Relatives claim government failed to protect victims of RAF Hercules crash
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Good to see that you haven't lost your bite chappie! Well said and you continue to amaze us with your tenacity.
Leon I think has been told a porkie by someone being disingenuous and he has been rebriefed. Otherwise, as Nige says, Leon would be accusing the MoD of misleading the Coroner in court, which would be a very serious crime.
Everyone knows that is not the case and that the fitment of ESF is indeed a huge improvement to the protection of the herc from ground fire and would, almost certainly, have prevented the loss of 179 had ESF been fitted.
The 'serious systemic failings' arise from the internal workings of the MoD. the MoD 'system' allowed the true threat of small arms to the Herc to be unknown to the crews and their squadrons and the MoD 'system' also prevented the mitigation of the threat by the procurement and airworthiness process.
I have yet to be convinced that the latter has been addressed despite the loss of XV179, XV230 and a number of other losses that highlight the failings of the MoD 'system'.
Leon you say "what we really need". I'll you what you really need - that is aircraft that are truly airworthy and fit for purpose and don't fall out of the sky through a lack of the MoD not meeting their obligations to the crews and the passengers. Flight Safety is not a peacetime function - it is actually very important to ensure we don't lose valuable aircraft and priceless crews and so diminish our operational capability. FS may not be very sexy but it is vital; if you do not make aircraft safe then you are doing the enemy's job for him..
Leon I think has been told a porkie by someone being disingenuous and he has been rebriefed. Otherwise, as Nige says, Leon would be accusing the MoD of misleading the Coroner in court, which would be a very serious crime.
Everyone knows that is not the case and that the fitment of ESF is indeed a huge improvement to the protection of the herc from ground fire and would, almost certainly, have prevented the loss of 179 had ESF been fitted.
The 'serious systemic failings' arise from the internal workings of the MoD. the MoD 'system' allowed the true threat of small arms to the Herc to be unknown to the crews and their squadrons and the MoD 'system' also prevented the mitigation of the threat by the procurement and airworthiness process.
I have yet to be convinced that the latter has been addressed despite the loss of XV179, XV230 and a number of other losses that highlight the failings of the MoD 'system'.
Leon you say "what we really need". I'll you what you really need - that is aircraft that are truly airworthy and fit for purpose and don't fall out of the sky through a lack of the MoD not meeting their obligations to the crews and the passengers. Flight Safety is not a peacetime function - it is actually very important to ensure we don't lose valuable aircraft and priceless crews and so diminish our operational capability. FS may not be very sexy but it is vital; if you do not make aircraft safe then you are doing the enemy's job for him..
Last edited by flipster; 20th Apr 2009 at 12:10.
I really do not understand the motivation for those apologists of the MOD that are prepared to dissemble on its behalf. Defend your Service, of course. Defend your Squadron, and proudly so. But defend a bureaucracy with form for reneging on its statutory obligations regarding the provision of airworthiness in accordance with its own Regulations and fitness for purpose? By their deeds ye shall know them!
Well said Chappie, you speak with the moral authority that others such as I lack. Morality is an endangered species in these "interesting" times. These issues are not technical so much as being about what is right and what is wrong. I would not think to turn to the MOD for advice on such matters.
Well said Chappie, you speak with the moral authority that others such as I lack. Morality is an endangered species in these "interesting" times. These issues are not technical so much as being about what is right and what is wrong. I would not think to turn to the MOD for advice on such matters.
I think it worth repeating that myself, and certainly a few other ppruners I know, have no wish to point the finger at individuals who make an honest mistake, whether they hold their hands up to it or not.
But in a long career I have had the misfortune to witness quite deliberate acts which have compromised the safety of individuals and their equipment, including aircraft.
The common factors in most of these cases are;
I have nothing but the deepest contempt for this small, but increasing, minority. I have lost count of the times I’ve been given a direct order to commit what I, and the MoD’s own regulations, state is an offence. Usually this involves making a false declaration that, for example, a piece of kit, an aircraft or an installation is safe/airworthy/serviceable/cost effective/a fair and reasonable price/the proper engineering solution etc. I’ve never once obeyed such an order. Without exception, the person issuing the (illegal) order has been protected from on high.
