Nimrod MRA.4
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LJ
"which is one of the reasons it didn't fly after delivery in March 10 as they had to rectify things that RAF engs had found)."
Wrong, it flew on at least 5 sorties post that event, I know, I was on 2 of them.
The B Word
I don't disagree with your argument but what is being lost in the COTS vs bespoke argument is the Requirement.
If you can buy a piece of COTS equipment that does the job you want it to (i.e meets the requirement), then great. If you are happy to accept a piece of COTS equipment that does 75% of what you want it to do (i.e concess some of the requirement), then great. If you buy a peice of COTS that does 75% of what you want and then expect to be able to modify it cheaply to do the other 25%, think again.
If the RAF is to get the P8 at some point in the future, then the Requirement will have to be re-written anyway as a) it appears that there is currently no requirement and b) if they copy the original requirement, that eventually led to MRA4, the P8 would fail to meet most of the performance requirements.
"
"which is one of the reasons it didn't fly after delivery in March 10 as they had to rectify things that RAF engs had found)."
Wrong, it flew on at least 5 sorties post that event, I know, I was on 2 of them.
The B Word
I don't disagree with your argument but what is being lost in the COTS vs bespoke argument is the Requirement.
If you can buy a piece of COTS equipment that does the job you want it to (i.e meets the requirement), then great. If you are happy to accept a piece of COTS equipment that does 75% of what you want it to do (i.e concess some of the requirement), then great. If you buy a peice of COTS that does 75% of what you want and then expect to be able to modify it cheaply to do the other 25%, think again.
If the RAF is to get the P8 at some point in the future, then the Requirement will have to be re-written anyway as a) it appears that there is currently no requirement and b) if they copy the original requirement, that eventually led to MRA4, the P8 would fail to meet most of the performance requirements.
"
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"The technical ability to build more is still protected and only US nationals can do that - so if the UK wants more and the US say no, we're stuck. So we build a one-off and the costs soar as they have done with MRA4"
The B Word
The question is who in the UK will build a one-off. If the UK government keeps buying abroad BAE UK wont keep the capability and therefore a one-off cant be built, well it probably could but it would take along time to acquire the correct personnel if at all possible and as you say will cost a fortune.
The B Word
The question is who in the UK will build a one-off. If the UK government keeps buying abroad BAE UK wont keep the capability and therefore a one-off cant be built, well it probably could but it would take along time to acquire the correct personnel if at all possible and as you say will cost a fortune.
SFO
OK I admit she flew under AvP67 at the risk of the contractor and that you, as either a TP or a secondee to the company could fly it under those rules & regs.
But 5 flights and a 'no show' at Farnborough and RIAT? You and I both know why that was - no RtS and a bunch of unresolved issues (some of which I've mentioned before) and no-one able to guarantee the aircraft was safe to the AOA.
LJ
OK I admit she flew under AvP67 at the risk of the contractor and that you, as either a TP or a secondee to the company could fly it under those rules & regs.
But 5 flights and a 'no show' at Farnborough and RIAT? You and I both know why that was - no RtS and a bunch of unresolved issues (some of which I've mentioned before) and no-one able to guarantee the aircraft was safe to the AOA.
LJ
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LJ
The MRA4 never flew at risk to the contractor - the MOD accepted full liability through DEFCON 638 hence the need for a FAC to be valid for all flights.
In fact, the PT have to countersign all MFTPs so all MRA4 activity was authorised by the MOD.
There were issues, the majority involving a lack of understanding by the AOA; I'll admit that BAES' reporting did them no favours but there would have been very little bending of metal to resolve the issues - far too much baby and bathwater imho.
SFO - couldn't stay away....
The MRA4 never flew at risk to the contractor - the MOD accepted full liability through DEFCON 638 hence the need for a FAC to be valid for all flights.
In fact, the PT have to countersign all MFTPs so all MRA4 activity was authorised by the MOD.
There were issues, the majority involving a lack of understanding by the AOA; I'll admit that BAES' reporting did them no favours but there would have been very little bending of metal to resolve the issues - far too much baby and bathwater imho.
SFO - couldn't stay away....
