Relatives claim government failed to protect victims of RAF Hercules crash
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flipster
We also heard at our Inquest that documents had been shredded.
Transcript from the Inquest.
XV230 had exploded 4 days earlier and here was a senior officer shredding documents from Kinloss,it beggers belief.
Sorry if this a bit off thread but I think it is relavant.
We also heard at our Inquest that documents had been shredded.
Transcript from the Inquest.
SQN LDR XXXXXXXXXX: They should not have been shredded and it
was my fault that they were shredded. There was an awful lot.
If you can imagine the amount of communication coming into the
detachment. I was told that I could continue -- obviously I
was told to continue running the detachment. We continued
flying missions and the -- and the stopped press book was
filling up somewhat with relevant communications between
Kinloss and various other agencies and my detachment, and I
thought it was the right time to go through and sort out what
needed to be there and what didn’t. And what was taken out
was nothing to do with the accident.
MALE SPEAKER: But, in hindsight, you would not have shredded
them?
SQN LDR XXXXXXXXXXX: Absolutely not.
MALE SPEAKER: Thank you very much.
was my fault that they were shredded. There was an awful lot.
If you can imagine the amount of communication coming into the
detachment. I was told that I could continue -- obviously I
was told to continue running the detachment. We continued
flying missions and the -- and the stopped press book was
filling up somewhat with relevant communications between
Kinloss and various other agencies and my detachment, and I
thought it was the right time to go through and sort out what
needed to be there and what didn’t. And what was taken out
was nothing to do with the accident.
MALE SPEAKER: But, in hindsight, you would not have shredded
them?
SQN LDR XXXXXXXXXXX: Absolutely not.
MALE SPEAKER: Thank you very much.
Sorry if this a bit off thread but I think it is relavant.
TD
It does not beggar belief. Shredding is a standard way of combatting espionage and compromise of classified material - you can't keep everything, and the more you do then more chance of a security breach! Out of interest, if they had kept every paper copy of classified material since 2003 then they would have needed 5 portacabins to store it all! Some US units have a 100% shredding policy...
Please stop trying to find tenuous links to blame individuals who, with hindsight, may have been slightly mistaken in their actions (which they have also freely admitted) - this is not negligence!
LJ
It does not beggar belief. Shredding is a standard way of combatting espionage and compromise of classified material - you can't keep everything, and the more you do then more chance of a security breach! Out of interest, if they had kept every paper copy of classified material since 2003 then they would have needed 5 portacabins to store it all! Some US units have a 100% shredding policy...
Please stop trying to find tenuous links to blame individuals who, with hindsight, may have been slightly mistaken in their actions (which they have also freely admitted) - this is not negligence!
LJ
Leon
Much of what you say is, of course, correct.
However, I believe TD is talking about deliberate withholding and shredding of evidence a Board of Inquiry or Coroner would regard as vital to their task (helping prevent further occurrences).
That is not routine admin to thin out unnecessary files, but an obstruction of justice and attempt to hide the truth - thus placing their colleagues at risk should it happen again. The line is pretty clearly drawn, in that JSP553 requires an airworthiness audit trail. It is this failure that is being alluded to by Coroners.
The fact that it happens routinely, and continues to have the support of, for example, Ainsworth, is the real disgrace.
Furthermore, when MoD is asked to produce this evidence, they are often disingenuous. The IPT (which may not have existed at the time) will be asked "Do you have this document?". They say "No" and MoD simply say it doesn't exist and take the hit.
But, as everyone knows, airworthiness documentation is routinely copied to the User, Sponsor, Boscombe and other MoD departments, plus of course the Design Authorities responsible for the Safety Cases. The latter would be mad to shred such evidence.
Also, the MoD person with authority for that equipment or aircraft is always encouraged to keep copies of his own decisions. This would be an interesting test of the OSA. If MoD denied the existence of a document while pointing the finger at the airworthiness chap, who then produced his own copy refuting MoD. But MoD don't want to go there, do they?
Much of what you say is, of course, correct.
However, I believe TD is talking about deliberate withholding and shredding of evidence a Board of Inquiry or Coroner would regard as vital to their task (helping prevent further occurrences).
That is not routine admin to thin out unnecessary files, but an obstruction of justice and attempt to hide the truth - thus placing their colleagues at risk should it happen again. The line is pretty clearly drawn, in that JSP553 requires an airworthiness audit trail. It is this failure that is being alluded to by Coroners.
