When was the RAF at its most capable?
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Perhaps capability needs to be correlated with the threat at the time to determine the ability to cope. In that case the 1940 period was a cliffhangar and our air force was barely capable of victory - that it was achieved is more a tribute to personnel than capability.
In the immediate post-war years and pre-cold war days we still had a very potent force but very little threat - maybe that period is a contender.
We would have lost a conventional cold war and, although nukes added to our capability, nobody wins a nuclear war.
After the fall of the Berlin wall we still had hitting and defensive power and a fair capability in all roles - certainly enough to stuff any opposition.
In my view capability related to threat was highest in the 90s and Gulf War 1 demonstrated how capable air power was when faced with such a weak threat.
In the immediate post-war years and pre-cold war days we still had a very potent force but very little threat - maybe that period is a contender.
We would have lost a conventional cold war and, although nukes added to our capability, nobody wins a nuclear war.
After the fall of the Berlin wall we still had hitting and defensive power and a fair capability in all roles - certainly enough to stuff any opposition.
In my view capability related to threat was highest in the 90s and Gulf War 1 demonstrated how capable air power was when faced with such a weak threat.
Dare I suggest it was the mid to late 60's when conscription had finished and we were an all 'volunteer' force. But mostly because we had a command structure that supported the military task - not just the 'front line' commands - Fighter, Bomber, Coastal, Transport - as well as FEAF, MEAF, RAFG, but also Signals, Maintenance, Training, as well as some I'm sure I must have missed, and all this came under the 'Air Ministry'. Each Command had its own AOC who had (generally) come up through that very command, and had intimate knowledge of the problems and would not take kindly to 'wool pullling' by his staff; in addition almost all the senior officers had served during WWII and thanks to that experience really were 'commanders and leaders'. They worked tirelessly to try to ensure 'their' guys had the best equipment possible.
This meant that the 'front line' received considerably more support and whilst we may not have always had the best/newest equipment - the treasury was still in charge of procurement - we also had a lot more confidence in what we were tasked to do and in our chain of command.
With the advent of Strike Command we entered an era of more and more centralised control by people who did not necessarily know the specifics of the individual task and who relied on staff officers who were also more and more removed from the front line and who frequently also had limited knowledge of what they were 'staffing'. Yes, we had a more 'rounded' Air Force and a lot of 'jack of all trades' - I leave you to finish the quotation.
Not only that but there was also considerably more 'jointery' between the 3 services than there is now, despite it being the modern buzzword. The RN aviation side was considered a potent force and the Coastal assets worked closely with them, with memories of the battle of the Atlantic still fresh in a lot of minds. Equally the AAC was seen as the front line of the rotary world, and SH was just that - Support (albeit the Whirlwind was pretty limited but the Belvedere/Wessex/Puma were all coming on stream) as well as a lot of Tac Support in both transport and ground attack. Whilst there was a lot of inter-service rivalry and banter there was very little of the constant back biting we get now - which to me seems driven almost entirely from the top by the budgetary battles being fought at MOD levels - to the point of almost deliberately undermining 'other service' projects in the hope of getting more money for one's own pet project. In addition with the introduction of instant comms around the world commanders at MOD/Air want to control every level, rather than leaving it to the people at the coal face.
Aircraft on their own did not make us 'most capable' - it was the entire structure from the AC in SHQ upwards who were made to feel part of the whole force. But I will admit it seemed much more capable in all roles when I joined than it does now. No doubt it was much more inefficient but at least there was a bit of 'fat' to deal with the unexpected.
Edited to add - I did of course mean NEAF (the usual finger trouble) - and my apologies to all the other commands I missed out, but I went through FTC , Coastal (never seemingly referred to as CC), FEAF, STC, NEAF, back to STC, JHC, TC, AC and a whole load of groups!
This meant that the 'front line' received considerably more support and whilst we may not have always had the best/newest equipment - the treasury was still in charge of procurement - we also had a lot more confidence in what we were tasked to do and in our chain of command.
With the advent of Strike Command we entered an era of more and more centralised control by people who did not necessarily know the specifics of the individual task and who relied on staff officers who were also more and more removed from the front line and who frequently also had limited knowledge of what they were 'staffing'. Yes, we had a more 'rounded' Air Force and a lot of 'jack of all trades' - I leave you to finish the quotation.
Not only that but there was also considerably more 'jointery' between the 3 services than there is now, despite it being the modern buzzword. The RN aviation side was considered a potent force and the Coastal assets worked closely with them, with memories of the battle of the Atlantic still fresh in a lot of minds. Equally the AAC was seen as the front line of the rotary world, and SH was just that - Support (albeit the Whirlwind was pretty limited but the Belvedere/Wessex/Puma were all coming on stream) as well as a lot of Tac Support in both transport and ground attack. Whilst there was a lot of inter-service rivalry and banter there was very little of the constant back biting we get now - which to me seems driven almost entirely from the top by the budgetary battles being fought at MOD levels - to the point of almost deliberately undermining 'other service' projects in the hope of getting more money for one's own pet project. In addition with the introduction of instant comms around the world commanders at MOD/Air want to control every level, rather than leaving it to the people at the coal face.
