Pivotal FJ in '91 and '03?
Won't comment much on '91 other than to say that D&C seemed horrendously one-tracked (we will go low...and fast...) and procurement was skewed to fulfill the doctrine. The result? Dreadful losses and a rapid switch in tactics. The FJ force has largely been at ML ever since. The USAF backed the right horse with dedicated SEAD and SPJs - we tried to be cheap and it cost us.
Telic 03 was not a FJ-fest from the UK - yes we deployed a comparitively large fleet and the crews flew with courage in the face of the enemy and, sadly, our own GBAD. However, the RAF FJ force were a drop in the ocean compared to the US deployed assets, and the campaign would have been perfectly achievable without them - much like Afg now. JHF on the other hand DID have a pivotal role in the campaign as we flew when and where the US couldn't or wouldn't and attacked targets of true strategic relevance. As the campaign was land-manoeuverist in nature, the CF RW assets were also vital to resupply the ground thrusts into Iraq, often with exposed flanks. Not as glamourous as dropping bombs but far more important to the overall campaign than a bit of tank-plinking...(which, btw, RW did quite a lot of too...).
1982 is a far better exemplar of the absolute need for organic FJ support to win and retain control of the air to allow SH to operate - and even then there were losses. So CVF and F35s all round then?