I’ve often been asked what the worst example I’ve come across is. There are so many. But the one I always come back to is the project office who, on a safety critical “no-go” system, completely ignored Boscombe’s advice (i.e. statement of fact) that the installation was functionally unsafe, rendering the aircraft vulnerable to friendly fire. They stated “It worked on the bench, so it’ll work in the aircraft”. No need for integration testing to ensure it (a) worked as a system and within a system of systems and (b) was compatible with other kit (it was neither). EMC testing was, apparently, something to avoid like the plague in case it failed (it did, miserably). No need to amend the tech pubs, including ACM and FRCs. Or the simulator. (Pilot – “WTF is this?”). No need to buy spares or test equipment. Or maintainer training. Despite being told all this was critical before MAR and Release to Service, they paid off the contract and walked away. Equally guilty was the contractor, who gladly accepted a 2nd contract to fix what he was absolved of first time round (but was paid for in full). Screwed up again, despite being told exactly what to do. In the end, the aircraft was made safe by paying (3rd payment) another unrelated company. (Who, by the way, charged a fraction of the other). Every single aspect I’ve mentioned, except the final contract which made the aircraft safe, was condoned by 1/2/4 Star and, later, Ministers (which is excusable once, as others write their correspondence, but not when an MP writes to him personally asking if he really knows what he signed for, and he says yes). But for making the aircraft safe, one was in purdah for evermore (the exception being the aircrew and Boscombe, but they don’t write your reports).
Fix these systemic failings and you improve safety at a stroke, and in most cases actually save money. It is often a false economy to defer, as the cost of regression and unnecessary retro-embodiment programmes is astronomical.
Rant over.
But in a long career I have had the misfortune to witness quite deliberate acts which have compromised the safety of individuals and their equipment, including aircraft.
The common factors in most of these cases are;
- Self interest / career progression
- Protecting higher ranks/grades, so endearing oneself to them
I have nothing but the deepest contempt for this small, but increasing, minority. I have lost count of the times I’ve been given a direct order to commit what I, and the MoD’s own regulations, state is an offence. Usually this involves making a false declaration that, for example, a piece of kit, an aircraft or an installation is safe/airworthy/serviceable/cost effective/a fair and reasonable price/the proper engineering solution etc. I’ve never once obeyed such an order. Without exception, the person issuing the (illegal) order has been protected from on high.
I’ve often been asked what the worst example I’ve come across is. There are so many. But the one I always come back to is the project office who, on a safety critical “no-go” system, completely ignored Boscombe’s advice (i.e. statement of fact) that the installation was functionally unsafe, rendering the aircraft vulnerable to friendly fire. They stated “It worked on the bench, so it’ll work in the aircraft”. No need for integration testing to ensure it (a) worked as a system and within a system of systems and (b) was compatible with other kit (it was neither). EMC testing was, apparently, something to avoid like the plague in case it failed (it did, miserably). No need to amend the tech pubs, including ACM and FRCs. Or the simulator. (Pilot – “WTF is this?”). No need to buy spares or test equipment. Or maintainer training. Despite being told all this was critical before MAR and Release to Service, they paid off the contract and walked away. Equally guilty was the contractor, who gladly accepted a 2nd contract to fix what he was absolved of first time round (but was paid for in full). Screwed up again, despite being told exactly what to do. In the end, the aircraft was made safe by paying (3rd payment) another unrelated company. (Who, by the way, charged a fraction of the other). Every single aspect I’ve mentioned, except the final contract which made the aircraft safe, was condoned by 1/2/4 Star and, later, Ministers (which is excusable once, as others write their correspondence, but not when an MP writes to him personally asking if he really knows what he signed for, and he says yes). But for making the aircraft safe, one was in purdah for evermore (the exception being the aircrew and Boscombe, but they don’t write your reports).
Fix these systemic failings and you improve safety at a stroke, and in most cases actually save money. It is often a false economy to defer, as the cost of regression and unnecessary retro-embodiment programmes is astronomical.
Rant over.
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The silent majority
Allow me to try to clear up some confusion.
There may be a feeling amongst serving members along these lines :-
1. Fantastic work by the group that has fought so hard.
2. The BOI delivered.
3. The Coroner delivered.
4. The MoD apologised knowing that the relatives would sue.
5. They are.
Opinion will always be divided on the 'compensation culture'. I believe that it's a fair case, and the defence budget can afford it.