MOA
Fair point, but I guess that SoS Def, the Defence Council, Chf Def Materiel or DFlying (or whatever the post is called these days?) hadn't wanted to take the risk to go to Fairford/Farnborough either?
LJ
Fair point, but I guess that SoS Def, the Defence Council, Chf Def Materiel or DFlying (or whatever the post is called these days?) hadn't wanted to take the risk to go to Fairford/Farnborough either?
LJ
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For those that subscribe to the Times On-line, look at this mornings Scottish version. (front page)
An additional £200 Million required to dispose of MRA4, and honour existing contracts this year!!
You could not make it up.
An additional £200 Million required to dispose of MRA4, and honour existing contracts this year!!
You could not make it up.
The B Word,
Your "maths in public" calculation is so full of holes it almost isn't worth discussing. The point Oz42 makes is especially valid in this arguement.
However, the main point that you failed to mention or consider, as indeed has anyone when talking about the cost per aircraft. A very large proportion of the £3.5Bn spent on the MRA4 was the research and development costs. This R&D money would have had to be spent whether we bought 1 or 100! All that happens is the more you buy then the more aircraft these R&D costs are spread between. The less aircraft you buy the more expensive each one becomes...
The initial intention was to purchase 21 MRA4s. This figure was salami sliced at various stages down to 9. However, the costs of extra aircraft was, in the scheme of things minimal. I believe, but stand to be corrected, that the difference in price between 9 and 12 MRA4s was £300M.
Also, using your sums, if we had stuck to the initial fleet size, the price of 21 P-8s is £2.94Bn. This money would be spent overseas, effectively lost with little or no benefit to the UK economy, and no doubt would do little towards paying for Boeings R&D costs. £2.94Bn just at forecourt prices.
By the way, I do not work for BAE, I do not have a high opinion of BAE, nor am I involved with the MRA4 project. I just like to see some accuracy and reason in any balanced discussion!
Your "maths in public" calculation is so full of holes it almost isn't worth discussing. The point Oz42 makes is especially valid in this arguement.
However, the main point that you failed to mention or consider, as indeed has anyone when talking about the cost per aircraft. A very large proportion of the £3.5Bn spent on the MRA4 was the research and development costs. This R&D money would have had to be spent whether we bought 1 or 100! All that happens is the more you buy then the more aircraft these R&D costs are spread between. The less aircraft you buy the more expensive each one becomes...
The initial intention was to purchase 21 MRA4s. This figure was salami sliced at various stages down to 9. However, the costs of extra aircraft was, in the scheme of things minimal. I believe, but stand to be corrected, that the difference in price between 9 and 12 MRA4s was £300M.
Also, using your sums, if we had stuck to the initial fleet size, the price of 21 P-8s is £2.94Bn. This money would be spent overseas, effectively lost with little or no benefit to the UK economy, and no doubt would do little towards paying for Boeings R&D costs. £2.94Bn just at forecourt prices.
By the way, I do not work for BAE, I do not have a high opinion of BAE, nor am I involved with the MRA4 project. I just like to see some accuracy and reason in any balanced discussion!
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Letter to the Prime Minister
With time running out, I have today sent the following email to the Prime Minister's office, with a copy to the Ministry of Defence:
Sir,
On the 22nd October 2010 I wrote to the Prime Minister on the subject of the Cancellation of Nimrod MRA4. On the 22nd November I received a letter from Mr M. Davies (10 Downing Street Direct Communications Unit) saying that he had forwarded the letter to the Ministry of Defence 'so that they may reply to your concerns directly'.
I have not yet received a reply to my letter.
For the first time in 70 years and for the foreseeable future, our nation will be without its own Maritime Patrol Aircraft, and at a time when the threat to the United Kingdom is probably at its highest since the Second World War. Nimrod MRA4 has been specifically developed to counter modern threats and to discard this force multiplying asset for a questionable financial saving is simply wrong, dangerously wrong.
Post SDSR, defence pundits have argued over the relative merits of Tornado and Harrier; old carriers; new carriers with, and new carriers without aircraft - but the most damaging event has been the loss of our indigenous MPA capability. An incomprehensible decision.
