F-35 Cancelled, then what ?
_launches_from_the_flight_deck_of_the_Nimitz-class_aircraft_carrier_USS_Abraham_Lincoln_(CV.jpg/640px-thumbnail.jpg)
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It was the RS-71 to follow the then code. But when the President revealed the program he called it the SR-71 by mistake.
So they renamed the aircraft.......
So they renamed the aircraft.......
Correct. I think (behind the legend) was a bit of a Lockheed campaign to continue building SRs for the strike role. The basic structure (of the SR) has the same chine bays as the YF-12, which had been cleared for weapon launch. Ben Rich wanted to stick SRAMs in there.
So the idea hung around that it should have been reconnaissance-strike (as the AF had tried to rename the B-70 the RS-70) but that the administration (blame McNamara, of course) sabotaged it.
However, the SR never (as far as I know) had the kind of sensor or fire-control system that would be needed to launch weapons.
So the idea hung around that it should have been reconnaissance-strike (as the AF had tried to rename the B-70 the RS-70) but that the administration (blame McNamara, of course) sabotaged it.
However, the SR never (as far as I know) had the kind of sensor or fire-control system that would be needed to launch weapons.
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Well, that's one version of events. OK, it was going to be RS at one point in the process.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
From Snopes research, they seem to go along with it.
........As to why it's called SR-71 and not SR-71, here are some quotes from Lockheed SR-71: The Secret Missions Exposed, courtesy of Mary Shafer on AFU (the material in square brackets are her comments)
quote:
1962 United States Tri-Service aircraft designation system
Non-systematic or aberrant designations
SR-71
The SR-71 designator is a continuation of the pre-1962 bomber series, which ended with the XB-70 Valkyrie. During the later period of its testing, the B-70 was proposed for the reconnaissance/strike role, with an RS-70 designation. The USAF decided instead to pursue an RS-71 version of the Lockheed A-12. Then-USAF Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay preferred the SR (Strategic Reconnaissance) designation and wanted the reconnaissance aircraft to be named SR-71. Before the Blackbird was to be announced by President Johnson on 29 February 1964, LeMay lobbied to modify Johnson's speech to read SR-71 instead of RS-71. The media transcript given to the press at the time still had the earlier RS-71 designation in places, creating the myth that the president had misread the aircraft's designation.[11]
........As to why it's called SR-71 and not SR-71, here are some quotes from Lockheed SR-71: The Secret Missions Exposed, courtesy of Mary Shafer on AFU (the material in square brackets are her comments)
quote:
During the initial stages of assembling the YF-12 in late 1960, it became apparent to ADP [Advanced Development Projects, better known as the Skunk Works] engineers that the basic interceptor airframe could be adapted to provide a strike bomber. Russ Daniel approached Kelly [Johnson, head of ADP] with the idea and asked to write a basic feasibility report.
Kelly reviewed Daniel's B-12 proposal with Strategic Air Command's Commander-in-Chief (CINCSAC) General Curtis LeMay, who agreed to fund R & D [Research & Development] studies provided that these projects would not be used to harm support for the XB-70 Valkyrie bomber program [which is stunningly unstealthy, with huge wingtips that deflected downward at right angles, two big verticals also at right angles, non-moving canards at right angles, and a delta wing with only small dihedral].
{ snip }
Sometime in 1966, the B-12 was christened the RS-71 (RS for Reconnaissance-Strike and the number '71' indicating a follow-on from the RS-70 Valkyrie, which was formerly the B-70). The lack of weapons procurement alarmed Lockheed, who produced drawings of a pure reconnaissance variant, designated the R-12.
{ snip }
[More snippage, mostly of discussion of the political situation during the election year and the transcript of the White House press release inwhich the airplane was called the SR-71 and described as providing a long-range advanced strategic reconnaissance (i.e. SR, as it wasn't Johnson misspeaking) plane for military use.]
Although the political wrangling continues, the future of the R-12 was being solved by Goldwater's taunt. Johnson had conveniently (and politically) transposed 'Reconnaissance-Strike' into 'Strategic Reconnaissance'--hence 'SR-71', which was really Lockheed's R-12. Unfortunately, the B-12 was lost to the McNamara era.
