Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Bos,
I am not sure what you are trying to say with your last post? This thread is currently on page 170 and if you want to read it thoroughly right from the start I am sure you will find enough food for thought with regards to your first paragraph and if you have the time go back and read post #3364 which should hopefully clear up your "breathtaking" misconceptions
JP,
Perhaps you are correct and it is best I leave this alone now. I have to say I am rather disappointed that you refuse to answer my question but considering the contrast between your standpoint and the blindingly obvious answer it comes as no surprise that you wish to avoid it so.
Cheers
SFFP
I am not sure what you are trying to say with your last post? This thread is currently on page 170 and if you want to read it thoroughly right from the start I am sure you will find enough food for thought with regards to your first paragraph and if you have the time go back and read post #3364 which should hopefully clear up your "breathtaking" misconceptions
JP,
Perhaps you are correct and it is best I leave this alone now. I have to say I am rather disappointed that you refuse to answer my question but considering the contrast between your standpoint and the blindingly obvious answer it comes as no surprise that you wish to avoid it so.
Cheers
SFFP
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SFFP
This thread was started by Brian on the 12 Feb 2002; there are full threads on this matter before this one - obviously you are not aware of those.
Regarding your repeated attempts to denigrate JP; will you please inform us what navigation aids (particulary radar) were situated on Sicily at that time and how many other aircraft (offensive and defensive - as well as Civil traffic operating in controlled airspace) were operating in a 50 NM radius, at what levels and under whose control?
To make you happy though, let me tell you about the time I (as well as several others) bent the rules on Wx minima for an approach and landing. It was 1972 whilst I was instructing at the School of Refresher Flying at the College of Air Warfare RAF Manby. We had been asked to provide a Flypast for a Graduation Parade at the School of Recruit Training, RAF Swinderby - so we laid on a 4-Ship SCT formation of Jet Provosts and offered the empty seats up for Air Experience to the Station.
After 30 mins fun we were halfway to Swinderby when we were recalled by Base as the wx was deteriorating but by the time we got there it was below limits (Manby only had an ACR7 with a 400ft Break Off Height) and our Diversions had gone RED. Our only option was our subsidiary Airfield at Strubby which was giving an optimistic 200ft cloudbase but had PAR. We split into pairs for the approaches with instructions to the talkdown controller to just keep talking and let us worry about BOH. I would estimate we saw the lights at about BOH - give or take 150ft -ish. We bent the rules but saved 4 aircraft and possibly some lives.
PS If the Fun Police read this may I point out that the above is fantasy. Any resemblance to what actually happened is purely co-incidental (anyway, I was merely keeping formation on my leader and I wasn't due for another dinghy drill for months).
This thread was started by Brian on the 12 Feb 2002; there are full threads on this matter before this one - obviously you are not aware of those.
Regarding your repeated attempts to denigrate JP; will you please inform us what navigation aids (particulary radar) were situated on Sicily at that time and how many other aircraft (offensive and defensive - as well as Civil traffic operating in controlled airspace) were operating in a 50 NM radius, at what levels and under whose control?
To make you happy though, let me tell you about the time I (as well as several others) bent the rules on Wx minima for an approach and landing. It was 1972 whilst I was instructing at the School of Refresher Flying at the College of Air Warfare RAF Manby. We had been asked to provide a Flypast for a Graduation Parade at the School of Recruit Training, RAF Swinderby - so we laid on a 4-Ship SCT formation of Jet Provosts and offered the empty seats up for Air Experience to the Station.
After 30 mins fun we were halfway to Swinderby when we were recalled by Base as the wx was deteriorating but by the time we got there it was below limits (Manby only had an ACR7 with a 400ft Break Off Height) and our Diversions had gone RED. Our only option was our subsidiary Airfield at Strubby which was giving an optimistic 200ft cloudbase but had PAR. We split into pairs for the approaches with instructions to the talkdown controller to just keep talking and let us worry about BOH. I would estimate we saw the lights at about BOH - give or take 150ft -ish. We bent the rules but saved 4 aircraft and possibly some lives.
PS If the Fun Police read this may I point out that the above is fantasy. Any resemblance to what actually happened is purely co-incidental (anyway, I was merely keeping formation on my leader and I wasn't due for another dinghy drill for months).
Avoid imitations
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PS If the Fun Police read this may I point out that the above is fantasy. Any resemblance to what actually happened is purely co-incidental (anyway, I was merely keeping formation on my leader and I wasn't due for another dinghy drill for months).
Again, Cazatou, K52, as you haven't reponded to my earlier question - and never have in the past; I will ask again...
Again, how much time in this role do you have?
