Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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TB
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Track........
Walt...
you are making the same mistake that Mitchell makes in the Boeing report.....
...from V813 to the Real lighthouse is a bearing of 19.78 degrees true , plus the variation for your sums..
..they were never at V813 ......that was a default option built into the Tans because it assumes the crew will load a new route every time they fly ....and so starts with the first waypoint..but this unit had a database already loaded of other locations.....
...and they were way way East of the real lighthouse at impact.......these differences negate most of your 'turn'.....sorry..
rgds..
you are making the same mistake that Mitchell makes in the Boeing report.....
...from V813 to the Real lighthouse is a bearing of 19.78 degrees true , plus the variation for your sums..
..they were never at V813 ......that was a default option built into the Tans because it assumes the crew will load a new route every time they fly ....and so starts with the first waypoint..but this unit had a database already loaded of other locations.....
...and they were way way East of the real lighthouse at impact.......these differences negate most of your 'turn'.....sorry..
rgds..
Last edited by Robin Clark; 28th Jun 2011 at 17:31. Reason: name correction
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Robin
I can understand your confusion I thought I had explained this in posts some time ago and it is in my report but just in case I will explain again with this excerpt:
<<There was also a starting position, a fix that Racal seems to have confused with an initialisation fix - the following extract from the Racal report describes a position fix they made after they had left the aerodrome:
-----------------
2.2.2 Initialisation Fix time and position
The superTANS stores the last operator fix position and time which were:
Last Fix time: 16:07:09.9
Latitude: N 54 41.10'
Longitude: W 006 11.89'
Selected sensor at time of Initial Fix: GPS
2.2.3 Comment
2.2.3.1 The initial position would have been written into both GPS and Doppler Navigation positions.
2.2.3.2 It is a recommended procedure that waypoint number 1 is the home base defined on the DTD to which the system will usually be initialised.
2.2.3.3 In this case, the system was initialised according to that procedure, at the position defined as point number 1 in the waypoints database, named V813.
--------------------
This is rather confusing as it would seem to suggest that the location where you are setting off from would be the first waypoint and it is saying that this was the case however, the above fix is not on the aerodrome at Aldergrove but 1.7 nmiles from the VOR site on a bearing of 45M but on 027 from the radar Racal seems to have assumed that the last fix stored was the initialisation fix but actually plotting it on a map (or digital map easier and more accurate) reveals the extra fix after departure let us refer to this position as Fix1 - this was normal procedure in those days (to do a fix soon after take off to reinforce the initial fix, such was the distrust of the GPS at the time) a point from witness [*****].>>
The time may have been for the initialisation fix but this next fix position was loaded ready for entering when they passed over the location if the reading was close enough, they may not have bothered to update it perhaps others that used this practice at the time could explain better?
The track from Fix1 to waypoint A was 027 hope this helps.
I can understand your confusion I thought I had explained this in posts some time ago and it is in my report but just in case I will explain again with this excerpt:
<<There was also a starting position, a fix that Racal seems to have confused with an initialisation fix - the following extract from the Racal report describes a position fix they made after they had left the aerodrome:
-----------------
2.2.2 Initialisation Fix time and position
The superTANS stores the last operator fix position and time which were:
Last Fix time: 16:07:09.9
Latitude: N 54 41.10'
Longitude: W 006 11.89'
Selected sensor at time of Initial Fix: GPS
2.2.3 Comment
2.2.3.1 The initial position would have been written into both GPS and Doppler Navigation positions.
2.2.3.2 It is a recommended procedure that waypoint number 1 is the home base defined on the DTD to which the system will usually be initialised.
2.2.3.3 In this case, the system was initialised according to that procedure, at the position defined as point number 1 in the waypoints database, named V813.
--------------------
This is rather confusing as it would seem to suggest that the location where you are setting off from would be the first waypoint and it is saying that this was the case however, the above fix is not on the aerodrome at Aldergrove but 1.7 nmiles from the VOR site on a bearing of 45M but on 027 from the radar Racal seems to have assumed that the last fix stored was the initialisation fix but actually plotting it on a map (or digital map easier and more accurate) reveals the extra fix after departure let us refer to this position as Fix1 - this was normal procedure in those days (to do a fix soon after take off to reinforce the initial fix, such was the distrust of the GPS at the time) a point from witness [*****].>>
The time may have been for the initialisation fix but this next fix position was loaded ready for entering when they passed over the location if the reading was close enough, they may not have bothered to update it perhaps others that used this practice at the time could explain better?