So, from this source it looks like the switch from "RS-71" to "SR-71" was deliberate, not an accident at all.Kelly reviewed Daniel's B-12 proposal with Strategic Air Command's Commander-in-Chief (CINCSAC) General Curtis LeMay, who agreed to fund R & D [Research & Development] studies provided that these projects would not be used to harm support for the XB-70 Valkyrie bomber program [which is stunningly unstealthy, with huge wingtips that deflected downward at right angles, two big verticals also at right angles, non-moving canards at right angles, and a delta wing with only small dihedral].
{ snip }
Sometime in 1966, the B-12 was christened the RS-71 (RS for Reconnaissance-Strike and the number '71' indicating a follow-on from the RS-70 Valkyrie, which was formerly the B-70). The lack of weapons procurement alarmed Lockheed, who produced drawings of a pure reconnaissance variant, designated the R-12.
{ snip }
[More snippage, mostly of discussion of the political situation during the election year and the transcript of the White House press release inwhich the airplane was called the SR-71 and described as providing a long-range advanced strategic reconnaissance (i.e. SR, as it wasn't Johnson misspeaking) plane for military use.]
Although the political wrangling continues, the future of the R-12 was being solved by Goldwater's taunt. Johnson had conveniently (and politically) transposed 'Reconnaissance-Strike' into 'Strategic Reconnaissance'--hence 'SR-71', which was really Lockheed's R-12. Unfortunately, the B-12 was lost to the McNamara era.
1962 United States Tri-Service aircraft designation system
Non-systematic or aberrant designations
SR-71
The SR-71 designator is a continuation of the pre-1962 bomber series, which ended with the XB-70 Valkyrie. During the later period of its testing, the B-70 was proposed for the reconnaissance/strike role, with an RS-70 designation. The USAF decided instead to pursue an RS-71 version of the Lockheed A-12. Then-USAF Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay preferred the SR (Strategic Reconnaissance) designation and wanted the reconnaissance aircraft to be named SR-71. Before the Blackbird was to be announced by President Johnson on 29 February 1964, LeMay lobbied to modify Johnson's speech to read SR-71 instead of RS-71. The media transcript given to the press at the time still had the earlier RS-71 designation in places, creating the myth that the president had misread the aircraft's designation.[11]
Fascinating as that all is, troops, may I drag you back to the rather less exciting F-35?
Bloomberg has a headline
In the piece, Anthony Capaccio says
The U.S. May Build 500 Jets Before Finding Out If the F-35 Works - Bloomberg Politics
There's much more along those lines, although Capaccio does leaven the criticism with some slightly less bad news towards the end.
airsound
Bloomberg has a headline
The U.S. May Build 500 Jets Before Finding Out If the F-35 Works
Tests of how Lockheed Martin Corp.’s F-35 will perform in combat won’t begin until at least August 2018, a year later than planned, and more than 500 of the fighter jets may be built before the assessment is complete, according to the Pentagon’s test office.
..... Michel (sic) Gilmore, the U.S. Defense Department’s top weapons tester, said in his annual report on major programs. “However, these modifications may be unaffordable for the services as they consider the cost of upgrading these early lots of aircraft while the program continues to increase production rates in a fiscally constrained environment.”
..... Michel (sic) Gilmore, the U.S. Defense Department’s top weapons tester, said in his annual report on major programs. “However, these modifications may be unaffordable for the services as they consider the cost of upgrading these early lots of aircraft while the program continues to increase production rates in a fiscally constrained environment.”
There's much more along those lines, although Capaccio does leaven the criticism with some slightly less bad news towards the end.
airsound
Capaccio got the jump on everyone again.
The complexity (and potential for conflict and confusion) is amazing.
Eventually, everything that is on the line right now, and everything that goes on contract before 3F passes DT, is likely to need some kind of mod. But you can't afford to wait until 3F is fully developed to start doing that because (1) the services want to start training and getting squadrons on line and (2) by the time you'd finished the new aircraft will be coming off the line in 4.1 anyway.