What relevant experience does fixed wing formation flying, either in a jet trainer, or flying VIP fixed wing aircraft from airport to airport, give a pilot an "expertise" on SH operations? Bearing in mind that SH have for many years been required to operate / transit VFR in weather below IFR minima for fixed wing aircraft.
I know the answer to the first question (nil) but more recent contributors might not. I don't really expect an answer because I believe Cazatou has put me on his ignore list, rather than answer this question, which I first asked him a few years ago, under his previous user name of K-52.
your aircraft was allowed into IFR conditions
PS I have lots of time in role.
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That was a bit of a low punch about IMC conditions. Seeing as the Mk2 was not cleared for ICING conditions and going into cloud meant just that, then it is just semantics (whatever that means). The cloud was not a legal option at the time.
Just as an aside, I was involved in another BOI a few years ago that involved a crew who didn't climb because of icing dangers. The experts suggested that a climb to even colder conditions was a good option because the type of icing changes. A brave decision to make.....
Just as an aside, I was involved in another BOI a few years ago that involved a crew who didn't climb because of icing dangers. The experts suggested that a climb to even colder conditions was a good option because the type of icing changes. A brave decision to make.....
JT2,
Sorry, I thought we only dealt in facts here, just wanted to make sure no-one was mistaken about the Chinook HC Mk 2 clearance. Did the BOI you mention involve an aircraft that has never had an icing clearance?
A climb into icing conditions is a brave decision, but it would have to be balanced against the alternative risks and the aircraft's known record in icing conditions ie did a previous mark have a clearance down to -6 deg and had there been changes made that would affect its performance.
Sorry, I thought we only dealt in facts here, just wanted to make sure no-one was mistaken about the Chinook HC Mk 2 clearance. Did the BOI you mention involve an aircraft that has never had an icing clearance?
A climb into icing conditions is a brave decision, but it would have to be balanced against the alternative risks and the aircraft's known record in icing conditions ie did a previous mark have a clearance down to -6 deg and had there been changes made that would affect its performance.
Avoid imitations
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PS I have lots of time in role.
Presumably you have a lot of experience in flying rotary in icing conditions?
Most rotary pilots only try it the one time.
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ShyT., As always you have come out with decent gen. Why is it that some people are still posting speculative theories on this thread when we all know what the facts are/were??
PS., Chris C., Will see you again downroute shortly mate, Keep smiling!!
PS., Chris C., Will see you again downroute shortly mate, Keep smiling!!
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It is now, Chinook240, it wasn't then.
What say we just wait to hear from Mr Browne?
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
What say we just wait to hear from Mr Browne?
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Brian,
Again to deal in facts, the icing clearance was -6 deg on the Mk 1 and on the Mk 2, although not until after the accident. My only interest is to ensure no-one is misled.
It was suggested that entering icing conditions was dangerous, I want to correct that - it was always an option in an emergency. Furthermore, the mindset that there was no IMC option is dangerous in itself, a possible factor in the BOI reffered to by JT2.
Again to deal in facts, the icing clearance was -6 deg on the Mk 1 and on the Mk 2, although not until after the accident. My only interest is to ensure no-one is misled.
It was suggested that entering icing conditions was dangerous, I want to correct that - it was always an option in an emergency. Furthermore, the mindset that there was no IMC option is dangerous in itself, a possible factor in the BOI reffered to by JT2.
Avoid imitations
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Again to deal in facts, the icing clearance was -6 deg on the Mk 1 and on the Mk 2, although not until after the accident. My only interest is to ensure no-one is misled.
They were pushed into a corner by an extremely poor management decision made at well above their level and they suffered the worst consequences imaginable.
These passengers should NOT have been flown in an aircraft without the necessary clearances to get the job done. Cazatou and his 32 Sqn colleagues could have been used to fly these passengers. Alternatively, the trip should have been cancelled altogether or postponed until a Mk1 Chinook, with a full IFR, a minus 6 degrees icing clearance, and a C of A release, unlike this aircraft at the time, was available.
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Thank you for clarifying your point Chinook240.
Just as a further point, Jon Tapper was told that he would be personally liable for any issues arising from his breaking the icing conditions in place at the time.
I'm sure we would all agree about the simple choices between breaking a rule and hitting the ground, but the simple fact is no-one knows exactly what was going on in the cockpit at the time. (And no, I don't wish to reignite that argument either!)
My best,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Just as a further point, Jon Tapper was told that he would be personally liable for any issues arising from his breaking the icing conditions in place at the time.
I'm sure we would all agree about the simple choices between breaking a rule and hitting the ground, but the simple fact is no-one knows exactly what was going on in the cockpit at the time. (And no, I don't wish to reignite that argument either!)
