Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
noose is slowly tightening round the necks of those most guilty
Haddon-Cave set an interesting precedent in this repect, by naming two retired 3 Stars who implemented a politically motivated 20% savings over a 4 year period - a fraction of which directly affected airworthiness.
I wonder if Lord Philip will do likewise. And this time get it right by pointing out the same names should be in both reports.
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Haddon-Cave set an interesting precedent in this repect, by naming two retired 3 Stars who implemented a politically motivated 20% savings over a 4 year period - a fraction of which directly affected airworthiness.
I wonder if Lord Philip will do likewise. And this time get it right by pointing out the same names should be in both reports.
I wonder if Lord Philip will do likewise. And this time get it right by pointing out the same names should be in both reports.
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Walter Kennedy
As I understand it the IRA were not in the habit of ringing up and giving precise details of their next planned attack. The Security Forces had to be prepared to respond to incidents with the minimum of delay - thus there would have to be a minimum number of Air assets available each day to respond to attacks and other incidents. In this respect one Chinook could deploy a response team which would otherwise have required at least 2 Pumas.
The flying programme for the next day would be based on intentions given the current scenario at the time of programming. That programme would become redundant in the event of a incident.
As I understand it the IRA were not in the habit of ringing up and giving precise details of their next planned attack. The Security Forces had to be prepared to respond to incidents with the minimum of delay - thus there would have to be a minimum number of Air assets available each day to respond to attacks and other incidents. In this respect one Chinook could deploy a response team which would otherwise have required at least 2 Pumas.
The flying programme for the next day would be based on intentions given the current scenario at the time of programming. That programme would become redundant in the event of a incident.
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So how does your point on priority affect the idea that you would be planning to use your assets to the max on what tasks - however routine - you could schedule the day before? - are you saying that this new asset would be sitting around idle just in case? No? I do not see how your comment affects the point that there was nothing, even a mundane training sortie, programmed for the next day.
Perhaps someone familiar with the workload put on such assets in theatre could comment.
I believe that the only other Chinook (HC1) there was u/s at the time.
Perhaps someone familiar with the workload put on such assets in theatre could comment.
I believe that the only other Chinook (HC1) there was u/s at the time.
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Cazatou.
Weather at Lighthouse is a Red Herring. According to Wratten negligence had taken place by Waypoint change. The only credible witness near this point (Holbrook), puts the aircraft in acceptable VMC.
Possible later breaches of CDT are again a complete Red Herring. The crew were well inside CDT at the time of the accident. Whether they intended to breach it sometime later that day is pure speculation.
Weather at Lighthouse is a Red Herring. According to Wratten negligence had taken place by Waypoint change. The only credible witness near this point (Holbrook), puts the aircraft in acceptable VMC.
Possible later breaches of CDT are again a complete Red Herring. The crew were well inside CDT at the time of the accident. Whether they intended to breach it sometime later that day is pure speculation.
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dalek
Let me get this absolutely right. What you are saying is that Mr Murchie (a trained Met Observer) is wrong, Mrs Murchie is wrong, Mr Lamont (also a trained Met Observer) is wrong, Mrs Lamont is wrong, Mr Brocher is wrong, Mr Gresswell is wrong, Mr & Mrs Crabtree are wrong and finally that Mr Ellacott who was less than 100 metres from impact is wrong.
Mr Holbrook gave sworn signed evidence to the BOI that, when he was 2 NM SW of the Mull, as the Chinook flew past him the visibility was "1 NM limited by haze" and that the Chinook was " proceeding towards the mass of orographic cloud that obscured the Mull."
Less than 1 minute later the Chinook impacted close to Mr Ellacott who estimated the visibility at that time as "nine or ten feet maximum". The 2 Met Observers estimated the visibility as "15-20 metres at most" at the Lighthouse and "10 metres or less" on the road to the Lighthouse.
In fact, no less than nine eyewitnesses who were on the Mull gave evidence in respect of the weather conditions at the time of the crash. The Yachtsman was not aware of the crash until several hours later.
I would refer you to the Letter written by Sqn Ldr Donald Kinch (a very experienced Coastal Command Pilot) to the Daily Telegraph on 13 December 2000:-
" In light winds and high relative humidity, layers of fog and low cloud form adjacent to the Mull to obscure the high ground completely. There are occasions when a relatively calm sea and a grey sky of similar hue merge, so that in otherwise good visibility a pilot flying in accordance with Visual Flight Rules may be unaware that he is about to enter a fog/cloud bank."
