F-35 Cancelled, then what ?
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$30K Per Hour to Operate USMC F-35B Eventually
'CHEEP' to "RUN" also? [Just DO NOT Press the STOVL RED BUTTON]
Marines Put F-35B Flight Costs 17 Percent Lower Than OSD 21 Aug 2013 Colin Clark
Marines Put F-35B Flight Costs 17 Percent Lower Than OSD « Breaking Defense - Defense industry news, analysis and commentary
Marines Put F-35B Flight Costs 17 Percent Lower Than OSD 21 Aug 2013 Colin Clark
"PENTAGON: By combing through the assumptions — some of them deeply questionable — undergirding the Defense Department’s official cost estimates for the F-35B and refining them, the Marines say the plane should cost 16.6 percent less per flight hour than the current estimate. Since the F-35B is the most expensive plane to operate, lowering these cost estimates for the Joint Strike Fighter’s Marine version would have a substantial impact on the program’s overall costs.
“We believe we are going to achieve much greater savings than we are currently being credited for,” Marine Lt. Gen. Robert Schmidle, deputy commandant for aviation, told me in an interview here.
Among the questionable assumptions Schmidle highlighted is this whopper: the Office of Secretary Defense estimate developed by the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office (CAPE) predicted that the F-35B would be flown at full throttle in STOVL mode — which uses enormous amounts of fuel and utilizes the highly sophisticated lift fan system at much greater rates than the Marines project — about 80 percent of its time in the air.
...The great majority of the plane’s flight time — ... — would be spent flying without using the lift fan and STOVL.
The current CAPE estimate assumes $41,000 an hour for the F-35B. a senior defense official said they will eventually bring the costs down to $30,000 per hour, with an interim figure of about $37,000. Schmidle also notes that the F-35B’s cost figures were extrapolated from the costs of the much older AV-8B Harrier.
Overall, once the F-35 replaces the three Marine aircraft — F-18, EA-6B, Harrier — it is designed to supplant the Marines will save an estimated $520 million a year in operations and maintenance costs in 2012 dollars, Schmidle says...."
“We believe we are going to achieve much greater savings than we are currently being credited for,” Marine Lt. Gen. Robert Schmidle, deputy commandant for aviation, told me in an interview here.
Among the questionable assumptions Schmidle highlighted is this whopper: the Office of Secretary Defense estimate developed by the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office (CAPE) predicted that the F-35B would be flown at full throttle in STOVL mode — which uses enormous amounts of fuel and utilizes the highly sophisticated lift fan system at much greater rates than the Marines project — about 80 percent of its time in the air.
...The great majority of the plane’s flight time — ... — would be spent flying without using the lift fan and STOVL.
The current CAPE estimate assumes $41,000 an hour for the F-35B. a senior defense official said they will eventually bring the costs down to $30,000 per hour, with an interim figure of about $37,000. Schmidle also notes that the F-35B’s cost figures were extrapolated from the costs of the much older AV-8B Harrier.
Overall, once the F-35 replaces the three Marine aircraft — F-18, EA-6B, Harrier — it is designed to supplant the Marines will save an estimated $520 million a year in operations and maintenance costs in 2012 dollars, Schmidle says...."
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Analysis: Lower F-35 Operating Costs Should Be Taken with A Pinch of Salt
PARIS --- Reports that the Pentagon has sharply reduced its estimates of F-35 operating costs have downplayed the way this reduction was achieved. On closer analysis, it appears that these lower estimates are based on improbably favorable assumptions that suggest this reduction could just as easily be reversed. Furthermore, as long-standing F-35 plans are also being twisted and stretched, notably by the Marine Corps, to show the aircraft is affordable, the headline 22% reduction in costs is probably much less credible than it appears.
This latest, lower estimate was sent to the Senate Armed Services Committee by the F-35 program director, US Air Force Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan, and was first reported Aug. 21 by Bloomberg.
