Haddon-Cave, Airworthiness, Sea King et al (merged)
Tappers Dad,
On 12 Nov you posted: "I am seeing Bill Rammel on Monday ....." and "I will post his answer on here on Tuesday morning."
Looking forward to any info you may have to share with us. Thanks.
On 12 Nov you posted: "I am seeing Bill Rammel on Monday ....." and "I will post his answer on here on Tuesday morning."
Looking forward to any info you may have to share with us. Thanks.
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One for the lawyers...
Looking at the Scotsman, it suggests that those outside the MoD could be up in court HERE...I thought the days of crown immunity and the likes of General Sir Sam Cowan, Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger, Group Captain George Baber, Wing Commander Michael Eagles and Frank Walsh could face the courts as well as those not in the MoD might...or should I stand corrected?
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This was looked into a few months ago when charges were being considered against a former Govt Minister. As I recall, the charge of gross negligence manslaughter can be made against MoD, Ministers etc. For private companies I believe the charge is corporate manslaughter. Interested in the views of any legal eagles, there may have been some changes to the law since.
BTW all that is required is 5K to kick off a case against the former Minister. If anyone has a spare 5K lying around please PM me!
The interesting aspect of Haddon Cave's report is its status. It cannot be challenged. I wouldn't like to comment on the specifics of the news story in the above link, but it must be very worrying for those named individuals because the evidence is so damning and so clear.
BTW all that is required is 5K to kick off a case against the former Minister. If anyone has a spare 5K lying around please PM me!
The interesting aspect of Haddon Cave's report is its status. It cannot be challenged. I wouldn't like to comment on the specifics of the news story in the above link, but it must be very worrying for those named individuals because the evidence is so damning and so clear.
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Take a look at this from the Health and Safety Executive website http://www.hse.gov.uk/foi/internalop...-399/335_1.pdf
I couldn't believe what I was reading on page 21 135:
Measuring performance
135 Absence of routine monitoring of health and safety objectives set appears to be an MOD weakness. The phrase ‘management by exception’ is used, indicating that if nothing is evidently wrong nobody checks whether it is actually right.
I couldn't believe what I was reading on page 21 135:
Measuring performance
135 Absence of routine monitoring of health and safety objectives set appears to be an MOD weakness. The phrase ‘management by exception’ is used, indicating that if nothing is evidently wrong nobody checks whether it is actually right.
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TD, while this may seem to "fit", I'd be cautious in considering it "evidence" - a) because it is so old b) because it is an "Operational Circular" for HSE Inspectors who may have to go to MOD establishments on shall I say "traditional H&S" work and c) it says "However, HSE’s policy is not to seek to investigate issues relating to airworthiness or aircraft crashes."
sw
sw
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Safeware
Worry not, this is not evidence as such, however it does however fit in with Haddon-Caves findings Re The Safety Case. Also with regard to the age of the document, it was written in August 2000 not to be reviewed until 2010 therefore it is current. Remember also that the Safety Case was compiled during the period 2001-2005.
The Secretary of State requires: “that the airworthiness arrangements for military aircraft should be at least as effective as those for civil aircraft contained in the [Air Navigation Orders], and should comply with the [Health
& Safety at Work Act 1974] where relevant.
Also
The Health & Safety at Work Act 1974 (H&SWA) lays down duties which employers owe to employees.
Section 2 provides:
“2. (1) It shall be the duty of every employer to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare at work of all his employees.
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/CC4F4.../0/leaf_47.pdf
HEALTH AND SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES OF MOD EMPLOYEES
In general, however, the HSE have made it clear that they have no intention of prosecuting an individual Crown servant in substitution for his Department. There is moreover no question of the HS prosecuting individuals because of defects in management organisation. Prosecutions of individual Crown servants would only be pursued in circumstances where the HSE would normally prosecute an individual employee or manager outside the Civil Service or Armed Services, e.g. if there were a wilful or reckless disregard of H&S requirements and a consequential contravention of the HSWA. As a rule,
though, the HSE have tended to regard the criminal law as a weapon of last resort.
But the bottom line is it is up to the HSE to investigate and decide if they failed to comply with The Health & Safety at Work Act 1974 and the subordinate regulations.
Worry not, this is not evidence as such, however it does however fit in with Haddon-Caves findings Re The Safety Case. Also with regard to the age of the document, it was written in August 2000 not to be reviewed until 2010 therefore it is current. Remember also that the Safety Case was compiled during the period 2001-2005.
