper to (a former) PUS telling him I am the only person in MoD who believes it right to implement mandated airworthiness and financial probity regulations. (I know I'm not, but I'm still in the minority).
With each change of Minister I seek a statement, through my MP, that they either reject this notion or continue to agree. The last 6 have stated, in writing, they are content with previous rulings; most recently last month.
I pity the MAA. This is the ethos they have to fight against every day. I believe they are horrified at what Personnel say in these briefings. (Yes, they forgot to redact the paper when it was provided to my MP). As for the Ministers who can't see the effect this is having on their Department.....
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Small Spinner said:
"One of the best quotes from H-C is sadly this:
A process-dependent, paper-reliant, ‘box-ticking’ safety culture has developed in the MOD. Any large, complex, hierarchical ‘top-down’ organisation which measures itself by strict adherence to procedures can become a slave to process and paperwork, and find false comfort in compliance and complexity. The MOD has not been immune from these pathogens. A process-dependent and paper-reliant culture has developed, particularly within DE&S and IPTs, which led to a shift away from proper risk analysis and ownership towards a ‘box-ticking’ approach to the management of safety and Airworthiness. Compliance with process and form-filling has taken the place of sound judgment."
This problem is endemic in the CAA today. It has been reduced to slavish box-ticking against a set of internal procedures. Idividual surveyors are not allowed to apply sound judgement, based on appropriate skill, knowledge and experience. The only good thing is that they are independent, and they will not accept lack of money as an excuse for not doing a proper job.
"One of the best quotes from H-C is sadly this:
A process-dependent, paper-reliant, ‘box-ticking’ safety culture has developed in the MOD. Any large, complex, hierarchical ‘top-down’ organisation which measures itself by strict adherence to procedures can become a slave to process and paperwork, and find false comfort in compliance and complexity. The MOD has not been immune from these pathogens. A process-dependent and paper-reliant culture has developed, particularly within DE&S and IPTs, which led to a shift away from proper risk analysis and ownership towards a ‘box-ticking’ approach to the management of safety and Airworthiness. Compliance with process and form-filling has taken the place of sound judgment."
This problem is endemic in the CAA today. It has been reduced to slavish box-ticking against a set of internal procedures. Idividual surveyors are not allowed to apply sound judgement, based on appropriate skill, knowledge and experience. The only good thing is that they are independent, and they will not accept lack of money as an excuse for not doing a proper job.
Mandator,
Agreed, the CAA has moved to a Box Ticking system, but so many companies are so used to doing the 'right thing' themselves they have not dropped the standards required and are sensitive to the current lack of commom sense from the CAA. I believe this is due to a lack of Surveyors, the transfer of some duties to EASA and the standardisation of EASA's NAA routines.
However, the CAA is still able to withdraw / suspend approvals and mandate corrective actions if required. And they still do suspend operator's / organisation's approvals in the name of safety and non-compliance.
Agreed, the CAA has moved to a Box Ticking system, but so many companies are so used to doing the 'right thing' themselves they have not dropped the standards required and are sensitive to the current lack of commom sense from the CAA. I believe this is due to a lack of Surveyors, the transfer of some duties to EASA and the standardisation of EASA's NAA routines.
However, the CAA is still able to withdraw / suspend approvals and mandate corrective actions if required. And they still do suspend operator's / organisation's approvals in the name of safety and non-compliance.