The fact that it happens routinely, and continues to have the support of, for example, Ainsworth, is the real disgrace.
Furthermore, when MoD is asked to produce this evidence, they are often disingenuous. The IPT (which may not have existed at the time) will be asked "Do you have this document?". They say "No" and MoD simply say it doesn't exist and take the hit.
But, as everyone knows, airworthiness documentation is routinely copied to the User, Sponsor, Boscombe and other MoD departments, plus of course the Design Authorities responsible for the Safety Cases. The latter would be mad to shred such evidence.
Also, the MoD person with authority for that equipment or aircraft is always encouraged to keep copies of his own decisions. This would be an interesting test of the OSA. If MoD denied the existence of a document while pointing the finger at the airworthiness chap, who then produced his own copy refuting MoD. But MoD don't want to go there, do they?
Last edited by tucumseh; 17th Apr 2009 at 05:52.
Tucumseh
LJ is right
If it was removed from a detachment "stopped [SIC] press book", there would be copies at the issuing unit, so alternative sources of evidence would be available. No conspiracy theory here at all! Even in TD's quote the officer in question says
So what is the problem!
LJ
As one of the real silent majority "Well done"
LJ is right
and shredding of evidence a Board of Inquiry or Coroner would regard as vital to their task (helping prevent further occurrences).
And what was taken out was nothing to do with the accident.
LJ
As one of the real silent majority "Well done"
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Olive Oil,
The theory of an RPG strike was put forward by the civilian crash investigator. It was a theory only, with no evidence, of explosive material found on the wing. The BoI rejected the possibility because of lack of evidence. Two rounds (of lead), hit the aircraft, one round did the damage, causing an explosive event in the fuel tank. The calibre of the round was not given. However, various bits of evidence were presented at the Inquest, with a little knowledge, you could work out what weapon was used, you just had to piece together the info. I won't say here, because some people are sensitive about the info being "out there". Suffice to say, it would probably shock you, that something so small could bring a Hercules down.
The documentation that was eventually recovered and proved that Group new all about Hercules weakness to fuel tank penetration was the original secret paper document. The electronic versions had all been deleted.
Tuc is right to say, the audit trail had not been maintained and actioned IAW the specific airworthiness requirements.
Needless to say, the Coroner was furious that the RAF and MoD could be so inept.
Just wanted to add, that in my own research surrounding this tragic case, it became clear that it is extremely unlikely that an RPG could bring down a relatively fast moving target. It is difficult to achieve the required accuracy.
The theory of an RPG strike was put forward by the civilian crash investigator. It was a theory only, with no evidence, of explosive material found on the wing. The BoI rejected the possibility because of lack of evidence. Two rounds (of lead), hit the aircraft, one round did the damage, causing an explosive event in the fuel tank. The calibre of the round was not given. However, various bits of evidence were presented at the Inquest, with a little knowledge, you could work out what weapon was used, you just had to piece together the info. I won't say here, because some people are sensitive about the info being "out there". Suffice to say, it would probably shock you, that something so small could bring a Hercules down.
The documentation that was eventually recovered and proved that Group new all about Hercules weakness to fuel tank penetration was the original secret paper document. The electronic versions had all been deleted.
Tuc is right to say, the audit trail had not been maintained and actioned IAW the specific airworthiness requirements.
Needless to say, the Coroner was furious that the RAF and MoD could be so inept.
Just wanted to add, that in my own research surrounding this tragic case, it became clear that it is extremely unlikely that an RPG could bring down a relatively fast moving target. It is difficult to achieve the required accuracy.
Last edited by nigegilb; 17th Apr 2009 at 08:48.
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Just a thought, playing Devils Advocate.
If the relatives are not interested in the money, but are doing this for our benefit...
If the MOD offered to settle out of court, the claimants would have to turn it down. Ditto for the Nimrod.
If the relatives are not interested in the money, but are doing this for our benefit...
If the MOD offered to settle out of court, the claimants would have to turn it down. Ditto for the Nimrod.
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I really don't think you should refer to the relatives as one body. They all have different perspectives and different motivations. The Nimrod and Hercules cases are different in the sense that there was no enemy involvement in the Nimrod tragedy, hence no enemy to blame, only failure to comply with airworthiness requirements. With the Hercules case there is a question of combat immunity to consider, because the aircraft was shot down.
You are of course right, the MoD would dearly love to settle this out of court. The legal precedent will cause fundamental change, which will inevitably bring higher degrees of safety and security for those of you still on operations.
My perspective? The higher and more punitive compensation the better.
