F-35 Cancelled, then what ?
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Courtney and Glad,
Thanks for coming back - I think I could provide some useful clarification for those viewing this thread from the outside. There's a constant theme that the F-35B carries a 'penalty' or 'deadweight' for land based ops. If the aircraft were being procured for a land based role, I'd agree 100%. But it's not. Perhaps a short recap of how the UK got into the JSF programme and what it wanted to buy would be useful.
The UK got into the programme firstly because of its STOVL expertise. Despite having gone ahead with a 'black' project (STOVL Strike Fighter (SSF)) after the UK/US ASTOVL programme wound up, the US was still ready to engage (if only unofficially) with interested UK parties.The reason - we knew more about making STOVL work than the US did.
The second reason the UK got into JSF was the RN's desire for a more capable 'follow on' for the Sea Harrier. A Naval Staff Target (I think it was NST 6466) was endorsed within MoD in the 90s, and became the FCBA (Future Carrier Borne Aircraft).
Note this was an RN project. The RAF were, at this stage, disinterested in JSF - they had their sights set on a long range stealthy replacement for the Tornado.
The existence of the NST allowed some very bright RN officers to maintain contacts through the 90s with the US DoD and USMC technical experts working on SSF. Those contacts led to the UK signing into the JSF programme (in around 2001, I think) via a special 'STOVL Memorandum of Understanding'. Let me stress this point - the UK got into JSF because the RN wanted a ship based supersonic STOVL aircraft, and because the UK (specifically BAES and RR) had an unmatchable set of STOVL expertise.
This was supported by the UK's decision to get back into the big carrier business. The CVF/QEC class are a direct result of a strategic decision by the UK that sea based fixed wing aviation was an essential part of future defence strategy. This hasn't changed.
Shortly afterwards, the JFH experiment was launched, and FCBA became the Future Joint Combat Aircraft (FJCA - sorry about the acronym overload here). The RAF joined in at this stage, having found that a stealthy Tornado replacement was quite beyond any future UK defence budget's capacity. FJCA was still the F-35B, and the CVF was to be a STOVL ship.
But there was a problem. The RN wanted an aircraft that could deliver air defence and strike capability from ships. The RAF wanted a Tornado replacement to operate from land. The politicians thought that 'jointery' (i.e. JFH) was the way forward - it would (they thought) help square this circle, by aligning RN and RAF requirements and operational command arrangements. The sad fact is that it completely failed in this regard.
The RAF, for perfectly good reasons, saw the JSF through their traditional 'air power' lens: a deep strike aircraft hitting targets that couldn't be reached by land or sea, and which would deliver 'decisive effects', thus avoiding land or sea based operations. They have never, in my experience, intellectually committed to 'sea based air power' as envisaged in RN doctrine. This view was confirmed as late as SDR 2010, when CAS stated that he viewed the new aircraft carriers as 'a potentially useful alternative basing option'. Again, I'm not criticising this view - it's perfectly rational for a land based Air Force. But it's pure nonsense for a force that wants to operate at sea.
The fact remains that the UK is buying the STOVL F-35B because it has to go on the CVF. That's the requirement, that's what the aircraft has to do.
From my JFH experience, I'd honestly suggest that a separate buy of F-35As would be the best solution to the RAF's Tornado replacement problem. The RAF could operate their As from land bases, and the RN could operate their Bs from the carriers, with a common support base, training and logistics structure. This would also allow the land and sea based ops to have their own properly 'SQEP'd' (Gawd I hate that 'word') Duty Holders.
Longish post, for which I apologise. It's just that, at times, we seem to be questioning the basic rationale for the F-35B - to go to sea.
Best Regards to those working to get the jets salty,
Engines
Thanks for coming back - I think I could provide some useful clarification for those viewing this thread from the outside. There's a constant theme that the F-35B carries a 'penalty' or 'deadweight' for land based ops. If the aircraft were being procured for a land based role, I'd agree 100%. But it's not. Perhaps a short recap of how the UK got into the JSF programme and what it wanted to buy would be useful.
The UK got into the programme firstly because of its STOVL expertise. Despite having gone ahead with a 'black' project (STOVL Strike Fighter (SSF)) after the UK/US ASTOVL programme wound up, the US was still ready to engage (if only unofficially) with interested UK parties.The reason - we knew more about making STOVL work than the US did.