The weather forecast should have alerted them to the possibility of this happening - indeed the Investigating Board specifically stated the forecast "would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre." I would have put that slightly differently and said " would have precluded flight in accordance with VFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."
Let me get this absolutely right. What you are saying is that Mr Murchie (a trained Met Observer) is wrong, Mrs Murchie is wrong, Mr Lamont (also a trained Met Observer) is wrong, Mrs Lamont is wrong, Mr Brocher is wrong, Mr Gresswell is wrong, Mr & Mrs Crabtree are wrong and finally that Mr Ellacott who was less than 100 metres from impact is wrong.
Mr Holbrook gave sworn signed evidence to the BOI that, when he was 2 NM SW of the Mull, as the Chinook flew past him the visibility was "1 NM limited by haze" and that the Chinook was " proceeding towards the mass of orographic cloud that obscured the Mull."
Less than 1 minute later the Chinook impacted close to Mr Ellacott who estimated the visibility at that time as "nine or ten feet maximum". The 2 Met Observers estimated the visibility as "15-20 metres at most" at the Lighthouse and "10 metres or less" on the road to the Lighthouse.
In fact, no less than nine eyewitnesses who were on the Mull gave evidence in respect of the weather conditions at the time of the crash. The Yachtsman was not aware of the crash until several hours later.
I would refer you to the Letter written by Sqn Ldr Donald Kinch (a very experienced Coastal Command Pilot) to the Daily Telegraph on 13 December 2000:-
" In light winds and high relative humidity, layers of fog and low cloud form adjacent to the Mull to obscure the high ground completely. There are occasions when a relatively calm sea and a grey sky of similar hue merge, so that in otherwise good visibility a pilot flying in accordance with Visual Flight Rules may be unaware that he is about to enter a fog/cloud bank."
The weather forecast should have alerted them to the possibility of this happening - indeed the Investigating Board specifically stated the forecast "would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre." I would have put that slightly differently and said " would have precluded flight in accordance with VFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."
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Less than 1 minute later the Chinook impacted close to Mr Ellacott who estimated the visibility at that time as "nine or ten feet maximum".
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dalek
Let me get this absolutely right. What you are saying is that Mr Murchie (a trained Met Observer) is wrong, Mrs Murchie is wrong, Mr Lamont (also a trained Met Observer) is wrong, Mrs Lamont is wrong, Mr Brocher is wrong, Mr Gresswell is wrong, Mr & Mrs Crabtree are wrong and finally that Mr Ellacott who was less than 100 metres from impact is wrong.
Mr Holbrook gave sworn signed evidence to the BOI that, when he was 2 NM SW of the Mull, as the Chinook flew past him the visibility was "1 NM limited by haze" and that the Chinook was " proceeding towards the mass of orographic cloud that obscured the Mull."
Less than 1 minute later the Chinook impacted close to Mr Ellacott who estimated the visibility at that time as "nine or ten feet maximum". The 2 Met Observers estimated the visibility as "15-20 metres at most" at the Lighthouse and "10 metres or less" on the road to the Lighthouse.
In fact, no less than nine eyewitnesses who were on the Mull gave evidence in respect of the weather conditions at the time of the crash. The Yachtsman was not aware of the crash until several hours later.
I would refer you to the Letter written by Sqn Ldr Donald Kinch (a very experienced Coastal Command Pilot) to the Daily Telegraph on 13 December 2000:-
" In light winds and high relative humidity, layers of fog and low cloud form adjacent to the Mull to obscure the high ground completely. There are occasions when a relatively calm sea and a grey sky of similar hue merge, so that in otherwise good visibility a pilot flying in accordance with Visual Flight Rules may be unaware that he is about to enter a fog/cloud bank."
The weather forecast should have alerted them to the possibility of this happening - indeed the Investigating Board specifically stated the forecast "would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre." I would have put that slightly differently and said " would have precluded flight in accordance with VFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."
Let me get this absolutely right. What you are saying is that Mr Murchie (a trained Met Observer) is wrong, Mrs Murchie is wrong, Mr Lamont (also a trained Met Observer) is wrong, Mrs Lamont is wrong, Mr Brocher is wrong, Mr Gresswell is wrong, Mr & Mrs Crabtree are wrong and finally that Mr Ellacott who was less than 100 metres from impact is wrong.
