AOC 1 Gp breaks ranks

[just another jocky]

There are a few engineering issues atm, yr correct, but this appears to be more of a statistical blip than an identifiable trend.

Anyway, there's no choice.

[Squirrel 41]

I'm now just a casual observer on the sidelines, but from where I stand:

1. The GR4 vs GR9 debate, already sterile, is missing the point. SDSR had a series of explicit financial totals to work to, and this was translated into losing an FJ platform. Once this was accepted, the question was GR4 vs GR9; and as has been aired on here before, in terms of the balance of high-end quasi-strategic capabilities offered by the GR4 (range, PW III, Storm Shadow, Brimstone) that weren't on GR9 (don't recall PW III or SS on GR9 - happy to be corrected), the decision was reasonably easy (if unpalatable).

2. If GR9 had been retained vice GR4, JFH would have been heavily committed to AFG to at least 2015; even if JFH had regenerated to 4 Sqns + OCU (timing?) then the amount of deck time would've remained small. As long as CAS in AFG was on the plot, then that would (rightly) have been the priority, so keeping the decks of a CVS warm was not likely.

3. Given the loss of other capabilities - notably MPA and Sentinel - I would have wanted clarity on the minimum size GR4 force required for AFG + strategic attack. If by going down to one base (Marham, presumably) and 4 or 5 Sqns of GR4s, I could've accomplished this minimum mission set and saved MRA4 and Sentinel, I would've done. (And it would be MRA4 first, Sentinel a very close second).

4. Given that there was a way of funding them through a different, less FJ centric force structure, binning MRA4 was crass stupidity. Binning Sentinel from 2015 will be crass stupidity. In both cases, I expect that it will cost lives, both civilian and military. It should've been a resigning issue.

5. Things, already bad, will get worse before they get any better. It is all well and good to look forward to a 2025 force of Dave-C and Tiffies with Rivet Joint, E-3D and FSTA support - but if it happens, it will be tiny. Maybe 5 Sqns of Tiffies and 4 of Dave-C? At what point does a force this size actually cease to be relevant other than as a diplomatic fig leaf for the USAF?

6. I would've transferred SH and JHC to the AAC. It sounds trivial, but over the next decade the differential in ranks and pay would've produced small but measurable savings. We're in the market for whatever savings we can find.

7. Exam question: The role and added value of Groups and Air Command. Discuss.

8. Bin the Reds as a public demonstration of how tight things are. BBMF to be funded by public subscription, like RNHF.

None of which makes me remotely happy. But opportunities were missed in this "Strategic" review that will have implications for years to come.

S41

PS, Farewell, Puffer Jets - it was a pleasure working with you.

[Pheasant]

Squirrel,

I would've transferred SH and JHC to the AAC.

Surely this is out of kilter with Project Trenchard (or whatever it is called today) - i.e. get all that flies into the RAF by 2018 (100th anniv). If it means marginalising the other Services aviation to achieve it then so be it. Ever the cynic I can even see moves to retain the SAR Force.

For a maritime nation to take risk on maritime air power (Carriers/Harriers, MPA, other ISTAR, etc) appears amazing to me and reflects the bizarre advice given to the PM in the last few hours of SDSR. I also find it interesting to note that even now the current CDS is trying to find ways of justifying a 94,000 strong Army post-2014 - "We must retain our soldiers because they are brave and battle-hardened." What about retaining sailors and airmen because they offer defence to the UK (which the Army doesn't). Who is this guy?

[muttywhitedog]

The GR4's increased their numbers by 25% to keep on top of their game for a few months. The Harrier force achieved > 100% of their sorties the whole period they were out there, with a higher sotie rate - and no need to increase numbers. Fact

But with a full shift of Engineers working day and night, its manageable to achieve the operational sortie rate required with the number of aircraft in theatre - its just that the tornado groundcrew have to work a little bit harder to maintain their serviceability.

[Justanopinion]

Squirrel 41

A very sensible and reasoned reply.

The GR4 GR9 debate is over, GR9 has gone.

The GR9 could carry PW3, couldn't carry Stormshadow and was in the process of being fitted with Brimstone. GR9 does have a smaller range than the Tornado however that makes little difference in Afghanistan where it would appear sortie lengths without refuelling are similar.

GR9 was the lead platform for PW4 and GR4 was the lead platform for Brimstone in terms of introduction to service.

