Some interesting thoughts indeed and I am sure that the next few weeks will be enlightening to say the least.
As a 'brown job' I remain totally perplexed by the whole requirement and procurement. AH had a very strong requirement clearly articulated with policy and doctrine at all levels that saw AH play its part across the entire spectrum of operations. There is no doubt that AH would have been just as useful in a Sierra Leone style crisis as it would have been if 3 Shock Army had come through the Horn Gap.
FLynx, BRH/Wild Cat does not have the same underpinning requirement I feel. The only valid argument that I can see for BRH is to provide a 'find' capability to cue the limted 'strike/attack' resources. Naturally I include cueing all Joint and Combined offensive assets, but from an AAC perspective I can see mileage in arguing for a force mix of AH and BRH akin to the legacy Cold War force laydowns that mixed Lynx and Gazelle.
Sadly though we as a Corps appear to be doing everything possible to remove or water down that justification. Not only have we neglected to update our policy and doctrine in the light of the developing BLUH/BRH/Wild Cat procurement, we have also neglected to integrate the current Lynx force into AH operations. Therefore they have been seen for a number of years as the 'wheezy boy on the sidelines with matron'.
Allied to this we have elected to allow the REME and logistics chain to wag the Corps capability tail - brigading our assets in 'hubs' to ensure serviceability and availibility. If we as a Corps were truly serious about a find capability for AH then we would have retained mixed Regiments and dare I say Squadrons to ensure that as in the Gazelle and Lynx days there was a synergy (in training, in SOPs, in C2 etc etc) that would have truly delivered an effect.
I fail to see the operational capability enhancement or the requirement to brigade a Regiment's worth of Lynx at Yeovilton over 2 hours flying time from the AH that it is meant to support? The first week over any exercise will be a 'getting to know you' shake out phase and both fleets will conduct peace time training from their own base location 'pretending' to interact with each other.
What in effect will happen on real operations (where it counts) is that the AH community will complain about 'Lynx drag' as they can do both jobs (find and strike/attack) with much higher Op Tempo than the BRH/Wild Cat crews.
Just to knock the limited movement of men and material on the head - yes in 24 Air Mobile Brigade days the rapid movement of a Milan Post could be achieved by a Lynx. However, I do not think that there is anyone in the Corps that even with the wildest stretching of the imagination sees BRH lifting anything.
Except - and this is a key fact that the Corps has 'owned goaled' in its establishement and hub philosophy - the limited movement of men and material from its own Regiment. The REME teams to support u/s aircraft, the movement of Command teams, the movement of Rebro teams - that is where the Lynx has proven invaluable in the past and added value. Another task that potential adds to overburden on the SH force. Yet again I remain confused why we as a Corps just didn't make it perfectly clear that was what we as a Corps required the 'lift' capability for rather than trying to pretend that we were adding to the SH tactical lift capability.
But no, we removed Lynx to a dislocated base away from our own cap badge that is now having to bid for 'lift' of our own assets.
The other area that is receiving some concern on this thread is of course the potential for the demise of 847. I must admit as someone that has seen u s not honour theAH 'Double Earmark' capability and as per the initial concerns of the Fisheads in that they knew that come the crunch AH would always be used (and more importantly train with/for) Land assets - I too would worry if the true Amphib capability of 847 was to be watered down in a wishy washy sop to try and maintain more AAC airframes and crews.
If we try and 'blend' the amphib capability into a mix of Army and Fishead crews away from the umbrella of the Commando Helicopter Force then another Amphib capability goes out the window and will be 'taken on risk' for a work up in transit to an area of operations.
Although it grips me that 847 use our airframes their wheel ain't broke and therefore I wouldn't try and 'fix' it - I would try and get a few more exchange posts without changing the role of the Squadron. If BRH comes fitted with all of the points for weapons that SCMR does, then it does not take the brains of an archbishop that feasibly 847 will be able to UOR themselves with a Find and Strike/Attack capability that will return the Commando Helicopter Force into an organic Amphib capbility rather than having to rely on the promises and best wishes of the AH fleet. With the heavy training and currency requirement for operations at sea if AH is removed from having to deliver this capability/role (or even try and pretend to as we are currently doing) then this frees up vital scarce AH assets that are over tasked/worked just with support Army tasks and roles.
Therefore I do believe that we as a Corps have a future with a mix of BRH and AH. Firstly we need to clearly articulate what the real requirement, policy and doctrine is for the capability (not the pretend requirement to make us look good and gain funding),secondly we then need to look at what will deliver that policy and doctrine and ask ourselves the big question regarding co-location or dislocation and the associated integration. Thirdly, we need to restore some 'honour amongst friends' as it is widely known that our backs are up against the wall and we are fighting for our survival - do we need to accept that our numbers have been cut significantly and adapt and balance accordingly, or do we become very aggressive and go down fighting taking as much as we can and screwing over other (perfectly functioning) capabilities in the process?