The Prime Minister must now rise above political irritations such as the stigma surrounding Nimrod XV230 (the MRA4 is a new and different design), the questionable performance of British Aerospace and our procurement system, the SNP factor at the aircraft’s intended base in Moray, and the advice of some military Chiefs who may have been influenced too much by their own career backgrounds.
The defence of the realm must come first, and the decision to cancel Nimrod MRA4, be reversed.
You may like to peruse the following petition on the same subject:
http://www.ipetitions.com/petition/mra4/signatures?page=1
I look forward to receiving a reply to my letter dated 22nd October, soon.
Yours faithfully,
etc.
Hanfimar.
Sir,
On the 22nd October 2010 I wrote to the Prime Minister on the subject of the Cancellation of Nimrod MRA4. On the 22nd November I received a letter from Mr M. Davies (10 Downing Street Direct Communications Unit) saying that he had forwarded the letter to the Ministry of Defence 'so that they may reply to your concerns directly'.
I have not yet received a reply to my letter.
For the first time in 70 years and for the foreseeable future, our nation will be without its own Maritime Patrol Aircraft, and at a time when the threat to the United Kingdom is probably at its highest since the Second World War. Nimrod MRA4 has been specifically developed to counter modern threats and to discard this force multiplying asset for a questionable financial saving is simply wrong, dangerously wrong.
Post SDSR, defence pundits have argued over the relative merits of Tornado and Harrier; old carriers; new carriers with, and new carriers without aircraft - but the most damaging event has been the loss of our indigenous MPA capability. An incomprehensible decision.
The Prime Minister must now rise above political irritations such as the stigma surrounding Nimrod XV230 (the MRA4 is a new and different design), the questionable performance of British Aerospace and our procurement system, the SNP factor at the aircraft’s intended base in Moray, and the advice of some military Chiefs who may have been influenced too much by their own career backgrounds.
The defence of the realm must come first, and the decision to cancel Nimrod MRA4, be reversed.
You may like to peruse the following petition on the same subject:
http://www.ipetitions.com/petition/mra4/signatures?page=1
I look forward to receiving a reply to my letter dated 22nd October, soon.
Yours faithfully,
etc.
Hanfimar.
I just like to see some accuracy and reason in any balanced discussion!
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For those that subscribe to the Times On-line, look at this mornings Scottish version. (front page)
An additional £200 Million required to dispose of MRA4, and honour existing contracts this year!!
You could not make it up.
An additional £200 Million required to dispose of MRA4, and honour existing contracts this year!!
You could not make it up.
But the actual figure so Ive heard is 5 times that.....a further £1 billion
i am sorry but I do not have time to read the 79 pages regarding this aircraft but what was the safety issue that grounded the aircraft last autumn?
MRA4 grounded after safety alert - Defence Management
MRA4 grounded after safety alert - Defence Management
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This will hurt 
what a waste, posted on the flypast forums
Pa1 ZJ516
The furthest away one is ZJ517 formerly PA3 now PA13? The closest, I'm not sure.
More here
Scrapping the Nimrods at Woodford - Key Publishing Ltd Aviation Forums
some of the thread makes fascinating reading, such as
what a waste, posted on the flypast forums
A few photos taken on Friday afternoon.
PA2 ZJ518
PA2 ZJ518
Pa1 ZJ516
The furthest away one is ZJ517 formerly PA3 now PA13? The closest, I'm not sure.
I'm not sure where PA5 ended up.
I find myself in a bit of turmoil over this. I've worked at Woodford for over 20 years and to see it in the state it's in now is heartbreaking. I drove to work on Friday past empty car parks. Never seen that before.
Having said that, I worked on MRA4 from 2003 to 2007 and to be honest, it was the worst project I ever worked on. It was poorly run and it staggered from one crisis to another. Some of the stories I could tell would be scarcely believable. Latterly though, many of the issues were worked through and although I believe it still had some issues, it was very close to being ready. From what I can gather, the RAF guys that were involved were enthusiatic about the aircraft and couldn't wait to see it in service.