My best,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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CA Release in Jun 94
I have been very hesitant to join the circular arguments that have re-surfaced whilst we wait for MOD's response, but to set the record straight the icing clearance - Section R of the Interim RTS to AL1 states:
Pending resolution of the effect of engine inlet screen blockage on engine surge margins, operations in cloud or fog (visibility less than 1000M) or rain are prohibited (my bold) in ambient temperatures colder than PLUS 4 degrees C (Indicated)
The crew were well aware of these limitations and had flight planned accordingly - as acknowledged by the BOI.
JB
Pending resolution of the effect of engine inlet screen blockage on engine surge margins, operations in cloud or fog (visibility less than 1000M) or rain are prohibited (my bold) in ambient temperatures colder than PLUS 4 degrees C (Indicated)
The crew were well aware of these limitations and had flight planned accordingly - as acknowledged by the BOI.
JB
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SFFP
Sorry for the delay. Once again my comments are not aimed at the crew in question.
I'm not sure what you don't understand. If you are flying VMC, are forced (you have no choice) to become IMC and then fly into rising ground, that is negligence and it doesn't come much grosser. You admit that you (your crew) f***ed up through pressing on when you shouldn't have done and by luck are still with us. Is not f***ed up merely a macho way of admitting negligence?
I used the word 'breathtaking' because you claimed to be talking on behalf of 'most low level pilots', thousands upon thousands of pilots. The first time I had to change my underpants in the mid-sixties after trying to find our barrack square helipad in my Skeeter in fog, I doubt my thoughts were, "my word, you've been negligent". However I took a long hard look at my immediate future and resolved not to be such a BF again which amounts to the same thing
Sorry for the delay. Once again my comments are not aimed at the crew in question.
I'm not sure what you don't understand. If you are flying VMC, are forced (you have no choice) to become IMC and then fly into rising ground, that is negligence and it doesn't come much grosser. You admit that you (your crew) f***ed up through pressing on when you shouldn't have done and by luck are still with us. Is not f***ed up merely a macho way of admitting negligence?
I used the word 'breathtaking' because you claimed to be talking on behalf of 'most low level pilots', thousands upon thousands of pilots. The first time I had to change my underpants in the mid-sixties after trying to find our barrack square helipad in my Skeeter in fog, I doubt my thoughts were, "my word, you've been negligent". However I took a long hard look at my immediate future and resolved not to be such a BF again which amounts to the same thing
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Bos,
Just gone back and read your previous post and now I realise your comments were not aimed at the crew of ZD576 I have to agree wholeheartedly with what you are saying
Regards
SFFP
PS For me there is a significant difference between negligent and grossly negligent which was what I was trying to bring to the fore.
Just gone back and read your previous post and now I realise your comments were not aimed at the crew of ZD576 I have to agree wholeheartedly with what you are saying
Regards
SFFP
PS For me there is a significant difference between negligent and grossly negligent which was what I was trying to bring to the fore.
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SFFP
Thanks for your comments
I agree. There must be considerable difference between negligence and gross negligence. As I understand it the RAF definition of 'gross' is "no doubt at all" which is where most of us came in but I have no idea about other degrees of negligence in a legal sense
Regards
Boslandew
Thanks for your comments
I agree. There must be considerable difference between negligence and gross negligence. As I understand it the RAF definition of 'gross' is "no doubt at all" which is where most of us came in but I have no idea about other degrees of negligence in a legal sense
Regards
Boslandew
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Hi Boslandew,
This is taken from APA3207 (6th Edition), Annex G Chapter 8:
Negligence
4. It is often extremely difficult to decide whether or not a person has been negligent and the Board must rely on its own knowledge of human behaviour and acceptable Service standards in reaching its decision. When considering if a person acted negligently, the Board must be quite clear in its own minds as to what constitutes negligence and what amounts to ‘Error of Judgement’ (see para 3 above). Negligence may be defined as:
a. The omission to do something which, in the circumstances, a reasonable person would do or,
b. The doing of something which, in the circumstances, a reasonable person would not do or would do differently.
6. ….. Where such circumstances do not apply, the 2 factors which a Board must consider when deciding upon negligence are:
a. Whether the person had the necessary degree of skill and/or knowledge, or should have had that skill and/or knowledge, to make the right decision and acted upon it.
b. Whether that person failed to exercise the degree of skill and/or knowledge required.
Note: When covering these questions Boards must have regards to circumstances which may account to Errors of Judgement (see para 3).
8. If a Board finds negligence, it is also to express an opinion upon its degree. Boards are to consider and record mitigating circumstances, and indicate whether or not such circumstances – in the Board’s view – reduce the degree of blame attaching to an individual. Conversely, where no such circumstances are apparent, the Board should express a view as to whether any negligence was blameworthy to a minor degree, to a gross degree or whether it constituted recklessness or disobedience. Higher authority will determine what, if any, disciplinary or administrative action is to be taken.
