F/Lynx all systems go at AW
Jacko - that's the whole point - the AAC has continued the myth that they really do limited movement of men and materiel around the battlefield - the Mk9 Lynx was christened the Soup Dragon as that was all it ever delivered and it never went near the battlefield proper.
As I said before, if you peel back the veneer, you find that the AAC has only ever been about anti-tank and obs and recce and now they have one aircraft that does it all brilliantly they don't need Lynx. The answer is more SH but then the battle for power begins and the AAC recognises its vulnerability especially as now everyone is in JHC and so many command/staff posts are held by AAC officers. If the AAC is drawn down to just AH 64 then there is no need for all those staff officers and the AAC grip on JHC power disappears followed shortly by the AAC itself.
If one can break through the party politics it is clear that the AAC has been struggling to justify its existence for many years but could claim superiority in numbers of helicopters over both the RAF and the FAA. The Gazelles are gone or going and the Lynx is hardly serviceable and has no hot or high performance( its anti tank performance was shaky 10 years ago). Unless they get FLynx and perpetuate the pseudo SH capability myth they have 2 Regts of AH and that is it (yes I am ignoring Belize and Brunei - anyone going to put FLynx there?)
As I said before, if you peel back the veneer, you find that the AAC has only ever been about anti-tank and obs and recce and now they have one aircraft that does it all brilliantly they don't need Lynx. The answer is more SH but then the battle for power begins and the AAC recognises its vulnerability especially as now everyone is in JHC and so many command/staff posts are held by AAC officers. If the AAC is drawn down to just AH 64 then there is no need for all those staff officers and the AAC grip on JHC power disappears followed shortly by the AAC itself.
If one can break through the party politics it is clear that the AAC has been struggling to justify its existence for many years but could claim superiority in numbers of helicopters over both the RAF and the FAA. The Gazelles are gone or going and the Lynx is hardly serviceable and has no hot or high performance( its anti tank performance was shaky 10 years ago). Unless they get FLynx and perpetuate the pseudo SH capability myth they have 2 Regts of AH and that is it (yes I am ignoring Belize and Brunei - anyone going to put FLynx there?)
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Shaky Future
"As I said before, if you peel back the veneer, you find that the AAC has only ever been about anti-tank and obs and recce and now they have one aircraft that does it all brilliantly they don't need Lynx. The answer is more SH but then the battle for power begins and the AAC recognises its vulnerability especially as now everyone is in JHC and so many command/staff posts are held by AAC officers. If the AAC is drawn down to just AH 64 then there is no need for all those staff officers and the AAC grip on JHC power disappears followed shortly by the AAC itself."
Without a shadow of doubt, the reality seems to be biting that this is the truth of our predicament, I would suggest that in these times of high operational Tempo, aircrew would not care which uniform they wear as long as they are providing they user with what THEY want, rather than some mish mash of capabilities that just so happen to suit an airframe. As has been said, with two airframes going in the very near future, I fear it IS too late to change the inevitability of being absorbed in some way, shape or form.
What delayed the inevitability was cosiness of N Ireland, (a whole Regiment!?) and Germany with it's Anti Tank,and Boz on the doorstep. Times have changed, I just wonder what political will in DAAvn will be flexed to effect or fight the change. Depends on what Jobs on offer in the S West I suppose.
I wash my hands of FLynx, I moved on cos the only people that will be flying it are QHI's and a handful of aircrew supporting ops, that's about as much as can be expected from a Regiments worth of helicopters. Good luck to them. I sincerely mean it.
Happy New Year All
Without a shadow of doubt, the reality seems to be biting that this is the truth of our predicament, I would suggest that in these times of high operational Tempo, aircrew would not care which uniform they wear as long as they are providing they user with what THEY want, rather than some mish mash of capabilities that just so happen to suit an airframe. As has been said, with two airframes going in the very near future, I fear it IS too late to change the inevitability of being absorbed in some way, shape or form.
What delayed the inevitability was cosiness of N Ireland, (a whole Regiment!?) and Germany with it's Anti Tank,and Boz on the doorstep. Times have changed, I just wonder what political will in DAAvn will be flexed to effect or fight the change. Depends on what Jobs on offer in the S West I suppose.