Olive Oil, just a bit more. XV179 was shot down on polling day in Iraq. The invasion/combat phase was over. A legally important distinction regarding combat immunity. During the Inquest it was hinted, in open court, that, due to the new defensive equipment on board the aircraft there had been a doubt about its efficacy in certain conditions. One of the reasons for staying low. AWC gave different evidence but it was accepted that AWC provided advisory information. It was well understood at the highest levels that the "Flight" was operating at low level in theatre. There was no suggestion that anyone in Command had a problem with that. In fact OLF was an accepted tactic, endorsed at all levels-until the aircraft was shot down.
I would also add that during my time on the flight, every single training detachment involved low level flying. Whenever possible at OLF heights. It was considered routine and we were all well practised. Previous to Iraq the guys had been flying extensively at OLF heights in Afg. If you want to have a pop, don't have a pop at the crew. I think you need to aim much higher.
You are quite wrong about ESF being irrelevant to the case. After the first couple of days at the Inquest it was obvious that the lack of ESF was the most significant aspect. I have said it many times before, but I will say it again. The crew would most likely have survived if ESF had been fitted. Don't be overly focussed on the CREW'S decision to opt for low level - key members of the RAF including senior officers knew about the weakness to fuel tank explosion, but the crews were NOT briefed. There was plenty of opportunity for anyone in the chain of command to step in and withdraw the OLF tactic if there was a perceived problem. Nobody did. That said, I would like to see the role of AWC beefed up, as a result of the tragedy. Not that they advised the crews about the fuel tank weakness in this particular case.
Hope this makes things clearer.
You are of course right, the MoD would dearly love to settle this out of court. The legal precedent will cause fundamental change, which will inevitably bring higher degrees of safety and security for those of you still on operations.
My perspective? The higher and more punitive compensation the better.
Olive Oil, just a bit more. XV179 was shot down on polling day in Iraq. The invasion/combat phase was over. A legally important distinction regarding combat immunity. During the Inquest it was hinted, in open court, that, due to the new defensive equipment on board the aircraft there had been a doubt about its efficacy in certain conditions. One of the reasons for staying low. AWC gave different evidence but it was accepted that AWC provided advisory information. It was well understood at the highest levels that the "Flight" was operating at low level in theatre. There was no suggestion that anyone in Command had a problem with that. In fact OLF was an accepted tactic, endorsed at all levels-until the aircraft was shot down.
I would also add that during my time on the flight, every single training detachment involved low level flying. Whenever possible at OLF heights. It was considered routine and we were all well practised. Previous to Iraq the guys had been flying extensively at OLF heights in Afg. If you want to have a pop, don't have a pop at the crew. I think you need to aim much higher.
You are quite wrong about ESF being irrelevant to the case. After the first couple of days at the Inquest it was obvious that the lack of ESF was the most significant aspect. I have said it many times before, but I will say it again. The crew would most likely have survived if ESF had been fitted. Don't be overly focussed on the CREW'S decision to opt for low level - key members of the RAF including senior officers knew about the weakness to fuel tank explosion, but the crews were NOT briefed. There was plenty of opportunity for anyone in the chain of command to step in and withdraw the OLF tactic if there was a perceived problem. Nobody did. That said, I would like to see the role of AWC beefed up, as a result of the tragedy. Not that they advised the crews about the fuel tank weakness in this particular case.
Hope this makes things clearer.
Last edited by nigegilb; 17th Apr 2009 at 12:19.
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Roland
It may have had nothing to to with the accident but in his words :
Relevant communications in my mind are communications that have relevance, if the were irelevant documents then I can understand that. And it was not his place to know if they had nothing to do with the crash that was up to the BOI to decide.
It may have had nothing to to with the accident but in his words :
The stopped press book was filling up somewhat with relevant communications between Kinloss and various other agencies and my detachment
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Apologies and admissions of negligence have been forthcoming, in the knowledge that this would lead to compensation claims. So maybe its just a question of how much compensation.
Nothing wrong with that, but I don't see us going through all this again in court.
Considering my current situation I fully embrace the compensation culture.
Nothing wrong with that, but I don't see us going through all this again in court.
Considering my current situation I fully embrace the compensation culture.
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Hard Facts - The Pounds Shillings and pence
I apreciate the forementioned arguements. I have only the open press knowledge of the incident i quiestion. However, having sat only 18 inces from a mate when he paid the "ultiomate price" I can say that a highly paid expert from without the chain explained that, although she had put forward proposed enhancements to the ac at a miserly cost, this was refused because the total fleet costs would be too great. Further, the resulting payouts to any berieved would be less than the safety enhancement outlay. Ergo your berieved's compensation is worth less than your life.