Despite what has been said in the media and by Dr Fox, the Harrier did have a moving target capability in the form of Maverick. Rockets have proved somewhat useful as well.

The harrier force in my time only ever had 3 squadrons and an OCU (until the shutting of 20) and as i have mentioned before was more than able to maintain an good period of deck time in the Afghanistan period. We didn't just do Afghanistan which seems to be a common misunderstanding.

It is a crying shame that the Harrier has gone as it was the most flexible and incredibly capable aircraft we had. However it is now pointless dwelling on it as the decision has been made and we are all worse off for it.

GR4 will continue to be a capable platform and very good luck to them.

[Finningley Boy]

The GR9 could carry PW3, couldn't carry Stormshadow and was in the process of being fitted with Brimstone. GR9 does have a smaller range than the Tornado however that makes little difference in Afghanistan where it would appear sortie lengths without refuelling are similar.

Isn't this kind of thinking the problem with the SDSR. Talking of Afghanistan as the only conflict which we'll ever encounter ever again. If the Harrier is the best aircraft for Afghanistan then one wonders just why its been ditched?? This country clearly cannot afford to defend itself as far afield as Afghanistan. Another thing if we'd gotten rid of the Tornado GR4 instead of the Harrier, surely we'd have virtually no air force left. 1 sqn of Harriers and 3 of Typhjoons? Never mind comparisons with Belgium, we'd compare unfavourably with just about any western air arm. Personally, I think a lot of what is said about the Harrier is simply the British soft spot for the "jump jet" Perhaps this is why a criminal amount of money was wasted on the utterly useless F35B version. Perhaps if we had someone who knew what they were about for a change in defence procurement... well we've heard it so many times before eh!

FB

FB

[Pontius Navigator]

Originally Posted by Finningley Boy

what is said about the Harrier is simply the British soft spot for the "jump jet"

or the western world's only effective VSTOL aircraft?

[Finningley Boy]

Come to think of it, when was the last time a Harrier lifted off the ground vertically, with a full warload?

FB

[Justanopinion]

FB

More pertinent is when was the last time VSTOL was used in anger? Oh thats right, yes, Afghanistan again. When the Harrier force first went out in 2004 and for a good year and a half after it was the only british, and possibly worldwide (apart from A10 possibly) fast jet that could use the runway at KAF due to its ripped up state. Short take off and landing with yes, a full war load and fuel in 50 deg C temperatures 3500' high.

[Finningley Boy]

Its all very well sining the praises of the Harrier as a U.K. aviation success story, but it was never built in great numbers, the logical development of the Harrier with Plenum Chamber Burning, was never developed, and even when deployed in Afghanistan, the then CAS Sir Glenn Torpy, I understand offered the entire fleet up for destruction. His successor has done just that. Don't get me wrong, as I've said before, I never grasped the logic of "the R.A.F. has to lose a fast jet type" just what kind of a Strategic Defence and Security Review makes that kind of stipulation. Some arue we desparately needed to retain the Nimrod as well. Interesting though how with such inadvisable cuts to service assets, the coalition government can still find an extra £4,000,000,000 for overseas aid.

FB

[AutoBit]

Sadly I suspect that the decision to offer Harrier up by Torpy and the current CAS was significently influenced by Navy/Air Force politics, rather then by any real operational priorities, particualry after the GR9 was so conveniently down-sized after Op Herrick prior to the SDR!!! This decision effectivly ruled out the GR9s return to Herrick.

The GR4 was always going to win the argument if you had to lose one FJ type. Still dont quite understand the 'have to lose 1 entire type' argument. And before people start talking about 'engineering and supply chains' Harrier was already paid for. Just a thought

Not anti-GR4....just anti getting rid of GR9

[Pontius Navigator]

Originally Posted by AutoBit

Still dont quite understand the 'have to lose 1 entire type' argument. And before people start talking about 'engineering and supply chains' Harrier was already paid for.

The Harrier may have been bought and paid for but the 'supply chain' would have been an ongoing expense. Then there is the cost a a second OCU, second role office etc etc.

[Biggus]

I believe I read in some BAE or DES glossy magazine, possibly both, that the BAE and RR contracts for support of the GR9 for the next 7 (? really stretching the memory now?) years had already been signed/agreed.

I don't know if the money had already changed hands before the SDR, but this may be part of what Autobit is referring to!

[AutoBit]

Quite right Biggus,
The contract was sigined and paid for. We are now in the crazy position of having to pay money to break these contracts.