I wash my hands of FLynx, I moved on cos the only people that will be flying it are QHI's and a handful of aircrew supporting ops, that's about as much as can be expected from a Regiments worth of helicopters. Good luck to them. I sincerely mean it.
Happy New Year All
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As an ex-AAC QHI I have to agree with Crab. There is no place for the Corps within the current Armed Forces now that conventional Obs and Recce are obsolete (thanks to the excellent systems on the AH64). The Lynx has proved itself to be totally useless in hot and high conditions and even the Flynx looks like it may have problems and thats before all the delays, excuses etc are factored in. I believe that one central helicopter force is preferential (the navy would have to look after their own) and under one controlling authority. As to who would control the single force is up for debate but if the RAF could change its policy of being a Reluctant Air Force then they would be the obvious choice.........I cant believe I just said that
I hesitate to express anything resembling an opinion on this, as it is almost entirely uninformed.
But didn't the six-man load carrying Lynx have a role (a sub-Puma, sub Support Helicopter, role)?
Doing all of those little tasks for which a Puma was too big, and for directly supporting the AH of the day (delivering TOW reloads for armed Lynx) - and all the rest?
Isn't there still a place for that?
Wouldn't a modernised, properly equipped, hot and high capable Lynx still be a useful tool for the Army and for the Corps?
We were all blown away, I'm sure, when Apaches took in the rescue team hanging on the outside to recover the fallen soldier - but if they'd had a FLynx capable of hot and high ops, wouldn't it have been a useful tool?
But didn't the six-man load carrying Lynx have a role (a sub-Puma, sub Support Helicopter, role)?
Doing all of those little tasks for which a Puma was too big, and for directly supporting the AH of the day (delivering TOW reloads for armed Lynx) - and all the rest?
Isn't there still a place for that?
Wouldn't a modernised, properly equipped, hot and high capable Lynx still be a useful tool for the Army and for the Corps?
We were all blown away, I'm sure, when Apaches took in the rescue team hanging on the outside to recover the fallen soldier - but if they'd had a FLynx capable of hot and high ops, wouldn't it have been a useful tool?
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Jacko,
You are very much correct. Especially with airmobile/air assualt operations there is certainly a requirement to deliver and recover small teams of 4 (approx) in all sorts of roles into the forward area where a puma and certainly a Merlin/Chinook would be considered too large/valuable an asset to be risked.
I think the problem is that having seen the AH capability be so succesful the Lynx community are desperate to be given the tools to deliver meaningful capability in a similarily professional manner and that was always envisaged at front line to continue with the small lift capability.
Lynx has always struggled in this regard as despite the 9 seats in the back, the combination of poor cabin space and lack of hot/high performance always frustrated the execution of this role. The limited movement of men and materiel no doubt improved from Scout/Gazelle days however when you do a job you always want to do it better. Not unreasonable therefore for the crews to expect a future aircraft to improve your capability in this area. Not so however; the cabin space and seating is to be reduced to perhaps that of the Scout (or less) so we lose the capability altogether as the roles are rewritten.
I think rather than Apache replace Gazelle and a new aircraft replace Lynx as was stated we have a situation where the Apache is more of a Lynx replacement with the Lynx now about to take on the Gazelle roles of direction of fire and recce/Istar.
I have no doubt that it will be better 'kit' loosely speaking but the point is it could have been so much more. This is before you start to talk about poor design for the battlefield and a whole host of other issues with Lynx; low speed handling springs to mind with the same disk but higher AUM.
Navy Lynx tick VG; Army Lynx remains a massive compromise, competes with unmanned ISTAR and will not deliver men, materiels or direct firepower to the battlespace. A retrograde step I fear rather than introducing a broader or more capable contribution to commanders.
As an aside, it is difficult to maintain the comitment to Ops for Apache with the current fleet; how many operational aircraft does 38 Lynx allow you to deliver to PJHQ?
No doubt there are many other opinions on this debacle, these are just my own,
HEDP
You are very much correct. Especially with airmobile/air assualt operations there is certainly a requirement to deliver and recover small teams of 4 (approx) in all sorts of roles into the forward area where a puma and certainly a Merlin/Chinook would be considered too large/valuable an asset to be risked.
I think the problem is that having seen the AH capability be so succesful the Lynx community are desperate to be given the tools to deliver meaningful capability in a similarily professional manner and that was always envisaged at front line to continue with the small lift capability.
