Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Tec, BOAC was right to correct you, pls read the post again, it's not that hard: there was a route planned by another officer (RN) that would have done the job and would have been the ideal route if WX had been too bad for crossing the Antrim Hills or going anywhere near the Mull;
this route was Aldergrove - H, thence to B;
I posted a long time ago an explanation for the odd letter sequence - I'll leave you to look that up yourself;
because of the requirement for the Chinook to be capable of flying on one engine for this sortie, the all up weight limit left this flight fuel critical - all the sums had already been done Ald-H-B and so provided they did not extend the path beyond this planned length, they could have an excursion - Ald-A-then across as a parallelogram as per the schematic got them to the Mull without any change to fuel calcs nor schedule.
Perhaps I should have done two separate schematics - or labelled a point where the line from the Mull going NW intercepts the 028 track from H-B - they would have been joining the H-B track somewhere near one of the islands (Islay or Jura, cant be bothered to check now).
Tec, if you read my posts, I have always said that they could not have done anything else BUT do a straight line at high cruise speed on 027 from Ald to waypoint change - you can do better than this.
Chugalug et al
What is it you do not understand about analysis of the known data pointing to a planned approach viewed with regard to practical airmanship in the prevalent conditions deducing that they had to have had a local reference of a certain type? Further, that such equipment was denied strongly but such was the confidence in the analysis that this line was investigated and later it was found to have been fitted.
Is the concept of QED familiar to you? - in science it rather proves the theory.
this route was Aldergrove - H, thence to B;
I posted a long time ago an explanation for the odd letter sequence - I'll leave you to look that up yourself;
because of the requirement for the Chinook to be capable of flying on one engine for this sortie, the all up weight limit left this flight fuel critical - all the sums had already been done Ald-H-B and so provided they did not extend the path beyond this planned length, they could have an excursion - Ald-A-then across as a parallelogram as per the schematic got them to the Mull without any change to fuel calcs nor schedule.
Perhaps I should have done two separate schematics - or labelled a point where the line from the Mull going NW intercepts the 028 track from H-B - they would have been joining the H-B track somewhere near one of the islands (Islay or Jura, cant be bothered to check now).
Tec, if you read my posts, I have always said that they could not have done anything else BUT do a straight line at high cruise speed on 027 from Ald to waypoint change - you can do better than this.
Chugalug et al
What is it you do not understand about analysis of the known data pointing to a planned approach viewed with regard to practical airmanship in the prevalent conditions deducing that they had to have had a local reference of a certain type? Further, that such equipment was denied strongly but such was the confidence in the analysis that this line was investigated and later it was found to have been fitted.
Is the concept of QED familiar to you? - in science it rather proves the theory.
Last edited by walter kennedy; 14th Oct 2010 at 19:14. Reason: addition
Thanks for correcting me Walter.
As you know I subscribe to the view the aircraft should not have been flying. What part of "Switch On Clearance only" did ACAS not understand when he signed the RTS? (Noting MoD now deny the existence of an RTS but I'm sure that won't wash with Lord Philip when he reads the RTS). None of the Nav or Comms were cleared, quite apart from the FADEC software implementation being "positively dangerous". As you say, QED.
As you know I subscribe to the view the aircraft should not have been flying. What part of "Switch On Clearance only" did ACAS not understand when he signed the RTS? (Noting MoD now deny the existence of an RTS but I'm sure that won't wash with Lord Philip when he reads the RTS). None of the Nav or Comms were cleared, quite apart from the FADEC software implementation being "positively dangerous". As you say, QED.
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Walt - quick one for you. How exactly could one use a piece of equipment that provides only range and bearing information to conduct an approach to a specific point in poor weather/IMC conditions? ILS, MLS maybe....CPLS, I don't think so
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mmmmmmm nice if you read the posts - I have described those common weather conditions many times and suggested people go up there at that time of year to see for themselves - I said only just now that the WX was fixed on the landmass and that they were not in IMC during the critical part of the approach - the effect of that local WX was to make judgement of range impossible to any practical degree and would also not have allowed lining up with any ground feature consistently enough for steering - as the yachtsman said, you could see the white of the light house through that thin upslope mist from a considerable distance but as you close at speed .... look, just look back through the posts and ask your colleagues (?) how you would use such gear when approaching, say, a FAF in the sandpit at night or in bad vis.