Mr Holbrook gave sworn signed evidence to the BOI that, when he was 2 NM SW of the Mull, as the Chinook flew past him the visibility was "1 NM limited by haze" and that the Chinook was " proceeding towards the mass of orographic cloud that obscured the Mull."
Less than 1 minute later the Chinook impacted close to Mr Ellacott who estimated the visibility at that time as "nine or ten feet maximum". The 2 Met Observers estimated the visibility as "15-20 metres at most" at the Lighthouse and "10 metres or less" on the road to the Lighthouse.
In fact, no less than nine eyewitnesses who were on the Mull gave evidence in respect of the weather conditions at the time of the crash. The Yachtsman was not aware of the crash until several hours later.
I would refer you to the Letter written by Sqn Ldr Donald Kinch (a very experienced Coastal Command Pilot) to the Daily Telegraph on 13 December 2000:-
" In light winds and high relative humidity, layers of fog and low cloud form adjacent to the Mull to obscure the high ground completely. There are occasions when a relatively calm sea and a grey sky of similar hue merge, so that in otherwise good visibility a pilot flying in accordance with Visual Flight Rules may be unaware that he is about to enter a fog/cloud bank."
The weather forecast should have alerted them to the possibility of this happening - indeed the Investigating Board specifically stated the forecast "would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre." I would have put that slightly differently and said " would have precluded flight in accordance with VFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."
All good background info but can you tell us what the actual weather was at the crash site
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Weather
This point has always bothered me. If the Mull was obscured by cloud, (Mr Holbrook), all the witnesses on the Mull were in fog and Mr Ellacott was within 100 metres of the crash site yet could not see it, how could the crash site not have been in fog?
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Boslandew, don't be too bothered. In most probability the crash site was covered in cloud/fog. However, the whole argument remains centred on the 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever' criteria required for the Gross Negligence verdict. Most accept that the crew probably got things wrong but, without irrefutable evidence and in accordance with their own rules there is no way that the MOD should have reached their verdict.
Throughout, the arguments that have been put forward on this forum and in other places are those that highlight the various doubts that completely undermine the verdict. Of course, other things such as airworthiness then come to light and these demonstrate the hypocrisy whereby a crew are blamed without the ability to defend themselves whilst the accusers, who willingly contravened the MOD's own regulations for airworthiness, continue to sip sherry in their gentlemens' club.
Ask yourself how many other aircraft have rammed hillsides during the last 100 years or so, with greater or lesser evidence, and how many of these crews have been found grossly negligent.
That is where the gross injustice has taken place.
Throughout, the arguments that have been put forward on this forum and in other places are those that highlight the various doubts that completely undermine the verdict. Of course, other things such as airworthiness then come to light and these demonstrate the hypocrisy whereby a crew are blamed without the ability to defend themselves whilst the accusers, who willingly contravened the MOD's own regulations for airworthiness, continue to sip sherry in their gentlemens' club.
Ask yourself how many other aircraft have rammed hillsides during the last 100 years or so, with greater or lesser evidence, and how many of these crews have been found grossly negligent.
That is where the gross injustice has taken place.
The evidence of the witnesses quoted by Caz indicates patchy fog, not a hillside or crash site obscured by it. How else could one of those witnesses listed state he saw 500 yards? And another, not listed, state "a few hundred yards".
Actually, Caz's post is very interesting. By going back further in time than MoD would wish, he talks of scenarios that would have "precluded flight".
Something far more fundamental should have precluded flight. An aircraft with no clearance to fly. The question then becomes - Why was this fact withheld from aircrew and inquiries?
Now it is up to Lord Philip to assess this evidence.
Actually, Caz's post is very interesting. By going back further in time than MoD would wish, he talks of scenarios that would have "precluded flight".
Something far more fundamental should have precluded flight. An aircraft with no clearance to fly. The question then becomes - Why was this fact withheld from aircrew and inquiries?
Now it is up to Lord Philip to assess this evidence.
Ask yourself how many other aircraft have rammed hillsides during the last 100 years or so, with greater or lesser evidence, and how many of these crews have been found grossly negligent.
Allegedly....
