F-35 Cancelled, then what ?
2000?
2003?
2015?
What generation of IADS was that requirement written against?
How will someone running that test define "modern" to meet the requirement?
If that's the O'Bryan I think it is, then the Mandy Rice-Davies Principle applies.
As for what is written into the requirements: Did the intel assessments of the late 1990s, as reflected in the final Joint Operational Requirements Document, correctly anticipate the capabilities of the S-400 and Russian/Chinese multi-band radar systems, including VHF Aesas?
The answer to that question is classified but I would cheerfully bet anyone a bottle of Woodford Reserve that they didn't.
As for what is written into the requirements: Did the intel assessments of the late 1990s, as reflected in the final Joint Operational Requirements Document, correctly anticipate the capabilities of the S-400 and Russian/Chinese multi-band radar systems, including VHF Aesas?
The answer to that question is classified but I would cheerfully bet anyone a bottle of Woodford Reserve that they didn't.
Join Date: Jul 2015
Location: aus
Posts: 277
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Here is a bit of it. I guess you make up your own opinion of it.
https://web.archive.org/web/20121125...12fighter.aspx
Much speculation has swirled around the question of the F-35’s electronic warfare and electronic attack capabilities. The Air Force has resolutely refused to discuss any specifics. Yet experts have pointed out that, in its most recent EW/EA roadmap, USAF has failed to mention any plans for a dedicated jamming aircraft. It is a conspicuous omission.
O’Bryan certainly couldn’t go into the subject of the fighter’s EW/EA suite in any detail, or the way it might coordinate with specialized aircraft such as the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System, RC-135 Rivet Joint, E-8 JSTARS, or EA-18G Growler jammer aircraft.
He did say, however, that F-35 requirements call for it to go into battle with "no support whatever" from these systems.
"I don’t know a pilot alive who wouldn’t want whatever support he can get," O’Bryan acknowledged. "But the requirements that we were given to build the airplane didn’t have any support functions built in. In other words, we had to find the target, ... penetrate the anti-access [defenses], ... ID the target, and ... destroy it by ourselves."
O’Bryan said the power of the F-35’s EW/EA systems can be inferred from the fact that the Marine Corps "is going to replace its EA-6B [a dedicated jamming aircraft] with the baseline F-35B" with no additional pods or internal systems.
Asked about the Air Force’s plans, O’Bryan answered with several rhetorical questions: "Are they investing in a big jammer fleet? Are they buying [EA-18G] Growlers?" Then he said, "There’s a capability here."
O’Bryan went on to say that the electronic warfare capability on the F-35A "is as good as, or better than, [that of the] fourth generation airplanes specifically built for that purpose." The F-35’s "sensitivity" and processing power—a great deal of it automated—coupled with the sensor fusion of internal and offboard systems, give the pilot unprecedented situational awareness as well as the ability to detect, locate, and target specific systems that need to be disrupted.
When it comes to electronic combat, the F-35A will make possible a new operational concept, O’Bryan said. The goal is not to simply suppress enemy air defenses. The goal will be to destroy them.
"I don’t want to destroy a double-digit SAM for a few hours," he said. "What we’d like to do is put a 2,000-pound bomb on the whole complex and never have to deal with that ... SAM for the rest of the conflict."
At present, that is difficult to do. Adversaries, O’Bryan pointed out, recognize that the basic American AGM-88 High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile has a light warhead able to do little more than damage an air defense array. Thus, they have adapted to the threat by deploying spare arrays with their mobile systems.
The hope is that the introduction of the new F-35 will put a stop to that practice.
The effect of the F-35’s stealth, EW/EA capabilities, and powers of automatic target recognition and location in all weather will offer conventional "deterrence" on an unprecedented scale, O’Bryan said.
The fighter’s version 3.0 automatic target recognition software won’t be able to distinguish one kind of battle tank from another. However it will be able to pluck out the mobile surface-to-air missile system from a forest of other kinds of vehicles.
Multiple fighters detecting and characterizing a site’s electronic emissions, coupled with a detailed synthetic aperture radar image, will lead a strike group to specific aimpoints. It goes without saying that all of this can be achieved while the fighters themselves remain undetected.