The second reason the UK got into JSF was the RN's desire for a more capable 'follow on' for the Sea Harrier. A Naval Staff Target (I think it was NST 6466) was endorsed within MoD in the 90s, and became the FCBA (Future Carrier Borne Aircraft).
Note this was an RN project. The RAF were, at this stage, disinterested in JSF - they had their sights set on a long range stealthy replacement for the Tornado.
The existence of the NST allowed some very bright RN officers to maintain contacts through the 90s with the US DoD and USMC technical experts working on SSF. Those contacts led to the UK signing into the JSF programme (in around 2001, I think) via a special 'STOVL Memorandum of Understanding'. Let me stress this point - the UK got into JSF because the RN wanted a ship based supersonic STOVL aircraft, and because the UK (specifically BAES and RR) had an unmatchable set of STOVL expertise.
This was supported by the UK's decision to get back into the big carrier business. The CVF/QEC class are a direct result of a strategic decision by the UK that sea based fixed wing aviation was an essential part of future defence strategy. This hasn't changed.
Shortly afterwards, the JFH experiment was launched, and FCBA became the Future Joint Combat Aircraft (FJCA - sorry about the acronym overload here). The RAF joined in at this stage, having found that a stealthy Tornado replacement was quite beyond any future UK defence budget's capacity. FJCA was still the F-35B, and the CVF was to be a STOVL ship.
But there was a problem. The RN wanted an aircraft that could deliver air defence and strike capability from ships. The RAF wanted a Tornado replacement to operate from land. The politicians thought that 'jointery' (i.e. JFH) was the way forward - it would (they thought) help square this circle, by aligning RN and RAF requirements and operational command arrangements. The sad fact is that it completely failed in this regard.
The RAF, for perfectly good reasons, saw the JSF through their traditional 'air power' lens: a deep strike aircraft hitting targets that couldn't be reached by land or sea, and which would deliver 'decisive effects', thus avoiding land or sea based operations. They have never, in my experience, intellectually committed to 'sea based air power' as envisaged in RN doctrine. This view was confirmed as late as SDR 2010, when CAS stated that he viewed the new aircraft carriers as 'a potentially useful alternative basing option'. Again, I'm not criticising this view - it's perfectly rational for a land based Air Force. But it's pure nonsense for a force that wants to operate at sea.
The fact remains that the UK is buying the STOVL F-35B because it has to go on the CVF. That's the requirement, that's what the aircraft has to do.
From my JFH experience, I'd honestly suggest that a separate buy of F-35As would be the best solution to the RAF's Tornado replacement problem. The RAF could operate their As from land bases, and the RN could operate their Bs from the carriers, with a common support base, training and logistics structure. This would also allow the land and sea based ops to have their own properly 'SQEP'd' (Gawd I hate that 'word') Duty Holders.
Longish post, for which I apologise. It's just that, at times, we seem to be questioning the basic rationale for the F-35B - to go to sea.
Best Regards to those working to get the jets salty,
Engines
Do a Hover - it avoids G
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Courtney
The need for max bring-back and therefore an SRVL loses you most of the advantages of a hover capability that I have covered. However these more conventional approach issues have to be dealt with at a pretty slow speed which is always a big help. Another big help is the visual aid system that will be used, plus of course the very benign handling provided by modern FBW. I see nothing controversial in any of that.
My personal view on the bring-back spec point (which may be controversial to some) is that it will only be a problem to meet (using an SRVL) when there is a combination of a lot of ship motion, very bad weather and very high OAT. This combination need never be a peacetime training issue (don’t take the stores) but clearly could happen with ops. So I just say that if all these bad things combine together (big if) throw the store(s) away, hover and eliminate the risk to the jet.
Back in the SHAR days when a guy was worried about his hover margin as he came back to mother (due to weight/OAT/motion/weather or whatever) I always advised that he turned off the JPTL and got on with a normal arrival. OK that would add a few extra counts to the ELR or even call for an engine change afterwards but so what ….. the job was easy and the jet was safe on board.
Engines
Well done. Nothing like a few facts!