I don't believe that any of this will get to court again.
However, notwithstanding the excellent work of you guys. It's down to 'How Much Money' now.
I believe we should accept that lack of ESF was a contributary factor as was Intelligence and Tactics. If we are talking compensation then we have to talk percentages. ESF as a single cause would be therefore down to 33% and possibly lower, as if the boys had not been low level, in daylight, on a repeated trip (Int & tactics) then ESF would be less of an issue.
Further to that, many serving members may believe that XV179's loss was 99% bad luck. A lucky shot by the bad guys, life has to go on for the rest of us, because we're still out there.
Nige & Flip, I respect you both but there is no need to put me straight on the last couple of paragraphs.
For the reasons above, many of the 'silent majority' may believe that it is time to leave it now. I can't guess what percentage of people think the compensation claim is justified.
I read an article last Sunday about Ron Smith, whose daughter Helen died after a balcony fall in Saudi 30 years ago. Her body is still in the morgue and has been PM'd six times. Her Mum wants her buried.
What started off as a campaign group has now gone full circle. Your group uses hysterical and emotional language and is intimidating to those who offer their opinion. This is why the half a dozen Herc & Nimrod threads are so full of contributions by no more than half a dozen PPRuNers. Read by many, and discussed in crewrooms.
Tuc, when you write your memoirs, put me down for a copy.
RIP to the boys of XV179
I thought long and hard before typing that. Please PM me while I worry about any offence I have caused.
There may be a feeling amongst serving members along these lines :-
1. Fantastic work by the group that has fought so hard.
2. The BOI delivered.
3. The Coroner delivered.
4. The MoD apologised knowing that the relatives would sue.
5. They are.
Opinion will always be divided on the 'compensation culture'. I believe that it's a fair case, and the defence budget can afford it.
I don't believe that any of this will get to court again.
However, notwithstanding the excellent work of you guys. It's down to 'How Much Money' now.
I believe we should accept that lack of ESF was a contributary factor as was Intelligence and Tactics. If we are talking compensation then we have to talk percentages. ESF as a single cause would be therefore down to 33% and possibly lower, as if the boys had not been low level, in daylight, on a repeated trip (Int & tactics) then ESF would be less of an issue.
Further to that, many serving members may believe that XV179's loss was 99% bad luck. A lucky shot by the bad guys, life has to go on for the rest of us, because we're still out there.
Nige & Flip, I respect you both but there is no need to put me straight on the last couple of paragraphs.
For the reasons above, many of the 'silent majority' may believe that it is time to leave it now. I can't guess what percentage of people think the compensation claim is justified.
I read an article last Sunday about Ron Smith, whose daughter Helen died after a balcony fall in Saudi 30 years ago. Her body is still in the morgue and has been PM'd six times. Her Mum wants her buried.
What started off as a campaign group has now gone full circle. Your group uses hysterical and emotional language and is intimidating to those who offer their opinion. This is why the half a dozen Herc & Nimrod threads are so full of contributions by no more than half a dozen PPRuNers. Read by many, and discussed in crewrooms.
Tuc, when you write your memoirs, put me down for a copy.
RIP to the boys of XV179
I thought long and hard before typing that. Please PM me while I worry about any offence I have caused.
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SPHLC
Don't worry, I won't be putting you straight on your analysis ..... because I think you are mostly right. The only things I would add are:
6. MoD deny anything was wrong with the airworthiness system that let down the crews of XV179 (and XV230).
7. No changes to that system and no real increase in funding.
8. More Servicemen and women may die as a result.
I can certainly accept that there are 2 schools of thought and everyone is entitled to their opinion and I respect that; its all a matter of perspective.
However, I would mention that picking on the families does no-one any favours and greatly upsets those who have lost so much. Maybe such opinions are best kept to oneself? However, an apology by some of our more insensitive posters might go a long way to easing the tension.
Overall, I think perhaps it is better that everyone now lets the courts do their business over ESF and we should all keep quiet on the compensation culture until then.
Yours aye,
flip
It may interest you to know that it is because you are all 'still out there' that I remain concerned.