Lynx has always struggled in this regard as despite the 9 seats in the back, the combination of poor cabin space and lack of hot/high performance always frustrated the execution of this role. The limited movement of men and materiel no doubt improved from Scout/Gazelle days however when you do a job you always want to do it better. Not unreasonable therefore for the crews to expect a future aircraft to improve your capability in this area. Not so however; the cabin space and seating is to be reduced to perhaps that of the Scout (or less) so we lose the capability altogether as the roles are rewritten.
I think rather than Apache replace Gazelle and a new aircraft replace Lynx as was stated we have a situation where the Apache is more of a Lynx replacement with the Lynx now about to take on the Gazelle roles of direction of fire and recce/Istar.
I have no doubt that it will be better 'kit' loosely speaking but the point is it could have been so much more. This is before you start to talk about poor design for the battlefield and a whole host of other issues with Lynx; low speed handling springs to mind with the same disk but higher AUM.
Navy Lynx tick VG; Army Lynx remains a massive compromise, competes with unmanned ISTAR and will not deliver men, materiels or direct firepower to the battlespace. A retrograde step I fear rather than introducing a broader or more capable contribution to commanders.
As an aside, it is difficult to maintain the comitment to Ops for Apache with the current fleet; how many operational aircraft does 38 Lynx allow you to deliver to PJHQ?
No doubt there are many other opinions on this debacle, these are just my own,
HEDP
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The problem here seems to be that the Army doesn't really know what it wants in an SUV helicopter. The same is true for many other armies, including the US Army. I think the RMs have a better understanding of their needs. A light attack and recce helo that can also lift a bit, that can move within the littoral,that can act as a mini airborne command post - basically a SCMR painted green. Perhaps this is what the AAC needs as well? How much more useful would a BRH with rockets/MR IR missile and an ISAR radar,data link.....and an Observer (RN version) in the LHS.....now there's an idea! But would it get past the "Bah, Humbug" brigade?
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I wonder whether the powers that be ever listen!
Navy Lynx = Seahawk
RM Lynx = Blackhawk
Army Lynx = Blackhawk
Puma = Blackhawk
Sea King = Blackhawk
Would this have not reduced types across JHC, improved capability, streamlined the training pipeline and produced a purple fleet.
I know this is simplistic and there may be small issues but I cant be that far off what was required. All conversions carried out at Rucker for a lot less than we can followed by an LCR/CTR organisation in UK
Navy Lynx = Seahawk
RM Lynx = Blackhawk
Army Lynx = Blackhawk
Puma = Blackhawk
Sea King = Blackhawk
Would this have not reduced types across JHC, improved capability, streamlined the training pipeline and produced a purple fleet.
I know this is simplistic and there may be small issues but I cant be that far off what was required. All conversions carried out at Rucker for a lot less than we can followed by an LCR/CTR organisation in UK
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HEDP,
A Seahawk is quite a different beast to a Blackhawk. It's not a Blackhawk painted grey as a lot of people believe. It's deck handling qualities aren't even close to the capabilities of the the Lynx. It is more complicated to recover to the deck and has lower deck limits. In my experience of operating alongside Australian, US and Spanish Seahawks they also seem to be a lot less serviceable than the Lynx which is hard to believe I know! The Seahawk is also primarily an ASW helo with an ASuW capability whereas Lynx is an ASuW helo with an ASW capability (albeit a fairly gash one, but who wants to do ASW anyway?
).
Whilst I agree that the FLynx is a poor choice for the Army anything less than FLynx would not suit the RN.
A Seahawk is quite a different beast to a Blackhawk. It's not a Blackhawk painted grey as a lot of people believe. It's deck handling qualities aren't even close to the capabilities of the the Lynx. It is more complicated to recover to the deck and has lower deck limits. In my experience of operating alongside Australian, US and Spanish Seahawks they also seem to be a lot less serviceable than the Lynx which is hard to believe I know! The Seahawk is also primarily an ASW helo with an ASuW capability whereas Lynx is an ASuW helo with an ASW capability (albeit a fairly gash one, but who wants to do ASW anyway?
). Whilst I agree that the FLynx is a poor choice for the Army anything less than FLynx would not suit the RN.
Only the second of January and I'm starting to feel that I'm 'larning'. Thanks so much, chaps.