The need for max bring-back and therefore an SRVL loses you most of the advantages of a hover capability that I have covered. However these more conventional approach issues have to be dealt with at a pretty slow speed which is always a big help. Another big help is the visual aid system that will be used, plus of course the very benign handling provided by modern FBW. I see nothing controversial in any of that.
My personal view on the bring-back spec point (which may be controversial to some) is that it will only be a problem to meet (using an SRVL) when there is a combination of a lot of ship motion, very bad weather and very high OAT. This combination need never be a peacetime training issue (don’t take the stores) but clearly could happen with ops. So I just say that if all these bad things combine together (big if) throw the store(s) away, hover and eliminate the risk to the jet.
Back in the SHAR days when a guy was worried about his hover margin as he came back to mother (due to weight/OAT/motion/weather or whatever) I always advised that he turned off the JPTL and got on with a normal arrival. OK that would add a few extra counts to the ELR or even call for an engine change afterwards but so what ….. the job was easy and the jet was safe on board.
Engines
Well done. Nothing like a few facts!
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Good post Engines - as you say not much point inthe F-35B if it is land-bound....... and if the F-35 ever does succeed its going to around a lot longer than the Typhoon
but wouldn't it be nice if our Lords & Masters made sure the RN and the RAF were working to a similar end rather than the constant service-centric view??
but wouldn't it be nice if our Lords & Masters made sure the RN and the RAF were working to a similar end rather than the constant service-centric view??
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Engines thank you again for an informative post.
HH you are absolutely correct divide et impera !
However as has been pointed out, F35Bis the worse possible variant for RAF use. In fact it probably isn't particularly optimal for the RN either but that boat has well and truly sailed [or stitched up like a kipper perhaps]
Considering the sheer cost involved, and as Engines has mooted, a buy of A would be far the better option for the RAF.
Which is the worrying thing; are those who make these decisions so unable to grasp simple LOGIC??
gr
HH you are absolutely correct divide et impera !
However as has been pointed out, F35Bis the worse possible variant for RAF use. In fact it probably isn't particularly optimal for the RN either but that boat has well and truly sailed [or stitched up like a kipper perhaps]
Considering the sheer cost involved, and as Engines has mooted, a buy of A would be far the better option for the RAF.
Which is the worrying thing; are those who make these decisions so unable to grasp simple LOGIC??
gr
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HH, JF,
Thanks for coming back. On the RN/RAF issues:
Over the years, I have come to accept and understand where Air Forces come from. They exist to apply 'Air Power', which in their view possesses unique and separate qualities that supersede and avoid the need for land and sea warfare. This capability must be commended by 'air-minded' officers, i.e. Air Force officers.
Navies that use aircraft possess doctrines of applying of 'power on and from the sea' - 'air power' exists as part of an overall fleet's capabilities. These doctrines reflect the importance of being able to move around the oceans without let or hindrance, protecting national maritime assets and using manoeuvre around coastlines to wage war. In this scenario, aircraft at sea must come under the tactical command of the Fleet Commander.
These two approaches can't readily be reconciled. JFH showed that. They could, however, be made to co-exist to the UK's advantage. Give the RN the F-35s it needs to to its job from the carriers, and the RAF the aircraft it needs - the F-35A (or more probably the F-35C - even more range, and probe compatible with the UK's tanker fleet). Let each service command and employ their aircraft as they see fit. Leverage the F-35's commonality to build a common support system.
Basically, adopt the model used by every other nation in the world operating fixed wing aircraft at sea. It's not rocket science.
Best Regards as ever,
Engines
Thanks for coming back. On the RN/RAF issues:
Over the years, I have come to accept and understand where Air Forces come from. They exist to apply 'Air Power', which in their view possesses unique and separate qualities that supersede and avoid the need for land and sea warfare. This capability must be commended by 'air-minded' officers, i.e. Air Force officers.
Navies that use aircraft possess doctrines of applying of 'power on and from the sea' - 'air power' exists as part of an overall fleet's capabilities. These doctrines reflect the importance of being able to move around the oceans without let or hindrance, protecting national maritime assets and using manoeuvre around coastlines to wage war. In this scenario, aircraft at sea must come under the tactical command of the Fleet Commander.
These two approaches can't readily be reconciled. JFH showed that. They could, however, be made to co-exist to the UK's advantage. Give the RN the F-35s it needs to to its job from the carriers, and the RAF the aircraft it needs - the F-35A (or more probably the F-35C - even more range, and probe compatible with the UK's tanker fleet). Let each service command and employ their aircraft as they see fit. Leverage the F-35's commonality to build a common support system.