Don't worry, I won't be putting you straight on your analysis ..... because I think you are mostly right. The only things I would add are:
6. MoD deny anything was wrong with the airworthiness system that let down the crews of XV179 (and XV230).
7. No changes to that system and no real increase in funding.
8. More Servicemen and women may die as a result.
I can certainly accept that there are 2 schools of thought and everyone is entitled to their opinion and I respect that; its all a matter of perspective.
However, I would mention that picking on the families does no-one any favours and greatly upsets those who have lost so much. Maybe such opinions are best kept to oneself? However, an apology by some of our more insensitive posters might go a long way to easing the tension.
Overall, I think perhaps it is better that everyone now lets the courts do their business over ESF and we should all keep quiet on the compensation culture until then.
Yours aye,
flip
It may interest you to know that it is because you are all 'still out there' that I remain concerned.
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I was happy to leave it, but having sat through large parts of the Inquest I wasn't happy to sit back and watch people suggest on this thread that it was somehow the crew's fault that they were shot down that day.
I will always be quick to defend the crew. The weakness in the tactics should not be attributed to them. I urge anyone who thinks they are at fault to get hold of the secret document, (redacted works just as well) that set out the huge weakness to the fuel tanks from ground fire and the recommendation that ESF should be fitted. It is frankly astonishing that nothing was done with this information. The information was not passed to 47 Sqn.
I also urge people to read Tuc's post setting out the human weaknesses and the culture in the RAF/MoD that led to this tragedy. He is spot on. Before one of my interviews, I was told by a senior correspondant that MoD insiders were briefing that it was the crew's fault. I agree with Flip, I doubt the culture has changed much at all. I don't think that argument will get very far in the forthcoming legal battle, but it indicates the kind of thinking that goes on at the highest levels. Say one thing in public, but brief something else in private, to somehow avoid responsibility.
I am happy to withdraw from the fray and let this rest, I agree, that for many people it is time to move on.
I will always be quick to defend the crew. The weakness in the tactics should not be attributed to them. I urge anyone who thinks they are at fault to get hold of the secret document, (redacted works just as well) that set out the huge weakness to the fuel tanks from ground fire and the recommendation that ESF should be fitted. It is frankly astonishing that nothing was done with this information. The information was not passed to 47 Sqn.
I also urge people to read Tuc's post setting out the human weaknesses and the culture in the RAF/MoD that led to this tragedy. He is spot on. Before one of my interviews, I was told by a senior correspondant that MoD insiders were briefing that it was the crew's fault. I agree with Flip, I doubt the culture has changed much at all. I don't think that argument will get very far in the forthcoming legal battle, but it indicates the kind of thinking that goes on at the highest levels. Say one thing in public, but brief something else in private, to somehow avoid responsibility.
I am happy to withdraw from the fray and let this rest, I agree, that for many people it is time to move on.
Last edited by nigegilb; 21st Apr 2009 at 16:39.
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And it should never be forgotten, that brave men and ladies, daily go about their chosen career. getting the tasks completed under some pretty trying conditions. Often at the time not fully understanding how dangerous it is, but just getting on with the job.
Many years ago I gave evidence to a senate hearing, and me a lowly ex SGT deliberately making my remarks facing the one star who represented the Air Force. Most of his answers were " we did not understand."
There in lies part of the problem, the higher ups are fed often what they want to hear, because some people are more interested in what is in it for them and how it will help them climb up the ladder.
In the mean time the real operators of the Air Force, and is proven by this inquiry, get on with the job, and getting it done, with old. tired and obsolete kit.
The duty of care is there for the "knobs" to see, they just have to gain the moral courage to see that problems get fixed before someone gets hurt or worse.
Proud to have been Hercules aircrew, and still hoping for the cultural change.
Regards
Col
Special cheer to Chapie I think you are very special.
Many years ago I gave evidence to a senate hearing, and me a lowly ex SGT deliberately making my remarks facing the one star who represented the Air Force. Most of his answers were " we did not understand."
There in lies part of the problem, the higher ups are fed often what they want to hear, because some people are more interested in what is in it for them and how it will help them climb up the ladder.
In the mean time the real operators of the Air Force, and is proven by this inquiry, get on with the job, and getting it done, with old. tired and obsolete kit.