The F-35’s electronic attack capabilities, said O’Bryan, allow the fighter to penetrate into "places that other airplanes can’t go" and therefore "hold strategic targets at risk." These capabilities are unique to the F-35, he asserted.
https://web.archive.org/web/20121125...12fighter.aspx
Much speculation has swirled around the question of the F-35’s electronic warfare and electronic attack capabilities. The Air Force has resolutely refused to discuss any specifics. Yet experts have pointed out that, in its most recent EW/EA roadmap, USAF has failed to mention any plans for a dedicated jamming aircraft. It is a conspicuous omission.
O’Bryan certainly couldn’t go into the subject of the fighter’s EW/EA suite in any detail, or the way it might coordinate with specialized aircraft such as the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System, RC-135 Rivet Joint, E-8 JSTARS, or EA-18G Growler jammer aircraft.
He did say, however, that F-35 requirements call for it to go into battle with "no support whatever" from these systems.
"I don’t know a pilot alive who wouldn’t want whatever support he can get," O’Bryan acknowledged. "But the requirements that we were given to build the airplane didn’t have any support functions built in. In other words, we had to find the target, ... penetrate the anti-access [defenses], ... ID the target, and ... destroy it by ourselves."
O’Bryan said the power of the F-35’s EW/EA systems can be inferred from the fact that the Marine Corps "is going to replace its EA-6B [a dedicated jamming aircraft] with the baseline F-35B" with no additional pods or internal systems.
Asked about the Air Force’s plans, O’Bryan answered with several rhetorical questions: "Are they investing in a big jammer fleet? Are they buying [EA-18G] Growlers?" Then he said, "There’s a capability here."
O’Bryan went on to say that the electronic warfare capability on the F-35A "is as good as, or better than, [that of the] fourth generation airplanes specifically built for that purpose." The F-35’s "sensitivity" and processing power—a great deal of it automated—coupled with the sensor fusion of internal and offboard systems, give the pilot unprecedented situational awareness as well as the ability to detect, locate, and target specific systems that need to be disrupted.
When it comes to electronic combat, the F-35A will make possible a new operational concept, O’Bryan said. The goal is not to simply suppress enemy air defenses. The goal will be to destroy them.
"I don’t want to destroy a double-digit SAM for a few hours," he said. "What we’d like to do is put a 2,000-pound bomb on the whole complex and never have to deal with that ... SAM for the rest of the conflict."
At present, that is difficult to do. Adversaries, O’Bryan pointed out, recognize that the basic American AGM-88 High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile has a light warhead able to do little more than damage an air defense array. Thus, they have adapted to the threat by deploying spare arrays with their mobile systems.
The hope is that the introduction of the new F-35 will put a stop to that practice.
The effect of the F-35’s stealth, EW/EA capabilities, and powers of automatic target recognition and location in all weather will offer conventional "deterrence" on an unprecedented scale, O’Bryan said.
The fighter’s version 3.0 automatic target recognition software won’t be able to distinguish one kind of battle tank from another. However it will be able to pluck out the mobile surface-to-air missile system from a forest of other kinds of vehicles.
Multiple fighters detecting and characterizing a site’s electronic emissions, coupled with a detailed synthetic aperture radar image, will lead a strike group to specific aimpoints. It goes without saying that all of this can be achieved while the fighters themselves remain undetected.
The F-35’s electronic attack capabilities, said O’Bryan, allow the fighter to penetrate into "places that other airplanes can’t go" and therefore "hold strategic targets at risk." These capabilities are unique to the F-35, he asserted.
Last edited by a1bill; 1st Dec 2015 at 15:47.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
O’Bryan said the power of the F-35’s EW/EA systems can be inferred from the fact that the Marine Corps "is going to replace its EA-6B [a dedicated jamming aircraft] with the baseline F-35B" with no additional pods or internal systems.
UMC Concepts & Programs - Legacy Aircraft
EA-6B Prowler
EA-6B Prowlers remain an essential, combat-proven element of the MAGTF and joint force. The Prowlers’ primary mission is EW, which includes electronic attack (EA), electronic support (ES), and electronic protection (EP). Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadrons (VMAQs) have completed the transition to the Improved Capabilities III (ICAP-III) weapon system............