Aircraft on their own did not make us 'most capable' - it was the entire structure from the AC in SHQ upwards who were made to feel part of the whole force. But I will admit it seemed much more capable in all roles when I joined than it does now. No doubt it was much more inefficient but at least there was a bit of 'fat' to deal with the unexpected.
Edited to add - I did of course mean NEAF (the usual finger trouble) - and my apologies to all the other commands I missed out, but I went through FTC , Coastal (never seemingly referred to as CC), FEAF, STC, NEAF, back to STC, JHC, TC, AC and a whole load of groups!
Last edited by Shackman; 6th Oct 2009 at 17:50.
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Fighter, Bomber, Coastal, Transport - as well as FEAF, MEAF, RAFG, but also Signals, Maintenance, Training
The whole, boots on the ground, together with RN (Simonestown) and Army deployments, all serve to stabilise a world that became increasingly unstable as we withdrew to Fortress UK.
I realise that this is a powerful argument for overseas deployments and CVS etc but is comes back to money. Can we afford to reinstate such a capability? Can we afford not too?
I heard a speech by a Rear-Admiral on Friday (airman but I forget which flavour) who re-iterated how import the CVS and the Type 45 were.
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Fighter, Bomber, Coastal, Transport - as well as FEAF, MEAF, RAFG
Perhaps Trenchard had it right in the economic depression of the 30s. Don't chop everything but reduce everything down to the lowest possible and then you can expand when necessary because all the talent and knowledge is still there.
MGD Was that the last time you were speechless?
unfortunately for some.
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Commands - Med/Mid East_P
MEAF existed until 1958 when a unified command Middle East Command was formed and MEAF was absorbed as RAF element of MEC.
Like many other changes the original name was probably retained in the vernacular as personnel in AFME were essentially transients for a year or 3 and then back to UK or other overseas theatre.
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I must admit, it's the most ill I've ever been.
I was only 22 at the time, but I felt so ill that I'd happily have died.
Back to the original thread; like PontNav, my 1st take was 1964, just before the Valiants developed their problems and we had TSR 2 on order. After reading other posts, I am reminded that it was also towards the end of when we had a proper 'Command' structure with Commands having a defined task.
Transport Command, transported people and things, what a way to work!
I do believe that the 90 Group/Signals Command roundabout was stopped on Signals Command at the time.
It was also towards the end of 1964 that one pipe smoking Harold Wilson became PM and started changing things.
I started my demob leave on 1st Feb 1965, before my leave was finished, the Valiant's were doomed and the TSR 2 was scrapped soon after.
Did I get out at the right time?
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While I held no brief for HW at the time, we were summarily withdrawn from the Far East, it seems he was dealt a rubbish hand of cards.
He was under pressure because of a balance of payments problem and soon had to devalue the pound from $2.80 to $2.40. Although we subsequently withdrew from the Far East and had avoided involvement in Vietnam, his inclination had been to preserve the Singapore base that the Tories had been trying to close.
Dean Rusk had also been keen that we remained in the Far East as we could do things that the US could not.
At the same time Wilson was coming under pressure from NATO to restore the forces that had been deployed to the Far East as our contribution to the deterent and our target coverage was reduced.
That Wilson cancelled the TSR2, F111 and P1154 to his credit he ordered the C130, F4 and Buccaneer that the Air Force did not want. He was probably responsible for Nimrod and Jaguar too although it was Ted Heath (IIRC) who dropped the idea of using some Jaguar as an advanced trainer. (If I have the chronology and culprits wrong put it down to anno dominii)
He was under pressure because of a balance of payments problem and soon had to devalue the pound from $2.80 to $2.40. Although we subsequently withdrew from the Far East and had avoided involvement in Vietnam, his inclination had been to preserve the Singapore base that the Tories had been trying to close.
Dean Rusk had also been keen that we remained in the Far East as we could do things that the US could not.
At the same time Wilson was coming under pressure from NATO to restore the forces that had been deployed to the Far East as our contribution to the deterent and our target coverage was reduced.
That Wilson cancelled the TSR2, F111 and P1154 to his credit he ordered the C130, F4 and Buccaneer that the Air Force did not want. He was probably responsible for Nimrod and Jaguar too although it was Ted Heath (IIRC) who dropped the idea of using some Jaguar as an advanced trainer. (If I have the chronology and culprits wrong put it down to anno dominii)
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How do you measure "capability"?