The duty of care is there for the "knobs" to see, they just have to gain the moral courage to see that problems get fixed before someone gets hurt or worse.
Proud to have been Hercules aircrew, and still hoping for the cultural change.
Regards
Col
Special cheer to Chapie I think you are very special.
Some interesting insights can be found here....
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/data/a..._for_C-130.pdf
...it maybe the case that the main reason why the foam was not fitted in the first place was due to the disadvantages on aircraft performance (weight / range / maintenance) - slide 17. Note the maintenance burden is not just a cost issue but also a driver for mission failure due to downtime.
Could be wrong but seems a more likely reason than a lack of money to me at the time of aircraft purchase - and would these decisions not have been made in the 1960s by a bunch of chaps on a tour in town straight from a squadron? Anyone here around at the time?
Just some food for thought.
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/data/a..._for_C-130.pdf
...it maybe the case that the main reason why the foam was not fitted in the first place was due to the disadvantages on aircraft performance (weight / range / maintenance) - slide 17. Note the maintenance burden is not just a cost issue but also a driver for mission failure due to downtime.
Could be wrong but seems a more likely reason than a lack of money to me at the time of aircraft purchase - and would these decisions not have been made in the 1960s by a bunch of chaps on a tour in town straight from a squadron? Anyone here around at the time?
Just some food for thought.
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There has been a lot of down time since XV179 was shot down. The money provided by HMT was eventually released and immediately spent on a new C17. The money for XV205 has only just been released by Treasury under the capital replacement program. More down time extending to years, during which the mini-fleet has been decimated, requiring a role change for the J.
The presentation you have linked to is a straightforward analysis of the merits of OBIGGS VS ESF. When US Mil looked at this they went through the process and still came up with ESF as the preferred solution. Late models may well have switched to OBIGGS to retain fuel tank capacity. The correct context JFZ is that LM were deciding which form of fuel tank protection to recommend, not formulating a way of ducking out of fuel tank protection. The main advantage of ESF being it's low tech and highly effective, There isn't a single aircraft in he US inventory with a combat role that does not have fuel protection. The RAF were offered external fuel tanks for the J but rejected them. The slight decrease in fuel tank capacity was stated as one of the reasons why the J wouldn't get foam when all this broke. We all know that the J has foam now and I have not heard of any complaints. Sure there is more work for engineers to do, but that is all part of the job. There have been complications for the J fleet in theatre, but that is nothing to do with ESF. Enough said on that point.
Some minutes were presented at the Inquest, the suggestion being that the J could have foam fitted in rsponse to specific operational requirement. This for a fleet that subsequently became maxed out with a war on two fronts, was never likely to happen in time. Once more back to the poor leadership from RAF Chiefs willingly overstretching assets in two wars at the same time. It was quite ridiculous to assume that a foam program could somehow have been implemented at short notice, BEFORE deployment.
Regarding Olive Oil's point, all I am saying is that Crew's should have the very best protection, very simply put, because life is precious. If the single bullet that brought down XV179 had somehow disabled the flying controls in a triple combat wired aircraft then sure, I would have gone along with the general point of view that the crew were unlucky. I agree, that flyers do the job knowing a degree of risk is attached and sometimes it goes wrong. The fact that a single bullet brought down XV179 when there was a very simple protection around for 40 years, that had been recommended several times but not fitted is a wholly different scenario.
And the reason I describe it as negligence.
A previously working widow with young children, might then face having the household income reduced by 2/3rds. Losing the family home, if it is a married quarter. And the curtailment of her own career. Her kids will grow up not knowing their father. I have no problem with the idea that families face the prospect of compensation, we are not talking about typists with RSI are we?
On another point raised about the compensation mentality. There is the suggestion that this won't reach court and an out of court settlement will be agreed. I don't wish to disclose any legal tactics, if inadvertently, but I stated earlier that the families should not be referred to as one group. There are different perspectives at play. Enough to say, that I won't be surprised in the least, if this is pressed all the way through the courts system and a landmark ruling is reached.
I wish the families all the very best. It has been a long, slow and painful road, none the least waiting for over 3 years for the Inquest. But the end, is finally in sight.