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The weather is a red herring... The CPLS is a red herring.... The planned route is a red herring.....The a/c serviceability now that is of concern.
To put this to bed, CPLS was fitted to the a/c when it arrived in Aldergrove,fact. did it take off with it fitted? I have no idea, I didnt witness the departure.
Was the a/c serviceable? who knows, but if you saw it 24 hours before would you go flying? I would, The gingers would say it was safe! Good eough for me..... but is that sound?
To put this to bed, CPLS was fitted to the a/c when it arrived in Aldergrove,fact. did it take off with it fitted? I have no idea, I didnt witness the departure.
Was the a/c serviceable? who knows, but if you saw it 24 hours before would you go flying? I would, The gingers would say it was safe! Good eough for me..... but is that sound?
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....how you would use such gear when approaching, say, a FAF in the sandpit at night or in bad vis.
Bearing in mind that even the VOR/ILS was not even cleared for use, I certainly would NOT have trusted CPLS/PRC112! (+/- 4 deg is an awful lot of room for error when near culmulo-granite and cloud - that's before you consider any possible EM interference - testing for which had NOT been done in '94.)
In short, the Hc2 was, at that time, a "Day, VMC, Op Necessity only" aircraft.
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Lets put this cpls to bed, The cpls was in those days mounted in the a/c under the coaming on the nhp side (to reduce glare) with the control unit in the cabin on the port side at station 140 ish on /in the pallet, It was fitted to the cab when it arrived. I do not know if if it departed with it,
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Winch Control. Spot on.
Just about everything mentioned recently is speculation.
What is not?
The likes of Tucumseh and company have clearly showed that the aircraft was not airworthy.
Sqn Ldr Burke has given us proven examples of dangerous faults with this mark of aircraft. The possibility of any of these faults occuring on this particular flight has never been disproved.
Was the aircraft serviceable. Who knows?
Was the weather suitable. Only witness (who could see the aircraft), Holbrook says yes.
What was the actual route planned? Were the Waypoints plotted exactly where the crew thought they were? Was equipment fitted (authorised or otherwise) for the crew to make an IMC approach at the Mull? Did they attempt it? Did it contribute to the accident???
The aircraft was not airworthy and prone to dangerous proven faults.
Everything else is speculation.
Just about everything mentioned recently is speculation.
What is not?
The likes of Tucumseh and company have clearly showed that the aircraft was not airworthy.
Sqn Ldr Burke has given us proven examples of dangerous faults with this mark of aircraft. The possibility of any of these faults occuring on this particular flight has never been disproved.
Was the aircraft serviceable. Who knows?
Was the weather suitable. Only witness (who could see the aircraft), Holbrook says yes.
What was the actual route planned? Were the Waypoints plotted exactly where the crew thought they were? Was equipment fitted (authorised or otherwise) for the crew to make an IMC approach at the Mull? Did they attempt it? Did it contribute to the accident???
The aircraft was not airworthy and prone to dangerous proven faults.
Everything else is speculation.
Last edited by dalek; 15th Oct 2010 at 16:04.
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Even though it is 2 x Mk 3 a/c with crews that have no idea what happend during the Mull incident, that are involved with the enquiry. can we please be mindfull of what the outcome means.
Was the weather suitable. Only witness (who could see the aircraft), Holbrook says yes.
Good posts Winch Control. The CPLS Service Deviation says Station 160, with Troop Seat #1 removed.
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How many times have hill top dwellers (OPs and the like) announced that vis is good 'cos they can see down the hill - when horizontal vis is usually minimal.
But as has been most eruditely put above; this (along with all the conspiracy theories) is all meaningless blah if you believe the root cause is a serviceability issue?
But as has been most eruditely put above; this (along with all the conspiracy theories) is all meaningless blah if you believe the root cause is a serviceability issue?
But as has been most eruditely put above; this (along with all the conspiracy theories) is all meaningless blah if you believe the root cause is a serviceability issue?
However, the manifest injustice has slowly brought to light the gross negligence of those in MOD reponsible for the airworthiness system.
The AAIB said all one needs to know about serviceability.
They were unable to test key components because there was no APs or test equipment available. A repair is not complete until verified.