Pentagon uses same, effective tactic
The Pentagon successfully used a similar tactic earlier this year, when its much-publicized 2012 Selected Acquisition Report said F-35 production costs had dropped, for the first time, by $4.5 billion. At the time, this generated a great volume of favorable media reports. However, mostly overlooked was the fact that the SAR itself said the reduction was “due primarily to decreases in the prime contractor and subcontractor labor rates (-$7,853.3 million).” In other words, lower costs were obtained simply by lowering labor rates, a perilous assumption to make for a 50-year program.
This time around, the F-35 Joint Program Office reduced operations and maintenance costs by 22% by again using “revised assumptions about how [the aircraft] will be used and maintained,” a DoD official told Reuters. The wire service also reported that “industry and military officials [argued] that many of the [previous] assumptions were outdated and off base” to justify the revision. But, at this point in time, no-one can say that the new assumptions are more or less credible than previous ones. This is no doubt why the Pentagon’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office has not seen fit to revise its own cost estimate, which remains pegged at $1.1 trillion as before.
Strange Arguments Justify Lower Costs
Both Bloomberg and Reuters reports (see links at bottom) cite some intriguing details that cast legitimate doubts on the credibility of the 22% cost reduction. First of all, as rightly noted by Bloomberg, operating costs mainly include fuel, repairs and spare parts. Since it is impossible to predict how fuel and manpower costs will evolve over the F-35’s 55-year career, it is vacuous to claim, today, that total operating costs have declined.
The Marine Corps has also radically changed its F-35 operations to claim lower costs. Lt. Gen. Robert Schmidle, deputy Marine Corps commandant for aviation, told Reuters that the Marines would fly their F-35Bs “in STOVL mode just 10 percent of the time, far less often than the 80 percent rate factored into the initial estimates.” This is a stunning statement, and one that contradicts all the arguments that the Marine Corps has used to justify the F-35B STOVL variant. It also shows the lengths the Corps has to go to show it can afford to buy and operate the F-35.
Marines Plan to Reduce STOVL, MRO Manning
If STOVL is needed only 10% of the time, then it is, at best, a secondary capability, and is no longer enough to justify the F-35B variant’s exorbitant cost, both in terms of acquisition ($153 million, without engine, in LRIP Lot 5) and of operations ($41,000 per flight hour). Furthermore, if STOVL operations are limited to 10% of flight activities, it is hard to see how Marine pilots will ever gain enough experience to fly STOVL missions from small, unprepared landing zones on the beachhead – the main, if not only, reason the Marine Corps says the F-35B is indispensable.
Reuters also quotes Schmidle as saying that manning levels assumed in the initial estimates were also higher than needed in practice. However, the Marine Corps has no realistic experience in operating the F-35: as of July 10, it had received only 23 F-35Bs, according to Lockheed’s latest status report, so it is questionable that it can determine appropriate long-term manning levels from such a small fleet, especially as Lockheed personnel continue to support the aircraft.
Schmidle also told Reuters that the Marines would “trim maintenance costs by doing up to 90 percent of the work in house, rather than farming it out to contractors.” He added that “similar efforts had resulted in big savings on the V-22, the Marines' tilt-rotor aircraft.” Again, this statement flies in the face of previous claims that private contractors cost less than military personnel, and that the Pentagon (and other militaries, especially in Europe, would save huge amounts by outsourcing work to the private sector. It also implies that the Pentagon has been wasting billions of dollars on contractor services when, if Schmidle is to be believed, military personnel can do the same job at lower cost.
Foreign Implications and Convenient Timing
It probably also is unwelcome news for Italy, which so far has spent a billion euros to set up a Final Assembly and Check-Out facility, which also is to maintain its own, Dutch and possibly other European F-35s. If the Marines can do 90% of the job at lower cost, then so can European air forces. This means Italy’s investment is essentially useless, and the business plan for the facility, and for Alenia’s future, is no longer valid. But the 1 billion has been spent.
Finally, the timing of the cost reductions is especially convenient for Lockheed Martin, whose bit to sell the F-35 to South Korea was rebuffed last week as far too expensive. Thanks to the lower estimate, Reuters reported that “U.S. officials said Seoul could decide to restart the competition and ask for new bids.”
