General Sir Richard Dannatt on radio 4
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Stopstart
"The alternative is we suck it up and buy off the shelf for once"
agreed, its a much better idea than this absurd PFI, but we don't have the cash
and even if we did have the cash would you prefer to spend it canceling the pfi or say spend the cash on some chinooks and/or c130j's
"The alternative is we suck it up and buy off the shelf for once"
agreed, its a much better idea than this absurd PFI, but we don't have the cash
and even if we did have the cash would you prefer to spend it canceling the pfi or say spend the cash on some chinooks and/or c130j's
Trim Stab,
No. Just a damned sight more than you. Though that's really not difficult.
Stoppers,
We must agree to disagree on Dannatt, who is in my view one of the least 'purple' senior officers we've seen in a major post for many years.
The current Northern Q arrangement shows that while it's possible to sustain one QRA with one (expanded) squadron, but equally shows that you can't do ANYTHING else with that Squadron. Not supporting the Falklands, not undertaking multi-role training, not being available for deployed ops, and not even able to maintain proper currency in all aspects of the primary role, as the recent accident showed!
That's why you need two squadrons for Northern Q, two for Southern, and one to be able to have the 'slack' for the Falklands etc. Whaddya know? Five squadrons needed for UK (and FI) AD.
And actually, you want enough Typhoons to be able to do the old Jag role, too. Seven squadrons as planned sounds about right.
And you might want enough JSF to replace both Harrier and Tornado GR...... and to be able to generate sufficient FEAR to be able to do another Telic or even another Granby.
"LOL - do you really think you know more about defence than him?"
Stoppers,
We must agree to disagree on Dannatt, who is in my view one of the least 'purple' senior officers we've seen in a major post for many years.
"Simply saying we need 5 Sqns for UK AD and that's that simply won't wash. A possibly ludditic suggestion might be one up north, one down south and one OCU. Chuck a few jets in storage and go overborne on engineers and pilots on each squadron."
That's why you need two squadrons for Northern Q, two for Southern, and one to be able to have the 'slack' for the Falklands etc. Whaddya know? Five squadrons needed for UK (and FI) AD.
And actually, you want enough Typhoons to be able to do the old Jag role, too. Seven squadrons as planned sounds about right.
And you might want enough JSF to replace both Harrier and Tornado GR...... and to be able to generate sufficient FEAR to be able to do another Telic or even another Granby.
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and not even able to maintain proper currency in all aspects of the primary role,
Sounds like self protecting argument to me, not one for the good and benefit of UK PLC?
What comment did John H finish the interview with? Was Dannet ‘an idiot’ with his reply, that will be interesting if true!!!
Jackonicko
Trim Stab,
Quote:
"LOL - do you really think you know more about defence than him?"
No. Just a damned sight more than you. Though that's really not difficult.
Quote:
"LOL - do you really think you know more about defence than him?"
No. Just a damned sight more than you. Though that's really not difficult.
I am a serving military reservist, will soon deploy to Afghanistan, and deployed to Iraq. You are correct that I therefore don't know very much at all about defence except from my narrow perspective as a junior infanteer - but one thing is for sure I would never be so presumptuous as to imagine that I know more about defence than a former CGS who holds an MC and qualified as a military pilot.
Aren't you just a journalist? Why don't you sign up with the reserve forces and learn something real?
The current Northern Q arrangement shows that while it's possible to sustain one QRA with one (expanded) squadron, but equally shows that you can't do ANYTHING else with that Squadron. Not supporting the Falklands, not undertaking multi-role training, not being available for deployed ops, and not even able to maintain proper currency in all aspects of the primary role, as the recent accident showed!
That's why you need two squadrons for Northern Q, two for Southern, and one to be able to have the 'slack' for the Falklands etc. Whaddya know? Five squadrons needed for UK (and FI) AD.
That's why you need two squadrons for Northern Q, two for Southern, and one to be able to have the 'slack' for the Falklands etc. Whaddya know? Five squadrons needed for UK (and FI) AD.
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." Defending against air attack from a highly unlikely foe is a luxury, not a necessity."
were you asleep on September 11th 2001?
are you seriously suggesting defending UK airspace is an optional extra?