So what you have to accept is that many, perhaps most, of the jets that go on contract before 2018 will need more than one mod visit to get to whatever the 3F standard ends up being.
But wait, there's more! Before you even start that process, the USAF wants a number of Block 3i IOC jets (a wing?) that presumably have some kind of priority.
How do the depots handle this (at the same time as they start seeing aircraft cycling through for PDM, and learn to handle this new aircraft)? They don't. You'll need to do a lot of mods in the field with contractor/government teams.
If this all starts to remind you of 1950s horror stories of lines of F-86Ds sitting on ramps waiting for radars and FCS, you're plainly an old f**t and an oldthinker who unbellyfeels 5GenTM.
The complexity (and potential for conflict and confusion) is amazing.
Eventually, everything that is on the line right now, and everything that goes on contract before 3F passes DT, is likely to need some kind of mod. But you can't afford to wait until 3F is fully developed to start doing that because (1) the services want to start training and getting squadrons on line and (2) by the time you'd finished the new aircraft will be coming off the line in 4.1 anyway.
So what you have to accept is that many, perhaps most, of the jets that go on contract before 2018 will need more than one mod visit to get to whatever the 3F standard ends up being.
But wait, there's more! Before you even start that process, the USAF wants a number of Block 3i IOC jets (a wing?) that presumably have some kind of priority.
How do the depots handle this (at the same time as they start seeing aircraft cycling through for PDM, and learn to handle this new aircraft)? They don't. You'll need to do a lot of mods in the field with contractor/government teams.
If this all starts to remind you of 1950s horror stories of lines of F-86Ds sitting on ramps waiting for radars and FCS, you're plainly an old f**t and an oldthinker who unbellyfeels 5GenTM.
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I read an article the other day which said current IRST has the ability to detect the engine exhaust from an F-35 60 miles away. The Su-35 has both IRST and L band radar, the L band perhaps having the capability to see the F-35 100 miles away. That would be before the F-35 can see the Su-35. Are these statements true?
Also, it was stated the F-22 pilots are limited to flying the F-22s to only 10-12 hours per month. It costs $58,000 per flight hour or 42 man-hours of maintenance per flight hour. Half the man-hours are spent repairing the RAM coating. The USAF can't afford more air hours. Would these statements be somewhat accurate?
I wonder what happens when the three services get 500 F-35s to take care of from a cost point of view?
Also, it was stated the F-22 pilots are limited to flying the F-22s to only 10-12 hours per month. It costs $58,000 per flight hour or 42 man-hours of maintenance per flight hour. Half the man-hours are spent repairing the RAM coating. The USAF can't afford more air hours. Would these statements be somewhat accurate?
I wonder what happens when the three services get 500 F-35s to take care of from a cost point of view?
All IRSTs are not created equal but they are getting damn good.
Selex Talks Details On IRST Technology | Defense content from Aviation Week
And if you cycle through the photos at this link, you'll find someone removing damaged RAM from an F-22. With a
ing chisel.
Hopefully they didn't have to pay someone $1500 for the chisel, but you never know.
Selex Talks Details On IRST Technology | Defense content from Aviation Week
And if you cycle through the photos at this link, you'll find someone removing damaged RAM from an F-22. With a
ing chisel. Hopefully they didn't have to pay someone $1500 for the chisel, but you never know.
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Also, it was stated the F-22 pilots are limited to flying the F-22s to only 10-12 hours per month. It costs $58,000 per flight hour or 42 man-hours of maintenance per flight hour. Half the man-hours are spent repairing the RAM coating. The USAF can't afford more air hours. Would these statements be somewhat accurate?
And although cheaper to fly than an F-22, F-35s will nevertheless be expensive to fly. That's why USAF and USN are both looking at offloading some of the F-22/F-35 pilot training hours onto a cheaper aircraft. Indeed that's one of the driving requirements for the T-X, to enable 5th gen pilots to train on it instead of their real ride.
Last edited by KenV; 29th Jan 2016 at 20:27.
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KenV,
Before you invite our resident pitch-fork-wielding experts into 6 further pages of ground-swallowing debate, you may wish to heavily caveat exactly what training you think could be offloaded from an F-35/F-22 onto a training aircraft!