Bogdan sent his letter announcing the lower cost estimates to the Senate panel right in the middle of the Congressional recess, which runs Aug. 2 to Sept. 9, and during the slow summer news season. This could well be another coincidence, but it could also have been arranged to guarantee maximum headlines.
Given all of the above, and to coin a phrase, reports of lower F-35 costs appear to have been greatly exaggerated.
Click on the links below for the reports mentioned in this story:
Bloomberg: F-35 Support Costs Fall 22%, Pentagon Manager Estimates
Reuters: Pentagon Cuts F-35 Operating Estimate Below $1 Trillion: Source
PARIS --- Reports that the Pentagon has sharply reduced its estimates of F-35 operating costs have downplayed the way this reduction was achieved. On closer analysis, it appears that these lower estimates are based on improbably favorable assumptions that suggest this reduction could just as easily be reversed. Furthermore, as long-standing F-35 plans are also being twisted and stretched, notably by the Marine Corps, to show the aircraft is affordable, the headline 22% reduction in costs is probably much less credible than it appears.
This latest, lower estimate was sent to the Senate Armed Services Committee by the F-35 program director, US Air Force Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan, and was first reported Aug. 21 by Bloomberg.
Pentagon uses same, effective tactic
The Pentagon successfully used a similar tactic earlier this year, when its much-publicized 2012 Selected Acquisition Report said F-35 production costs had dropped, for the first time, by $4.5 billion. At the time, this generated a great volume of favorable media reports. However, mostly overlooked was the fact that the SAR itself said the reduction was “due primarily to decreases in the prime contractor and subcontractor labor rates (-$7,853.3 million).” In other words, lower costs were obtained simply by lowering labor rates, a perilous assumption to make for a 50-year program.
This time around, the F-35 Joint Program Office reduced operations and maintenance costs by 22% by again using “revised assumptions about how [the aircraft] will be used and maintained,” a DoD official told Reuters. The wire service also reported that “industry and military officials [argued] that many of the [previous] assumptions were outdated and off base” to justify the revision. But, at this point in time, no-one can say that the new assumptions are more or less credible than previous ones. This is no doubt why the Pentagon’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office has not seen fit to revise its own cost estimate, which remains pegged at $1.1 trillion as before.
Strange Arguments Justify Lower Costs
Both Bloomberg and Reuters reports (see links at bottom) cite some intriguing details that cast legitimate doubts on the credibility of the 22% cost reduction. First of all, as rightly noted by Bloomberg, operating costs mainly include fuel, repairs and spare parts. Since it is impossible to predict how fuel and manpower costs will evolve over the F-35’s 55-year career, it is vacuous to claim, today, that total operating costs have declined.
The Marine Corps has also radically changed its F-35 operations to claim lower costs. Lt. Gen. Robert Schmidle, deputy Marine Corps commandant for aviation, told Reuters that the Marines would fly their F-35Bs “in STOVL mode just 10 percent of the time, far less often than the 80 percent rate factored into the initial estimates.” This is a stunning statement, and one that contradicts all the arguments that the Marine Corps has used to justify the F-35B STOVL variant. It also shows the lengths the Corps has to go to show it can afford to buy and operate the F-35.
Marines Plan to Reduce STOVL, MRO Manning
If STOVL is needed only 10% of the time, then it is, at best, a secondary capability, and is no longer enough to justify the F-35B variant’s exorbitant cost, both in terms of acquisition ($153 million, without engine, in LRIP Lot 5) and of operations ($41,000 per flight hour). Furthermore, if STOVL operations are limited to 10% of flight activities, it is hard to see how Marine pilots will ever gain enough experience to fly STOVL missions from small, unprepared landing zones on the beachhead – the main, if not only, reason the Marine Corps says the F-35B is indispensable.