I suspect if you asked most of the population they'd inform you that the government should cease invading other countries first
I suspect when the government has a long hard think about what its priories are they might not come up the the answer Gen Dannat wants, 2011 is supposed to mark the beginning of our withdrawal from Afghanistan after all.
were you asleep on September 11th 2001?
are you seriously suggesting defending UK airspace is an optional extra?
I suspect if you asked most of the population they'd inform you that the government should cease invading other countries first
I suspect when the government has a long hard think about what its priories are they might not come up the the answer Gen Dannat wants, 2011 is supposed to mark the beginning of our withdrawal from Afghanistan after all.
StopStart
Seriously, when civvy airlines pare down aircraft weights to the bare minimums to save fuel burn & maximise bum on seats, who on earth is going to want to rent a part time tanker that comes with a couple of tonnes of extra fuel pipework?
It is to the advantage of the RAF to use their aircraft productively on the commercial market - whenever appropriate - because it ensures that they are replaced when their productive life ends. The RAF would not have such an outdated AT inventory if its aircraft were (wherever appropriate) subject to commercial competition. Isn't that a good thing?
I am not arguing that the entire PFI Tanker programme is flawless - just that the idea is meritorious. I expect we will see it perfected in the future.
Or do you want to live in a dreamland where RAF AT just spend peacetime on endless training jollies at the taxpayers expense, and end up flying out-dated aircraft as a result?
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
." Defending against air attack from a highly unlikely foe is a luxury, not a necessity."
were you asleep on September 11th 2001?
are you seriously suggesting defending UK airspace is an optional extra?
were you asleep on September 11th 2001?
are you seriously suggesting defending UK airspace is an optional extra?
What would make sense to me is the early drawdown of the GR4 force once the Typhoon can take on their tasks. For that we need to buy all of the Typhoons ordered. Spend to save.
But having ended up in the situation we are in, we have to compromise - and that inevitably means slashing massively the projected Typhoon fleet. Defence is going to take at least 15% cut in budget over the next few years - so stop dreaming. Where else will the cuts come from if not FJs generally and Typhoon in particular?
Did I miss the page where someone explained how 9/11 could have been prevented through effective use of Air Defence assets?
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What are these "endless training jollies at the taxpayers expense" of which you speak?
In my time on Albert (many years ago) overseas sorties were always 'Task Orientated'. Aside from the OCU, 'Overseas Trainers' were the things of dim and distant memory that were spoken of in awe by the more 'senior' sweats.
Indeed most of the 'overseas' flying were Ops: Jural, Warden, Vigour, Grapple, Deny, aside from Excercise commitments, NI commitments and the Akrotiri schedule. I was on the first crew to deploy on Op Jural and regularly exceeded the mandated maximum 16 hour crew duty day - the longest being 22 hours. Please tell me just how that is a "jolly"?
After leaving the fleet to become an Instructor, staying in touch with friends on the fleet, the pace of Ops did not slacken with the ongoing problems in the Balans and the No-Fly Zones in Iraq.
I would warrant that the pace of Ops increased post 2001 with the Afghanistan and Iraq situations.
Given that, could you tell me how the RAF could "use their [AT] aircraft productively on the commercial market"?
In my time on Albert (many years ago) overseas sorties were always 'Task Orientated'. Aside from the OCU, 'Overseas Trainers' were the things of dim and distant memory that were spoken of in awe by the more 'senior' sweats.
Indeed most of the 'overseas' flying were Ops: Jural, Warden, Vigour, Grapple, Deny, aside from Excercise commitments, NI commitments and the Akrotiri schedule. I was on the first crew to deploy on Op Jural and regularly exceeded the mandated maximum 16 hour crew duty day - the longest being 22 hours. Please tell me just how that is a "jolly"?
After leaving the fleet to become an Instructor, staying in touch with friends on the fleet, the pace of Ops did not slacken with the ongoing problems in the Balans and the No-Fly Zones in Iraq.
I would warrant that the pace of Ops increased post 2001 with the Afghanistan and Iraq situations.
Given that, could you tell me how the RAF could "use their [AT] aircraft productively on the commercial market"?