(Sounds as though a 606/Lynx 3 plug would have been an invaluable addition to FLynx, though....)
(Sounds as though a 606/Lynx 3 plug would have been an invaluable addition to FLynx, though....)
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Some interesting thoughts indeed and I am sure that the next few weeks will be enlightening to say the least.
As a 'brown job' I remain totally perplexed by the whole requirement and procurement. AH had a very strong requirement clearly articulated with policy and doctrine at all levels that saw AH play its part across the entire spectrum of operations. There is no doubt that AH would have been just as useful in a Sierra Leone style crisis as it would have been if 3 Shock Army had come through the Horn Gap.
FLynx, BRH/Wild Cat does not have the same underpinning requirement I feel. The only valid argument that I can see for BRH is to provide a 'find' capability to cue the limted 'strike/attack' resources. Naturally I include cueing all Joint and Combined offensive assets, but from an AAC perspective I can see mileage in arguing for a force mix of AH and BRH akin to the legacy Cold War force laydowns that mixed Lynx and Gazelle.
Sadly though we as a Corps appear to be doing everything possible to remove or water down that justification. Not only have we neglected to update our policy and doctrine in the light of the developing BLUH/BRH/Wild Cat procurement, we have also neglected to integrate the current Lynx force into AH operations. Therefore they have been seen for a number of years as the 'wheezy boy on the sidelines with matron'.
Allied to this we have elected to allow the REME and logistics chain to wag the Corps capability tail - brigading our assets in 'hubs' to ensure serviceability and availibility. If we as a Corps were truly serious about a find capability for AH then we would have retained mixed Regiments and dare I say Squadrons to ensure that as in the Gazelle and Lynx days there was a synergy (in training, in SOPs, in C2 etc etc) that would have truly delivered an effect.
I fail to see the operational capability enhancement or the requirement to brigade a Regiment's worth of Lynx at Yeovilton over 2 hours flying time from the AH that it is meant to support? The first week over any exercise will be a 'getting to know you' shake out phase and both fleets will conduct peace time training from their own base location 'pretending' to interact with each other.
What in effect will happen on real operations (where it counts) is that the AH community will complain about 'Lynx drag' as they can do both jobs (find and strike/attack) with much higher Op Tempo than the BRH/Wild Cat crews.
Just to knock the limited movement of men and material on the head - yes in 24 Air Mobile Brigade days the rapid movement of a Milan Post could be achieved by a Lynx. However, I do not think that there is anyone in the Corps that even with the wildest stretching of the imagination sees BRH lifting anything.
Except - and this is a key fact that the Corps has 'owned goaled' in its establishement and hub philosophy - the limited movement of men and material from its own Regiment. The REME teams to support u/s aircraft, the movement of Command teams, the movement of Rebro teams - that is where the Lynx has proven invaluable in the past and added value. Another task that potential adds to overburden on the SH force. Yet again I remain confused why we as a Corps just didn't make it perfectly clear that was what we as a Corps required the 'lift' capability for rather than trying to pretend that we were adding to the SH tactical lift capability.
But no, we removed Lynx to a dislocated base away from our own cap badge that is now having to bid for 'lift' of our own assets.
The other area that is receiving some concern on this thread is of course the potential for the demise of 847. I must admit as someone that has seen u s not honour theAH 'Double Earmark' capability and as per the initial concerns of the Fisheads in that they knew that come the crunch AH would always be used (and more importantly train with/for) Land assets - I too would worry if the true Amphib capability of 847 was to be watered down in a wishy washy sop to try and maintain more AAC airframes and crews.
If we try and 'blend' the amphib capability into a mix of Army and Fishead crews away from the umbrella of the Commando Helicopter Force then another Amphib capability goes out the window and will be 'taken on risk' for a work up in transit to an area of operations.
Although it grips me that 847 use our airframes their wheel ain't broke and therefore I wouldn't try and 'fix' it - I would try and get a few more exchange posts without changing the role of the Squadron. If BRH comes fitted with all of the points for weapons that SCMR does, then it does not take the brains of an archbishop that feasibly 847 will be able to UOR themselves with a Find and Strike/Attack capability that will return the Commando Helicopter Force into an organic Amphib capbility rather than having to rely on the promises and best wishes of the AH fleet. With the heavy training and currency requirement for operations at sea if AH is removed from having to deliver this capability/role (or even try and pretend to as we are currently doing) then this frees up vital scarce AH assets that are over tasked/worked just with support Army tasks and roles.