9. Only in cases in which there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever should deceased aircrew be found negligent.
A lot of information included in the paragraphs not listed refers to errors of judgement and to applicability of Human Failings. I don’t propose to write the whole document here, but it is worth noting that in their conclusions the Board made reference to the following:
The Board concluded that there were no human failings with respect to Flt Lt COOK.
The Board was unable to positively determine the sequence of events leading up to the accident, and therefore concluded that although it is likely that Flt Lt TAPPER made an Error of Judgement in the conduct of the attempted climb over the Mull of Kintyre, it would be incorrect to criticise him for human failings based on the available evidence.
Hope this helps.
Regards, as always.
Brian
“Justice has no expiry date” – John Cook
This is taken from APA3207 (6th Edition), Annex G Chapter 8:
Negligence
4. It is often extremely difficult to decide whether or not a person has been negligent and the Board must rely on its own knowledge of human behaviour and acceptable Service standards in reaching its decision. When considering if a person acted negligently, the Board must be quite clear in its own minds as to what constitutes negligence and what amounts to ‘Error of Judgement’ (see para 3 above). Negligence may be defined as:
a. The omission to do something which, in the circumstances, a reasonable person would do or,
b. The doing of something which, in the circumstances, a reasonable person would not do or would do differently.
6. ….. Where such circumstances do not apply, the 2 factors which a Board must consider when deciding upon negligence are:
a. Whether the person had the necessary degree of skill and/or knowledge, or should have had that skill and/or knowledge, to make the right decision and acted upon it.
b. Whether that person failed to exercise the degree of skill and/or knowledge required.
Note: When covering these questions Boards must have regards to circumstances which may account to Errors of Judgement (see para 3).
8. If a Board finds negligence, it is also to express an opinion upon its degree. Boards are to consider and record mitigating circumstances, and indicate whether or not such circumstances – in the Board’s view – reduce the degree of blame attaching to an individual. Conversely, where no such circumstances are apparent, the Board should express a view as to whether any negligence was blameworthy to a minor degree, to a gross degree or whether it constituted recklessness or disobedience. Higher authority will determine what, if any, disciplinary or administrative action is to be taken.
9. Only in cases in which there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever should deceased aircrew be found negligent.
A lot of information included in the paragraphs not listed refers to errors of judgement and to applicability of Human Failings. I don’t propose to write the whole document here, but it is worth noting that in their conclusions the Board made reference to the following:
The Board concluded that there were no human failings with respect to Flt Lt COOK.
The Board was unable to positively determine the sequence of events leading up to the accident, and therefore concluded that although it is likely that Flt Lt TAPPER made an Error of Judgement in the conduct of the attempted climb over the Mull of Kintyre, it would be incorrect to criticise him for human failings based on the available evidence.
Hope this helps.
Regards, as always.
Brian
“Justice has no expiry date” – John Cook
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SFFP
Chambers Dictionary:-
Negligence -
"Omission of duty; especially such care for the interests of others as the law may require."
Gross -
" Flagrant - glaring - extreme - palpable -total "
Every Officer in the Command chain who reviewed the actions of the Pilots in accordance with the requirements of the BOI procedure found negligence by one or both of them.
The completed BOI and its findings were additionally reviewed by the then CAS and his Staff without dissension.
No evidence of any Technical malfunction which could have caused the tragedy was found and there has been no repeat of such a tragedy in any of the Armed Forces employing the Chinook in the subsequent 14 years.
Because no malfunction was identified there was no programme of rectification or modification to cure the "fault".
If every RAF Chinook had averaged just one flying hour per day since the tragedy they would each have flown in excess of 5000 hours without a repeat of the unknown "fault".
Chambers Dictionary:-
Negligence -
"Omission of duty; especially such care for the interests of others as the law may require."
Gross -
" Flagrant - glaring - extreme - palpable -total "
Every Officer in the Command chain who reviewed the actions of the Pilots in accordance with the requirements of the BOI procedure found negligence by one or both of them.
The completed BOI and its findings were additionally reviewed by the then CAS and his Staff without dissension.
No evidence of any Technical malfunction which could have caused the tragedy was found and there has been no repeat of such a tragedy in any of the Armed Forces employing the Chinook in the subsequent 14 years.
Because no malfunction was identified there was no programme of rectification or modification to cure the "fault".
If every RAF Chinook had averaged just one flying hour per day since the tragedy they would each have flown in excess of 5000 hours without a repeat of the unknown "fault".