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Control of The Air
In the debate for what the country requires for defence we should remember the concept known as 'control of the air'. In Afghanistan now the coalition has almost complete control of the air barring Manpads, small arms and RPG. This allows SH, Air Transport and CAS aircraft to go about their business largely unmolested. More crucially, it allows the ground forces to operate without fear of attack from enemy aircraft. This level of control of the air is a luxury for ground forces. Effectively they have access to CAS on call, rapid medevacs, reliable resupply.
To achieve this as part of an expeditionary operation usually requires a Counter Air Campaign first to neutralise any air threat. This was needed in big campaigns such as the Gulf wars and Kosovo but was also even needed for theatre entry in Afghanistan in 2001 where the air threat was very low (a few low digit SAMs and some Mig 21s but they were there nevertheless and needed to be neutralised to allow all of the other air and ground campaigns to be mounted without interference (see IMINT - Afghanistan for some maps and pictures of the strikes throughout Oct 2001). Failure to have enough aircraft to mount a reasonable Counter Air Campaign to gain control of the air comes has serious consequences. The battering the RN ships and ground troops endured in the Falklands from aircraft on the very edge of their radius of action demonstrates the damage that old and basic aircraft can do. Let us imagine a situation where Britain is required to mount a relatively small operation into, for arguments sake, an failing state where rebels/insurgents have access to a sympathising neighbouring (perhaps fundamaentalist) nations attack aircraft with let us say some Mig23s/Hawks/Mig29s/Mig21s as seen in many nations across Africa and the Middle East. To provide the umbrella necessary to protect the CAS/AT/SH aircraft as well as the troops on the ground requires fast jets to be able to mount fighter CAPs at the very least and ideally to set up SEAD missions as well as bombing missions to deny the enemy the use of their aircraft and bases. And yes, this would be required for even a small threat - even light attack aircraft such as the Hawk can do an awful lot of damage to troops, SH/AT as well as ships which might be operating in support of any small task force sent to do a job. Meanwhile the Mig series available in many nations can do much more serious damage. To counter these threats we need modern aircraft which can efficiently target enemy aircraft before they hamper other air and surface operations. The ability to multirole is also important so that they can provide counter air capabilities but also be flexed into other roles such as CAS or Ground Attack to be able to contribute to the counter surface campaign as well either after providing a counter air capability or for situations where counter air really is not required.
"But Britain will never operate except as part of an alliance" I hear people say. Well, how about retaining our own capability. I don't remember any US or European aircraft getting involved in the Falklands. I don't remember any foreign forces fighting in Sierra Leone.
British Interests need to be safeguarded overseas and that could well require theatre entry either as part of a coalition or on our own. We need to maintain a capability to do that. There is a rather simplistic argument going around suggesting that we should only concentrate on Afghan type conflicts. Remember that to get in there round the clock fast jet missions were flown, initially as part of a counter air campaign and then in support of ground operations in the CAS role. In that country, with the luxury of almost complete control of the air, fast jet missions continue to be flown from both land and sea based aircraft - and even with this dedicated support the ground war is proving difficult.
Surely, then, the argument should not revolve around reducing fast jets which currently hold the key to control of the air, but should be centred on having fast jets and also upgrading the woefully inadequate AT and helos. If, as a country, we cannot afford to do this then we need to look seriously at our willingness to take part in overseas adventures (cue the SDR). If we decide then that we can no longer afford to carry out operations overseas, then the argument for fast jets remains. To defend a nation such as the UK we will continue to require a high quality air superiority fighter capability.
Let us not make the mistake of the Fall of France in 1940. The Germans recognised the need for control of the air, the French and allies did not and the Germans were able to maul the allied forces on the ground using air power. We barely had enough for the Falklands. Control of the Air is currently needed and provided for with fast jets. CAS is also provided by fast jets as is vital ISR information. Let us not be duped into making a differential case between SH/AT and fast jets. A balance of all aircraft and capabilities is required. Failure to get this balance right might suit the current situation in Afghanistan but the army will be cursing the lack of presence of the RAF/RN air superiority fighters (The army cursed the RAF for years when they got strafed at Dunkirk) when they get a complete mauling on some foreign beachead from a bunch of third world light attack aircraft which they can do nothing about.