For example, general seat-of-the-pants jet flying experience; g tolerance; 3-1 procedures versus other agencies (CAS with JTACs etc); BFM; ACM; other Air/Maritime and Air/Land integration activity.
You won't necessarily be doing many of the mission sets in the same way because of the different platform characteristics so one must be careful not to transpose them.
But yes, the financial principles behind surrogacy are sound.
Before you invite our resident pitch-fork-wielding experts into 6 further pages of ground-swallowing debate, you may wish to heavily caveat exactly what training you think could be offloaded from an F-35/F-22 onto a training aircraft!
For example, general seat-of-the-pants jet flying experience; g tolerance; 3-1 procedures versus other agencies (CAS with JTACs etc); BFM; ACM; other Air/Maritime and Air/Land integration activity.
You won't necessarily be doing many of the mission sets in the same way because of the different platform characteristics so one must be careful not to transpose them.
But yes, the financial principles behind surrogacy are sound.
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The Su-35 has both IRST and L band radar, the L band perhaps having the capability to see the F-35 100 miles away.
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...you may wish to heavily caveat exactly what training you think could be offloaded from an F-35/F-22 onto a training aircraft!
For example, general seat-of-the-pants jet flying experience; g tolerance; 3-1 procedures versus other agencies (CAS with JTACs etc); BFM; ACM; other Air/Maritime and Air/Land integration activity.
Oh my!
No real arguments about offloading/downloading and LVC. It's where training is going. When you start using datalinks and longer-range weapons, realistic training with real systems working starts to need even more airspace, not to mention security issues, which get very difficult indeed. However, as MSOCS is pointing out, whether you can download enough training from a fighter to a trainer, or offload it to a sim, to compensate for a much higher CPFH is questionable.
Maybe the new RAM techs are carrier-rugged. I hope so. But I spent hours in the 1990s being reassured that the new super RAM on the F-22 was also tough and that the aircraft would require very little special treatment, so permit me to be skeptical.
And I haven't seen or heard a whole lot that's reliable about the F-22 fleet getting a new-generation RAM makeover. Very, very expensive proposition.
BTW I have wielded a pitchfork in my time, but only for moving hay around a loft. But then the farmer's daughter climbed up the ladder and [That's quite enough of that. - Ed.].
No real arguments about offloading/downloading and LVC. It's where training is going. When you start using datalinks and longer-range weapons, realistic training with real systems working starts to need even more airspace, not to mention security issues, which get very difficult indeed. However, as MSOCS is pointing out, whether you can download enough training from a fighter to a trainer, or offload it to a sim, to compensate for a much higher CPFH is questionable.
Maybe the new RAM techs are carrier-rugged. I hope so. But I spent hours in the 1990s being reassured that the new super RAM on the F-22 was also tough and that the aircraft would require very little special treatment, so permit me to be skeptical.
And I haven't seen or heard a whole lot that's reliable about the F-22 fleet getting a new-generation RAM makeover. Very, very expensive proposition.
BTW I have wielded a pitchfork in my time, but only for moving hay around a loft. But then the farmer's daughter climbed up the ladder and [That's quite enough of that. - Ed.].
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KenV,
Before you invite our resident pitch-fork-wielding experts into 6 further pages of ground-swallowing debate, you may wish to heavily caveat exactly what training you think could be offloaded from an F-35/F-22 onto a training aircraft!
For example, general seat-of-the-pants jet flying experience; g tolerance; 3-1 procedures versus other agencies (CAS with JTACs etc); BFM; ACM; other Air/Maritime and Air/Land integration activity.
You won't necessarily be doing many of the mission sets in the same way because of the different platform characteristics so one must be careful not to transpose them.
But yes, the financial principles behind surrogacy are sound.
Before you invite our resident pitch-fork-wielding experts into 6 further pages of ground-swallowing debate, you may wish to heavily caveat exactly what training you think could be offloaded from an F-35/F-22 onto a training aircraft!
For example, general seat-of-the-pants jet flying experience; g tolerance; 3-1 procedures versus other agencies (CAS with JTACs etc); BFM; ACM; other Air/Maritime and Air/Land integration activity.
