MOD to be cut by 25%: Coalition says.

[hello1]

Drones.
Robots.

Precisely what did you have in mind? My physics teacher circa 1987 and 3CPO or have you been pilfering from Uncle Clive's stash?

Army of 105 000 + reserves. Why.

[charliegolf]

One wonders if they were really serious why one needs a Scottish, a Welsh and an Irish Assembly, all with their own Civil service excess baggage, doing the same Job that one Parliament used to do with a 1/4 of the civil service staffing of the four we have now...

Thank someone thinks as you do nutloose. I thought it was just me!

CG

[Tom Laxey]

Over-manning

The whole UK defence sector is heading for a bit of a crunch.

Certainly, private sector views of the MOD are that it is over-manned. The MOD typically turn up to meetings with as many as the industry side put together, and they are nominally customers. And I think a lot of those civil servants don't fully-contribute to the projects they are managing, or have a clear idea why they're there. I suppose the idea was that now that the project risks are handed over to industry, having a few extra brains on hand can only help, however I'm not sure it's having the impact hoped for. Also, MOD pay & conditions must now compare well with Industry.

I always think it amusing to see talk of cutting funds for the large programs currently being designed, .e.g JSF, carriers, subs etc. Industry teams are always short-handed of the sort of quality technical staff who can sort design problems out, but at least if there is continuity of funding then there is a chance. Cutting-edge technology is expensive, and programes are planned optimistically so they get on contract. I think there will remain an understanding of that in the planning.

[tucumseh]

Certainly, private sector views of the MOD are that it is over-manned. The MOD typically turn up to meetings with as many as the industry side put together, and they are nominally customers. And I think a lot of those civil servants don't fully-contribute to the projects they are managing, or have a clear idea why they're there. I suppose the idea was that now that the project risks are handed over to industry, having a few extra brains on hand can only help, however I'm not sure it's having the impact hoped for. Also, MOD pay & conditions must now compare well with Industry.

It is certainly true that many areas of “MoD” are over-manned but your post assumes two things – MoD = DE&S and all are Civil Servants. Apart from that, you touch on important points.

Why do so many turn up at meetings? Part of the reason is that “project managers” are no longer required to demonstrate an ability to do every job in the team before being promoted to the lowest PM grade (typically Grade C2); or once they are at that grade. Expertise is spread too thinly so it is difficult to find one man who can satisfactorily represent the Department at any given meeting.

Instead of having managed projects and programmes, in every phase of the acquisition cycle (Concept to Disposal) across a range of disciplines (e.g. for an avionics engineer, Software, Sonics, Radar, Comms, Nav, EW, ELINT) before being promoted to the 2nd rung (typically Grade C1), what we have now are C2s who have never managed any part of a project, C1s who have worked for a year as 2nd assistant to the tea boy and IPT leaders who have never delivered a project (never mind to time, cost and performance) and who are demonstrably not leaders, or even managers. And please don’t get me started on Military staff who roll up to meetings mob-handed, take a few notes, say nothing of substance and then seek out the experienced and competent Civil Servant and beg him to do their job (which the regulations permit). The latter is a dying breed. That is MoD’s problem.

There is a buzz phrase going around anti-MoD places – “Conspiracy of Optimism”, trying to describe why certain projects are years late. The usual examples are Nimrod MRA4 and Chinook HC Mk3. There was no conspiracy, just a refusal to listen to the above experience. At the same time, infinitely more complex programmes were delivered by the same Directorate General in MoD(PE)/DPA with effortless competence. Why? Two reasons. On the successful projects, the same people who had the authority (or gumption) to shape the projects had the technical expertise, competence and necessary authority to implement their plans. Secondly, they completely ignored the instructions of their bosses. The unsuccessful projects had, at various times, the technical competence and expertise at lower levels but the project leaders blindly followed 1 and 2 Star instructions. (Same 2 Star remember). An example? Systems Integration is optional. If it costs too much or takes too long, ditch it. Hint for direct entrant C2s who haven’t served in the previous 5 Grades – Aircraft don’t fly (safely) without systems integration. I’ve said it before – on a Squadron you wouldn’t allow a first day trainee pilot to be appointed Senior Observer. But that’s effectively what happens in MoD every day.