Therefore I do believe that we as a Corps have a future with a mix of BRH and AH. Firstly we need to clearly articulate what the real requirement, policy and doctrine is for the capability (not the pretend requirement to make us look good and gain funding),secondly we then need to look at what will deliver that policy and doctrine and ask ourselves the big question regarding co-location or dislocation and the associated integration. Thirdly, we need to restore some 'honour amongst friends' as it is widely known that our backs are up against the wall and we are fighting for our survival - do we need to accept that our numbers have been cut significantly and adapt and balance accordingly, or do we become very aggressive and go down fighting taking as much as we can and screwing over other (perfectly functioning) capabilities in the process?
As a 'brown job' I remain totally perplexed by the whole requirement and procurement. AH had a very strong requirement clearly articulated with policy and doctrine at all levels that saw AH play its part across the entire spectrum of operations. There is no doubt that AH would have been just as useful in a Sierra Leone style crisis as it would have been if 3 Shock Army had come through the Horn Gap.
FLynx, BRH/Wild Cat does not have the same underpinning requirement I feel. The only valid argument that I can see for BRH is to provide a 'find' capability to cue the limted 'strike/attack' resources. Naturally I include cueing all Joint and Combined offensive assets, but from an AAC perspective I can see mileage in arguing for a force mix of AH and BRH akin to the legacy Cold War force laydowns that mixed Lynx and Gazelle.
Sadly though we as a Corps appear to be doing everything possible to remove or water down that justification. Not only have we neglected to update our policy and doctrine in the light of the developing BLUH/BRH/Wild Cat procurement, we have also neglected to integrate the current Lynx force into AH operations. Therefore they have been seen for a number of years as the 'wheezy boy on the sidelines with matron'.
Allied to this we have elected to allow the REME and logistics chain to wag the Corps capability tail - brigading our assets in 'hubs' to ensure serviceability and availibility. If we as a Corps were truly serious about a find capability for AH then we would have retained mixed Regiments and dare I say Squadrons to ensure that as in the Gazelle and Lynx days there was a synergy (in training, in SOPs, in C2 etc etc) that would have truly delivered an effect.
I fail to see the operational capability enhancement or the requirement to brigade a Regiment's worth of Lynx at Yeovilton over 2 hours flying time from the AH that it is meant to support? The first week over any exercise will be a 'getting to know you' shake out phase and both fleets will conduct peace time training from their own base location 'pretending' to interact with each other.
What in effect will happen on real operations (where it counts) is that the AH community will complain about 'Lynx drag' as they can do both jobs (find and strike/attack) with much higher Op Tempo than the BRH/Wild Cat crews.
Just to knock the limited movement of men and material on the head - yes in 24 Air Mobile Brigade days the rapid movement of a Milan Post could be achieved by a Lynx. However, I do not think that there is anyone in the Corps that even with the wildest stretching of the imagination sees BRH lifting anything.
Except - and this is a key fact that the Corps has 'owned goaled' in its establishement and hub philosophy - the limited movement of men and material from its own Regiment. The REME teams to support u/s aircraft, the movement of Command teams, the movement of Rebro teams - that is where the Lynx has proven invaluable in the past and added value. Another task that potential adds to overburden on the SH force. Yet again I remain confused why we as a Corps just didn't make it perfectly clear that was what we as a Corps required the 'lift' capability for rather than trying to pretend that we were adding to the SH tactical lift capability.
But no, we removed Lynx to a dislocated base away from our own cap badge that is now having to bid for 'lift' of our own assets.
The other area that is receiving some concern on this thread is of course the potential for the demise of 847. I must admit as someone that has seen u s not honour theAH 'Double Earmark' capability and as per the initial concerns of the Fisheads in that they knew that come the crunch AH would always be used (and more importantly train with/for) Land assets - I too would worry if the true Amphib capability of 847 was to be watered down in a wishy washy sop to try and maintain more AAC airframes and crews.
If we try and 'blend' the amphib capability into a mix of Army and Fishead crews away from the umbrella of the Commando Helicopter Force then another Amphib capability goes out the window and will be 'taken on risk' for a work up in transit to an area of operations.