You won't necessarily be doing many of the mission sets in the same way because of the different platform characteristics so one must be careful not to transpose them.
But yes, the financial principles behind surrogacy are sound.
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The JPO has posted a public response to DOT&E's annual report on the F-35 - before DOT&E's report has been made available to the general public, which is interesting in its politically expedient release - I guess they are trying to get out front of the issues. You can find it here:
https://www.f35.com/news/detail/2015...onse-statement
Basically, the JPO agrees that DOT&E's report is factually accurate, but of course disagrees with interpretation of the facts, and reminds us the the JSF is still in its developmental phase, while ignoring that we will be buying upwards of 500 "developmental" jets masquerading as operational assets.
https://www.f35.com/news/detail/2015...onse-statement
Basically, the JPO agrees that DOT&E's report is factually accurate, but of course disagrees with interpretation of the facts, and reminds us the the JSF is still in its developmental phase, while ignoring that we will be buying upwards of 500 "developmental" jets masquerading as operational assets.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
And it's off-loading to the training to simulation etc which causing much of the problem - as pointed out by by Bill Sweetman (the man you love to hate) in AW&ST in their analysis of the report and the JO response....
Opinion: F-35 Software Fixes Likely To Take Time
There are two levels of concern about the latest critical memo on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) from the Pentagon’s director of operational test and engineering (DOT&E), Michael Gilmore.
The first is that it is time for the Defense Department to resolve the friction between the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) and DOT&E, which has now reached the status of public flaming. The second is the question of whether late and defective software is a feature, rather than a bug, of any defense system as complex as the JSF........
Delays should not entirely be blamed on management, because what emerges from a review of Gilmore’s reports is the multidimensional complexity of the JSF software challenge.
Essential JSF software runs on at least four platforms: the airplane; the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS), which is supposed to manage maintenance and support; reprogramming laboratories, which develop the mission data file (MDF) software that allows fused sensors to identify threats and targets; and simulators used for training and mission rehearsal. All are functionally interlinked: ALIS and training devices need to reflect the configuration of the aircraft hardware and software on the ramp. Simulators and the airplane run on updated MDFs. The latter connection becomes crucial as air forces move toward live, virtual, constructive training, where pilots fly against synthetic threats and targets, because the MDFs determine how those objects are detected and displayed. All have suffered delays, according to Gilmore’s reports.
There is no end-state to development. The goal is to update the software on a two-year cycle, so there will usually be two standards in service at any one time in the U.S., plus customized MDFs for export customers. Much of the software must be validated to a life-or-death level. Aircraft-borne code changes will require some level of regression testing (to ensure they don’t disrupt flight-critical functions). The intelligence that allows the system to distinguish a missile launcher from the village market bus resides in the MDFs. Under this pressure, the temptation is to do exactly what Gilmore says is happening: patch the problems and build each release on top of the next. But as the coders say:
Ninety-nine little bugs in the code,
Take one down, patch it around,
117 little bugs in the code.
Will this situation improve? Possibly. The JPO has been working since 2011 to meet each customer’s demand for three initial operational capability standards—2B for the Marines, 3i for the Air Force and the definitive 3F—that are being developed on overlapping schedules. If that hadn’t been done, the production effort would have had to slow down (nobody wanted to see hundreds of non-operational jets sitting on ramps at the end of 2017), which would have cost a lot of money. The end of the multitracking will be a relief.
Unfortunately, the overarching customer is not done. Shocked by the cost of upgrading highly integrated custom software on the F-22 and other programs, the Pentagon wants to require open systems architecture (OSA) in all new programs and retrofit it to the F-22 and F-35, to bring more competition and commonality into upgrade efforts. “Open mission systems are key to everything we do,” Air Combat Command leader Gen. Herbert Carlisle said late last year. William LaPlante, the Air Force acquisition chief until December 2015, wanted to go to OSA during the F-35’s Block 4 upgrade process—but it has to compete for time and money with badly needed new weapons and fixes left over from Block 3F.