The track from Fix1 to waypoint A was 027 hope this helps.
This is interesting stuff because as tecumseh said before, MoD's case relied a great deal on this "evidence" yet there are many unexplained anomalies.
I can't understand why Racal were allowed to write the report on their own equipment but the AAIB wrote the GPS report instead of Trimble. This can't be normal, can it? Whose job was it to independently assess the Racal report and make sure it aligned with the GPS one?
A few posters on here seem to know what they are talking about and still we debate what the Tans "evidence" means. So how can the Reviewing Officers be so sure? Was it Day who at one point described Tans as a "black box recorder"? Not the words of a knowledgeable man. It this were a court of law such an "expert witness" would be laughed out of court, yet he was allowed to pronounce on the supposed guilt of two men using equipment he knew nothing about.
Disgraceful.
I can't understand why Racal were allowed to write the report on their own equipment but the AAIB wrote the GPS report instead of Trimble. This can't be normal, can it? Whose job was it to independently assess the Racal report and make sure it aligned with the GPS one?
A few posters on here seem to know what they are talking about and still we debate what the Tans "evidence" means. So how can the Reviewing Officers be so sure? Was it Day who at one point described Tans as a "black box recorder"? Not the words of a knowledgeable man. It this were a court of law such an "expert witness" would be laughed out of court, yet he was allowed to pronounce on the supposed guilt of two men using equipment he knew nothing about.
Disgraceful.
dervish:
In those few words you encapsulate the whole rotten mess that is UK Military Air Accident Investigation. It is done by those who are not trained Air Accident Investigators (trained Air Accident Investigators from the AAIB can be invited to give assistance to a BoI but only on its terms and direction). So the operator (ie the RAF) investigates its own air accidents and thus any of its own shortcomings. Even if a BoI managed to do so objectively it in turn is subject to review by Senior Officers and its conclusions can be overturned by their Finding, as with Mull. Their Finding then becomes inviolate in the absence of "New Evidence", the existence of which is solely judged by the same operator, as with Mull. Incestuous would be a polite way of describing this cosy arrangement!
If all this merely covered up the incompetence and negligence of the operator there would be those who would simply say "let sleeping dogs lie", I'm sure. But Air Accident Investigation has one all important purpose, ie preventing recurring accidents from the same cause. This the Royal Air Force Air Accident Investigation System has spectacularly failed to do, if only a fraction of the Fatal Airworthiness Related Air Accidents were caused by the revealed Systemic Failures of the UK Military Airworthiness Regulatory Authority, aka the MOD.
High time then that the Investigation of UK Military Air Accidents and the Regulation of UK Military Airworthiness be handed over to those who can, as the existing set-up plainly cannot.
High time we had a separate and independent MAAIB and MAA!
Self Regulation Never Works, and in Aviation it Kills!
.... yet he was allowed to pronounce on the supposed guilt of two men using equipment he knew nothing about.
If all this merely covered up the incompetence and negligence of the operator there would be those who would simply say "let sleeping dogs lie", I'm sure. But Air Accident Investigation has one all important purpose, ie preventing recurring accidents from the same cause. This the Royal Air Force Air Accident Investigation System has spectacularly failed to do, if only a fraction of the Fatal Airworthiness Related Air Accidents were caused by the revealed Systemic Failures of the UK Military Airworthiness Regulatory Authority, aka the MOD.
High time then that the Investigation of UK Military Air Accidents and the Regulation of UK Military Airworthiness be handed over to those who can, as the existing set-up plainly cannot.
High time we had a separate and independent MAAIB and MAA!
Self Regulation Never Works, and in Aviation it Kills!
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Caz,
Then he should have had the common sense to listen to Sqn Ldr Burke, who was the "best available" expert in 1994. What was his Chinook experience?
Had he ever even used a TANS computer?
Chualug
The main reason MOD and supporters are so keen to discredit Mr Holbrook is because he challenges AM Wrattens contention that negligence had taken place at or before Waypoint change. Flying "too fast" for the conditions.
Holbrook has the aircraft at sensible height and speed and in VMC around that very point.
Calling other witnesses to confirm this could only embarrass the AM further.
Why was Holbrook not questioned further? Probably down to the addage:
"When in a hole, stop digging."
Then he should have had the common sense to listen to Sqn Ldr Burke, who was the "best available" expert in 1994. What was his Chinook experience?
Had he ever even used a TANS computer?