Although it grips me that 847 use our airframes their wheel ain't broke and therefore I wouldn't try and 'fix' it - I would try and get a few more exchange posts without changing the role of the Squadron. If BRH comes fitted with all of the points for weapons that SCMR does, then it does not take the brains of an archbishop that feasibly 847 will be able to UOR themselves with a Find and Strike/Attack capability that will return the Commando Helicopter Force into an organic Amphib capbility rather than having to rely on the promises and best wishes of the AH fleet. With the heavy training and currency requirement for operations at sea if AH is removed from having to deliver this capability/role (or even try and pretend to as we are currently doing) then this frees up vital scarce AH assets that are over tasked/worked just with support Army tasks and roles.
Therefore I do believe that we as a Corps have a future with a mix of BRH and AH. Firstly we need to clearly articulate what the real requirement, policy and doctrine is for the capability (not the pretend requirement to make us look good and gain funding),secondly we then need to look at what will deliver that policy and doctrine and ask ourselves the big question regarding co-location or dislocation and the associated integration. Thirdly, we need to restore some 'honour amongst friends' as it is widely known that our backs are up against the wall and we are fighting for our survival - do we need to accept that our numbers have been cut significantly and adapt and balance accordingly, or do we become very aggressive and go down fighting taking as much as we can and screwing over other (perfectly functioning) capabilities in the process?
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Jack, a fuselage plug would have been a start.
Think of the Lynx as a Land Rover Wolf. Look at the huge amount of jobs and roles the wagon fulfils. If you took the Wolf out of service, what would you get to do its numerous jobs? A 4 tonner? A DROPS? An Oshkosh? Can you imagine an MAN 15t truck doing a close recce job or a DROPS delivering a half section of blokes into a FOB? Very, very simplistic I know but the Lynx really is akin to the Land Rover and unfortunately, FLynx is more akin to an RB44.
Think of the Lynx as a Land Rover Wolf. Look at the huge amount of jobs and roles the wagon fulfils. If you took the Wolf out of service, what would you get to do its numerous jobs? A 4 tonner? A DROPS? An Oshkosh? Can you imagine an MAN 15t truck doing a close recce job or a DROPS delivering a half section of blokes into a FOB? Very, very simplistic I know but the Lynx really is akin to the Land Rover and unfortunately, FLynx is more akin to an RB44.
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There is no doubt that AH would have been just as useful in a Sierra Leone style crisis as it would have been if 3 Shock Army had come through the Horn Gap.
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Front Seater,
Some very good points.
We in the RAF have gone down the 'hub' route of operating in a big way. I think its a good thing, but the points you make are very valid for the way you invisage Lynx and AH to operate. Are you sure its the REME thats waging the tail and not JHC in cost cutting measures?
I take your point about being on excercise and spending additional time 'getting to know each other' At Benson we have the Merlin and Puma, we very very rarely operate in the UK together and dont in theatre. If the SH superbase comes along having all SH together would have huge benefits. But again we dont work that closely in theatre. I guess it boils down to weather your fighting the war or a war. With the draw down in Iraq this year will things get better? Potentially, but equally with the economic climate money is going to be even more scarce!
Some very good points.
We in the RAF have gone down the 'hub' route of operating in a big way. I think its a good thing, but the points you make are very valid for the way you invisage Lynx and AH to operate. Are you sure its the REME thats waging the tail and not JHC in cost cutting measures?
I take your point about being on excercise and spending additional time 'getting to know each other' At Benson we have the Merlin and Puma, we very very rarely operate in the UK together and dont in theatre. If the SH superbase comes along having all SH together would have huge benefits. But again we dont work that closely in theatre. I guess it boils down to weather your fighting the war or a war. With the draw down in Iraq this year will things get better? Potentially, but equally with the economic climate money is going to be even more scarce!
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Considering that this thread is supposed to be about Future Lynx, I guess the recent posts could be described as "thread drift".
But, I must congratulate these contributers on sound, logical, informative and, most importantly, non-partisan discussion. The early posts were marred by mud slinging, both Service/industry and inter-Service. At last we are having an open, informed discussion.
But, I must congratulate these contributers on sound, logical, informative and, most importantly, non-partisan discussion. The early posts were marred by mud slinging, both Service/industry and inter-Service. At last we are having an open, informed discussion.