What makes me sad is not that the airframes will be broken into pieces without any substantial parts being saved, but that they are being broken up at all. A project that was within a few weeks of being ready for service being cancelled is, in my opinion, a worse crime than the cancellation of TSR2.
__________________
So much for Pathos
I find myself in a bit of turmoil over this. I've worked at Woodford for over 20 years and to see it in the state it's in now is heartbreaking. I drove to work on Friday past empty car parks. Never seen that before.
Having said that, I worked on MRA4 from 2003 to 2007 and to be honest, it was the worst project I ever worked on. It was poorly run and it staggered from one crisis to another. Some of the stories I could tell would be scarcely believable. Latterly though, many of the issues were worked through and although I believe it still had some issues, it was very close to being ready. From what I can gather, the RAF guys that were involved were enthusiatic about the aircraft and couldn't wait to see it in service.
What makes me sad is not that the airframes will be broken into pieces without any substantial parts being saved, but that they are being broken up at all. A project that was within a few weeks of being ready for service being cancelled is, in my opinion, a worse crime than the cancellation of TSR2.
__________________
So much for Pathos
Scrapping the Nimrods at Woodford - Key Publishing Ltd Aviation Forums
some of the thread makes fascinating reading, such as
Quote:
Originally Posted by alertken
- deep overhaul of MR2 fuselage was sensibly placed not with Woodford or Salmesbury repair-by-replacement sites, but with a reclamation specialist, Cobham's Hurn FRAL (who got a new hangar out of the deal).
By then cost overruns had caused BAe. to take the FRAL work into Woodford: in-house activity at a(n accountantcy) loss was better than leaking cash to a Supplier. .
Not quite, FRAL were contracted for fuse O/H, complete build of all the A/C and flight test prep of PA1-4. It was an election bung to spread the work around. Now FRAL may have understood the O/H portion but were clueless about the A/C build and particularly the flight test. BAESYSTEMS took enormous advantage of this lack of understanding and really did them over in the contract. FRAL soon realised it was exit Nimrod or go bust, so started to cost claim for everything not in the contract, even BAESYSTEMS personnel parking their cars on FRAL site. This all lead to the infamous row on the FRAL gate between the FRAL site director and Nimrods project director, which ended with the words "I'm taking the ******* build to Woodford!"
Originally Posted by alertken
- deep overhaul of MR2 fuselage was sensibly placed not with Woodford or Salmesbury repair-by-replacement sites, but with a reclamation specialist, Cobham's Hurn FRAL (who got a new hangar out of the deal).
By then cost overruns had caused BAe. to take the FRAL work into Woodford: in-house activity at a(n accountantcy) loss was better than leaking cash to a Supplier. .
Not quite, FRAL were contracted for fuse O/H, complete build of all the A/C and flight test prep of PA1-4. It was an election bung to spread the work around. Now FRAL may have understood the O/H portion but were clueless about the A/C build and particularly the flight test. BAESYSTEMS took enormous advantage of this lack of understanding and really did them over in the contract. FRAL soon realised it was exit Nimrod or go bust, so started to cost claim for everything not in the contract, even BAESYSTEMS personnel parking their cars on FRAL site. This all lead to the infamous row on the FRAL gate between the FRAL site director and Nimrods project director, which ended with the words "I'm taking the ******* build to Woodford!"
Last edited by NutLoose; 17th Jan 2011 at 22:49.
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Thanks Nutloose, probably the best, and most depressing images I have seen for some time. As a tax payer, British citizen and, least of all, ex-Nimrod mate I reckon I've had enough.
We all know the decision was political - strong Dave, capable Dave, no nonsense Dave etc. And he won't reverse it.
Close the thread........ What's the point now? Rhetorical question obviously. Close the thread!
We all know the decision was political - strong Dave, capable Dave, no nonsense Dave etc. And he won't reverse it.
Close the thread........ What's the point now? Rhetorical question obviously. Close the thread!
Nutloose
Thank you. I agree with Scuttled. Very depressing images.