Chualug
The main reason MOD and supporters are so keen to discredit Mr Holbrook is because he challenges AM Wrattens contention that negligence had taken place at or before Waypoint change. Flying "too fast" for the conditions.
Holbrook has the aircraft at sensible height and speed and in VMC around that very point.
Calling other witnesses to confirm this could only embarrass the AM further.
Why was Holbrook not questioned further? Probably down to the addage:
"When in a hole, stop digging."
Last edited by dalek; 2nd Jul 2011 at 18:02.
Sir John Day was flying helicopters on Active Service long before either of the Pilots of ZD 576 had completed Primary School.
Then, assuming he knows what a flight and cockpit voice recorder are, what motive did he have for telling a committee Tans was a "black box recorder?" The only answer I can think of is to present as factual, information that was not.
Assuming you agree with Day's words and that you know so much about Tans, which would seem to be far more than Racal do as they stated it was not a recorder, then perhaps you'd like to clear up the anomalies being discussed here.
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Dervish
Your post #7970 sums the situation up - after 17 years someone should have done the basic navigation/situation/weather analysis comprehensively.
As the RAF/MOD has not, it would surely have been worthwhile for an interested party to task a team of experts with the right mixes of experience and expertise to work on this and push for specific answers to any matters arising.
I suggested this approach years ago.
Your post #7970 sums the situation up - after 17 years someone should have done the basic navigation/situation/weather analysis comprehensively.
As the RAF/MOD has not, it would surely have been worthwhile for an interested party to task a team of experts with the right mixes of experience and expertise to work on this and push for specific answers to any matters arising.
I suggested this approach years ago.
Walter
If I may offer a reply, it seems there is common ground at last.
The point being made here by so many (not just your good self or dervish), for so long, is that it is incumbent upon MoD to do precisely that as part of the Board of Inquiry investigation. The regulations required proof beyond any doubt whatsoever.
It follows that doubts should be identified where they are thought to exist, examined and positively eliminated as causal factors. AP3207 gives examples of such factors, for example Organisational Fault. If one does not positively eliminate, then by definition doubt remains.
Instead, what happened was Organisational Fault (i.e. doubt) was established (witnessed by a plethora of evidence in the BoI report), ignored by the BoI (perhaps because it implicated the ROs and fellow Stars of the day, such as the RAF Chief Engineer) who in turn conveniently blamed the pilots; thus diverting attention from their own deliberate failings. Deliberate, because the record shows they (RAF and MoD hierarchy) were warned as to the effect these failings were already having on Chinook and all other aircraft. For example, Inspector of Flight Safety to Chief Engineer in August 1992, swiftly followed by further cuts to safety funding which, with hindsight, now begin to look like a petulant, child-like reaction to IFSs criticism. (Its my toy and Ill damn well make it unsafe if I want to, to paraphrase CE's 2i/c 3 months later). But it goes much deeper than that, because for 17 years there has been a systematic cover-up. Im reasonably confident Lord Philip will address this issue, either in his main report or the supplementary.
Regarding your previous point about the duff FET, you could add the fact GPS Time of Day output was faulty. Not exactly indicative of a fault-free system, as claimed by MoD. One should also bear in mind this is not the only fatal accident where faulty/non-existent ToD has been cited, yet conveniently overlooked and the impact not assessed. This, too, is indicative of a Safety Management System which has irretrievably broken down, as it is a fundamental requirement to collate, assess and disseminate advice on such common factors. (The reporting, investigation and feedback obligation). Instead, the ToD failure was ignored, no action was taken and 10 years later up it popped again when, had simple rules been followed, it would not have. Perhaps not the cause of either accident but, as they say, nibbled to death by ducks and indicative of deep systemic failings that remain to this day.
after 17 years someone should have done the basic navigation/situation/weather analysis comprehensively.
As the RAF/MOD has not, it would surely have been worthwhile for an interested party to task a team of experts with the right mixes of experience and expertise to work on this and push for specific answers to any matters arising
As the RAF/MOD has not, it would surely have been worthwhile for an interested party to task a team of experts with the right mixes of experience and expertise to work on this and push for specific answers to any matters arising
If I may offer a reply, it seems there is common ground at last.
The point being made here by so many (not just your good self or dervish), for so long, is that it is incumbent upon MoD to do precisely that as part of the Board of Inquiry investigation. The regulations required proof beyond any doubt whatsoever.