We will execute a phased decommissioning of our four VMAQs between FY16 and FY19. VMAQ-1, which formally re-designated as VMAQT-1 in June 2013, has assumed EA-6B Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) responsibilities. VMAQT-1 will function as the EA-6B FRS until it decommissions at the end of FY16. The remaining squadrons will decommission at a rate of one per year until the Marine The EA-6B fleet is fully retired by the end of FY19: VMAQ-4 at the end of FY17, VMAQ-3 at the end of FY18, and VMAQ-2 at the end of FY19. No single platform will replace the EA-6B. Rather, EW capabilities for the MAGTF will be provided from numerous airborne and ground-based systems. The vision of MAGTF EW is a composite of manned and unmanned surface, air, and space-based assets, which are fully networking and collaborating to provide the MAGTF with the ability to control the EM spectrum.............
Marine Aviation Plan 2015
See section 2.1.
............MAGTF EW– The Marine Corps’ comprehensive plan to address post-EA- 6B Prowler Electronic Warfare (EW) requirements is Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) EW. MAGTF EW leverages emerging technologies and integrates multiple aviation platforms (unmanned, fixed wing, and rotary wing assets); payloads; ground-based EW nodes; and cyber effects to provide commanders with an organic and persistent EW capability. MAGTF EW transitions the Marine Corps from a focus on low- density/high-demand (LD/HD) EW capability, to a distributed, platform- agnostic approach.
Any available digitally interoperable sensor can be connected with another to build a scalable, responsive, and cost-effective integrated system, delivering capabilities such as EW, cyber, and signals intelligence (SIGINT) on demand. This approach will also allow the Marine Corps, as a middleweight expeditionary force, to retain direct access to its capability investment throughout the operations as organic and inseparable features of the MAGTF. MAGTF EW will complement joint EW assets in support of ground forces and fifth-generation aircraft flying against sophisticated integrated air defense systems (IADS).
Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell (CEWCC)– The CEWCC coordinates the integrated planning, execution, and assessment of cyberspace and EMS actions across the MAGTF’s operational environment in order to increase operational tempo and achieve military advantage. To perform this primary function, the CEWCC is placed within the MAGTF at the commander’s discretion, but should be established within the command element S-3/G-3 in order to ensure it can support all phases of the commander’s scheme of maneuver with Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO) and Cyberspace Operations (CO), which can be complex, technical, highly classified, and potentially global in consequence. Wherever the CEWCC exists, it is responsible for coordinating across principal staff sections , major subordinate commands (MSCs)/major subordinate elements (MSEs); working groups, boards, and bureaus; and with higher headquarters to enhance the integration of cyberspace and EMS-dependent capabilities applicable to all warfighting functions and MAGTF objectives.
EW Services Architecture (EWSA)- An extensible data exchange and hardware protocol intended to connect EW/SIGINT airborne nodes to ground Operators, Cyberspace and EW Coordination Cells (CEWCCs), and other air EW nodes. EWSA will provide “on-demand EW fires” in operational conditions under C/EWCC control, and will unite Air EW, Ground EW and SIGINT via an adaptive network with multiple waveforms. Additionally, EWSA will also provide basic digital interoperability between air platforms.
ALQ-231 Intrepid Tiger II (ITII)– IT-II is a platform agnostic, modular open system architecture payload that provides advanced AEA and ES capability to existing and dependable multirole platforms. Just as IT-II can be rapidly reprogrammed to counter evolving and emerging threats, the Modular Open System Architecture (MOSA) design allows for rapid integration on multiple platforms. IT-II (V) 1 currently deploys with AV-8Bs and F/A-18s. This year the IT-II (V) 3 will EOC with USMC light attack helicopters with follow –on IT-II (V) 2 for unmanned aircraft systems in development.
ITII details include:
• EOC of Block ‘0’ pod to OEF conducted in 2012
• 116 pods for counter-communications and irregular warfare RF target sets
• Technology and capacity to field radar variant of Intrepid Tiger II
• MEU focus (AV-8B, F/A18, AH/UH series aircraft)
• Currently deployed V(1) on Fixed-Wing
• V(3) AH/UH series QRA of Block ‘1’ set for FY15
• UAS (future)
Nobody Asked Me.......Bur We Still Need the Prowler
• 116 pods for counter-communications and irregular warfare RF target sets
• Technology and capacity to field radar variant of Intrepid Tiger II
• MEU focus (AV-8B, F/A18, AH/UH series aircraft)
• Currently deployed V(1) on Fixed-Wing
• V(3) AH/UH series QRA of Block ‘1’ set for FY15
• UAS (future)
O’Bryan said F-35B can do what??