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Agreed, the officer whose responsibility it would have been to approve the fitting of ESF to SF Hercs, said at the Inquest, if he had received the request, having seen the supporting documentation, he could easily have found the money.
Of course, the Hercules fleet at the time was stretched, but if a foam program had been put in place, when these reports first went into Group in 2003, the entire mini-fleet would have been fitted out at the time XV179 flew that final mission. It has also been accepted by the RAF that there was too much of a focus on the missile threat at the time. Please believe me, the evidence amassed by the RAF and MoD support groups was both frightening and compelling, at the same time. The case for foam was overwhelming and yet the very people tasked with raising issues concerned with fitness for purpose, ignored it. An action that is totally inexplicable.
The worst aspect, in my view, is that the decision to change tactics would have been made much earlier if the system had worked, the chain of command had been effective and the knowledge of fuel tank weakness and the requirement for ESF had filtered down to the front line.
Post XV179, there are still areas of concern in theatre, not necessarily affecting the Hercules fleet. Enough said on this point.
Of course, lawyers get rewarded for their work, but the Hercules and Nimrod legal cases could well break new legal ground. Having been sent into theatre myself in a defenceless aircraft, I am watching the legal developments closely.
Like it or not, "military risk" is used as a lever to absolve responsibility for the safety of crews and soldiers. It is easier to invoke than fighting for better kit. Would soldiers still have been driving round in thin-skinned landrovers years after the invasion if the MoD was required to assume more responsibility for the lives of soldiers?
I doubt it. A solution would have been found much quicker.
Of course, the Hercules fleet at the time was stretched, but if a foam program had been put in place, when these reports first went into Group in 2003, the entire mini-fleet would have been fitted out at the time XV179 flew that final mission. It has also been accepted by the RAF that there was too much of a focus on the missile threat at the time. Please believe me, the evidence amassed by the RAF and MoD support groups was both frightening and compelling, at the same time. The case for foam was overwhelming and yet the very people tasked with raising issues concerned with fitness for purpose, ignored it. An action that is totally inexplicable.
The worst aspect, in my view, is that the decision to change tactics would have been made much earlier if the system had worked, the chain of command had been effective and the knowledge of fuel tank weakness and the requirement for ESF had filtered down to the front line.
Post XV179, there are still areas of concern in theatre, not necessarily affecting the Hercules fleet. Enough said on this point.
Of course, lawyers get rewarded for their work, but the Hercules and Nimrod legal cases could well break new legal ground. Having been sent into theatre myself in a defenceless aircraft, I am watching the legal developments closely.
Like it or not, "military risk" is used as a lever to absolve responsibility for the safety of crews and soldiers. It is easier to invoke than fighting for better kit. Would soldiers still have been driving round in thin-skinned landrovers years after the invasion if the MoD was required to assume more responsibility for the lives of soldiers?
I doubt it. A solution would have been found much quicker.
Last edited by nigegilb; 17th Apr 2009 at 12:57.
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Olive Oil - Nail on the head. Why were they at low level within small arms range when they didn't have to be?
Can we expect 'Hercules - Still Hitting Back 3' to be still running in 2024?
Can we expect 'Hercules - Still Hitting Back 3' to be still running in 2024?
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Because the perceived threat from shoulder launched missiles on a short leg was considered to be greater. And because, unlike the rest of the AT crews in theatre they were trained to fly OLF, enabling them to avoid completely the missile engagement zone.
In hindsight, the actual risk at low level was greater.
Did they have all the relevant info to make that decision-NO. Were they aware of the huge weakness in the fuel tanks-NO.
And the RAF and MoD were unable to explain why ESF was not fitted at an Inquest lasting 6 weeks.
So lay off the crew. Neither the BoI nor the Inquest placed any blame with the crew. Unless you are completely stupid, the crew of the chinook were blamed in entirety for the Mull crash.
In hindsight, the actual risk at low level was greater.
Did they have all the relevant info to make that decision-NO. Were they aware of the huge weakness in the fuel tanks-NO.
And the RAF and MoD were unable to explain why ESF was not fitted at an Inquest lasting 6 weeks.
So lay off the crew. Neither the BoI nor the Inquest placed any blame with the crew. Unless you are completely stupid, the crew of the chinook were blamed in entirety for the Mull crash.