The presentation you have linked to is a straightforward analysis of the merits of OBIGGS VS ESF. When US Mil looked at this they went through the process and still came up with ESF as the preferred solution. Late models may well have switched to OBIGGS to retain fuel tank capacity. The correct context JFZ is that LM were deciding which form of fuel tank protection to recommend, not formulating a way of ducking out of fuel tank protection. The main advantage of ESF being it's low tech and highly effective, There isn't a single aircraft in he US inventory with a combat role that does not have fuel protection. The RAF were offered external fuel tanks for the J but rejected them. The slight decrease in fuel tank capacity was stated as one of the reasons why the J wouldn't get foam when all this broke. We all know that the J has foam now and I have not heard of any complaints. Sure there is more work for engineers to do, but that is all part of the job. There have been complications for the J fleet in theatre, but that is nothing to do with ESF. Enough said on that point.
Some minutes were presented at the Inquest, the suggestion being that the J could have foam fitted in rsponse to specific operational requirement. This for a fleet that subsequently became maxed out with a war on two fronts, was never likely to happen in time. Once more back to the poor leadership from RAF Chiefs willingly overstretching assets in two wars at the same time. It was quite ridiculous to assume that a foam program could somehow have been implemented at short notice, BEFORE deployment.
Regarding Olive Oil's point, all I am saying is that Crew's should have the very best protection, very simply put, because life is precious. If the single bullet that brought down XV179 had somehow disabled the flying controls in a triple combat wired aircraft then sure, I would have gone along with the general point of view that the crew were unlucky. I agree, that flyers do the job knowing a degree of risk is attached and sometimes it goes wrong. The fact that a single bullet brought down XV179 when there was a very simple protection around for 40 years, that had been recommended several times but not fitted is a wholly different scenario.
And the reason I describe it as negligence.
A previously working widow with young children, might then face having the household income reduced by 2/3rds. Losing the family home, if it is a married quarter. And the curtailment of her own career. Her kids will grow up not knowing their father. I have no problem with the idea that families face the prospect of compensation, we are not talking about typists with RSI are we?
On another point raised about the compensation mentality. There is the suggestion that this won't reach court and an out of court settlement will be agreed. I don't wish to disclose any legal tactics, if inadvertently, but I stated earlier that the families should not be referred to as one group. There are different perspectives at play. Enough to say, that I won't be surprised in the least, if this is pressed all the way through the courts system and a landmark ruling is reached.
I wish the families all the very best. It has been a long, slow and painful road, none the least waiting for over 3 years for the Inquest. But the end, is finally in sight.
Last edited by nigegilb; 22nd Apr 2009 at 16:17.
Nige,
I wasn't suggesting that in the presentation they were looking to duck out of ESF or OBIGGS - its was more that it gives an insight into the drawbacks of ESF (not that they are particularly large - but material all the same), and how this may have featured as part of a performance trade off.
I grant that that emphasis is shifting towards safety but the trades are always there. Hence I was merely opening up the possiblity that the Herc decision from yesteryear on ESF was not necessarily to do with money, and other (seemingly justifiable at the time) motives could have been at play. It would be interesting to known if ESF type technologies had a poor reputation (esp for maintenance) at the time, or whether there was significant emphasis put on range/payload that squeezed out the merits of ESF protection against the cold war threats at the time. Seems more plausable than lack of money to be honest.
I'm a bit confused by your argument that the crews were unaware of their aircrafts vulnerability to small arms fire by the way - this seems at odds with the BBC articles (in which you're quoted) which suggests that crews were asking for ESF back in 2002. Can both be true - which is it?
I wasn't suggesting that in the presentation they were looking to duck out of ESF or OBIGGS - its was more that it gives an insight into the drawbacks of ESF (not that they are particularly large - but material all the same), and how this may have featured as part of a performance trade off.
I grant that that emphasis is shifting towards safety but the trades are always there. Hence I was merely opening up the possiblity that the Herc decision from yesteryear on ESF was not necessarily to do with money, and other (seemingly justifiable at the time) motives could have been at play. It would be interesting to known if ESF type technologies had a poor reputation (esp for maintenance) at the time, or whether there was significant emphasis put on range/payload that squeezed out the merits of ESF protection against the cold war threats at the time. Seems more plausable than lack of money to be honest.
