Strange no one has commented on the MAA’s annual report. Assuming most aircrew here agree that avoiding wire strikes is rightfully high on their priority list, I think there should be immense concern over;
1. The technical solution was sought about 25 years ago through R&D.
2. MoD’s own scientists said the specification could be met with existing technology; they could immediately progress to full development. (From memory, the MoD sought to detect 3cm at about 1.5 miles and display on HUD, and were immediately offered 1cm at 3 miles – I’m probably a little out but you get the idea. Sorry, mixed imperial/metric but that was the way it was expressed).
3. Jump forward 20 years and in 2008 it is flagged as a high priority.
4. In 2011 the MAA report says it is still a high priority, with R&D still required.
Am I the only one who is thinking WTF’s going on?
MoD has a section responsible for delivering technology. It is surely unsatisfactory for the MAA report to simply note a long standing problem without offering some explanation. Their report would have been circulated in draft to, among others, the section responsible for overseeing technology development/delivery. That section has a self professed expert in this very field, having “worked” in the R&D section that delivered the above multi-function device, and who would surely have been expected to contribute his experience. Even if that device or technology had proved to be unsuitable, it is surely in the MAA’s interest to add a sentence explaining that they have actively explored solutions and have narrowed it down in a technological sense by omitting this technology or system. It would at least make it look as if the MAA were trying to do something. As it stands, the complete disconnect screams at you from every page.
This is not just about wire detection. This one issue encapsulates all that is wrong with “acquisition”. 25 years ago project managers didn’t have e-mail or PCs and had to make scores of phone calls to track down any possible R&D that would help them deliver. But 10 years ago there was a system whereby you simply typed in key words (like “wire” and “avoidance”) and any R&D programmes would pop up. It is called avoiding reinventing the wheel. The system seems never to have been used. The MAA seem frozen in time when it comes to practical implementation, but romping ahead with re-writing regulations which, while dated, sometimes complex and often contradictory, remained fit for purpose when used by trained staffs. Ah, trained staffs. MoD stopped doing that 20 years ago.
But, 2 years on, it seems little progress is being; this lack of practical experience means many are scared to sign anything. And, it has finally been recognised after 20 years of warnings that many with delegation had no right to it (or were self-appointed) so there are many fewer to do the same amount of work. These problems have not been caused by those who wanted airworthiness regulations enforced; they have been caused by those who didn’t. And that neatly gets us back to the above, and why key information has apparently been withheld from the MAA. I wonder if their boss ever asks whose actions brought this **** storm down on MoD and just who among his so called colleagues is working against him. He now knows the answer (as I know he reads pprune!).
What should be uppermost in the MAA’s mind is the answer to this question...... Could all the problems noted by the various Airworthiness Review Teams and Audits have been avoided by implementing existing airworthiness regulations?
YES, with the only real complication being the cultural and behavioural failings that manifested themselves as consistent rulings that implementing these regulations was a waste of money and an offence. (In fact, most could be avoided by implementing one key Def Stan, now cancelled without replacement. We now have 5 ARTs plus various audit reports and the similarities are there for all to see). It follows that this should be the starting point, but it has been conveniently swept under the carpet. The “new” regulations offer little hint that the old ones even existed. It wasn’t that the old ones were poor, it was that key senior staffs, especially the RAF Chief Engineer and CDP, oversaw a regime which refused to countenance them being implemented properly.