Did NGJ magic itself into the aircraft without anyone noticing or adding any weight?
Meanwhile in the real world the podded NGJ just got through PDR and should be on track for 2021, with IOC for low-band in 2022 and high-band in 2024. These dates are for the podded system for the Growler. Moving the technology on to F-35 will take a little longer.
None of this prevents F-35 doing clever things with its sense capability or using its radar in the frequencies & aspects it can cover, but this does not make it an EA-6B or a Growler.
Did NGJ magic itself into the aircraft without anyone noticing or adding any weight?
Meanwhile in the real world the podded NGJ just got through PDR and should be on track for 2021, with IOC for low-band in 2022 and high-band in 2024. These dates are for the podded system for the Growler. Moving the technology on to F-35 will take a little longer.
None of this prevents F-35 doing clever things with its sense capability or using its radar in the frequencies & aspects it can cover, but this does not make it an EA-6B or a Growler.
The U.S. Marine Corps has begun in earnest to divest itself of the EA-6B Prowler and the unique electronic warfare (EW) capabilities of the ICAP III aircraft. As currently planned, Fiscal Year 2016 will start
the dismantlement of the Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron (VMAQ) community and phase-out of the EA6B aircraft that has since the mid-1970s served this nation and Marine Corps airborne EW requirements. Through 2019, one VMAQ squadron per year will be phased out.
the dismantlement of the Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron (VMAQ) community and phase-out of the EA6B aircraft that has since the mid-1970s served this nation and Marine Corps airborne EW requirements. Through 2019, one VMAQ squadron per year will be phased out.
Although we are not completely at peace, we are not in a full-fledged air battle right now - so the Pentagon bean counters and the powerpoint experts have the upper hand. Once things heat up in an environment where there are real anti-air threats to our fighters, strike and bomber aircraft, the light bulb will belatedly come on, once again, with the idea that an effective EW platform is a true force multiplier and necessary. True warriors and peacetime leadership have different DNA.
Join Date: Jul 2015
Location: aus
Posts: 277
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Page 120? The air power australia's kopp and goon.
I think their opinions were well covered by the RAAF back in 2012
House of Representatives Committees ? jfadt/defenceannualreport_2010_2011/hearings.htm ? Parliament of Australia
ParlInfo - Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade : 16/03/2012 : Department of Defence annual report 2010-11
Air Vice Marshal Osley : Mr Chairman and committee members, I am tabling a submission which I think broadly addresses the issues raised by Air Power Australia and RepSim Pty Ltd representatives when they spoke to you on 7 February this year. At that hearing the Air Power Australia and RepSim principals were critical of the air combat capabilities of the JSF as well as being critical of the cost estimates and delays in schedule of the program. In my opinion, as Program Manager New Air Combat Capability, I consider the representatives of both Air Power Australia and RepSim made some errors of fact about F35 capability and the status of the New Air Combat Capability program. Similar to the opportunity that was afforded to Air Power Australia, I would like to make this opening statement and then provide a brief Defence response to some of the specific Air Power Australia and RepSim claims, and then of course I am more than happy to take any questions. I am also aware that Lockheed-Martin's Mr Tom Burbadge, will be making an independent presentation to your committee next week.
On the JSF program in general, the restructure that has occurred in the program over 2010-2011, and the past 18 months in particular, known as the 'Technical Baseline Review', has resulted in some delay of milestones and in increased cost estimates. But it has also resulted in a step-change improvement in the project management of the JSF program. In particular, the system development and demonstration phase of the program remains fully funded. It was funded to $43 billion and the US has since added a further $7.4 billion from their own funds, so it is fully funded and will not be affected by the planned US delay of 179 aircraft over the next six years.
On 2 March 2012 this year at the international partners meeting in Washington DC, Vice Admiral David Venlet who is the Principal Executive Officer of the JSF Program Office, reiterated the US government's commitment to ensuring the F35 success and confirmed that the test program and remaining development program were fully resourced. He also reiterated strongly that the current technical issues are normal in a fighter development program and are known by the program, and all are in work and being mitigated. In recent weeks the US Defense Secretary, Leon Panetta, has also reiterated the US commitment to continue to aim to buy 2,443 F35s for the US Military Services. All nine international partners remain committed—that is, the US, the UK, Canada, Turkey, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Italy and Australia. I will not go through the individual countries, but they have all as recently as yesterday at the JSF Executive Steering Board reconfirmed their commitment to the program and indicated how and when they are going to buy their aeroplanes. In addition Israel and Japan have committed to buy F35A through the Foreign Military Sales program with the US, a total of about 60 aircraft at this point in time.