I'm a bit confused by your argument that the crews were unaware of their aircrafts vulnerability to small arms fire by the way - this seems at odds with the BBC articles (in which you're quoted) which suggests that crews were asking for ESF back in 2002. Can both be true - which is it?
JFZ90. This is all teetering on thread drift IMHO, but as someone who was around at the time, as it has been so delicately put, here's my two penneth. I was on Hercs 1968-1973. In all that time I new nothing about ESF and failed to understand how vulnerable the aircraft was to small arms fire. In retrospect that makes me feel somewhat stupid. No doubt some people from time to time became aware of it, usually via US exchange officers I imagine. Presumably it was they, or some of them, who made the representations to which you refer. As regards money, the MOD was so tight that they would not pay the penny(s) per gallon that FIIS cost, and so the very effects of fuel tank corrosion that Lockheed predicted duly resulted. This was the start of a fruitful and profitable (for them) relationship between Marshals (who re planked the wings) and the RAF Herc fleet. Needless to say the FIIS savings were peanuts in comparison. It might be interesting to note that the 60 aircraft cost 60 million in US dollars, but double that after the sterling costs were included. The initial amount (ie US$1M per aircraft) was a bargain, the latter on the whole was not.
Hi Chugs,
If you were at Lyneham during your time on Hercs your tour would have overlapped with the station’s first aircraft fitted with ESF as part of an extensive in-service trial. This trial sought to understand the long-term issues with the various types of reticulated foam (more than one type was fitted) and followed numerous ballistic tests conducted on earlier trials.
If you were at Lyneham during your time on Hercs your tour would have overlapped with the station’s first aircraft fitted with ESF as part of an extensive in-service trial. This trial sought to understand the long-term issues with the various types of reticulated foam (more than one type was fitted) and followed numerous ballistic tests conducted on earlier trials.
JTO, then that shows ever more thoroughly how ill informed I was! I was roughly 50/50 Fairford then Lyneham. Was the aircraft available for squadron use, ie in the centralised pool? Do you happen to know its airframe number and when it was so fitted? Surely the effects on fuel capacity alone, minimal though they would be, would have to be made known to the crews thus alerting us to its presence. Bear in mind we were flying some 14 hour legs down the Changi slip in those days.
A few aircraft were used for more limited trials, but the long-term resilience of reticulated foam was tested in one of Lyneham’s Comet C4s so as to encompass the greatest range of environmental factors (altitudes / temperatures) and a broader range of fuel tank designs.
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Strange how the MoD did not admit to this at the Inquest. It makes the organisation appear even more negligent.
The MoD line, initially, was that nobody at higher levels knew anything about foam until the findings of Xv179 BoI were presented. This all changed when the secret documents were shown to have gone to Air Rank level in 2002 setting out the urgent need for foam
But still, no evidence of a trial....
Any more gen JTO?
The MoD line, initially, was that nobody at higher levels knew anything about foam until the findings of Xv179 BoI were presented. This all changed when the secret documents were shown to have gone to Air Rank level in 2002 setting out the urgent need for foam
But still, no evidence of a trial....
Any more gen JTO?
Yes, very interesting. Perhaps these trials resulted in the 1980/81 MoD ESF specifications.
Bad enough MoD claimed not to know about ESF in 2002, when their own specs on the subject are dated 20+ years previously.
Illustrates the need to retain experience and corporate knowledge. Oops, mandated airworthiness requirements.
Bad enough MoD claimed not to know about ESF in 2002, when their own specs on the subject are dated 20+ years previously.
Illustrates the need to retain experience and corporate knowledge. Oops, mandated airworthiness requirements.
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JTO, I am fairly certain the two lawyers representing different members of the families were not given this information. I submitted many documents, only for some of them never to see the light of day. Thank you very much for telling us about the trials, it helps complete the picture, particularly regarding Tuc's info, which we presented to the coroner. I am not sure the lawyers covering the latest legal challenge knew anything about these foam trials, I have to say, it is crucial information, I am a little surprised.
Makes the initial MoD argumentation rather difficult to understand......
Makes the initial MoD argumentation rather difficult to understand......
Last edited by nigegilb; 23rd Apr 2009 at 21:38.