Basically, adopt the model used by every other nation in the world operating fixed wing aircraft at sea. It's not rocket science.
Best Regards as ever,
Engines
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Courtney, no angst but I sensed from your post that there was a disadvantage to RVL when there actually isn't. FWIW I don't view you as a nay-sayer either.
Engines, thanks for the recap however I would add that F-35B was never viewed formally as a Tornado replacement until we lost our Harriers in SDSR 10. There was a view to purchase F-35A for the RAF in addition to F-35B in order to cover the deep offensive strike we'd lose in GR4. Once Harrier went it was convenient but a tad disingenuous to then make the connection between GR4 OSD and F-35B IOC. I say disingenuous because of the F-35B met our distinctly different requirements for a deep penetrator then it, not F-35A, would have been a candidate.
On your point about RAF not really being intellectually committed to embarked, it may warm your heart to know that things have most definitely changed. There is a very collegiate, open and productive - dare I say truly Joint - commitment to F-35B aboard QEC these days.
Engines, thanks for the recap however I would add that F-35B was never viewed formally as a Tornado replacement until we lost our Harriers in SDSR 10. There was a view to purchase F-35A for the RAF in addition to F-35B in order to cover the deep offensive strike we'd lose in GR4. Once Harrier went it was convenient but a tad disingenuous to then make the connection between GR4 OSD and F-35B IOC. I say disingenuous because of the F-35B met our distinctly different requirements for a deep penetrator then it, not F-35A, would have been a candidate.
On your point about RAF not really being intellectually committed to embarked, it may warm your heart to know that things have most definitely changed. There is a very collegiate, open and productive - dare I say truly Joint - commitment to F-35B aboard QEC these days.
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There is a very collegiate, open and productive - dare I say truly Joint - commitment to F-35B aboard QEC these days.
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MSOCS,
Thanks very much for coming back.
I'm glad there's a collegiate approach in action, and as ever I expect that the main progress is being made at SO1/SO2 level. I wish those given the task of getting F-35B to sea all the very best of luck, whatever the colour of their uniform. I really do think that in true Brit fashion, it will be made to work.
I would plead guilty as charged to being influenced by the past, but I would gently deny that I'm 'blinded'. Just because you've left the service doesn't mean you stop caring, or thinking. However, if anyone on PPrune objects to retired personnel posting, I'll of course stop doing so.
I just don't yet see the level of commitment required to generate a truly seaborne force being displayed by RAF VSOs - but I can happily accept that the decisions have been made and will be worked through.
The most important thing is that the UK is getting a world class aircraft that it will be able to use more flexibly than most other nations.
Best Regards as ever to those who will make it work,
Engines
Thanks very much for coming back.
I'm glad there's a collegiate approach in action, and as ever I expect that the main progress is being made at SO1/SO2 level. I wish those given the task of getting F-35B to sea all the very best of luck, whatever the colour of their uniform. I really do think that in true Brit fashion, it will be made to work.
I would plead guilty as charged to being influenced by the past, but I would gently deny that I'm 'blinded'. Just because you've left the service doesn't mean you stop caring, or thinking. However, if anyone on PPrune objects to retired personnel posting, I'll of course stop doing so.
I just don't yet see the level of commitment required to generate a truly seaborne force being displayed by RAF VSOs - but I can happily accept that the decisions have been made and will be worked through.
The most important thing is that the UK is getting a world class aircraft that it will be able to use more flexibly than most other nations.
Best Regards as ever to those who will make it work,
Engines
I've yet to encounter any resistance from the RAF reference spending time aboard. As it's the only game in town, and the future, people are chomping to work on/with it. Every single applicant for each post at present is fully aware of what they'll have to do and the various organisations in the states are truly joint.
It isn't about being out or in really, what some people need to realise is that times have changed and moved on from the past.
It isn't about being out or in really, what some people need to realise is that times have changed and moved on from the past.
Engines, thank you for making the very point I made concerning the B-model not being the ideal solution for the RAF. I agree, if the UK wanted to go down the JSF route (and there weren't so many other options at the time that would be gen 5 and with a lifespan projecting far enough forward) they should have selected B for Navy and A or C for the RAF. When it came down to just one model for both, B it was. And, yes, that was pretty much how the RAF 'selected' the B.