During the cold war - which seems to be the favoured period on this thread - we were probably capable of vapourising more bodies than at any other period in time. But that was all a phoney war with endless training orientated towards a fictional scenario. Every exercise you more or less knew what was going to happen as you had done it before the previous year (albeit at a slightly more junior level).
Despite all the whingers on here, I have to say that it I think it possibly now one of the best times to be in the services - lots of different and challenging real operations, all totally unpredictable and with a mostly worthwhile objective (excepting Iraq of course).
During the cold war - which seems to be the favoured period on this thread - we were probably capable of vapourising more bodies than at any other period in time. But that was all a phoney war with endless training orientated towards a fictional scenario. Every exercise you more or less knew what was going to happen as you had done it before the previous year (albeit at a slightly more junior level).
Despite all the whingers on here, I have to say that it I think it possibly now one of the best times to be in the services - lots of different and challenging real operations, all totally unpredictable and with a mostly worthwhile objective (excepting Iraq of course).
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PN is right. (Healey, under) Wilson, funded Jaguar (17/5/65 largely as trainer, redefined 16/1/67 as 165 'S' {GR1}, 35 'B' {T.2}); Nimrod (38 MR1 ordered 1/66, 3 R.1, 10/69); Puma (22/2/67); Harrier GR1 (60 ordered 3/67); 26 new Buccaneer S.2(RAF), 12/7/68; 118 F-4M and 66 C-130K. He deployed WE177B, funded WE177A, initiated the Definition Phase of (to be) Tornado GR1 (14/5/69), and on 16/1/68 quit pretending we could police the East, while funding a NATO conventional prelude to escalation, as "flexible response".
All of that produced the RAFG of 1972-89, controlled in NADGE, carrying WE177A on Bucc/Jag to 1984 then Tornado. In UK the expeditionary Harrier force, maritime Buccs and, from 1984 multi-stores-kitted Tornado gave a capability rather more competitive than any since 1945. USAFE/NATO ditto: no co-incidence that Gorbachev threw in the towel.
All of that produced the RAFG of 1972-89, controlled in NADGE, carrying WE177A on Bucc/Jag to 1984 then Tornado. In UK the expeditionary Harrier force, maritime Buccs and, from 1984 multi-stores-kitted Tornado gave a capability rather more competitive than any since 1945. USAFE/NATO ditto: no co-incidence that Gorbachev threw in the towel.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
You remind me however of the number of staff on 24 hour duty during V-force QRA days from Duty Staish, Ops Controller, ATCO, Eng O, Arm O, 15 aircrew, SDO, OC Police - at least 22 officers and then the 3 Q-ship ground crew, the arm teams, SST, caterers, fire, admin, medics, etc etc.
Perhaps 10% or a bit of the station on 24 hr alert.
As has been already asked, capable of what? If it is to do what air forces are supposed to do, that is to project airpower and to deny that opportunity to an enemy airforce, then 1944/45 must surely trump all other candidates. For most of them the necessary ingredients of an actual enemy (rather than a potential one) and an enemy airforce worthy of the title did not exist. The 1974 list of course would have seemed shockingly short in 1944/5 when the sheer volume of types and locations would never be seen again. Of course technology meant more and more bang at ever higher speeds thereafter, but that is not what this thread is about, or is it?
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I did my RAF SAS training in Aalborg in Denmark, with a fine bunch of Jaguar men in 1996. Did manouvres down John Wayne Strasse with early starts and late parties, the hardest I've pushed my body in any two weeks of my RAF career. I could'nt do it now, I've gone soft. My plan to harden up the Air Force, 2 weeks in Denmark drinking, womanising and 'sleepings cheating'. Aah if only I was chief of the Air Staff!
...a fine bunch of Jaguar men in 1996. Did manoeuvres down John Wayne...
2 weeks in Denmark drinking, womanising and 'sleeping's cheating'.
(BTW - that's banter!)
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I'm surprised at all the votes for 1974. That was the year I got tired of the never-ending cuts that meant the standard was a 55 hour week without overtime pay. I decided enough was enough and began my studies for civvy street, finally departing a much depleted and, compared to the strategic power of the sixties, much less capable air force. When I joined in '63 we were 140,000 strong and overseas we still had seven stations in Germany, six in the Mediterranean, seven in the Arabian peninsula and East Africa, nine in Asia, spanning the Indian Ocean to the far reaches of the South China Sea and three more in Australia. When I left in '77 we had one in the Far East, one in Arabia, two in the Mediterranean and three in Germany - hardly a global power projection. Meanwhile Bomber Command, Fighter Command, Air Support (formerly Transport) Command and Coastal Command had merged into Strike Command and half of the home stations had closed.