[The Old Fat One]

There is an interesting article by Stephanie Flanders on the BBC Website today, which dissects the numbers announced in the budget. Simply put to achieve the savings required, and if the cuts fell equally across the whole public sector, each department would have to find a 14 percent saving. With the NHS ring-fenced and Education and Defence likely to be "favoured", some departments are looking at hits of 30-40 percent.

I doubt we will learn too much more until the Public Spending Review (November??) and the Defence Review (no idea when), but it seems to me that defence will be lucky to escape with anything less than a 10 per cent cut in real terms - and that is a big number. You're not going to achieve anything like that by simply reducing the size of the MOD - the cuts (savings) will have to be found throughout the Defence budget. If anybody has the figures handy, it would be interesting to see how much was saved by Options for Change back in 1991. If my memory serves my correctly (increasingly unlikely) those cuts (targeted at post Cold War force reduction) reduced the armed forces by about a third, but I'm not sure what the commensurate budget reduction in percentage terms was??

[Jabba_TG12]

The description you give Tuc, is (depressingly) very familiar. Particularly at Corsham.

....And Bicester for that matter....

[gijoe]

...and not surprisingly Abbey Wood.

I disagree with the bit about the mil asking the Civil Servants to do their stuff for them - I found it the other way around due to a lack of knowledge, ability and drive. Peanuts, monkeys etc

Give DE&S the pullthrough it needs.

[Bigfoot]

How about this??

Scrap the Puma extension, buy additional merlins / chinooks to supplement current fleets. Thus reducing costs of old equipment. Even the Black hawk buy, good piece of kit/ good value for money and troops on the ground.

Assign all helicopters to the Army Air Corps, as they are all mostly used in suppport of ground troops. Reducing all the red tape and different chains of command, thus reducing costs at the same time making it more efficient.

Re-Examine the Lynx purchase. Small in size and not even able to carry a fully equiped section of men. Replace with Black Hawk.

Just an idea.

[minigundiplomat]

Scrap the Puma extension, buy additional merlins / chinooks to supplement current fleets. Thus reducing costs of old equipment. Even the Black hawk buy, good piece of kit/ good value for money and troops on the ground.

22 Chinooks on order from US, old news and was covered in the media. A newspaper may be a good investment.

Buy more Merlins? Why? They aren't a very capable platform. It is a testament to the crews (dark and light blue), that they have made them work in some sort of fashion.

Assign all helicopters to the Army Air Corps, as they are all mostly used in suppport of ground troops. Reducing all the red tape and different chains of command, thus reducing costs at the same time making it more efficient.

Yawn, see any of the several arguments on this forum. Unless you already have and you're fishing.

Re-Examine the Lynx purchase. Small in size and not even able to carry a fully equiped section of men. Replace with Black Hawk.

Agree, but it's been suggested for years and hasn't happened, mainly because all 3 parties are chasing votes in the South West.

[Squirrel 41]

OldFatOne asked:

I doubt we will learn too much more until the Public Spending Review (November??) and the Defence Review (no idea when)

<<Anorak mode: ON>>
<<Hood mode: UP>>

Dates:

- Spending review was announced in the Budget as Wed 20 Oct 10.
- Rumour has it that SDSR should be published late Nov early Dec, but it may be a little earlier.

but it seems to me that defence will be lucky to escape with anything less than a 10 per cent cut in real terms - and that is a big number.

Quite right. A 10% cut over four years would be surprisingly good news (despite how awful that sounds) as if you cut defence and schools by 10%, then every Department other than NHS and DfID will get cut by 33%. And that's officially painful. (See the Institute of Fiscal Studies The Institute For Fiscal Studies - Emergency Budget June 2010 - Rowena Crawford's presentation)

You're not going to achieve anything like that by simply reducing the size of the MOD - the cuts (savings) will have to be found throughout the Defence budget.