The Secretary of State requires: “that the airworthiness arrangements for military aircraft should be at least as effective as those for civil aircraft contained in the [Air Navigation Orders], and should comply with the [Health
& Safety at Work Act 1974] where relevant.
Also
The Health & Safety at Work Act 1974 (H&SWA) lays down duties which employers owe to employees.
Section 2 provides:
“2. (1) It shall be the duty of every employer to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare at work of all his employees.
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/CC4F4.../0/leaf_47.pdf
HEALTH AND SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES OF MOD EMPLOYEES
In general, however, the HSE have made it clear that they have no intention of prosecuting an individual Crown servant in substitution for his Department. There is moreover no question of the HS prosecuting individuals because of defects in management organisation. Prosecutions of individual Crown servants would only be pursued in circumstances where the HSE would normally prosecute an individual employee or manager outside the Civil Service or Armed Services, e.g. if there were a wilful or reckless disregard of H&S requirements and a consequential contravention of the HSWA. As a rule,
though, the HSE have tended to regard the criminal law as a weapon of last resort.
But the bottom line is it is up to the HSE to investigate and decide if they failed to comply with The Health & Safety at Work Act 1974 and the subordinate regulations.
Last edited by Tappers Dad; 19th Nov 2009 at 09:34. Reason: To include HEALTH AND SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES OF MOD EMPLOYEES
e.g. if there were a wilful or reckless disregard of H&S requirements and a consequential contravention of the HSWA.
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TD,
I have no issue with the MOD's requirements re duty of care and H&SWA, and that it has been lacking in this (airworthiness) and other areas - look at the various crown censures that have been issued over even the last few years.
My concern with this is that the HSE have divorced themselves from airworthiness in particular and functional safety in general. Therefore, wrt to the circular, the information therein is not in the same context. Also, while it says that it is valid until 2010, is that reasonable? Would a 10 yr old "audit report" be considered valid in any other context? Next year will the HSE consider that they need to change their policy? - I bet not.
Don't get me wrong, I'm not saying that the H&SWA and duty of care isn't a valid line of approach, just that whereas the HSE are there to police industry, they don't police the MOD in the same way.
sw
I have no issue with the MOD's requirements re duty of care and H&SWA, and that it has been lacking in this (airworthiness) and other areas - look at the various crown censures that have been issued over even the last few years.
My concern with this is that the HSE have divorced themselves from airworthiness in particular and functional safety in general. Therefore, wrt to the circular, the information therein is not in the same context. Also, while it says that it is valid until 2010, is that reasonable? Would a 10 yr old "audit report" be considered valid in any other context? Next year will the HSE consider that they need to change their policy? - I bet not.
Don't get me wrong, I'm not saying that the H&SWA and duty of care isn't a valid line of approach, just that whereas the HSE are there to police industry, they don't police the MOD in the same way.
sw
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This was reported a couple of days ago -
BBC NEWS | UK | England | Somerset | Nimrod family seeking prosecution
The family of a man who was killed when an RAF Nimrod exploded over Afghanistan are calling for lawyers to consider a criminal prosecution......
.....Sgt Knight's parents have written to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) urging lawyers to take up the case.....
....Graham and Trish Knight have also written to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) calling for an investigation into whether the Ministry of Defence (MoD) should be prosecuted for failing to ensure the airworthiness of the Nimrod.
BBC NEWS | UK | England | Somerset | Nimrod family seeking prosecution
The family of a man who was killed when an RAF Nimrod exploded over Afghanistan are calling for lawyers to consider a criminal prosecution......
.....Sgt Knight's parents have written to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) urging lawyers to take up the case.....
....Graham and Trish Knight have also written to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) calling for an investigation into whether the Ministry of Defence (MoD) should be prosecuted for failing to ensure the airworthiness of the Nimrod.
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deeceethree
The Bill Rammell meeting was something and nothing, something because he answered some questions we had. Nothing because we had to submit our questions in writing prior to the meeting and he will reply to those in writing . He is going to make a statement to the 'House' before Christmas on progress Re Haddon-Cave Review and what action if any is being taken on serving officers.
The Bill Rammell meeting was something and nothing, something because he answered some questions we had. Nothing because we had to submit our questions in writing prior to the meeting and he will reply to those in writing . He is going to make a statement to the 'House' before Christmas on progress Re Haddon-Cave Review and what action if any is being taken on serving officers.