This failure to provide up to date APs and TE is exactly what QinetiQ reported in their Nimrod report some years later.
The policy decision not to maintain APs and test facilities was made in 1991 by AMSO. As you say Fitter 2, we look forward to the day he and his senior staffs are asked to explain themselves. He seems fond of speaking about ZD576, as he writes to the newspapers about his first hand knowledge of the cause. Of course it's "al cock" and bull.
They were unable to test key components because there was no APs or test equipment available. A repair is not complete until verified.
This failure to provide up to date APs and TE is exactly what QinetiQ reported in their Nimrod report some years later.
The policy decision not to maintain APs and test facilities was made in 1991 by AMSO. As you say Fitter 2, we look forward to the day he and his senior staffs are asked to explain themselves. He seems fond of speaking about ZD576, as he writes to the newspapers about his first hand knowledge of the cause. Of course it's "al cock" and bull.
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Yet more on maps......
Boac ,Dalek and others.....
Guys............. I understand entirely that they may normally only have used the Supertans as a rough guide , there have been several quotes about choosing a place with vertical extent as a waypoint , so that it can be recognised from a distance......but what happens when the visibility ahead is becoming diminished and you cannot actually recognise the waypoint ...????....you slow down a little maybe and continue on the same heading for a short time..????.......
.......even using it as a rough guide is dangerous so close to a high place........in the event they do appear to have flown almost directly towards waypoint 'A' but drifted a little to the right of it ..... .....all the actions of the crew are consistent with them confidently tracking in towards what they thought was a safe waypoint , with good adequate margins all round .......so where did they think it was...??????????...
..in view of the terrain it would have been safer to have chosen a point offshore in order to look for the lighthouse from a safe distance( yes I know its easy in hindsight , perhaps that is where they thought it was)........
........I think that some contributors do not have a feel for the terrain around the Mull lighthouse..........to put it into context............
..the coast is pretty much north/south , they are approaching at an shallow angle , sea on their left , land on the right.......if they creep east they are closer to the land..........so the longitude setting is more critical than latitude......
...the waypoint 'A' ......as plotted..... is inland ,some 670 feet east of the lighthouse , and is at a point 323 feet above sea level...........that is nearly 100 feet above the top of the lighthouse ....(and is actually in a gully where a stream runs down the shelf to the cliff edge ).............surrounding ground is even higher eg. 350 feet just north and east of the waypoint ........climbing to 400 feet further to the north as you become east abeam of the lighthouse......
....but then the GPS signal had a quite considerable error (in my view)........and so was guiding them to a point a further 490 feet east and at an elevation of 500 feet above sea level...........
......so you can see the choice of the position of waypoint 'A' becomes critical.............the difference between safe and not-safe.........or go and no-go is very small , in aviation or any other language.......
...if they had chosen a longitude value of '5 deg.48.5minutes' , the waypoint would have been offshore , and had they flown in the same manner should have survived..............
..this degree of accuracy should have been possible , as it is documented that they had 1/4 Mil maps available which in those days were OS maps with additional aviation information over-printed.........a measurement of 1/2 minute of longitude is about 2 mm or 1/12 inch at that latitude..........
.....(.I have a' 1/4 inch to the mile ' OS map of the area , which is the map the 1/4 Mil was based apon , and the lighthouse does appear to be close to , but on the seaward side of , the '5deg 48min' longitude line....interestingly the latitude is not accurate on this map , as the scale is set about 1/2 minute of latitude (1/2 nautical mile)..further north than it really is.......but it is the 1970 revision so may have been corrected by now.....???????????......)
......if the weather had been better any mis-plotting might never have been an issue .......
.....if they had been navigating using the doppler source they would probably have realised in time that they were close to shore ( waypoint 'A' would have been on the shoreline just south of the lighthouse..)......
.......if the GPS error had been in the opposite sense..(direction) , it would have led them to a waypoint 'A' which was also on the shoreline much the same as the doppler source , just a little further out on the rocks...............
regards Robin.....
Guys............. I understand entirely that they may normally only have used the Supertans as a rough guide , there have been several quotes about choosing a place with vertical extent as a waypoint , so that it can be recognised from a distance......but what happens when the visibility ahead is becoming diminished and you cannot actually recognise the waypoint ...????....you slow down a little maybe and continue on the same heading for a short time..????.......