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Bismark,
Just to clarify, I used the term 'style' referring to the Peace Enforcement end of the spectrum of conflict and could have used a number of other examples - however although the 105's weren't allowed off the LPH, I am sure that every local knew that the capability was in the boats bows somewhere (big stick conviently hidden) - Deterrent/poise/demonstration etc etc.
As to Super Cobra your point may be valid if we (UK PLc) could support 2 aircraft types and if the RN could have funded a separate AH/Super Cobra line, but for some reason they accepted/allowed the 847 TOW capability to be replaced by a Double Earmarked Army AH Sqn rather than putting up the requirement or funding to replace 847 themselves.
Just to clarify, I used the term 'style' referring to the Peace Enforcement end of the spectrum of conflict and could have used a number of other examples - however although the 105's weren't allowed off the LPH, I am sure that every local knew that the capability was in the boats bows somewhere (big stick conviently hidden) - Deterrent/poise/demonstration etc etc.
As to Super Cobra your point may be valid if we (UK PLc) could support 2 aircraft types and if the RN could have funded a separate AH/Super Cobra line, but for some reason they accepted/allowed the 847 TOW capability to be replaced by a Double Earmarked Army AH Sqn rather than putting up the requirement or funding to replace 847 themselves.
Last edited by Front Seater; 2nd Jan 2009 at 16:46.
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rather than putting up the requirement or funding to replace 847.
It sounds as though FLynx will be an excellent replacement for grey Lynx HMA3/8.
And for the No.847 Squadron 'Commando' Mk 7s.
You might even think that 70 FLynx would be about the right number to do the above (expanding the amphib attack/ISTAR/utility capability by a squadron, perhaps).
And it sounds as though FLynx isn't a bad way of augmenting the over-tasked and under-strength Apache force. (Mixed FLynx/AH Regiments, anyone?)
What's lacking is an AAC light utility helicopter to replace AH.Mk 9.......
AW149?
How is the size of the Flynx order rationalised? How many squadrons is it supposed to sustain?
And for the No.847 Squadron 'Commando' Mk 7s.
You might even think that 70 FLynx would be about the right number to do the above (expanding the amphib attack/ISTAR/utility capability by a squadron, perhaps).
And it sounds as though FLynx isn't a bad way of augmenting the over-tasked and under-strength Apache force. (Mixed FLynx/AH Regiments, anyone?)
What's lacking is an AAC light utility helicopter to replace AH.Mk 9.......
AW149?
How is the size of the Flynx order rationalised? How many squadrons is it supposed to sustain?
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Jackonicko was quicker on the keyboard than me and essentially asked the same question as why AH and BRH will not be integrated in the same Regiments/geographical location.
I did expand by saying that with the Middle Wallop 'hub' an hour up the road and AW/Yeovilon the doorstep then why not 'press to test' on true Jointery and have a true amphib capbility mix of AH and BRH at Yeovilton?
This should satisfy those that are concerned about the demise of a true amphibious capability and also those that wonder what BRH will actually do by assisting with true AH/BRH integration across all Lines Of Development.
With a little bit of lateral application Wattisham and Yeovilton could be the 2 AH/BRH locations - Wattisham (Colchester) 16 Air Assault Brigade focussed and Yeovilton (Plymouth) 3 Commando Brigade focussed. As we are finding on current ops the demarcation line between 3 Commando and 16 Air Assault is a blurred one, but one thing is for sure and that is that there is certainly 1000% more deck ops, amphib exposure and ethos taking place at Yeovilton than is taking place at Wattisham.
From the AAC's persepctive this option could be the selling point and ultimate saviour for Middle Wallop as it could retain its AH/BRH training hub specialisation with both Simulators and tactics trainers already in place, with the associated airspace to facilitate night training.
If not, and Wattisham remains as the AH hub and Yeovilton becomes the Lynx hub, then from a military and financial viewpoint I would have to question why Middle Wallop remains open and why AH training is not re-located to Wattisham and Lynx training to Yeovilton.
So I agree, mixing the AH and BRH capabilities makes perfect sense - but I will scuttle sideways back to my SH comfort zone and mince pies.
I did expand by saying that with the Middle Wallop 'hub' an hour up the road and AW/Yeovilon the doorstep then why not 'press to test' on true Jointery and have a true amphib capbility mix of AH and BRH at Yeovilton?