Reuters also quotes Schmidle as saying that manning levels assumed in the initial estimates were also higher than needed in practice. However, the Marine Corps has no realistic experience in operating the F-35: as of July 10, it had received only 23 F-35Bs, according to Lockheed’s latest status report, so it is questionable that it can determine appropriate long-term manning levels from such a small fleet, especially as Lockheed personnel continue to support the aircraft.
Schmidle also told Reuters that the Marines would “trim maintenance costs by doing up to 90 percent of the work in house, rather than farming it out to contractors.” He added that “similar efforts had resulted in big savings on the V-22, the Marines' tilt-rotor aircraft.” Again, this statement flies in the face of previous claims that private contractors cost less than military personnel, and that the Pentagon (and other militaries, especially in Europe, would save huge amounts by outsourcing work to the private sector. It also implies that the Pentagon has been wasting billions of dollars on contractor services when, if Schmidle is to be believed, military personnel can do the same job at lower cost.
Foreign Implications and Convenient Timing
It probably also is unwelcome news for Italy, which so far has spent a billion euros to set up a Final Assembly and Check-Out facility, which also is to maintain its own, Dutch and possibly other European F-35s. If the Marines can do 90% of the job at lower cost, then so can European air forces. This means Italy’s investment is essentially useless, and the business plan for the facility, and for Alenia’s future, is no longer valid. But the 1 billion has been spent.
Finally, the timing of the cost reductions is especially convenient for Lockheed Martin, whose bit to sell the F-35 to South Korea was rebuffed last week as far too expensive. Thanks to the lower estimate, Reuters reported that “U.S. officials said Seoul could decide to restart the competition and ask for new bids.”
Bogdan sent his letter announcing the lower cost estimates to the Senate panel right in the middle of the Congressional recess, which runs Aug. 2 to Sept. 9, and during the slow summer news season. This could well be another coincidence, but it could also have been arranged to guarantee maximum headlines.
Given all of the above, and to coin a phrase, reports of lower F-35 costs appear to have been greatly exaggerated.
Click on the links below for the reports mentioned in this story:
Bloomberg: F-35 Support Costs Fall 22%, Pentagon Manager Estimates
Reuters: Pentagon Cuts F-35 Operating Estimate Below $1 Trillion: Source
While I liked the videos, BFD. It's what the aircraft are supposed to do.
Question in re this thread: the question is "cancelled, then what" and I'd like to know who is intending to cancel their F-35 buy?
Anyone?
USN and USMC do not seem to be in that position.
PS: cost estimates reduced ... gee, there's a shock.
Question in re this thread: the question is "cancelled, then what" and I'd like to know who is intending to cancel their F-35 buy?
Anyone?
USN and USMC do not seem to be in that position.
PS: cost estimates reduced ... gee, there's a shock.
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"
when you start with a false assumption, it can only go down hill from there, I think you will find it was lower man hours
However, mostly overlooked was the fact that the SAR itself said the reduction was “due primarily to decreases in the prime contractor and subcontractor labor rates (-$7,853.3 million).” In other words, lower costs were obtained simply by lowering labor rates, a perilous assumption to make for a 50-year program.
Orac's video makes me agree with Engines' praise for the flight control people. There's one hell of a lot going on in the last moments of the T/O at 0:40 onwards, including a goodly roll input from the horizontals.
Some people are getting the Marine op cost story wrapped around their necks, by the way. CAPE's assumption was that 80 per cent of sorties would use STOVL, not that 80 per cent of flight time would be in STOVL, in which case the op cost per hour would be in six digits.
80 per cent is about right for the Harrier in Marine use, I suspect. (Posters here suggest that the RAF never does CTO and CL is emergency-only.) But the F-35B is a different animal because it is more comfortable in CTOL, and STOVL is more expensive than CTOL because it activates a whole bunch of extra moving parts, some of them hot and highly loaded.
So what the Marines are saying now (it seems) is that they will use STOVL only on the boat, training to go to the boat, and in their once-per-major-war austere-base excursion, and that adds up to ten per cent of sorties.