.......even using it as a rough guide is dangerous so close to a high place........in the event they do appear to have flown almost directly towards waypoint 'A' but drifted a little to the right of it ..... .....all the actions of the crew are consistent with them confidently tracking in towards what they thought was a safe waypoint , with good adequate margins all round .......so where did they think it was...??????????...
..in view of the terrain it would have been safer to have chosen a point offshore in order to look for the lighthouse from a safe distance( yes I know its easy in hindsight , perhaps that is where they thought it was)........
........I think that some contributors do not have a feel for the terrain around the Mull lighthouse..........to put it into context............
..the coast is pretty much north/south , they are approaching at an shallow angle , sea on their left , land on the right.......if they creep east they are closer to the land..........so the longitude setting is more critical than latitude......
...the waypoint 'A' ......as plotted..... is inland ,some 670 feet east of the lighthouse , and is at a point 323 feet above sea level...........that is nearly 100 feet above the top of the lighthouse ....(and is actually in a gully where a stream runs down the shelf to the cliff edge ).............surrounding ground is even higher eg. 350 feet just north and east of the waypoint ........climbing to 400 feet further to the north as you become east abeam of the lighthouse......
....but then the GPS signal had a quite considerable error (in my view)........and so was guiding them to a point a further 490 feet east and at an elevation of 500 feet above sea level...........
......so you can see the choice of the position of waypoint 'A' becomes critical.............the difference between safe and not-safe.........or go and no-go is very small , in aviation or any other language.......
...if they had chosen a longitude value of '5 deg.48.5minutes' , the waypoint would have been offshore , and had they flown in the same manner should have survived..............
..this degree of accuracy should have been possible , as it is documented that they had 1/4 Mil maps available which in those days were OS maps with additional aviation information over-printed.........a measurement of 1/2 minute of longitude is about 2 mm or 1/12 inch at that latitude..........
.....(.I have a' 1/4 inch to the mile ' OS map of the area , which is the map the 1/4 Mil was based apon , and the lighthouse does appear to be close to , but on the seaward side of , the '5deg 48min' longitude line....interestingly the latitude is not accurate on this map , as the scale is set about 1/2 minute of latitude (1/2 nautical mile)..further north than it really is.......but it is the 1970 revision so may have been corrected by now.....???????????......)
......if the weather had been better any mis-plotting might never have been an issue .......
.....if they had been navigating using the doppler source they would probably have realised in time that they were close to shore ( waypoint 'A' would have been on the shoreline just south of the lighthouse..)......
.......if the GPS error had been in the opposite sense..(direction) , it would have led them to a waypoint 'A' which was also on the shoreline much the same as the doppler source , just a little further out on the rocks...............
regards Robin.....
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Robin - since none of us, even the 'Rip van Winkles', know what happened, we must say we "and had they flown in the same manner might have survived" - no?
The indications are, surely, that the lighthouse should have been visible from below cloud?
The indications are, surely, that the lighthouse should have been visible from below cloud?
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Robin,
I do understand what you are saying.
If the crew had intended that Waypoint A was being marked as an LZ (or even a DZ or Final Approach Fix), then the slight misplot may have been critical in the prevailing weather conditions.
If they intended it to be the approximate position of a turning point, the small variation in the two positions is irrelevant.
We do not know what the crew intended. Without that information we are speculating.
I do understand what you are saying.
If the crew had intended that Waypoint A was being marked as an LZ (or even a DZ or Final Approach Fix), then the slight misplot may have been critical in the prevailing weather conditions.
If they intended it to be the approximate position of a turning point, the small variation in the two positions is irrelevant.
We do not know what the crew intended. Without that information we are speculating.
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Been trying to figure out how to put this for years so might as well have a say and see how it goes :-)
You're leaving Glasgow en route London. You have Birmingham (waypoint) in your head as the time to start looking for London signs. You never, ever, intend to go to the middle of Birmingham.
I put Mull as turning point because it was a 'Birmingham' for the sortie.
Will
You're leaving Glasgow en route London. You have Birmingham (waypoint) in your head as the time to start looking for London signs. You never, ever, intend to go to the middle of Birmingham.
I put Mull as turning point because it was a 'Birmingham' for the sortie.
Will