It follows that doubts should be identified where they are thought to exist, examined and positively eliminated as causal factors. AP3207 gives examples of such factors, for example Organisational Fault. If one does not positively eliminate, then by definition doubt remains.
Instead, what happened was Organisational Fault (i.e. doubt) was established (witnessed by a plethora of evidence in the BoI report), ignored by the BoI (perhaps because it implicated the ROs and fellow Stars of the day, such as the RAF Chief Engineer) who in turn conveniently blamed the pilots; thus diverting attention from their own deliberate failings. Deliberate, because the record shows they (RAF and MoD hierarchy) were warned as to the effect these failings were already having on Chinook and all other aircraft. For example, Inspector of Flight Safety to Chief Engineer in August 1992, swiftly followed by further cuts to safety funding which, with hindsight, now begin to look like a petulant, child-like reaction to IFSs criticism. (Its my toy and Ill damn well make it unsafe if I want to, to paraphrase CE's 2i/c 3 months later). But it goes much deeper than that, because for 17 years there has been a systematic cover-up. Im reasonably confident Lord Philip will address this issue, either in his main report or the supplementary.
Regarding your previous point about the duff FET, you could add the fact GPS Time of Day output was faulty. Not exactly indicative of a fault-free system, as claimed by MoD. One should also bear in mind this is not the only fatal accident where faulty/non-existent ToD has been cited, yet conveniently overlooked and the impact not assessed. This, too, is indicative of a Safety Management System which has irretrievably broken down, as it is a fundamental requirement to collate, assess and disseminate advice on such common factors. (The reporting, investigation and feedback obligation). Instead, the ToD failure was ignored, no action was taken and 10 years later up it popped again when, had simple rules been followed, it would not have. Perhaps not the cause of either accident but, as they say, nibbled to death by ducks and indicative of deep systemic failings that remain to this day.
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Tuc
You were quick with the sand bucket then, eh?
Perhaps I should have expanded a bit:
A team should have been put together like has been done with the airworthiness aspects but focussing on the navigation and with the support of an interested party.
Why smother this point? - give it a rest.
You were quick with the sand bucket then, eh?
Perhaps I should have expanded a bit:
A team should have been put together like has been done with the airworthiness aspects but focussing on the navigation and with the support of an interested party.
Why smother this point? - give it a rest.
Walter
Faced with MoD's attitude toward the subject, all we can do is fire fight with sand buckets. I dare say the MAA are finding the same but you never know, one day they may consult people who know how to do it properly and who retain a copy of the mandated Standards MoD got rid of 19 years ago, without replacement. What a co-incidence. Just as CHART was reporting to the Chief Engineer.
Not sure why you constantly highlight the link between your theory and (lack of) airworthiness, yet in the same breath denigrate those who think the latter should be attained and maintained. If it had been, then you would have less cause to complain that no-one can seemingly answer many of your questions, because the answers would be there for all to see.
For umpteen years you postulated CPLS was fitted. If simple, mandated regs had been followed, the RTS would list the kit and what level of clearance it had. It didn't, so you struggled. (And it is not clear to me what questions you have asked MoD). You were thwarted for all that time by a basic airworthiness failure, yet apparently cannot see the irony of complaining about people who think the very regulations that would have helped should be implemented. It is a perverse stance, but admittedly not as perverse as MoD's.
-re your point about the Nav team. Given the excellent posts by Robin Clark, Dalek and others, I'd say such a "team" exists. Perhaps, even, a significant report on the subject has been submitted concentrating on the rather basic issue of not one single piece of Nav kit having any operational clearance. Such a report would be factual, supported by evidence provided by MoD themselves. To generate doubt (see previous post) one would not even have to discuss the unvalidated and unverified data retrieved by Racal, thus avoiding accusations of conjecture or unsubstantiated theory. But it is good to discuss it, because it serves to highlight how sloppy the original investigation was.
Having read your own submission at great length, I thought you made your case very well - the video is particulary techy, something the BoI should have tried. But at the end of the day one set of evidence is factual, yours is speculation. That is where MoD can refute for lack of evidence (again, somewhat ironic, but you know they are a duplicitous bunch). But, the case for (lack of) airworthiness has been made and the evidence supplied in abundance by MoD, so it only remains for Lord Philip to say if this constituted an organisational fault. I say again, at no time has any claim been made this caused the crash; only that it introduces doubt. Your theory is designed to explain the direct cause, which is where we diverge. It does not mean either of us is wrong, just that we have different aims.