Sir Robert Nelson to head independent review for QinetiQ
Sir Robert Nelson to head independent review for QinetiQ
Caustic Comments:
1. "In the meantime all airworthiness advisory projects have been given an additional reporting line" = We're resubmitting our quotes to MoD to increase the price for this advice, especially given they now want good advice.
2. "The Board believes that input from an independent third party will provide important impetus to our analysis of the lessons to be learned from the Haddon-Cave report" = Like MoD, we've systematically rid ourselves of the very people who told us all along we were doing the wrong thing, so haven't a clue which way to turn.
The Board of QinetiQ Group plc today announces that it has appointed Sir Robert Nelson, a former High Court Judge, to oversee the company’s formal investigation that is underway into the conclusions and recommendations made in the Haddon-Cave report into the loss of Nimrod XV230.
Sir Robert will address the conclusions and recommendations made by Charles Haddon-Cave QC in the Nimrod Review. He will also assess the processes, structure and reporting requirements covering QinetiQ's advisory work in the UK and will propose the actions he thinks QinetiQ should take in response to the Haddon-Cave report.
He will provide an interim report to the Board of QinetiQ Group plc before the end of 2009. In the meantime all airworthiness advisory projects have been given an additional reporting line and the two QinetiQ employees named in the Haddon-Cave report have been suspended on full pay while the investigation is underway.
Sir John Chisholm, Chairman of QinetiQ said: “The QinetiQ Board has received a detailed briefing on the Haddon-Cave report and is determined the company learns from all that the report says. To ensure that this happens, we have appointed Sir Robert Nelson, recently retired as a High Court Judge, to oversee an independent investigation, proposing any actions he thinks are appropriate."
He added: "The Board believes that input from an independent third party will provide important impetus to our analysis of the lessons to be learned from the Haddon-Cave report. Sir Robert has the experience and expertise to oversee this process and the Board looks forward to reviewing his preliminary recommendations before the end of the year.”
Sir Robert will address the conclusions and recommendations made by Charles Haddon-Cave QC in the Nimrod Review. He will also assess the processes, structure and reporting requirements covering QinetiQ's advisory work in the UK and will propose the actions he thinks QinetiQ should take in response to the Haddon-Cave report.
He will provide an interim report to the Board of QinetiQ Group plc before the end of 2009. In the meantime all airworthiness advisory projects have been given an additional reporting line and the two QinetiQ employees named in the Haddon-Cave report have been suspended on full pay while the investigation is underway.
Sir John Chisholm, Chairman of QinetiQ said: “The QinetiQ Board has received a detailed briefing on the Haddon-Cave report and is determined the company learns from all that the report says. To ensure that this happens, we have appointed Sir Robert Nelson, recently retired as a High Court Judge, to oversee an independent investigation, proposing any actions he thinks are appropriate."
He added: "The Board believes that input from an independent third party will provide important impetus to our analysis of the lessons to be learned from the Haddon-Cave report. Sir Robert has the experience and expertise to oversee this process and the Board looks forward to reviewing his preliminary recommendations before the end of the year.”
1. "In the meantime all airworthiness advisory projects have been given an additional reporting line" = We're resubmitting our quotes to MoD to increase the price for this advice, especially given they now want good advice.
2. "The Board believes that input from an independent third party will provide important impetus to our analysis of the lessons to be learned from the Haddon-Cave report" = Like MoD, we've systematically rid ourselves of the very people who told us all along we were doing the wrong thing, so haven't a clue which way to turn.
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"In the meantime all airworthiness advisory projects have been given an additional reporting line"
Not sure what that will do in reality - is it spin to make it look like they are adding an additional level of oversight? And what does it entail - lawyers?
Or is it because something is wrong with the current process?
Things may have changed recently, QQ having done the "lean" thing, but at the time in question:
Stage 1 - author(s) would review the available evidence, whether from industry, 3rd parties or QQ testing and write their report on this basis, making their RTS argument based on this evidence, cross-referenced as required for traceability. (JSP 553 requirement to be able to trace back from the RTS to the supporting evidence)
Stage 2 - Technical Assurance - those with such responsibility - Technical Leader / OC Test Sqn review the reports, giving due consideration to the recommendations being made, the rationale for such recommendations and the evidence supporting them.
Stage 3 - Release - the Technical Assurance Manager, having reviewed the report (as signed off as SATIS by Stage 2, attended review meetings, giving due consideration to the recommendations being made, the rationale for such recommendations and the evidence supporting them, signs off the report.