Yes, absolutely right. Let's call them cuts; they are. There WILL be fewer Sqns, Stations and whatnot at the end of this. Some sacred cows will get the bullet, and there's going to be a lot of blood on the floor. Running at least ankle deep, in fact.

If anybody has the figures handy, it would be interesting to see how much was saved by Options for Change back in 1991. If my memory serves my correctly (increasingly unlikely) those cuts (targeted at post Cold War force reduction) reduced the armed forces by about a third, but I'm not sure what the commensurate budget reduction in percentage terms was??

I don't have the figures immediately to hand, OFO, but IIRC Options for Change was about -7% and Front Line First was another -4%. So our
BEST CASE scenario is "Options for Saving Money" and "Front Line Last" being conducted concurrently.

Does that sort of put in in perspective? And remember, 25% cuts would more than twice as tough as "Options for Saving Money" and "Front Line Last" combined. At the same time.

<<Anorak mode: OFF>>
<<Hood mode: DOWN>>

S41

[Tom Laxey]

Cost over-runs

Some excellent points made here, I think. When the annual reports showing MOD project over-runs are published I tend to have sympathy for the MOD's position as customers and contract managers, in that their role as managers gives little opportunity to positively intervene to improve the cost/capability balance. However, where I am critical is in what was mentioned by Tecumseh, that failures to analyse and de-risk projects prior to launch are very costly.

To listen to the News one might think that all these British engineering companies were on the make, under-bidding to win contracts, then burning the planned funds, and then later holding MOD to ransom. What I actually suspect is true is that, whilst, yes, complex engineering projects do over-run during design/test, some this is re-working design that has already been undertaken. Risks left in projects until design often require ingenius 'fixes' during design.

Failure to tackle systems engineering is damaging to Engineering as an enterprise, and the perception is that all large engineering projects over-run, the larger and more complex, the worse the over-run. This perception is not in anyone's interest, nor is it neccesarily true, and I don't see any reason why complex engineering should be much more expensive today than previously.

[gijoe]

'...one might think that all these British engineering companies were on the make, under-bidding to win contracts, then burning the planned funds, and then later holding MOD to ransom.'

Tom,

A prime in South Wales near Newport for a well known procurement failure that regularly attracts the attention of the NAO - this is exactly what they did and do. Nothing happens for less than a £1m cheque and they constantly kid themselves and, more importantly, the export market that their project delivered to the UK MOD is a success.

Maybe this is a weakness of contracting primes but the MOD in many cases is seen as a cash cow and a 'we're a British company and you will support us even if we deliver rubbish' attitude adopted.

My time at DE&S was an eye-opener and very disappointing.

G

[Red Line Entry]

If Defence cuts 'only' come to 10%, then we should all be happy. If we implement those cuts by removing entire capabilities, or by making the positive decision to buy less cutting edge platforms (eg T45, JSF, A400M) in future, then we should all be doing cartwheels.

The alternative would be to continue the salami slicing of past years, only with much thicker slices...

[tucumseh]

Gijoe

'...one might think that all these British engineering companies were on the make, under-bidding to win contracts, then burning the planned funds, and then later holding MOD to ransom.'

Tom,

A prime in South Wales near Newport for a well known procurement failure that regularly attracts the attention of the NAO - this is exactly what they did and do. Nothing happens for less than a £1m cheque and they constantly kid themselves and, more importantly, the export market that their project delivered to the UK MOD is a success.

I think we know who you are talking about! There are always exceptions but the softly softly, you can do no wrong, approach to that particular company, and in particular the protection afforded both they and their suppliers, was and remains scandalous. What other company would be let off with a complete product recall and disposal; followed by 2 or 3 years to replace the defective kit during which time the shortage caused deaths in theatre? Especially as other companies were queuing up at AbbeyWood to sell a fully compliant, better made product at half the price. (I suppose having a Defence Minister on your supplier’s Board may help).