Can the F-22 and F-35 migrate to OSA and reach the sunlit uplands of regular, on-time upgrades on a stable basis? Probably, but it will take more time and money than people think. The lesson is that what we want software to do in our weapons, and when we want it, has to be scrutinized, Red-teamed and matched to assets as rigorously as any other aspect of system requirements.
Opinion: F-35 Software Fixes Likely To Take Time
There are two levels of concern about the latest critical memo on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) from the Pentagon’s director of operational test and engineering (DOT&E), Michael Gilmore.
The first is that it is time for the Defense Department to resolve the friction between the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) and DOT&E, which has now reached the status of public flaming. The second is the question of whether late and defective software is a feature, rather than a bug, of any defense system as complex as the JSF........
Delays should not entirely be blamed on management, because what emerges from a review of Gilmore’s reports is the multidimensional complexity of the JSF software challenge.
Essential JSF software runs on at least four platforms: the airplane; the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS), which is supposed to manage maintenance and support; reprogramming laboratories, which develop the mission data file (MDF) software that allows fused sensors to identify threats and targets; and simulators used for training and mission rehearsal. All are functionally interlinked: ALIS and training devices need to reflect the configuration of the aircraft hardware and software on the ramp. Simulators and the airplane run on updated MDFs. The latter connection becomes crucial as air forces move toward live, virtual, constructive training, where pilots fly against synthetic threats and targets, because the MDFs determine how those objects are detected and displayed. All have suffered delays, according to Gilmore’s reports.
There is no end-state to development. The goal is to update the software on a two-year cycle, so there will usually be two standards in service at any one time in the U.S., plus customized MDFs for export customers. Much of the software must be validated to a life-or-death level. Aircraft-borne code changes will require some level of regression testing (to ensure they don’t disrupt flight-critical functions). The intelligence that allows the system to distinguish a missile launcher from the village market bus resides in the MDFs. Under this pressure, the temptation is to do exactly what Gilmore says is happening: patch the problems and build each release on top of the next. But as the coders say:
Ninety-nine little bugs in the code,
Take one down, patch it around,
117 little bugs in the code.
Will this situation improve? Possibly. The JPO has been working since 2011 to meet each customer’s demand for three initial operational capability standards—2B for the Marines, 3i for the Air Force and the definitive 3F—that are being developed on overlapping schedules. If that hadn’t been done, the production effort would have had to slow down (nobody wanted to see hundreds of non-operational jets sitting on ramps at the end of 2017), which would have cost a lot of money. The end of the multitracking will be a relief.
Unfortunately, the overarching customer is not done. Shocked by the cost of upgrading highly integrated custom software on the F-22 and other programs, the Pentagon wants to require open systems architecture (OSA) in all new programs and retrofit it to the F-22 and F-35, to bring more competition and commonality into upgrade efforts. “Open mission systems are key to everything we do,” Air Combat Command leader Gen. Herbert Carlisle said late last year. William LaPlante, the Air Force acquisition chief until December 2015, wanted to go to OSA during the F-35’s Block 4 upgrade process—but it has to compete for time and money with badly needed new weapons and fixes left over from Block 3F.
Can the F-22 and F-35 migrate to OSA and reach the sunlit uplands of regular, on-time upgrades on a stable basis? Probably, but it will take more time and money than people think. The lesson is that what we want software to do in our weapons, and when we want it, has to be scrutinized, Red-teamed and matched to assets as rigorously as any other aspect of system requirements.
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Following on from the discussion about different software releases and implicitly technical refreshes of the IT architecture of the F35.
What versions are being delivered from Fort Worth? I, dangerously, assume that 2B is no longer being manufactured and that all B & Cs are being produced with 3F ready hardware and that USAF As are being built 3I ready, not sure about export As. Can anyone cast any light?
What versions are being delivered from Fort Worth? I, dangerously, assume that 2B is no longer being manufactured and that all B & Cs are being produced with 3F ready hardware and that USAF As are being built 3I ready, not sure about export As. Can anyone cast any light?
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That may sound a bit rich since I operate anonymously myself, and its a fair point, however I am not an aviation talking head who is mentioned on here regularly under my actual name.