As for the cost of a 2nd OCU? The OCU was fully functioning up to the day the jet was retired!!

The point I'm making is that the actual savings made from getting rid of the jet are not, in the long term, what they've been made out to be.

Again not anti GR4...just anti scrapping GR9

[Finningley Boy]

It increasingly seems to me that the SDSR has looked at one thing and one thing only (not at all surprisingly) and that is the straight forward operating costs of the assets. By getting rid of the Harrier, they've axed a valuable asset and discounted the money spent on preparing it for continued service. If they had axed the entire Tornado fleet, they would have lost two thirds of the remaing Tactical air combat capability.

I understand there were stll technical wrinkles to be ironed out of the Nimrod MRA4 programme. Even so, what this all seems to add up to is that the government had embarked upon the SDSR believing they had a still quite expansive military capability to trim some fat off. How often do we get some Joe or Jo Soap holding forth on programmes like Question Time and elsewhere upbrading us about how we should no longer be maintaining such a huge military establishment in order to be the world's cop. Well we don't, and doubtless when the SDSR was gone into with every expectation of finding plenty of junk to clear out, they found all they had left after 20 years of hacking and slicing were bleeding stumps. So like the prudent, logical and clear headed politicians they are, they told the chiefs well we need an 8% cut from somewhere! You decide. Meanwhile, we'll put the an extra £4,000,000,000 on foreign aid and ring fence one of the most bloated and inefficient departments left nationalised, the NHS. I'm not for one second suggesting that foreign aid doesn't deserve £4,000,000,000 extra cash, nor that it wouldn't be prudent to ring fence the NHS, but would it not have been even more prudent, under the circumstances, to simply ring fence the overseas aid budget as well, perhaps allowing for a much more minimal cut to the defence budget, and leaving it at that.

FB

[just another jocky]

Short take off and landing with yes, a full war load and fuel in 50 deg C temperatures 3500' high.

I'd be very interested in finding out the MOS for those conditions....seriously, and I assume it was all done under risk if the engine did fail as there would be no way to stop safely, or was the runway surface available, just not fit (fod, holes etc)?

Of course, under risk, you can do just about anything. GR4 may not have been able to get airborne without defuelling if the strip had been short enough, but for landing, 2000ft - 2500ft should have been sufficient. I bet taxying was fun.

Not anti GR4...just anti scrapping GR9

I think that pretty much sums us all up.

[Justanopinion]

If the engine had failed in a harrier everything was a big risk!

[Easy Street]

and I assume it was all done under risk if the engine did fail as there would be no way to stop safely

As justanopinion points out the Harrier always operated 'unbalanced field'. The Jag did as well for most of the time. However at some point in the Tornado's history someone decided that because it could operate balanced-field, it should unless combat considerations dictated otherwise, and hence that's become ingrained in the thought process. A very early example of "ALARP" thinking if you like....

Some really old Tornado hands might be able to correct me here... but my understanding is that the 'balanced field' requirement was not a feature of the early life of the Tonker - was it introduced by a QFI on a career push sometime in the early nineties?

[just another jocky]

ES - it certainly wasn't there when I started, though I can't remember who it was that brought it in (nor why).

My point above was only that I wondered what the operating strip length was at KAF at the start and if the GR9 had to abort at rotate (or wherever decision was), was that taken at risk as there was insufficient stopping distance available? I also wondered whether GR4 could have operated under similar conditions in extremis. Can't recall the take-off ground roll, but recall the stopping distance trials many years ago...<2500ft IIRC.

[NigelOnDraft]

"Abort Takeoff" and Harrier are fairly unassociated planning terms

When I flew the GR5/7 there wasn't even any RTO performance data It came in later, but am pretty sure it was rarely used / required.

NB the differences in types:

1. 2 engines, you need decision making points if 1 stops.
2. 1 engine - if it stops there is no "decision" to make - only consideration largely revolved about if/when to bang out.
3. Harrier - stopping? PNB is main aid, but doesn't work too well without an engine Brakes on a single point main leg, and with fair weight on the O/Rs, were next to useless.
4. GR4 stopping... all sorts of factors from hooks, brakes, cables, barriers.

I went from the GR7 to the A340. I think a rough guide was that on the GR7, an Accel-Stop used 10% distance for accel, 90% for stop. The A340 reversed the % values...

NoD