I know one of these suppliers was warned off by MoD’s Commercial Director, the precursor to being blacklisted. This is a feature of MoD procurement in IPTs that have a combination of weak leadership and incompetent Commercial staff – if a potential supplier dares criticise an Invitation to Tender, or offers a better solution, they risk everything. It is why they “answer the exam question”, even though the question may be daft. Then, if they get the contract, they apply pressure to those who have taken over management of the contract (not the above leaders and Commercial) and, hopefully, together they work out a better plan. The downside is that this often means delay, but not always cost increase. In this case it was both due to the sheer scale and cumulative effect of the basic howlers – all of which were notified before the event. That is the worst aspect. None of the problems came as a surprise.

[ORAC]

There's a repeated refrain from Fox et al about there being too many fast jets. I'd argue the case that the phase 3 Typhoon tranches have/are mostly being used to offset sales to Saudi/Oman etc; and that the JSF buy is unlikey to be more than 7-80 aircraft.

Regardless, there is no real monetary saving in cutting the odd squadron, the real savings are in retiring a fleet with all the associated training, logistic support etc.

Accetping the Typhhon and the JSF will form the core of the future RAF, that leaves the GR4 fleet. I accept that will leave a large capability gap until the Typhoon weapons upgrades are completed and/or a suitable future UAV capabilty can be procured - if at all. But it does make for a major saving in costs, plus it eliminates the need for FJ navigator training and a resultant reduction in manpower.

I wouls also suggest that the smaller ELINT platforms being produced in increasing numbers render the cost effectiveness of using the MRA4 in such a role moot, and the viability of a the fleet as an ASW/ASUW force is limited due to the numbers being procured. We are already taking a capability "holiday" due to the delay. I would suggest it could well become permanent and the Nimrod fleet could go the way of the V force and strategic bomber forces.

As has been stated elsewhere, we are beyond minor salami slicing and efficiency savings. That means cutting bone.

[vecvechookattack]

Re-Examine the Lynx purchase. Small in size and not even able to carry a fully equiped section of men. Replace with Black Hawk.

And the SH 60R for the Navy..... A much more capable aircraft.

[indie cent]

Type cuts...

RAF expects to cut some aircraft types

Impossible to escape the inevitible.

[XR219]

Surely the Tornado GR4 fleet is the obvious one to cut first? Now that the rest of the RAF's fast jet inventory is down to three-and-a-half squadrons of Typhoon, two squadrons of Harrier, and one of Tonka F3, it's rather surprising, to say the least, that there are still no fewer than eight GR4 squadrons still around (AFAIK). Especially when you consider that two of the roles that the GR1 previously fulfilled (tactical nuclear strike and anti-shipping) are now no more...

[Wrathmonk]

Especially when you consider that two of the roles that the GR1 previously fulfilled (tactical nuclear strike and anti-shipping) are now no more...

And when the TGRF had those roles it also had 11 or 12 squadrons. Those roles may have gone but many, many more have appeared. So, yet again, we're back to the Harrier vs Tornado question. The Tornado can sustain Afghan ops pretty much indefinately (as it had done in the Iraq theatre for the previous 15+ years). The Harrier can't. So lets kill Harrier off. The RN seem to be diverting their pilots to the USN to get deck time (and if the Harrier was recommitted to AFG then deck time disappears). The only thing keeping Harrier alive is the "capability gap" pre-JSF. What would you rather have - a capability gap in a role that is not being used (carrier ops) or a capability gap in a role that is?

Besides, sqns are completely irrelevant as no two (aircraft types) squadrons are the same. Its all about FE@R. But you knew that anyway, didn't you

Edited to add - its 7 squadrons plus an OCU

[Squirrel 41]

ORAC wrote:

Regardless, there is no real monetary saving in cutting the odd squadron, the real savings are in retiring a fleet with all the associated training, logistic support etc.