So, if done effectively (ie not as described by H-C), this is a robust system IMHO. Or are they now going to have the Technical Director sign off all reports.
sw
Not sure what that will do in reality - is it spin to make it look like they are adding an additional level of oversight? And what does it entail - lawyers?
Or is it because something is wrong with the current process?
Things may have changed recently, QQ having done the "lean" thing, but at the time in question:
Stage 1 - author(s) would review the available evidence, whether from industry, 3rd parties or QQ testing and write their report on this basis, making their RTS argument based on this evidence, cross-referenced as required for traceability. (JSP 553 requirement to be able to trace back from the RTS to the supporting evidence)
Stage 2 - Technical Assurance - those with such responsibility - Technical Leader / OC Test Sqn review the reports, giving due consideration to the recommendations being made, the rationale for such recommendations and the evidence supporting them.
Stage 3 - Release - the Technical Assurance Manager, having reviewed the report (as signed off as SATIS by Stage 2, attended review meetings, giving due consideration to the recommendations being made, the rationale for such recommendations and the evidence supporting them, signs off the report.
So, if done effectively (ie not as described by H-C), this is a robust system IMHO. Or are they now going to have the Technical Director sign off all reports.
sw
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I think it will be interesting. I think there may be a more nuanced view of QQ's role and it would be nice to have the precise detail of the genesis of that useful little phrase, which minister's and the MoD were so happy to have to fob off any critics, that the system was "tolerably safe". Odd no-one was prepared to accept until H-C came along that it was rubbish, including it has to be said some ppruners. That little phrase definitely wasnt in the first QQ report, which was pretty much a blanket condemnation without it. So who told them to put it there? Not that they should have agreed to, of course, but nevertheless.
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I've read it through and it still reads as English to me but then I havent had any time to sober up yet!
Haddon-Cave criticised QinetiQ for the use of the term "tolerably safe but not ALARP" (p334). He says: "There is no such thing as 'tolerably safe but not ALARP'. Risks are either 'tolerable and ALARP' or intolerable.
But the QinetiQ report which used the words "tolerably safe" did not originally use those words. They appear to have been put into a second version of the report at the request of the IPT.
The claim that the aircraft was "tolerably safe" was then used by ministers and the MoD press office to insist that it meant there were no problems when there were a number.
I am simply saying that the review ordered by QinetiQ seems likely to get to the bottom of who actually persuaded their engineers to insert words "tolerably safe" into their conclusions.
Haddon-Cave criticised QinetiQ for the use of the term "tolerably safe but not ALARP" (p334). He says: "There is no such thing as 'tolerably safe but not ALARP'. Risks are either 'tolerable and ALARP' or intolerable.
But the QinetiQ report which used the words "tolerably safe" did not originally use those words. They appear to have been put into a second version of the report at the request of the IPT.
The claim that the aircraft was "tolerably safe" was then used by ministers and the MoD press office to insist that it meant there were no problems when there were a number.
I am simply saying that the review ordered by QinetiQ seems likely to get to the bottom of who actually persuaded their engineers to insert words "tolerably safe" into their conclusions.
I am simply saying that the review ordered by QinetiQ seems likely to get to the bottom of who actually persuaded their engineers to insert words "tolerably safe" into their conclusions.
I hope you are right Mick. I confess I haven't seen it often, but I recall Boscombe (RWTS) being pressurised into downgrading recommendations and 4 years later a BoI report using precisely the same words as the original. 2 dead.
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Mick, Safeware, Tuc, Flip, Nige
Have you considered writing direct to Sir Robert Nelson about this specific issue?
[Insert conspiracy theory:-
'Re-write your independant report or you won't get paid']
Having attended Human Factors training last week, I will not be content with the two names that this will throw up (probably already named)
I would like to know what factors caused them to act the way they did. If the individuals have any sense of self preservation, they will implicate the higher-ups who got us into this mess.
Not holding my breath, shades of the Dodgy Dossier
Have you considered writing direct to Sir Robert Nelson about this specific issue?
[Insert conspiracy theory:-
'Re-write your independant report or you won't get paid']
Having attended Human Factors training last week, I will not be content with the two names that this will throw up (probably already named)
I would like to know what factors caused them to act the way they did. If the individuals have any sense of self preservation, they will implicate the higher-ups who got us into this mess.
Not holding my breath, shades of the Dodgy Dossier