I think some of you would have read about under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Frank Kendall's quick look report from November last year. It was an internal Department of Defense document that made an overall assessment of the suitability of the F35 to continue in low-rate initial production. The report identified 13 key risk areas, but it concluded there was no fundamental design risk sufficient to preclude further production. The report listed the risks, but it did not outline the steps that the JSF program office is going through to mitigate those risks. All of those risks are known by the program and are being worked on.
While the annual 2011 US Department of Defense operational test and evaluation report that was released in January this year said that the most difficult testing is still to come, the report did acknowledge that there had been good progress in flight testing to date, there was pleasing progress on the mission system testing, arguably the most challenging part of the F35 program, and they currently expect to have block 3 software through development testing by mid-2017. That potentially would support an Australian IOC as early as late 2018, should the government agree to that IOC when stage 2 is considered by government.
In response to Airpower Australia and RepSim's claims, I would like to hit on a few points. The first one is Airpower Australia and RepSim claim that the AIR 6000 is a failed project. As explained in my submission, AIR 6000 Phase 2A/B (Stage 1), the first 14 aircraft, has not triggered any DMO criteria as a failed program. Its cost is currently within the cost envelope for stage 1 that was approved by government at the end of 2009. As far as capability goes, it still plans to meet the RAAF's planned initial operating capability requirements as advised to government at the end of 2009. The scheduled delivery of our first two aircraft in 2014 is still on track. Our first aircraft will start to be put together in the next few weeks.
Airpower Australia and RepSim claim that the F35 will not be competitive in 2020. Airpower Australia's criticisms mainly centre around F35's aerodynamic performance and stealth capabilities. These are inconsistent with years of detailed analysis that has been undertaken by Defence, the JSF program office, Lockheed Martin, the US services and the eight other partner nations. While aircraft developments such as the Russian PAK-FA or the Chinese J20, as argued by Airpower Australia, show that threats we could potentially face are becoming increasingly sophisticated, there is nothing new regarding development of these aircraft to change Defence's assessment. I think that the Airpower Australia and RepSim analysis is basically flawed through incorrect assumptions and a lack of knowledge of the classified F-35 performance information.
The JSF program accomplishments to date, towards entering operational service, include that the F35 continues to be assessed to be able to penetrate a modern, integrated air defence system. When the classified capabilities are taken into account, we have had Australian pilots flying high-fidelity simulators and they have been very impressed with the combat capabilities of the aircraft. These pilots include fighter combat instructors from RAAF Base Williamtown and ex-commanding officers of fighter squadrons within Australia. The range of the F35A is about 30 per cent greater than the F18 legacy aircraft. The stealth is meeting planned requirements. The F35 coating technology is being retrofitted to the F22 because the coating is more effective and easier to maintain. The F35 has reached its maximum design speed of Mach 1.6 during testing in 2011 and it has been tested to 9G—in fact, a little bit more than 9G due to a slight overstress by the test pilot. On radar and sensors, the APG81 radar exceeded expectations in real-world exercises in Northern Edge in 2009 and 2011 where it was presented with a modern, hostile, electronic environment. The F35 has very good electronic attack and electronic defence capabilities. Weight has not been an issue in the program since 2005; for the F35A it is well within specification. Eighty per cent of full software capability is flying today. As far as flight tests go, in calendar year 2011 the F35 achieved 6,664 test points against 6,256 planned, so it exceeded it by about 400 points. The F35 does include a follow-on development program each two years of software and every four years a hardware update that is funded by the partner nations in accordance with the number of aeroplanes that they have.
RepSim Pty Ltd reps believe that they have an understanding of the F35 capability that is as good as or better than most, and that is the basis for them making some of their comments about their simulations and about the F35. I would like to say that the RepSim principals have never had access to the classified F35 air combat capability data that Defence has used to assess the capability of the aircraft in various scenarios. Without this access they cannot have a complete understanding of the F35 capability.