Well if this was already in the Public Domain, JTO, it certainly wasn't in this particular part of it, but par for my course it would seem. I would guess that all this happened while I was at FFD before our move to LYN and the SRTs move from there to BZN. Say between 1968 and early 1971, does that sound about right? Was the trial successful or were problems, other than financial encountered? Who was sponsoring it, just the MOD or others as well? Was it all done at LYN or did it move onto BZN with the Vomits? As tuc says, curious that this corporate knowledge seems to have "disappeared". Good job that you retained it JTO. Thank you for your posts!
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Remarks from the Commander in Chief, XV179 BoI;
"The issue of the Hercules' vulnerability to [ ] was at the time of the accident, not fully appreciated. (By whom?). A perception had developed over many years, based on previous attacks on Hercules aircraft, that such weapon systems did not represent a threat to aircraft integrity. Clearly that perception was incorrect and therfore methods to further reduce risk should be investigated. One method could be the fitting of a fuel tank fire-suppression system and I have already directed the Hercules Integrated Project Team to investigate this as a matter of urgency."
All I can say about this statement, is that four years earlier, at the start of ops in Afg, a stark document was produced and sent to Group for action. The information contained within this document set out clearly the risks to ground fire and the massive weakness in the fuel tanks and set out the required mitigation measure, ESF. It was backed up with solid research papers. Some officers known to me, were shown the information and came off the witness stand shaking with rage, that nothing had been done. CinC appears to have missed the point, a Vulnerability Analysis is mandated, and there are defined threats; including inert, incendiary, rockets etc.
ESF is the mitigation to the tank area, a fact recognised in the RAF since 1981/82.
This vulnerability analysis is an established part of the airworthiness process, or at least should be, in an organisation fit for purpose.
The information contained in the document was fired into the system again at the start of the Iraq war after an in-theatre assessment; again absolutely nothing was done and frontline crews were not informed, crucial if the doctrine of low level was to be challenged from the grass roots.
It now appears trials were carried out some 30 years before.
There is no excuse for this failure, other than a complete breakdown in the airworthiness system. The very systemic failure referred to in the coroner's conclusion. Interestingly, the IPTL gave evidence at the Inquest and made it clear that FFP was not his responsibility.
So whose is it?
And should we now be calling for a public inquiry into what happened on that fateful day. If not, much of the evidence will simply collect dust, never to see the light of day.
My thanks, once more to JTO.
"The issue of the Hercules' vulnerability to [ ] was at the time of the accident, not fully appreciated. (By whom?). A perception had developed over many years, based on previous attacks on Hercules aircraft, that such weapon systems did not represent a threat to aircraft integrity. Clearly that perception was incorrect and therfore methods to further reduce risk should be investigated. One method could be the fitting of a fuel tank fire-suppression system and I have already directed the Hercules Integrated Project Team to investigate this as a matter of urgency."
All I can say about this statement, is that four years earlier, at the start of ops in Afg, a stark document was produced and sent to Group for action. The information contained within this document set out clearly the risks to ground fire and the massive weakness in the fuel tanks and set out the required mitigation measure, ESF. It was backed up with solid research papers. Some officers known to me, were shown the information and came off the witness stand shaking with rage, that nothing had been done. CinC appears to have missed the point, a Vulnerability Analysis is mandated, and there are defined threats; including inert, incendiary, rockets etc.
ESF is the mitigation to the tank area, a fact recognised in the RAF since 1981/82.
This vulnerability analysis is an established part of the airworthiness process, or at least should be, in an organisation fit for purpose.
The information contained in the document was fired into the system again at the start of the Iraq war after an in-theatre assessment; again absolutely nothing was done and frontline crews were not informed, crucial if the doctrine of low level was to be challenged from the grass roots.
It now appears trials were carried out some 30 years before.
There is no excuse for this failure, other than a complete breakdown in the airworthiness system. The very systemic failure referred to in the coroner's conclusion. Interestingly, the IPTL gave evidence at the Inquest and made it clear that FFP was not his responsibility.
So whose is it?
And should we now be calling for a public inquiry into what happened on that fateful day. If not, much of the evidence will simply collect dust, never to see the light of day.
My thanks, once more to JTO.
Last edited by nigegilb; 23rd Apr 2009 at 21:39.