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It quite probably was in fog but as there are no eyewitness's we have to also concede that maybe it wasn't, hence the "no doubt what so ever" judgment is quite clearly flawed
post #6989
If you can see wreckage from 500 yards .. then the visibility must be in excess of 500 yards .... surely ???
Definition of "fog" I believe is visibility less than 100 meters??
Yet another unexplained anomaly
Including the witnesses who testified they saw wreckage careering "across the hill" from 500 yards away, who were clearly not in thick fog or mist? If they didn't see the actual moment of impact, they saw the immediate aftermath no more than a second ot two later. Yes, it would seem many still ignore that evidence in favour of the more convenient "think fog" version.
Definition of "fog" I believe is visibility less than 100 meters??
Yet another unexplained anomaly
Last edited by OmegaV6; 13th Nov 2010 at 21:44.
Thank you for that ... but I'll still point out that "most" people would describe "fog" more in terms they use everyday .. and the highway code is just another source ??
So, to a non-military trained observer ....
Driving in adverse weather conditions (226-237) : Directgov - Travel and transport
Yet another anomaly ???
So, to a non-military trained observer ....
Driving in adverse weather conditions (226-237) : Directgov - Travel and transport
226
You MUST use headlights when visibility is seriously reduced, generally when you cannot see for more than 100 metres (328 feet). You may also use front or rear fog lights but you MUST switch them off when visibility improves (see Rule 236).
You MUST use headlights when visibility is seriously reduced, generally when you cannot see for more than 100 metres (328 feet). You may also use front or rear fog lights but you MUST switch them off when visibility improves (see Rule 236).
236
You MUST NOT use front or rear fog lights unless visibility is seriously reduced (see Rule 226) as they dazzle other road users and can obscure your brake lights. You MUST switch them off when visibility improves.
You MUST NOT use front or rear fog lights unless visibility is seriously reduced (see Rule 226) as they dazzle other road users and can obscure your brake lights. You MUST switch them off when visibility improves.
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The definition of "hill fog" in chinook240's helpful link looks interesting.
Easily explaining how people (even qualified met observers!) on a windward hillside can be standing in thick fog, whilst conditions are remarkably clear at lower levels a very short distance away from the terrain???
Who would have thought that eh?
Easily explaining how people (even qualified met observers!) on a windward hillside can be standing in thick fog, whilst conditions are remarkably clear at lower levels a very short distance away from the terrain???
Who would have thought that eh?
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All this talk about the definition of what Fog is and what Hill fog is and whether they were VFR or IFR is irrelevant. The weather could have been Blue-Blue and they could have still been IFR.
The question is, were they VMC? Were they clear of cloud and in sight of the surface and the answer is clearly No. They were IMC and below their Safety Altitude. They should have turned around.
They were unprofessional and displayed poor airmanship - but they were not grossly negligent.
The question is, were they VMC? Were they clear of cloud and in sight of the surface and the answer is clearly No. They were IMC and below their Safety Altitude. They should have turned around.
They were unprofessional and displayed poor airmanship - but they were not grossly negligent.
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Caz,
For an A1 pilot you are being remarkably dim.
Mr Holbrook gives us a visibility of 1 - 2 nms.
The lighthouse keepers give us visibility of a few metres.
Another observer says it was around 500m.
Who was right?
Well quite possibly they all were. That is the nature of patchy fog.
The point you failed to answer was what conditions were encountered by the crew at waypoint change? Do you have a shred of evidence to show the crew were not VMC and flying at a sensible speed for the conditions?
Do you accept the crew were still within CDT and would still have been so on planned landing time?
If you do, just where is the negligence?
Welcome back, by the way. I notice that you and Purdey stayed very quiet on my entries on speed anomolies.
Cat got your tongue?
For an A1 pilot you are being remarkably dim.
Mr Holbrook gives us a visibility of 1 - 2 nms.
The lighthouse keepers give us visibility of a few metres.
Another observer says it was around 500m.
Who was right?
Well quite possibly they all were. That is the nature of patchy fog.
The point you failed to answer was what conditions were encountered by the crew at waypoint change? Do you have a shred of evidence to show the crew were not VMC and flying at a sensible speed for the conditions?
Do you accept the crew were still within CDT and would still have been so on planned landing time?
If you do, just where is the negligence?
Welcome back, by the way. I notice that you and Purdey stayed very quiet on my entries on speed anomolies.
Cat got your tongue?
Last edited by dalek; 14th Nov 2010 at 16:25.