Some people are getting the Marine op cost story wrapped around their necks, by the way. CAPE's assumption was that 80 per cent of sorties would use STOVL, not that 80 per cent of flight time would be in STOVL, in which case the op cost per hour would be in six digits.
80 per cent is about right for the Harrier in Marine use, I suspect. (Posters here suggest that the RAF never does CTO and CL is emergency-only.) But the F-35B is a different animal because it is more comfortable in CTOL, and STOVL is more expensive than CTOL because it activates a whole bunch of extra moving parts, some of them hot and highly loaded.
So what the Marines are saying now (it seems) is that they will use STOVL only on the boat, training to go to the boat, and in their once-per-major-war austere-base excursion, and that adds up to ten per cent of sorties.
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I can believe that they're getting the cost down, it's the claim that it will only conduct 10% of it's landings vertically that I find astonishing, wtf is the point in investing so much money in such a niche capability that is apparently going to be very rarely used!?
And Bastardeux wins the internetz for today.
The answer to the question is "Because most people in Washington don't have the
to say no to the Marines, no matter how idiotic their plans are."
The answer to the question is "Because most people in Washington don't have the
to say no to the Marines, no matter how idiotic their plans are."
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So, 3 years and more than 3,150 posts after the question (F-35 cancelled, then what?) was first posed, where does the programme stand? I have tried to take stock:
1. I think it is past the point where F35 might have been cancelled. While not yet zero, I don’t think this is now a high risk. Progress has been slow, costly and politically charged. Fewer aircraft may be acquired, and orders delayed. Some customers, such as the USN perhaps, may not be totally devastated by that. For others it may be a convenient deferral of the bill, at the risk of more future cost escalation, capability uncertainty, and legacy aircraft sustainment issues.
2. F35 is designed to bring different qualities to the fight - stealth, sensors, networking, all wrapped up in an airframe constrained by STOVL and supersonic capability and required to be all things to all air-arms. It trades off some of the aerodynamic performance of the legacy fighters it is to replace. Initially at least, more performance has been traded off than the original specification promised; perhaps it has been traded off permanently.
3. It has been an extremely ambitious programme; the complexity under-estimated or design capability over-estimated. Take your pick(s). This has cost time and money which has evolved into a self-propagating cycle. ‘Concurrency’ has been pushed to the limit and then some, while faith in computer modelling appears to have been too readily accepted at the expense of the more staid and traditional method of testing to see how reality compares to the predicted and correcting as necessary. At its heart 'concurrency' appears to have been a means of bringing forward cash-flow for the manufacturer more than a programme development tool. Substantial issues remain in a number of areas – helmets, software, arrestor hooks, weight and heat management and some structural components for example, and likely some not in the public domain.
4. Politics have dragged things out too, yet may have saved the programme from extinction. Had it not been too big to fail, it might well have done. If it had been a European project, the remains would likely now be at a museum somewhere, and various nations scrabbling to fill the gap. In the UK, two brand new aircraft carriers might easily have become surplus to requirements.
5. Everybody recognises that the development period for such major projects is just too long. It exposes a programme to even more risks and uncertainties than result from ambitious technology alone. How this cycle is broken is a future challenge. As F35’s long gestation period has embroiled it in the worst global financial crisis in living memory, it has been subjected it to extraordinary levels of scrutiny.
6. Taking Courtney Mil's point in an earlier post,
its success or otherwise will be down to just how effective it's new tricks turn out to be, how far ahead they remain of counter-technology, and whether they are significant enough to more than offset its performance deficits. Will the new whole be greater than the legacy whole? The answer(s) may be role-specific. E.g. perhaps yes in the strike role, perhaps not in a close encounter with an agile and advanced foe. It may also vary over time, as development and upgrades either fulfil requirements, or not. In the early days F35, like many systems that have gone before, is highly likely to come up short compared with legacy capability. So will its unique features deliver on their promises and allow the fighter to quickly catch up and overtake the platforms it is designed to replace? Will it be a landmark development and outperform expectations or will it be a stepping stone to the next level, and an expensive one at that? Will the computer simulated superiority over legacy fighters - 3:1, 4:1 or whatever is claimed, be justified in the real world? History provides examples of such theories evaporating upon first contact with reality. I certainly don’t know the answers, but then nor do I think anyone else really does yet. Informed opinion may well be positive, but behind that necessary optimism, I suspect fingers and toes are crossed tight. My perception is that these uncertainties are more pronounced than with previous ambitious projects, but I can’t be sure that is not just a reflection of the extraordinary level of scrutiny of F35 development, certainly more than I can recall with other advanced programmes.