The following quote from the other forum rang my bell;
In a way, this sums up what became of proper programme management in MoD. Let a prime contract, then allow the prime to offload all the work on sub-contractors. Stand back and say "It is up to the prime how he manages the contract". They have become inept monitors, not professional managers. The risk is huge, especially if the intent was not declared at the outset.
The BAeS behaviour described here is what MoD (should) expect from any prime and it sounds as if FRAL gave them a bit of their own medicine. However, contracting FRAL on trials despite them not having experience is contrary to some very strict rules of contracting. (In short, a company must be "licensed" to do this, something MoD and BAeS contracts should have spotted; and FRAL should have known).
But where was the MoD oversight? All contracts have a "Right of access to sub-contractors" clause. Such was the importance of FRAL's role, MoD should have had a resident project officer or QAR there straight away, reporting these shenanigans/risks.
Perhaps the most revealing post in this whole saga. One for the Inquiry.
Thank you. I agree with Scuttled. Very depressing images.
The following quote from the other forum rang my bell;
FRAL soon realised it was exit Nimrod or go bust, so started to cost claim for everything not in the contract, even BAESYSTEMS personnel parking their cars on FRAL site. This all lead to the infamous row on the FRAL gate between the FRAL site director and Nimrods project director, which ended with the words "I'm taking the ******* build to Woodford!"
In a way, this sums up what became of proper programme management in MoD. Let a prime contract, then allow the prime to offload all the work on sub-contractors. Stand back and say "It is up to the prime how he manages the contract". They have become inept monitors, not professional managers. The risk is huge, especially if the intent was not declared at the outset.
The BAeS behaviour described here is what MoD (should) expect from any prime and it sounds as if FRAL gave them a bit of their own medicine. However, contracting FRAL on trials despite them not having experience is contrary to some very strict rules of contracting. (In short, a company must be "licensed" to do this, something MoD and BAeS contracts should have spotted; and FRAL should have known).
But where was the MoD oversight? All contracts have a "Right of access to sub-contractors" clause. Such was the importance of FRAL's role, MoD should have had a resident project officer or QAR there straight away, reporting these shenanigans/risks.
Perhaps the most revealing post in this whole saga. One for the Inquiry.
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"With time running out" hanfimar I am sorry to be blunt as you are obviously passionate about the aircraft and it's capabilities, but TIME HAS RAN OUT! it won't be coming into service, it will be chopped up as sure as eggs is eggs.
I find myself in a bit of turmoil over this. I've worked at Woodford for over 20 years and to see it in the state it's in now is heartbreaking. I drove to work on Friday past empty car parks. Never seen that before.
MR4A was doomed almost from the start. Light years late and well over budget, a lot of people are amazed it has gone as far as it has. Just another example of the British aircraft industry shooting itself in the foot.
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Without wishing to drift off-topic too much, and despite being told not to comment, I feel I have to.
I too was a Hatfield employee and re-located to Woodford in 1989. The 2nd 146 line was opened in 1988 at Woodford to cope with the extra demand for the aircraft (no, really, that's what we were told.) The fact that the company in reality wanted to close Hatfield is where the treachery lies, not with the Woodford workforce who were, after all, only trying to protect their own jobs.
I understand the bitterness felt then, we felt it to some degree ourselves, but to have no sympathy for those thousands affected by this decision strikes me as being rather worse than "unkind".
Sorry for the drift.
I too was a Hatfield employee and re-located to Woodford in 1989. The 2nd 146 line was opened in 1988 at Woodford to cope with the extra demand for the aircraft (no, really, that's what we were told.) The fact that the company in reality wanted to close Hatfield is where the treachery lies, not with the Woodford workforce who were, after all, only trying to protect their own jobs.
I understand the bitterness felt then, we felt it to some degree ourselves, but to have no sympathy for those thousands affected by this decision strikes me as being rather worse than "unkind".
Sorry for the drift.
Jimmy
I appreciate your comments, you have your views (as an ex Woodford employee) and I have mine (as an ex Hatfield employee) but I would be very interested to know who told you 'not to comment'.
I appreciate your comments, you have your views (as an ex Woodford employee) and I have mine (as an ex Hatfield employee) but I would be very interested to know who told you 'not to comment'.