Quite right; this is why I think that Harrier will be first to go as a result of the previous cuts and that it is not scheduled to got back to Afghanistan. I suspect that Harrier will be going by the end of the financial year, and harsh as it is, I wouldn't be surprised to see go in 2010. Remember the fate of 6 Sqn at the end of the Jag.... (And I'm sure that you'll go out in true Bonajet style!)

Accepting the Typhoon and the JSF will form the core of the future RAF, that leaves the GR4 fleet. I accept that will leave a large capability gap until the Typhoon weapons upgrades are completed and/or a suitable future UAV capability can be procured - if at all. But it does make for a major saving in costs, plus it eliminates the need for FJ navigator training and a resultant reduction in manpower.

I half agree with this. Typhoon and Dave (JSF / JCA / F-35) will form the the RAF FJ fleet in the 2020s. However, I think the fiscally possible route to this is to delay the arrival of Dave until the GR4s are retired, not the other way around. Within this, it would be possible (if unpalatable) for the GR4 force to focus exclusively on Herrick and be slimmed down as a result. Slim it far enough (4 Sqns + OCU?) and two further savings are possible:

- first, closing Marham or Lossie (i.e. probably Marham given that it's due to close later this decade. Doubtless Norfolk needs another prison. )

- second, you'll have enough Navs in the system now to see the jet to an OSD of 2020(ish).

Once you go firm on this - and potentially golden handcuff enough Navs - you can stop all Nav training making substantially greater savings. So, a potential for a FJ Nav Retention scheme - some sort of a silver lining? (Note to SDSR PSOs: this is a non-reversible decision - make sure you're sure before pressing to test!)

This would retain a TGRF strategic capability with Storm Shadow, but precious little else - it would be "all Afghanland all the time" for most of the next decade - especially as PM Cameron has pencilled a land force in theatre until beyond 2015. A substantially smaller GR4 force would then be replaced with a similar sized JSF force from 2020 - preferably Dave-C, given the extra range and weapons capacity.

The next question is how many Typhoon Sqns you want to form, and what do you want them to do? Ministerial statements from the last government and the current situation suggest that Tranche 3b is dead and buried. Others here will know better than I the number of Typhoons that are on contract, minus the number diverted to Saudi (and potentially Oman).

Next question: what do you want Typhoon to do in the medium term? Again, a reasonable worst case, though unpalatable, would give you Typhoon doing AD with a very limited A-G commitment, focussed on QRA(I) North, South and Far South. On this pattern, 111's lonely northern vigil with the F3 shows that you can maintain QRA with one large Sqn (which is not to say that this is any fun, but that's the way it goes) suggesting that you could do QRA (though not much else) with 4 Sqns + OCU, or about 60 jets. (I do hope that the F3s bow out with a suitable amount of Tremblers' style and panache next spring.... 404+ Switchblade flick-knife of death to the end! )

Where does this get us with Typhoon? At a push, perhaps 3 Sqns + OCU? And if you've got a single Sqn doing QRA North, then having Leuchars open seems like an expensive luxury - so relocate QRA North to Lossie or Kinloss. (Probably going to be lots of room at Kinloss for sometime to come...). Given the diversion requirements, if you converted Leuchars into Tayport International Airport (for Dundee and St Andrews), then you'd be well advised to pay them to keep the cable.

Finally, if you end up with as small an FJ frontline as this, you immediately call into question then need for the FJ MFTS in particular and Valley / Linton in general. The demand could be met using NFTC Cold Lake, resulting in very significant savings, especially of the Hawk 128s and Tucano replacement elements of MFTS. (Note to SDSR PSOs: this is also effectively a non-reversible decision - make sure you're sure before pressing to test!)

Just some (unwelcome) thoughts. But I'd be surprised if these weren't under consideration as the left-field options in the SDSR bunker.

S41

PS, Sorry for the length.