Faced with MoD's attitude toward the subject, all we can do is fire fight with sand buckets. I dare say the MAA are finding the same but you never know, one day they may consult people who know how to do it properly and who retain a copy of the mandated Standards MoD got rid of 19 years ago, without replacement. What a co-incidence. Just as CHART was reporting to the Chief Engineer.
Not sure why you constantly highlight the link between your theory and (lack of) airworthiness, yet in the same breath denigrate those who think the latter should be attained and maintained. If it had been, then you would have less cause to complain that no-one can seemingly answer many of your questions, because the answers would be there for all to see.
For umpteen years you postulated CPLS was fitted. If simple, mandated regs had been followed, the RTS would list the kit and what level of clearance it had. It didn't, so you struggled. (And it is not clear to me what questions you have asked MoD). You were thwarted for all that time by a basic airworthiness failure, yet apparently cannot see the irony of complaining about people who think the very regulations that would have helped should be implemented. It is a perverse stance, but admittedly not as perverse as MoD's.
-re your point about the Nav team. Given the excellent posts by Robin Clark, Dalek and others, I'd say such a "team" exists. Perhaps, even, a significant report on the subject has been submitted concentrating on the rather basic issue of not one single piece of Nav kit having any operational clearance. Such a report would be factual, supported by evidence provided by MoD themselves. To generate doubt (see previous post) one would not even have to discuss the unvalidated and unverified data retrieved by Racal, thus avoiding accusations of conjecture or unsubstantiated theory. But it is good to discuss it, because it serves to highlight how sloppy the original investigation was.
Having read your own submission at great length, I thought you made your case very well - the video is particulary techy, something the BoI should have tried. But at the end of the day one set of evidence is factual, yours is speculation. That is where MoD can refute for lack of evidence (again, somewhat ironic, but you know they are a duplicitous bunch). But, the case for (lack of) airworthiness has been made and the evidence supplied in abundance by MoD, so it only remains for Lord Philip to say if this constituted an organisational fault. I say again, at no time has any claim been made this caused the crash; only that it introduces doubt. Your theory is designed to explain the direct cause, which is where we diverge. It does not mean either of us is wrong, just that we have different aims.
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Tuc
Play the ball, not the player (moderator).
The voluminous responses that the airworthiness crowd post whenever a nav issue is brought up is what I object to as they make it harder for the new reader to follow this aspect.
I fully understand the need to have had a thorough look at airworthiness but not to the exception of anything else.
There is much clear evidence for a planned approach to a point on the Mull, the whole scenario I have presented being consistent with all that is known about the flight and it would have only taken a single factor to have been inconsistent with this scenario for it to fall down in part or in the whole - yet the only blocks presented by other posters so far I believe have been demonstrably incorrect - thus I believe at the very least that the nav aspect merits thorough investigation.
On the other hand, the main areas of concern in airworthiness not only did not manifest themselves but the data preserved by the impact contradict any such control problems - yet you all dedicate yourselves to this cause which is surely secondary to the actual cause of the crash.
You compliment certain posters while I am amused that no one else on this thread corrects some of their basic errors (in some cases stupid) - perhaps they are not developing the understanding and doing a good job keeping everything confused, eh?
Play the ball, not the player (moderator).
Play the ball, not the player (moderator).
The voluminous responses that the airworthiness crowd post whenever a nav issue is brought up is what I object to as they make it harder for the new reader to follow this aspect.
I fully understand the need to have had a thorough look at airworthiness but not to the exception of anything else.
There is much clear evidence for a planned approach to a point on the Mull, the whole scenario I have presented being consistent with all that is known about the flight and it would have only taken a single factor to have been inconsistent with this scenario for it to fall down in part or in the whole - yet the only blocks presented by other posters so far I believe have been demonstrably incorrect - thus I believe at the very least that the nav aspect merits thorough investigation.
On the other hand, the main areas of concern in airworthiness not only did not manifest themselves but the data preserved by the impact contradict any such control problems - yet you all dedicate yourselves to this cause which is surely secondary to the actual cause of the crash.
You compliment certain posters while I am amused that no one else on this thread corrects some of their basic errors (in some cases stupid) - perhaps they are not developing the understanding and doing a good job keeping everything confused, eh?
Play the ball, not the player (moderator).
