JP
^^
Indeed, but it is a far more interesting question why H-C (not the MoD) chose to name those two when their "offence" paled into insignificance beside that "committed" by their predecessors.
Worth noting that this "offence" was to implement a 20% savings in support costs, spread over 4 years (within a support structure that had bloated out of all proportion following the creation of AMSO/AML/DLO and any pain was spread across all 3 Services). Why did H-C not reveal far more damning evidence that, from 1991-94, around 28% had been cut EACH YEAR, from the budget whose sole purpose was to maintain airworthiness? A budget that serviced a legal requirement which was not volume related. That is, unlike most of the General's 20% cut, it could not be justified by the argument that numbers/fleets were reducing. THAT fact was far more pertinent to his brief. And it is that volume related issue which is at the heart of many of our airworthiness problems, because so few understand it.
He won't answer the question (a common trait it seems) but it conveniently allowed his report to omit a period crucial to the introduction of Chinook HC Mk2; which of course relied heavily on the airworthiness of the Mk1 being maintained in the preceding years, and a stable and maintained build standard being presented for trials and conversion. (Precisely the same situation on the Nimrod MR2 > MRA4 programme, which has been the cause of so many delays). As I have said before, its not as if this was news to H-C, as the Chief of Defence Procurement (4 Star) admitted these crucial failings on Chinook to the PAC in 1999; which he could hardly deny as the Chinook Project Director had voiced the same concerns at the time the Releases were being fabricated.