As an aside, I still think the C would have been a better choice for both, with the appropriate carrier, but the RN and USN clearly have different views about projecting air power.
As an aside, I still think the C would have been a better choice for both, with the appropriate carrier, but the RN and USN clearly have different views about projecting air power.
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As an aside, I still think the C would have been a better choice for both, with the appropriate carrier, but the RN and USN clearly have different views about projecting air power.
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The genesis of the variant debate is money. If it were no object then the RN would most likely now be pursuing a hefty purchase of F-35C to fill both CATOBAR Carriers to the Gunwales. On the other hand, the RAF would be happily filling at least 5 sqns of probe-equipped F-35A. Cost that lot out and you rapidly realise why one variant or none at all was the order of the day from HM Treasury.
Back to reality, please.
The argument that JFH proved that an Air Force and a Navy's "Air Power" cannot be reconciled has become dogma to those bitten by the past. It is legacy thinking and, while you can argue all you want about it on the forums, there are a highly capable and forward-leaning bunch of light and dark blue committed to reconciling the mistakes of the past. That is NOT an argument against the B variant. I can confidently state that the JFH saga was born of two (not one) sides forced to play each other's game.
It's not forced this time. Both sides are in it together. Both sides understand the end-state and the concept in equal measure and, as has already been stated earlier, are chomping at the bit to get stuck in and demonstrate a very powerful capability for the UK.
Oh, and by the way Engines, the view isn't just held at SO1/SO2 level like it used to be. It now goes to at least 2* on both shades of blue which proves that times have changed and for the better.
Back to reality, please.
The argument that JFH proved that an Air Force and a Navy's "Air Power" cannot be reconciled has become dogma to those bitten by the past. It is legacy thinking and, while you can argue all you want about it on the forums, there are a highly capable and forward-leaning bunch of light and dark blue committed to reconciling the mistakes of the past. That is NOT an argument against the B variant. I can confidently state that the JFH saga was born of two (not one) sides forced to play each other's game.
It's not forced this time. Both sides are in it together. Both sides understand the end-state and the concept in equal measure and, as has already been stated earlier, are chomping at the bit to get stuck in and demonstrate a very powerful capability for the UK.
Oh, and by the way Engines, the view isn't just held at SO1/SO2 level like it used to be. It now goes to at least 2* on both shades of blue which proves that times have changed and for the better.
Originally Posted by MSOCS
The genesis of the variant debate is money. If it were no object then the RN would most likely now be pursuing a hefty purchase of F-35C to fill both CATOBAR Carriers to the Gunwales. On the other hand, the RAF would be happily filling at least 5 sqns of probe-equipped F-35A. Cost that lot out and you rapidly realise why one variant or none at all was the order of the day from HM Treasury.
My remarks were simply in response to the comments earlier about "dead weight" and the suitability of the B Model to all arms. I still believe the C would have been a better choice for both services, fulfilling the single model ideal but offering greater range and punch in ops.
The B is here to stay and I accept that. As you say it is the reality.
It's not forced this time. Both sides are in it together. Both sides understand the end-state and the concept in equal measure and, as has already been stated earlier, are chomping at the bit to get stuck in and demonstrate a very powerful capability for the UK.
A few points:
Someone implied that the UK was brought into the program in the late 1990s; it was much earlier. DARPA's CALF study looked at USMC and RN needs, and it was announced in 11/93 that Britain would formally join JAST.
The main design features (including the major dimensions) at contract award in 2001 were very similar to those of the design proposed for the CDA phase in 1996, when the QE class was not so much as a gleam in the milkman's eye. So what UK carriers was it designed to fit?
Note also that the Boeing STOVL designs (CDA and PWSC) had a 30-foot span (same as the AV-8B) while the CTOL & CV versions had the same 36-foot wing. Boeing's wing was too thick to fold easily. Engines is correct to say that LM was briefly carrying folding tips, strictly for the Invincible-fit RN version.
The shape could have been changed before the SDD competition, but was not - Boeing did so and it was a negative in the evaluation.