Defence is expensive. The country is broke. Defence does not get votes. Are we to remain expeditionary? If so you need jets. Are we to save cash and be a home defence force? If so you need jets.
To achieve this as part of an expeditionary operation usually requires a Counter Air Campaign first to neutralise any air threat. This was needed in big campaigns such as the Gulf wars and Kosovo but was also even needed for theatre entry in Afghanistan in 2001 where the air threat was very low (a few low digit SAMs and some Mig 21s but they were there nevertheless and needed to be neutralised to allow all of the other air and ground campaigns to be mounted without interference (see IMINT - Afghanistan for some maps and pictures of the strikes throughout Oct 2001). Failure to have enough aircraft to mount a reasonable Counter Air Campaign to gain control of the air comes has serious consequences. The battering the RN ships and ground troops endured in the Falklands from aircraft on the very edge of their radius of action demonstrates the damage that old and basic aircraft can do. Let us imagine a situation where Britain is required to mount a relatively small operation into, for arguments sake, an failing state where rebels/insurgents have access to a sympathising neighbouring (perhaps fundamaentalist) nations attack aircraft with let us say some Mig23s/Hawks/Mig29s/Mig21s as seen in many nations across Africa and the Middle East. To provide the umbrella necessary to protect the CAS/AT/SH aircraft as well as the troops on the ground requires fast jets to be able to mount fighter CAPs at the very least and ideally to set up SEAD missions as well as bombing missions to deny the enemy the use of their aircraft and bases. And yes, this would be required for even a small threat - even light attack aircraft such as the Hawk can do an awful lot of damage to troops, SH/AT as well as ships which might be operating in support of any small task force sent to do a job. Meanwhile the Mig series available in many nations can do much more serious damage. To counter these threats we need modern aircraft which can efficiently target enemy aircraft before they hamper other air and surface operations. The ability to multirole is also important so that they can provide counter air capabilities but also be flexed into other roles such as CAS or Ground Attack to be able to contribute to the counter surface campaign as well either after providing a counter air capability or for situations where counter air really is not required.
"But Britain will never operate except as part of an alliance" I hear people say. Well, how about retaining our own capability. I don't remember any US or European aircraft getting involved in the Falklands. I don't remember any foreign forces fighting in Sierra Leone.
British Interests need to be safeguarded overseas and that could well require theatre entry either as part of a coalition or on our own. We need to maintain a capability to do that. There is a rather simplistic argument going around suggesting that we should only concentrate on Afghan type conflicts. Remember that to get in there round the clock fast jet missions were flown, initially as part of a counter air campaign and then in support of ground operations in the CAS role. In that country, with the luxury of almost complete control of the air, fast jet missions continue to be flown from both land and sea based aircraft - and even with this dedicated support the ground war is proving difficult.
Surely, then, the argument should not revolve around reducing fast jets which currently hold the key to control of the air, but should be centred on having fast jets and also upgrading the woefully inadequate AT and helos. If, as a country, we cannot afford to do this then we need to look seriously at our willingness to take part in overseas adventures (cue the SDR). If we decide then that we can no longer afford to carry out operations overseas, then the argument for fast jets remains. To defend a nation such as the UK we will continue to require a high quality air superiority fighter capability.
Let us not make the mistake of the Fall of France in 1940. The Germans recognised the need for control of the air, the French and allies did not and the Germans were able to maul the allied forces on the ground using air power. We barely had enough for the Falklands. Control of the Air is currently needed and provided for with fast jets. CAS is also provided by fast jets as is vital ISR information. Let us not be duped into making a differential case between SH/AT and fast jets. A balance of all aircraft and capabilities is required. Failure to get this balance right might suit the current situation in Afghanistan but the army will be cursing the lack of presence of the RAF/RN air superiority fighters (The army cursed the RAF for years when they got strafed at Dunkirk) when they get a complete mauling on some foreign beachead from a bunch of third world light attack aircraft which they can do nothing about.
Defence is expensive. The country is broke. Defence does not get votes. Are we to remain expeditionary? If so you need jets. Are we to save cash and be a home defence force? If so you need jets.
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Army Manpower
I missed Dannatt this morning but there was someone else on R4 offering the view that it would be impossible to maintain the current force in Afghanistan if the Army was cut................ what, are they really suggesting that you need an Army of more than 100K to keep a tenth of that deployed on ops? Tanks and big guns are a smoke screen - it is the manpower costs that dominate with our Land friends so don't be deceived.
