Agreed, the officer whose responsibility it would have been to approve the fitting of ESF to SF Hercs, said at the Inquest, if he had received the request, having seen the supporting documentation, he could easily have found the money.
Of course, the Hercules fleet at the time was stretched, but if a foam program had been put in place, when these reports first went into Group in 2003, the entire mini-fleet would have been fitted out at the time XV179 flew that final mission. It has also been accepted by the RAF that there was too much of a focus on the missile threat at the time. Please believe me, the evidence amassed by the RAF and MoD support groups was both frightening and compelling, at the same time. The case for foam was overwhelming and yet the very people tasked with raising issues concerned with fitness for purpose, ignored it. An action that is totally inexplicable.
The worst aspect, in my view, is that the decision to change tactics would have been made much earlier if the system had worked, the chain of command had been effective and the knowledge of fuel tank weakness and the requirement for ESF had filtered down to the front line.
Post XV179, there are still areas of concern in theatre, not necessarily affecting the Hercules fleet. Enough said on this point.
Of course, lawyers get rewarded for their work, but the Hercules and Nimrod legal cases could well break new legal ground. Having been sent into theatre myself in a defenceless aircraft, I am watching the legal developments closely.
Like it or not, "military risk" is used as a lever to absolve responsibility for the safety of crews and soldiers. It is easier to invoke than fighting for better kit. Would soldiers still have been driving round in thin-skinned landrovers years after the invasion if the MoD was required to assume more responsibility for the lives of soldiers?
I doubt it. A solution would have been found much quicker.
Last edited by nigegilb; 17th Apr 2009 at 12:57.