Walter:
As usual you misrepresent those that you attack, Walter. tuc does not claim that Airworthiness was a cause as we do not know that, let alone that it was the "actual" cause of this crash. As he, I, and others have declared repeatedly, we do not claim that lack of airworthiness was the cause of anything, merely that it definitely existed in this as in many other fatal military accidents, and therefore could well have been a cause. You on the other hand claim that a planned approach to the Mull was definitely being carried out in totally unacceptable conditions of very low visibility resulting in an almost inevitable fatal tragedy. We have proved our case, you have not proved yours. You, Wratten and Day, all seem to think that throwing mud strengthens your case. It doesn't, it diminishes it, and in doing so diminishes yourselves. Think on....
On the other hand, the main areas of concern in airworthiness not only did not manifest themselves but the data preserved by the impact contradict any such control problems - yet you all dedicate yourselves to this cause which is surely secondary to the actual cause of the crash.
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To allow an aircraft to fly with so many items of equipment with just a "switch on" release is an airworthiness issue. The performance of TANS can only be regarded as "unknown" because the perfomance of the sensors feeding it were "unknown".
As an ex-Boscombe Down trials officer, who fully understands the limitations of a "switch on" release, I am surprised that this machine was allowed to taxi around the airfield.
DV
As an ex-Boscombe Down trials officer, who fully understands the limitations of a "switch on" release, I am surprised that this machine was allowed to taxi around the airfield.
DV
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Chugalug
<<... in totally unacceptable conditions of very low visibility resulting in an almost inevitable fatal tragedy.>>
I believe that I have put a lot of effort into describing the local weather formation on the Mull and explained when you could most likely go there and see it for yourself.
There is no excuse for your appalling spin on the weather in the scenario I have put forward.
Pls put me on your ignore list.
<<... in totally unacceptable conditions of very low visibility resulting in an almost inevitable fatal tragedy.>>
I believe that I have put a lot of effort into describing the local weather formation on the Mull and explained when you could most likely go there and see it for yourself.
There is no excuse for your appalling spin on the weather in the scenario I have put forward.
Pls put me on your ignore list.
There is no excuse for your appalling spin on the weather in the scenario I have put forward.
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Walter
The weather as reported by those on the Mull:-
Mr Murchie - Lighthouse Keeper and Qualified Met Observer:-
" I would estimate the visibility at this stage to be 15 to 20 metres at the most".
Mr Lamont - Lighthouse Keeper and Qualified Met Observer:-
" the visibility, as I drove over the hill from Campbeltown to the Lighthouse, was down to only about 10 metres or less."
Mr Gresswell
"The weather conditions en route to the Mull were that of very dense fog."
Mr Brocher
" The weather was really bad at this time, there was a lot of mist and fog, visibility was only about 10 to 15 feet."
Mr Ellacott
"Visibility at this time was only about 9 or 10 feet maximum - it was difficult to say how far I was from the point of the explosion, but I don't think it could be any more than 100 yards."
Walter, you have your theory - and I know that you have devoted a lot of time (and effort) over the years to bring that theory to fruition. Unfortunately the facts do not give credence to your theory - moreover, the premise of your theory is that HMG (and the RAF) deliberately murdered a large number of innocent people in order to gain a possible - but unquantifiable - bargaining position with the IRA and its Republican sympathisers.
Neither the Country of your Birth - or the Country of your Domicile - gives you the right to cast such slurs upon the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom.
The weather as reported by those on the Mull:-
Mr Murchie - Lighthouse Keeper and Qualified Met Observer:-
" I would estimate the visibility at this stage to be 15 to 20 metres at the most".
Mr Lamont - Lighthouse Keeper and Qualified Met Observer:-
" the visibility, as I drove over the hill from Campbeltown to the Lighthouse, was down to only about 10 metres or less."
Mr Gresswell
"The weather conditions en route to the Mull were that of very dense fog."
Mr Brocher
" The weather was really bad at this time, there was a lot of mist and fog, visibility was only about 10 to 15 feet."
Mr Ellacott
"Visibility at this time was only about 9 or 10 feet maximum - it was difficult to say how far I was from the point of the explosion, but I don't think it could be any more than 100 yards."
Walter, you have your theory - and I know that you have devoted a lot of time (and effort) over the years to bring that theory to fruition. Unfortunately the facts do not give credence to your theory - moreover, the premise of your theory is that HMG (and the RAF) deliberately murdered a large number of innocent people in order to gain a possible - but unquantifiable - bargaining position with the IRA and its Republican sympathisers.
Neither the Country of your Birth - or the Country of your Domicile - gives you the right to cast such slurs upon the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom.
Last edited by cazatou; 5th Jul 2011 at 19:56.