Whilst we may be agreed that the FSTA PFI is somewhat sub-optimal, Dannatt needs to bear a couple of things in mind:
- It is subject to a very tight contract.
- There is no point having an Army to fight those wars that he was so happy to enter unless we have the means to get there!
Whilst we may be agreed that the FSTA PFI is somewhat sub-optimal, Dannatt needs to bear a couple of things in mind:
- It is subject to a very tight contract.
- There is no point having an Army to fight those wars that he was so happy to enter unless we have the means to get there!
In the debate for what the country requires for defence we should remember the concept known as 'control of the air'. In Afghanistan now the coalition has almost complete control of the air barring Manpads, small arms and RPG. This allows SH, Air Transport and CAS aircraft to go about their business largely unmolested. More crucially, it allows the ground forces to operate without fear of attack from enemy aircraft.
Having been in Afghanistan on and off since early 2002, the Taliban Air Force has been a repeated menace.
Thanks for clearing that up. Money well spent obviously!
* I am aware airpower has many uses, but this explanation (or justification) is arse.
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Agreed. That bloke saying SH can mooch about 'largely unmolested' has never, EVER, been there.
Mate, too many textbooks at staff college, you have read.
One other thing, once big fast airliners full of fuel and people smash into big cities creating mayhem, what you need is ac to move people and stuff from a to b to mop up the aftermath, ie AT and SH. Jets? Hmm, fire up the bbq and hit happy hour - do something nice and talk about your aeros sequence or something, we'll shout if we need you.
Mate, too many textbooks at staff college, you have read.
One other thing, once big fast airliners full of fuel and people smash into big cities creating mayhem, what you need is ac to move people and stuff from a to b to mop up the aftermath, ie AT and SH. Jets? Hmm, fire up the bbq and hit happy hour - do something nice and talk about your aeros sequence or something, we'll shout if we need you.
FJs may be of very limited relevance in Helmand in May 2010, but they were of pivotal import in Granby in '91 and in Telic in '03, when SH and AT were much less so.
And they may well be again, but once cut, it's a capability that cannot easily be restored.
Trident replacement. CVF. Heavy armour. Heavy artillery. Ceremonial troops, with their busbies and breastplates. A withdrawal of all but a skeleton presence in Scotland and Wales and closure of bases in those countries. The TA...... 
Or better still, not from the defence budget at all, but from bloated NHS bureaucracy, education, EU payments, support to asylum seekers et al, coupled with increases in progressive taxation.
And they may well be again, but once cut, it's a capability that cannot easily be restored.
"Where else will the cuts come from if not FJs generally and Typhoon in particular?"
Or better still, not from the defence budget at all, but from bloated NHS bureaucracy, education, EU payments, support to asylum seekers et al, coupled with increases in progressive taxation.
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
FJs may be of very limited relevance in Helmand in May 2010, but they were of pivotal import in Granby in '91 and in Telic in '03,
As for;
In Afghanistan now the coalition has almost complete control of the air barring Manpads, small arms and RPG.
Pivotal FJ in '91 and '03?
Won't comment much on '91 other than to say that D&C seemed horrendously one-tracked (we will go low...and fast...) and procurement was skewed to fulfill the doctrine. The result? Dreadful losses and a rapid switch in tactics. The FJ force has largely been at ML ever since. The USAF backed the right horse with dedicated SEAD and SPJs - we tried to be cheap and it cost us.
Telic 03 was not a FJ-fest from the UK - yes we deployed a comparitively large fleet and the crews flew with courage in the face of the enemy and, sadly, our own GBAD. However, the RAF FJ force were a drop in the ocean compared to the US deployed assets, and the campaign would have been perfectly achievable without them - much like Afg now. JHF on the other hand DID have a pivotal role in the campaign as we flew when and where the US couldn't or wouldn't and attacked targets of true strategic relevance. As the campaign was land-manoeuverist in nature, the CF RW assets were also vital to resupply the ground thrusts into Iraq, often with exposed flanks. Not as glamourous as dropping bombs but far more important to the overall campaign than a bit of tank-plinking...(which, btw, RW did quite a lot of too...).