This should satisfy those that are concerned about the demise of a true amphibious capability and also those that wonder what BRH will actually do by assisting with true AH/BRH integration across all Lines Of Development.
With a little bit of lateral application Wattisham and Yeovilton could be the 2 AH/BRH locations - Wattisham (Colchester) 16 Air Assault Brigade focussed and Yeovilton (Plymouth) 3 Commando Brigade focussed. As we are finding on current ops the demarcation line between 3 Commando and 16 Air Assault is a blurred one, but one thing is for sure and that is that there is certainly 1000% more deck ops, amphib exposure and ethos taking place at Yeovilton than is taking place at Wattisham.
From the AAC's persepctive this option could be the selling point and ultimate saviour for Middle Wallop as it could retain its AH/BRH training hub specialisation with both Simulators and tactics trainers already in place, with the associated airspace to facilitate night training.
If not, and Wattisham remains as the AH hub and Yeovilton becomes the Lynx hub, then from a military and financial viewpoint I would have to question why Middle Wallop remains open and why AH training is not re-located to Wattisham and Lynx training to Yeovilton.
So I agree, mixing the AH and BRH capabilities makes perfect sense - but I will scuttle sideways back to my SH comfort zone and mince pies.
Last edited by MaroonMan4; 3rd Jan 2009 at 16:19.
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It sounds as though FLynx will be an excellent replacement for grey Lynx HMA3/8.
And for the No.847 Squadron 'Commando' Mk 7s.
And for the No.847 Squadron 'Commando' Mk 7s.
You might even think that 70 FLynx would be about the right number to do the above (expanding the amphib attack/ISTAR/utility capability by a squadron, perhaps).
And it sounds as though FLynx isn't a bad way of augmenting the over-tasked and under-strength Apache force. (Mixed FLynx/AH Regiments, anyone?)
Totally agree regarding mixed regiments (some very good points from Frontseater).
How is the size of the Flynx order rationalised? How many squadrons is it supposed to sustain?
Anyone know what the Lynx crews are going to do in between current Lynx out of service date (2012) and BRH ISD (2014)? I dont think eight Mk9GTs will cover the gap especially as we have to give the engines back to AW to stick into FLynx.
Being a SARboy and a very long way from the sandy ****holes where battlefield helicopters are currently earning their keep - do any commanders actually want a helicopter than can lift 6 troops any more? It seems to me that the bigger the helo, the more flexibility it gives you and someone much better paid than me said that flexibility was the key to air power!.
The 847 capability came from the TOW system, not the Lynx's ability to deliver a pathetic number of troops - trooping is the Sea Kings role. In Sierra Leone it was a weapons platform not a troop carrier - has it ever delivered troops (other than in NI) in a front-line role? Moving the REME around for aircraft support is not an adequate justification for a new helicopter!
It is near to impossible to justify any role for the Lynx on the modern battlefield - it is not even a jack-of-all-trades - no matter how you equip it.
Front seater made some excellent comments - I think most in the front-line think it is about time the petty inter-service rivalry with each trying to justify its existence was ****canned and we merged into a truly joint force (since JHC seems to be anything but joint). Then the customer and the poor buggers paying the bills might get what they want and not what the staff officers and bean counters settle on as the best compromise that perpetuates all the outdated structures that we presently have obstructing the delivery of helicopter capability to the sharp end.
The 847 capability came from the TOW system, not the Lynx's ability to deliver a pathetic number of troops - trooping is the Sea Kings role. In Sierra Leone it was a weapons platform not a troop carrier - has it ever delivered troops (other than in NI) in a front-line role? Moving the REME around for aircraft support is not an adequate justification for a new helicopter!
It is near to impossible to justify any role for the Lynx on the modern battlefield - it is not even a jack-of-all-trades - no matter how you equip it.
Front seater made some excellent comments - I think most in the front-line think it is about time the petty inter-service rivalry with each trying to justify its existence was ****canned and we merged into a truly joint force (since JHC seems to be anything but joint). Then the customer and the poor buggers paying the bills might get what they want and not what the staff officers and bean counters settle on as the best compromise that perpetuates all the outdated structures that we presently have obstructing the delivery of helicopter capability to the sharp end.