Air Power Australia and RepSim principals offer a summary of the Pacific Vision exercise conducted in 2008 where they assert that it proves the vulnerability of the F35. The war game in question was not focused on air combat capability analysis at the required classification and level of detail necessary to draw valid conclusions on the relative merits of the F35 in force-on-force applications. The Pacific Vision 2008 exercise was not intended to test air-to-air capabilities and the analysis done by Air Power Australia and RepSim at the time was not accepted as valid by either Rand, the USAF or the RAAF.
As I concluded in my submission, Defence maintains that the F35 is the right aircraft for Australia. The JSF program continues, however, to be closely monitored by Defence. It is a development program that does have considerable risk and we are aware of that. The Minister for Defence has clearly stated our commitment to acquiring 14 F35A aircraft and that the schedule for delivery of the next 12 is under consideration. The minister has explained that Defence will conduct an exhaustive review of the risks of the capability gap and will recommend options for government consideration later in 2012. The minister has further stated that any decision on the next tranche of F35 aircraft is unlikely to be a high priority for 2012. Thank you.
I think their opinions were well covered by the RAAF back in 2012
House of Representatives Committees ? jfadt/defenceannualreport_2010_2011/hearings.htm ? Parliament of Australia
ParlInfo - Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade : 16/03/2012 : Department of Defence annual report 2010-11
Air Vice Marshal Osley : Mr Chairman and committee members, I am tabling a submission which I think broadly addresses the issues raised by Air Power Australia and RepSim Pty Ltd representatives when they spoke to you on 7 February this year. At that hearing the Air Power Australia and RepSim principals were critical of the air combat capabilities of the JSF as well as being critical of the cost estimates and delays in schedule of the program. In my opinion, as Program Manager New Air Combat Capability, I consider the representatives of both Air Power Australia and RepSim made some errors of fact about F35 capability and the status of the New Air Combat Capability program. Similar to the opportunity that was afforded to Air Power Australia, I would like to make this opening statement and then provide a brief Defence response to some of the specific Air Power Australia and RepSim claims, and then of course I am more than happy to take any questions. I am also aware that Lockheed-Martin's Mr Tom Burbadge, will be making an independent presentation to your committee next week.
On the JSF program in general, the restructure that has occurred in the program over 2010-2011, and the past 18 months in particular, known as the 'Technical Baseline Review', has resulted in some delay of milestones and in increased cost estimates. But it has also resulted in a step-change improvement in the project management of the JSF program. In particular, the system development and demonstration phase of the program remains fully funded. It was funded to $43 billion and the US has since added a further $7.4 billion from their own funds, so it is fully funded and will not be affected by the planned US delay of 179 aircraft over the next six years.
On 2 March 2012 this year at the international partners meeting in Washington DC, Vice Admiral David Venlet who is the Principal Executive Officer of the JSF Program Office, reiterated the US government's commitment to ensuring the F35 success and confirmed that the test program and remaining development program were fully resourced. He also reiterated strongly that the current technical issues are normal in a fighter development program and are known by the program, and all are in work and being mitigated. In recent weeks the US Defense Secretary, Leon Panetta, has also reiterated the US commitment to continue to aim to buy 2,443 F35s for the US Military Services. All nine international partners remain committed—that is, the US, the UK, Canada, Turkey, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Italy and Australia. I will not go through the individual countries, but they have all as recently as yesterday at the JSF Executive Steering Board reconfirmed their commitment to the program and indicated how and when they are going to buy their aeroplanes. In addition Israel and Japan have committed to buy F35A through the Foreign Military Sales program with the US, a total of about 60 aircraft at this point in time.
I think some of you would have read about under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Frank Kendall's quick look report from November last year. It was an internal Department of Defense document that made an overall assessment of the suitability of the F35 to continue in low-rate initial production. The report identified 13 key risk areas, but it concluded there was no fundamental design risk sufficient to preclude further production. The report listed the risks, but it did not outline the steps that the JSF program office is going through to mitigate those risks. All of those risks are known by the program and are being worked on.
While the annual 2011 US Department of Defense operational test and evaluation report that was released in January this year said that the most difficult testing is still to come, the report did acknowledge that there had been good progress in flight testing to date, there was pleasing progress on the mission system testing, arguably the most challenging part of the F35 program, and they currently expect to have block 3 software through development testing by mid-2017. That potentially would support an Australian IOC as early as late 2018, should the government agree to that IOC when stage 2 is considered by government.