1982 is a far better exemplar of the absolute need for organic FJ support to win and retain control of the air to allow SH to operate - and even then there were losses. So CVF and F35s all round then?
Won't comment much on '91 other than to say that D&C seemed horrendously one-tracked (we will go low...and fast...) and procurement was skewed to fulfill the doctrine. The result? Dreadful losses and a rapid switch in tactics. The FJ force has largely been at ML ever since. The USAF backed the right horse with dedicated SEAD and SPJs - we tried to be cheap and it cost us.
Telic 03 was not a FJ-fest from the UK - yes we deployed a comparitively large fleet and the crews flew with courage in the face of the enemy and, sadly, our own GBAD. However, the RAF FJ force were a drop in the ocean compared to the US deployed assets, and the campaign would have been perfectly achievable without them - much like Afg now. JHF on the other hand DID have a pivotal role in the campaign as we flew when and where the US couldn't or wouldn't and attacked targets of true strategic relevance. As the campaign was land-manoeuverist in nature, the CF RW assets were also vital to resupply the ground thrusts into Iraq, often with exposed flanks. Not as glamourous as dropping bombs but far more important to the overall campaign than a bit of tank-plinking...(which, btw, RW did quite a lot of too...).
1982 is a far better exemplar of the absolute need for organic FJ support to win and retain control of the air to allow SH to operate - and even then there were losses. So CVF and F35s all round then?
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Am I having one of those strange dreams? I'm finding myself agreeing with Jackonicko on Land and Air environments. 
Anyway; BBC News - Ex-Army chief Dannatt says equipment cuts inevitable
I find it interesting and telling that he didn't say "the three armed services".
An irrelivant observation or detection of a Freudian slip?
For the benefit of Trim Stab and others, Gen Dannatt has repeatedly shown that he has a complete grasp of the Land battlespace (should bloody hope so!) but demonstrated a sad grasp of the Air and, particularly, the Sea battlespaces.
Anyway; BBC News - Ex-Army chief Dannatt says equipment cuts inevitable
Sir Richard said the three branches of the armed forces needed to continue working "superbly together"
An irrelivant observation or detection of a Freudian slip?
For the benefit of Trim Stab and others, Gen Dannatt has repeatedly shown that he has a complete grasp of the Land battlespace (should bloody hope so!) but demonstrated a sad grasp of the Air and, particularly, the Sea battlespaces.
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If we get rid of the tradition (kit already paid for by the way) then we will become like the FJ fleet, a boring, self applauding non-necessity; did you forget the RAF dance troop with guns in you blinkered list? The TA will love you and you forgot the RAFR (maybe they don’t deploy like the TA)
If we need FJ in the hundreds - we call the US like everything else? We will all pay for the previous administrations tax and spend policy so look left and right a bit, you might see that we are ALL in this together.
If we need FJ in the hundreds - we call the US like everything else? We will all pay for the previous administrations tax and spend policy so look left and right a bit, you might see that we are ALL in this together.
Jackonicko:
Jackonicko are you seriously proposing that we should do without an independent nuclear deterrent but keep hordes of useless cold war FJs?
ExAscoteer:
Given that, could you tell me how the RAF could "use their [AT] aircraft productively on the commercial market"?
There is no denying that the existing AT fleet is outdated and overstretched. But if initiatives to put the RAF AT fleet on a semi-commercial basis had been taken three or four decades ago, we would almost certainly now have a bigger and more modern fleet. The dual use commercialisation of the Air Tanker fleet is definitely the way forward to maintain RAF wartime frontline capability in the future.
Quote:
"Where else will the cuts come from if not FJs generally and Typhoon in particular?"
Trident replacement.
"Where else will the cuts come from if not FJs generally and Typhoon in particular?"
Trident replacement.
ExAscoteer:
Given that, could you tell me how the RAF could "use their [AT] aircraft productively on the commercial market"?
Last edited by Trim Stab; 15th May 2010 at 10:03.
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The dual use commercialisation of the Air Tanker fleet is definitely the way forward to maintain RAF wartime frontline capability in the future.
Why does this country feel the need to lead where no-one else will follow...