7. But it is what numerous air forces, including the UK's, are going to get and I think the question now is "How do we get the best out of it?" and not "What are we going to get instead?" - at least not for a good few years.
LF
1. I think it is past the point where F35 might have been cancelled. While not yet zero, I don’t think this is now a high risk. Progress has been slow, costly and politically charged. Fewer aircraft may be acquired, and orders delayed. Some customers, such as the USN perhaps, may not be totally devastated by that. For others it may be a convenient deferral of the bill, at the risk of more future cost escalation, capability uncertainty, and legacy aircraft sustainment issues.
2. F35 is designed to bring different qualities to the fight - stealth, sensors, networking, all wrapped up in an airframe constrained by STOVL and supersonic capability and required to be all things to all air-arms. It trades off some of the aerodynamic performance of the legacy fighters it is to replace. Initially at least, more performance has been traded off than the original specification promised; perhaps it has been traded off permanently.
3. It has been an extremely ambitious programme; the complexity under-estimated or design capability over-estimated. Take your pick(s). This has cost time and money which has evolved into a self-propagating cycle. ‘Concurrency’ has been pushed to the limit and then some, while faith in computer modelling appears to have been too readily accepted at the expense of the more staid and traditional method of testing to see how reality compares to the predicted and correcting as necessary. At its heart 'concurrency' appears to have been a means of bringing forward cash-flow for the manufacturer more than a programme development tool. Substantial issues remain in a number of areas – helmets, software, arrestor hooks, weight and heat management and some structural components for example, and likely some not in the public domain.
4. Politics have dragged things out too, yet may have saved the programme from extinction. Had it not been too big to fail, it might well have done. If it had been a European project, the remains would likely now be at a museum somewhere, and various nations scrabbling to fill the gap. In the UK, two brand new aircraft carriers might easily have become surplus to requirements.
5. Everybody recognises that the development period for such major projects is just too long. It exposes a programme to even more risks and uncertainties than result from ambitious technology alone. How this cycle is broken is a future challenge. As F35’s long gestation period has embroiled it in the worst global financial crisis in living memory, it has been subjected it to extraordinary levels of scrutiny.
6. Taking Courtney Mil's point in an earlier post,
...With any modern fighter, it is the entire system that’s important, not just selected features on a platform such as stealth, agility, power, weapons, etc.
7. But it is what numerous air forces, including the UK's, are going to get and I think the question now is "How do we get the best out of it?" and not "What are we going to get instead?" - at least not for a good few years.
LF
JSF's successor is already in development.
As a lot of folks have said in the past decade, the F-35 is the last manned fighter the US will ever build. I firmly believe that to be true.
The American way of war, is, in a lot of ways, war by machine. (Which has its plusses and minuses ...)
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Originally Posted by Low Observable
"Because most people in Washington don't have the 
to say no to the Marines, no matter how idiotic their plans are."
to say no to the Marines, no matter how idiotic their plans are."
Shark = jumped!
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'Bastardeux' said:
Do you think the same for any Naval Aircraft? It would be interesting to know your perception of how many arrested landings an F-35C may make compared to ordinary runway landings. Of course you can only guess but nevertheless is the hook a 'pointless' accessory? It is so handy - not just for carrier arrested landings but even the F-35A has an emergency hook - which will probably never be used. But lets get rid of that quick smart.
The STOVL MODE of the F-35B allows landings in a kinds of situations where a conventional aircraft - even one with a hook - would find such landing impossible. Let us not forget a STO. But you knew that - right?