In response to Airpower Australia and RepSim's claims, I would like to hit on a few points. The first one is Airpower Australia and RepSim claim that the AIR 6000 is a failed project. As explained in my submission, AIR 6000 Phase 2A/B (Stage 1), the first 14 aircraft, has not triggered any DMO criteria as a failed program. Its cost is currently within the cost envelope for stage 1 that was approved by government at the end of 2009. As far as capability goes, it still plans to meet the RAAF's planned initial operating capability requirements as advised to government at the end of 2009. The scheduled delivery of our first two aircraft in 2014 is still on track. Our first aircraft will start to be put together in the next few weeks.
Airpower Australia and RepSim claim that the F35 will not be competitive in 2020. Airpower Australia's criticisms mainly centre around F35's aerodynamic performance and stealth capabilities. These are inconsistent with years of detailed analysis that has been undertaken by Defence, the JSF program office, Lockheed Martin, the US services and the eight other partner nations. While aircraft developments such as the Russian PAK-FA or the Chinese J20, as argued by Airpower Australia, show that threats we could potentially face are becoming increasingly sophisticated, there is nothing new regarding development of these aircraft to change Defence's assessment. I think that the Airpower Australia and RepSim analysis is basically flawed through incorrect assumptions and a lack of knowledge of the classified F-35 performance information.
The JSF program accomplishments to date, towards entering operational service, include that the F35 continues to be assessed to be able to penetrate a modern, integrated air defence system. When the classified capabilities are taken into account, we have had Australian pilots flying high-fidelity simulators and they have been very impressed with the combat capabilities of the aircraft. These pilots include fighter combat instructors from RAAF Base Williamtown and ex-commanding officers of fighter squadrons within Australia. The range of the F35A is about 30 per cent greater than the F18 legacy aircraft. The stealth is meeting planned requirements. The F35 coating technology is being retrofitted to the F22 because the coating is more effective and easier to maintain. The F35 has reached its maximum design speed of Mach 1.6 during testing in 2011 and it has been tested to 9G—in fact, a little bit more than 9G due to a slight overstress by the test pilot. On radar and sensors, the APG81 radar exceeded expectations in real-world exercises in Northern Edge in 2009 and 2011 where it was presented with a modern, hostile, electronic environment. The F35 has very good electronic attack and electronic defence capabilities. Weight has not been an issue in the program since 2005; for the F35A it is well within specification. Eighty per cent of full software capability is flying today. As far as flight tests go, in calendar year 2011 the F35 achieved 6,664 test points against 6,256 planned, so it exceeded it by about 400 points. The F35 does include a follow-on development program each two years of software and every four years a hardware update that is funded by the partner nations in accordance with the number of aeroplanes that they have.
RepSim Pty Ltd reps believe that they have an understanding of the F35 capability that is as good as or better than most, and that is the basis for them making some of their comments about their simulations and about the F35. I would like to say that the RepSim principals have never had access to the classified F35 air combat capability data that Defence has used to assess the capability of the aircraft in various scenarios. Without this access they cannot have a complete understanding of the F35 capability.
Air Power Australia and RepSim principals offer a summary of the Pacific Vision exercise conducted in 2008 where they assert that it proves the vulnerability of the F35. The war game in question was not focused on air combat capability analysis at the required classification and level of detail necessary to draw valid conclusions on the relative merits of the F35 in force-on-force applications. The Pacific Vision 2008 exercise was not intended to test air-to-air capabilities and the analysis done by Air Power Australia and RepSim at the time was not accepted as valid by either Rand, the USAF or the RAAF.
As I concluded in my submission, Defence maintains that the F35 is the right aircraft for Australia. The JSF program continues, however, to be closely monitored by Defence. It is a development program that does have considerable risk and we are aware of that. The Minister for Defence has clearly stated our commitment to acquiring 14 F35A aircraft and that the schedule for delivery of the next 12 is under consideration. The minister has explained that Defence will conduct an exhaustive review of the risks of the capability gap and will recommend options for government consideration later in 2012. The minister has further stated that any decision on the next tranche of F35 aircraft is unlikely to be a high priority for 2012. Thank you.
Join Date: Jul 2015
Location: aus
Posts: 277
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
My opinion is, I'm as clueless on the classified performance as most of the posters here.