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Because the perceived threat from shoulder launched missiles on a short leg was considered to be greater
(Yes, I know, different aircraft, different theatre. It's the principle.)
TD
Yes of course there would have been relevant information; relevant to flying the aircraft, often type specific, so there would have been communicated information between home base and detachment. The Stop Press book on any flying unit is designed to give crews information on all manner of things. It may be a locally agreed avoid that is temporary in nature. It might be the notification of a change of frequency ahead of a formal amendment to publications. It might be a change in a local departure or arrival procedure ahead of a formal change to documentation. All irrelevant to airworthiness, but contained within a Stop Press folder.
And actually yes it was his decision. Stop Press books need to be regularly thinned out or else they become irrelevant and do not meet the requirement of a last reminder of something new to flying operations. The information contained within becomes irrelevant, gets formally amended or goes out of date. As a detachment commander and flying supervisor he should be exactly the right person to decide what needs to be in the book. Anyway it is semantics and a bit of red herring, as anything relevant to an aircraft type deemed important to be in the stop press will have been communicated from elsewhere, so copies will be available.
And for all those advocating
, just remember it all comes out of the Defence budget. The higher the compensation now, the less there is to spend on new equipment also required now, ergo reduced frontline capability. If anyone thinks HMG and HMT are going to fill the shortfall, well clouds and cuckoos spring to mind. SPHL - Spot on!!
Yes of course there would have been relevant information; relevant to flying the aircraft, often type specific, so there would have been communicated information between home base and detachment. The Stop Press book on any flying unit is designed to give crews information on all manner of things. It may be a locally agreed avoid that is temporary in nature. It might be the notification of a change of frequency ahead of a formal amendment to publications. It might be a change in a local departure or arrival procedure ahead of a formal change to documentation. All irrelevant to airworthiness, but contained within a Stop Press folder.
And actually yes it was his decision. Stop Press books need to be regularly thinned out or else they become irrelevant and do not meet the requirement of a last reminder of something new to flying operations. The information contained within becomes irrelevant, gets formally amended or goes out of date. As a detachment commander and flying supervisor he should be exactly the right person to decide what needs to be in the book. Anyway it is semantics and a bit of red herring, as anything relevant to an aircraft type deemed important to be in the stop press will have been communicated from elsewhere, so copies will be available.
And for all those advocating
the higher and more punitive compensation the better
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RP, if there is no compensation then life becomes cheap enough to risk on future ops. The requirement to have the best equipment becomes unnecessary. A legal victory and punitive payout will hamper operational capability in the near term, but will pay for itself in the long term. XV179 cost 50 million to replace, but for a modification that would have cost a fraction of the price. Only the families involved know the true cost of the lives lost.
The 14 men on board XV230 were killed because of negligence on behalf of the RAF and MoD. The 10 men on board XV179 were also killed, as much because of negligence as the attack itself, which should have been survivable. This negligence occurred because the very system designed to provide safe aircraft in times of peace and war broke down.
Thankfully, now we have much more effective communications we were able to raise issues regarding airworthiness and fitness for purpose at the highest levels. Incompetence at higher levels within the MoD and RAF has been exposed. This really is a different world to the 1990s. Better get used to the idea of accountability, it ain't going away.
If you think the Defence Budget will be maintained at its current inadequate level, in the event that there is no change in responsibility for soldiers lives, you are sadly mistaken. The budget would be repeatedly trimmed because the cost of life would be proportionately cheaper. The first question the Defence Minister asks, is, "do you really need that equipment, it is very expensive?". In your world, without accountability the answer would be no, and the money lost. There is little chance of real increases in Defence Budget in coming years, only defence cuts. When A400M enters service in 2014 it will be fully ready for operations, full DAS, FTP, FDA, the works. A first. Pressure must be maintained on the Ministry, or it will lapse into old habits. A legal precedent would leave the Ministry with nowhere to hide.
The 14 men on board XV230 were killed because of negligence on behalf of the RAF and MoD. The 10 men on board XV179 were also killed, as much because of negligence as the attack itself, which should have been survivable. This negligence occurred because the very system designed to provide safe aircraft in times of peace and war broke down.
Thankfully, now we have much more effective communications we were able to raise issues regarding airworthiness and fitness for purpose at the highest levels. Incompetence at higher levels within the MoD and RAF has been exposed. This really is a different world to the 1990s. Better get used to the idea of accountability, it ain't going away.