"I can believe that they're getting the cost down, it's the claim that it will only conduct 10% of it's landings vertically that I find astonishing, wtf is the point in investing so much money in such a niche capability that is apparently going to be very rarely used!?"
The STOVL MODE of the F-35B allows landings in a kinds of situations where a conventional aircraft - even one with a hook - would find such landing impossible. Let us not forget a STO. But you knew that - right?
LF - Cogent points. I would add one more:
Given all of the above, do we want to pursue a plan under which this one system swallows a vast proportion of our air combat budget for the next two decades, depriving alternative, complementary or follow-on systems of fiscal oxygen?
FA18 - Welcome to my ignore list, as a review of your posts shows nothing of any use whatsoever.
Given all of the above, do we want to pursue a plan under which this one system swallows a vast proportion of our air combat budget for the next two decades, depriving alternative, complementary or follow-on systems of fiscal oxygen?
FA18 - Welcome to my ignore list, as a review of your posts shows nothing of any use whatsoever.
The answer to the question is "Because most people in Washington don't have the to say no to the Marines, no matter how idiotic their planes are."
to say no to the Marines, no matter how idiotic their planes are."
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Wow, that's a massive call to be made by a journalist of supposed integrity!
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Originally Posted by LowObservable
So what the Marines are saying now (it seems) is that they will use STOVL only on the boat, training to go to the boat, and in their once-per-major-war austere-base excursion, and that adds up to ten per cent of sorties.
Seven LHAs loaded with six planes each comes down to 12% of the MC fleet.
With war load of up to 20 planes per ship, the STOVL percentage goes down the drain.
Last edited by NITRO104; 24th Aug 2013 at 17:09.
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More Bs for the MisGuided Children
USMC Concepts & Programs 2013 20 Dec 2012
http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/...13%20Final.pdf (11.9Mb)
Earlier:
More Marines to fly carrier variant JSFs 14 Mar 2011 Christopher P. Cavas
http://www.navytimes.com/news/2011/0...n_jsf_031411w/
“...The Marine Corps will acquire 357 STOVL aircraft and 63 CV aircraft for a total of 420 JSFs. Once the F-35 enters service, the Marine Corps will begin retirement of AV-8Bs and F/A-18A-Ds. All legacy tactical strike aircraft platforms should be retired by 2031....” page 179
Earlier:
More Marines to fly carrier variant JSFs 14 Mar 2011 Christopher P. Cavas
"...The Navy Department still intends to buy 680 F-35 joint strike fighters. Of those, 260 will be Navy F-35Cs, another 80 F-35Cs will be Marine aircraft, and the STOVL version for the Corps will make up 340 planes, or half the total Navy-Marine JSF fleet...."
Last edited by SpazSinbad; 25th Aug 2013 at 05:10. Reason: Date PDF Creation
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F-35B STO + VL DAYtime Video USS Wasp Aug 2013
ONLY DAYtime STO & VL (with unusual viewing angles) in this video:
Marines test F-35B vertical landing on ship
Marines test F-35B vertical landing on ship
"Published on Aug 26, 2013
The F-35B variant of the Joint Strike Fighter demonstrates its capabilities on the USS Wasp while being tested by Marine Corps and Lockheed Martin pilots and engineers off the coast of North Carolina, Aug. 19, 2013. This is the second repetition of three planned sea trials designed to test the capabilities of the Department of Defense's newest multi-role jet aircraft candidate. (Official U.S. Marine Corps photos and video by Sgt. Tyler L. Main)"
The F-35B variant of the Joint Strike Fighter demonstrates its capabilities on the USS Wasp while being tested by Marine Corps and Lockheed Martin pilots and engineers off the coast of North Carolina, Aug. 19, 2013. This is the second repetition of three planned sea trials designed to test the capabilities of the Department of Defense's newest multi-role jet aircraft candidate. (Official U.S. Marine Corps photos and video by Sgt. Tyler L. Main)"
Last edited by SpazSinbad; 26th Aug 2013 at 18:43. Reason: title + JPG