As for whether a landing gear is deadweight - in a real sense it is, up and away, which is why we make it as light as possible. (TSR2 is a good example of the gear being made overweight by silly requirements, by the way.) Minimizing the weight and volume of STOVL-dedicated gear is a key part of STOVL design, because that's how you minimize the impact on range and other performance attributes.
And a point that seems to have to be made over and over again: A very big reason why the F-35C has more range than the F-35A is that it has more internal fuel. Some of this may be in the bigger wing, but most of it is the consequence of not having an internal gun. The RAF's best bet would be an F-35A variant with no gun and a probe. This should cost almost nothing to develop, but the bill would doubtless be colossal.
Someone implied that the UK was brought into the program in the late 1990s; it was much earlier. DARPA's CALF study looked at USMC and RN needs, and it was announced in 11/93 that Britain would formally join JAST.
The main design features (including the major dimensions) at contract award in 2001 were very similar to those of the design proposed for the CDA phase in 1996, when the QE class was not so much as a gleam in the milkman's eye. So what UK carriers was it designed to fit?
Note also that the Boeing STOVL designs (CDA and PWSC) had a 30-foot span (same as the AV-8B) while the CTOL & CV versions had the same 36-foot wing. Boeing's wing was too thick to fold easily. Engines is correct to say that LM was briefly carrying folding tips, strictly for the Invincible-fit RN version.
The shape could have been changed before the SDD competition, but was not - Boeing did so and it was a negative in the evaluation.
As for whether a landing gear is deadweight - in a real sense it is, up and away, which is why we make it as light as possible. (TSR2 is a good example of the gear being made overweight by silly requirements, by the way.) Minimizing the weight and volume of STOVL-dedicated gear is a key part of STOVL design, because that's how you minimize the impact on range and other performance attributes.
And a point that seems to have to be made over and over again: A very big reason why the F-35C has more range than the F-35A is that it has more internal fuel. Some of this may be in the bigger wing, but most of it is the consequence of not having an internal gun. The RAF's best bet would be an F-35A variant with no gun and a probe. This should cost almost nothing to develop, but the bill would doubtless be colossal.
Last edited by LowObservable; 30th May 2015 at 20:47.
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What I fail to understand is why if the RAF is to get an F35 variant that the C is not preferred, possibly with A type undercarriage, subject to cost, the C can be refuelled by UK assets, the F35 is to used as a stealth bomb truck on a first day of war event, then as I understand it as a platform for non stealthy weapon carriage.
Why do members feel that the A would be the preferred variant for the RAF? The more Cs ordered reduces the unit cost, the same argument about refuelling obviously applies to Canada.
Why do members feel that the A would be the preferred variant for the RAF? The more Cs ordered reduces the unit cost, the same argument about refuelling obviously applies to Canada.
Last edited by PhilipG; 30th May 2015 at 21:15. Reason: Typo
PhillipG,
The C would be my preferred option regardless of undercarriage. Just leave it as it is. But when the grown ups turn up this evening we shall both be castigated for saying so.
LO,
Thank you for bringing some very pertinent facts back into focus. Again it's the C for the RAF. But it's all too late now.
The C would be my preferred option regardless of undercarriage. Just leave it as it is. But when the grown ups turn up this evening we shall both be castigated for saying so.
LO,
Thank you for bringing some very pertinent facts back into focus. Again it's the C for the RAF. But it's all too late now.
Last edited by Courtney Mil; 30th May 2015 at 21:44.
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Phil,
In my experience the depth of the average argument is 'The A is the Air Force aircraft - surely it's the only choice for an Air Force?'
You are right, the C would be the choice of anyone looking for range and probe and drogue refuelling.
Yes it's heavier (so?) and yes the range KPP isn't dissimilar to the A (what it achieves in practice might be far higher). And yes it can't hack 9 g (not exactly a show stopper).
I desperately hope CM that I'm not among those you consider a grown up!
In my experience the depth of the average argument is 'The A is the Air Force aircraft - surely it's the only choice for an Air Force?'
You are right, the C would be the choice of anyone looking for range and probe and drogue refuelling.
Yes it's heavier (so?) and yes the range KPP isn't dissimilar to the A (what it achieves in practice might be far higher). And yes it can't hack 9 g (not exactly a show stopper).
I desperately hope CM that I'm not among those you consider a grown up!