If you think the Defence Budget will be maintained at its current inadequate level, in the event that there is no change in responsibility for soldiers lives, you are sadly mistaken. The budget would be repeatedly trimmed because the cost of life would be proportionately cheaper. The first question the Defence Minister asks, is, "do you really need that equipment, it is very expensive?". In your world, without accountability the answer would be no, and the money lost. There is little chance of real increases in Defence Budget in coming years, only defence cuts. When A400M enters service in 2014 it will be fully ready for operations, full DAS, FTP, FDA, the works. A first. Pressure must be maintained on the Ministry, or it will lapse into old habits. A legal precedent would leave the Ministry with nowhere to hide.
Last edited by nigegilb; 17th Apr 2009 at 18:04.
if there is no compensation
Here's an example. In WWII the RAF fitted a tail warning radar to the Lancaster. It was thought that it would provide protection from night fighters; best information available at the time. Unfortunately the Germans used the radar transmissions to home onto the unfortunate bombers. Does that mean all bomber crews shot down after the fitting of tail radar are due compensation? After all, someone must have been negligent in not having the remarkable foresight to see the dangers.
At no point have I criticised "accountability", but there is a huge naivety amongst some that the MOD can afford everything we want. We are not funded to that level. Never have been, never will be. And every time compensation is paid out it further reduces what the MOD can afford. So what that something might cost £X million (in your example ESF) but might end up saving £XXX million. If you do not have the £XM, or you decide that the £XM is better spent fitting something else more important to your aircraft, or they decide the money is better spent on a more important naval or army programme. If you haven't got the cash you cannot fit it.
And who is responsible? The sqn ldr/maj/lt desk officer for not fighting hard enough? His boss? The 1* DEC? The 2*s that ultimately decide on the priorities? The 3* DCDS EC? The 4* DMB who make the final decisions on where the money is spent? Or the Chancellor of the day who didn't allocate enough money to the Defence budget.
People make decisions on the best information available to them at the time. You get what you can get through the system and there will be priorities. At that time threats might be different; perceived dangers might be different; priorities will be different. Decisions have to be taken, and are taken on the best information available at the time. HINDSIGHT is a such a marvellous thing; you will be a multi billionaire when you can bottle that.
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That is why you need an airworthiness system that delivers fitness for purpose. In my example, ESF, there was a requirement for decisions taken in the procurement process of the J, to be recorded. For future reference, in the event that protection that is too expensive now, might become affordable in the future. In the event that a change of role increases the possibility of being shot down and triggers the priority change for funding. To set out why the offer of factory fitting foam was turned down from the outset, for an aircraft that is required to fly at low level in badlands.
NOTHING was written down and retained in the case of XV179 or the J. Nothing. An airworthiness system that was worthless and not understood by anyone. Why didn't Group fulfil its role as a user and pass the crucial report on to the relevant authority? No idea. No paper trail. The man in charge didn't know.
Where was the safety case? What happened after the requirement for foam was sent to Group? Who knows? There is no record.
Is that your idea of a system delivering, or people doing the best they can?
Contrary to the gist of your argument, we were assured that the money would have been made available, if the need for the safety measure had been made known.
Do you think they might try a bit harder with a huge legal stick hovering above them?
NOTHING was written down and retained in the case of XV179 or the J. Nothing. An airworthiness system that was worthless and not understood by anyone. Why didn't Group fulfil its role as a user and pass the crucial report on to the relevant authority? No idea. No paper trail. The man in charge didn't know.
Where was the safety case? What happened after the requirement for foam was sent to Group? Who knows? There is no record.
Is that your idea of a system delivering, or people doing the best they can?
Contrary to the gist of your argument, we were assured that the money would have been made available, if the need for the safety measure had been made known.
Do you think they might try a bit harder with a huge legal stick hovering above them?
Last edited by nigegilb; 17th Apr 2009 at 19:39.
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Sadly, I think you're right Nige, they will try harder....to avoid any association with meaningful decision making which might be held against them, which is pretty much what 'they' already appear to stand accused of!
Sometimes we need to be careful what we wish for; Oliver Cromwell achieved his utopia only to discover he had created a greater monster than the one he fought to depose.
So you're in good company, or maybe not, as the case may be.
BTW - Q- Who are "they"?
Sometimes we need to be careful what we wish for; Oliver Cromwell achieved his utopia only to discover he had created a greater monster than the one he fought to depose.
So you're in good company, or maybe not, as the case may be.
BTW - Q- Who are "they"?