However, just two pages ago, UK Beck said.
“This jet isn’t just about the weapons — it’s a game-changing capability. The Tornado GR.4 can't just stroll into a double digit SAM MEZ [Missile Engagement Zone]. In the F-35 I can generate a wormhole in the airspace and lead everyone through it. There isn’t another platform around that can do that. This isn’t all about height and supercruise speed — it’s the ability to not be seen,” added Beck. “We can never be explicit about the true capabilities of this jet, we've got to hold our cards close because otherwise people will try to reverse engineer it. This aircraft is so sophisticated that no pilot who has actually flown it says a bad thing about it. That tells you a lot about what this can do.”
However, just two pages ago, UK Beck said.
“This jet isn’t just about the weapons — it’s a game-changing capability. The Tornado GR.4 can't just stroll into a double digit SAM MEZ [Missile Engagement Zone]. In the F-35 I can generate a wormhole in the airspace and lead everyone through it. There isn’t another platform around that can do that. This isn’t all about height and supercruise speed — it’s the ability to not be seen,” added Beck. “We can never be explicit about the true capabilities of this jet, we've got to hold our cards close because otherwise people will try to reverse engineer it. This aircraft is so sophisticated that no pilot who has actually flown it says a bad thing about it. That tells you a lot about what this can do.”
Last edited by a1bill; 2nd Dec 2015 at 10:11.
Join Date: Jul 2015
Location: aus
Posts: 277
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I thought you were referring to your posts quoting air power australia as a source. Re other posters, everyone is entitled to their opinion.
Last edited by a1bill; 2nd Dec 2015 at 08:56.
Join Date: Aug 2007
Location: London, New York, Paris, Moscow.
Posts: 3,632
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Wormholes seem logical. The programme is a blackhole financially, and they are where wormholes come from..... 
Last edited by ORAC; 2nd Dec 2015 at 13:19.
That reminds me of Team F-35's testimony to the Australian parliament in 2012.
ParlInfo - Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade : 20/03/2012 : Department of Defence annual report 2010-11
Gary Liberson, Technical Lead Operations Analysis, Strategic Studies Group, Lockheed Martin, said:
"Our current assessment that we speak of is: greater than six-to-one relative loss exchange ratio... in four-versus-eight engagement scenarios—four blue F-35s versus eight advanced Red threats in the 2015 to 2020 timeframe.
"And it is very important to note that our constructive simulations that Mr Burbage talks about, without the pilot in the loop, are the lowest number that we talk about—the greater than six to one. When we include the pilot in the loop activities, they even do better."
All righty then.
Now, can someone explain why - if the F-35 gets better than 6:1 CLER over advanced Red threats, when outnumbered two-to-one - the boss of ACC is bemoaning the truncation of F-22 production.
ParlInfo - Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade : 20/03/2012 : Department of Defence annual report 2010-11
Gary Liberson, Technical Lead Operations Analysis, Strategic Studies Group, Lockheed Martin, said:
"Our current assessment that we speak of is: greater than six-to-one relative loss exchange ratio... in four-versus-eight engagement scenarios—four blue F-35s versus eight advanced Red threats in the 2015 to 2020 timeframe.
"And it is very important to note that our constructive simulations that Mr Burbage talks about, without the pilot in the loop, are the lowest number that we talk about—the greater than six to one. When we include the pilot in the loop activities, they even do better."
All righty then.
Now, can someone explain why - if the F-35 gets better than 6:1 CLER over advanced Red threats, when outnumbered two-to-one - the boss of ACC is bemoaning the truncation of F-22 production.
Last edited by LowObservable; 2nd Dec 2015 at 18:41.
Hi, LO.
LER takes us back to early 2013; didn't we shoot that down around about page 37? The first man-in-the-loop trial was 1999, maybe 2000. If Gary Liberson would care to list the modelling assumptions used to get 6:1, I would be more likely to start taking him seriously.
LER takes us back to early 2013; didn't we shoot that down around about page 37? The first man-in-the-loop trial was 1999, maybe 2000. If Gary Liberson would care to list the modelling assumptions used to get 6:1, I would be more likely to start taking him seriously.
True. But it seems that ACC has finally woken up to the fact that the early TAC BRAWLER simulations cited by Liberman (and others) may not be definitive. Which may have been the reason that the F-35-vs-F-16 report was leaked.