Nimrod Information
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tucumseh
Whilst I do not doubt your assertion over your observations of said DefStan implementation policy, I do know that any DefStan non-compliance has to be covered by a concession, detailing any relevant impact (risk management - safety case gurus) on all manner of things (including airworthiness) before it can be signed off.
Of course, this does assume that any relevant DefSTan's were refered to in the original Spec/Contract/MOU with the supplier!
SFO
Of course, this does assume that any relevant DefSTan's were refered to in the original Spec/Contract/MOU with the supplier!
SFO
Join Date: Apr 2002
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The Nimrod Baseline Equipment Safety Case compiled by BAE Systems and the Nimrod Integrated Project Team (IPT), recently won a bronze award under the pan-BAE Systems chairman's award for innovation scheme.
Different departments get targets for the numbers of awards that must be submitted, the result is that towards the closing date, any old rubbish is submitted just to look good. Some people just do it in order to get a freebie p*ss-up at the award "ceremony." The current Nimrod programme's target was reduced from 2006 and I still don't believe hit the target. (If we did, it'll just prove what a farce the CA is)
SFO
“Whilst I do not doubt your assertion over your observations of said DefStan implementation policy, I do know that any DefStan non-compliance has to be covered by a concession, detailing any relevant impact (risk management - safety case gurus) on all manner of things (including airworthiness) before it can be signed off.
Of course, this does assume that any relevant DefSTan's were refered to in the original Spec/Contract/MOU with the supplier!”
Thank you. This is why I referred to a “disconnect” in MoD. Clearly, the Def Stans exist for a reason. Many were written by people with intimate knowledge and long experience of delivering to time, cost and performance – long before this became the SMART procurement mantra. What you describe is what I was taught from Day 1. And any competent contractor would INSIST on them being in the contract if MoD omitted them for any reason. So, over a hundred projects later, it came as a shock when a few non-entities (but with the patronage of their seniors) denounced me openly for striving to deliver airworthiness and safety iaw these Def Stans. And, as they had that patronage, the seniors, all the way up to junior ministerial level (the latter, I concede, merely signed what was put in front of them – but nevertheless I have the papers in question under FOI), continued to dig deeper and deeper holes for themselves through their bizarre decisions to uphold the actions taken against me. However, you’ll be glad to know I completely ignored them and, despite their efforts, the aircraft in question are safe.
“Whilst I do not doubt your assertion over your observations of said DefStan implementation policy, I do know that any DefStan non-compliance has to be covered by a concession, detailing any relevant impact (risk management - safety case gurus) on all manner of things (including airworthiness) before it can be signed off.
Of course, this does assume that any relevant DefSTan's were refered to in the original Spec/Contract/MOU with the supplier!”
Thank you. This is why I referred to a “disconnect” in MoD. Clearly, the Def Stans exist for a reason. Many were written by people with intimate knowledge and long experience of delivering to time, cost and performance – long before this became the SMART procurement mantra. What you describe is what I was taught from Day 1. And any competent contractor would INSIST on them being in the contract if MoD omitted them for any reason. So, over a hundred projects later, it came as a shock when a few non-entities (but with the patronage of their seniors) denounced me openly for striving to deliver airworthiness and safety iaw these Def Stans. And, as they had that patronage, the seniors, all the way up to junior ministerial level (the latter, I concede, merely signed what was put in front of them – but nevertheless I have the papers in question under FOI), continued to dig deeper and deeper holes for themselves through their bizarre decisions to uphold the actions taken against me. However, you’ll be glad to know I completely ignored them and, despite their efforts, the aircraft in question are safe.
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"Topcover is the support of a Sea King beyond a distance from the shore, which to my recollection the Nimrod has not been needed. The same reason we do not support SAR Trails airborne anymore."
You may want to have a word with the OCU and standards team.
No pissing contest at all, its a discussion forum and we all have the right to add our ten pence worth.
You may want to have a word with the OCU and standards team.
No pissing contest at all, its a discussion forum and we all have the right to add our ten pence worth.
Join Date: Feb 2007
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Changing the direction of the subject slightly, I found this thread on The Telegraph website, seems the lack of Nimrod spares is by far from a new problem...
http://my.telegraph.co.uk/claves/jun...s_problems.htm
RAF: Nimrod spares problems
Posted by Claves at 09:46 on 04 Jun 2007
Whilst recognising the terrible tragedy that befell one of our Nimrods over Afghanistan, the present media fuss about lack of spares is about nearly 40 years behind the times.
I remember when the Nimrods replaced the Shackleton M3 Phase 3s (4 turning 2 burning) at RAF Kinloss in 1969 . A briefing session was held for the all the erks. A engineer from Command HQ declared that on this aircraft, unlike the Shackletons, 'robbing' would not be necessary. It took some time for the laughter to die down.
In the early 70s a fine example of lack of spares occurred when a light alloy casting that had not been provisioned, broke. Eventually a spare was obtained: from a scrapped Aerolineas Argentinas Comet IV at Buenos Aires airport. God only knows what the RAF had to pay for it.
A really serious situation occured in the mid-70s when some stores wallah,detailed to dispose of the scrapped Comet IVs enthusiastically also sold off all Section 26DL parts in the RAF Stores catalogue. These were of course also all the Nimrod MR1 spares. Did they get them back, I wonder? Maybe not.
Posted by Claves at 09:46 on 04 Jun 2007
Whilst recognising the terrible tragedy that befell one of our Nimrods over Afghanistan, the present media fuss about lack of spares is about nearly 40 years behind the times.
I remember when the Nimrods replaced the Shackleton M3 Phase 3s (4 turning 2 burning) at RAF Kinloss in 1969 . A briefing session was held for the all the erks. A engineer from Command HQ declared that on this aircraft, unlike the Shackletons, 'robbing' would not be necessary. It took some time for the laughter to die down.
In the early 70s a fine example of lack of spares occurred when a light alloy casting that had not been provisioned, broke. Eventually a spare was obtained: from a scrapped Aerolineas Argentinas Comet IV at Buenos Aires airport. God only knows what the RAF had to pay for it.
A really serious situation occured in the mid-70s when some stores wallah,detailed to dispose of the scrapped Comet IVs enthusiastically also sold off all Section 26DL parts in the RAF Stores catalogue. These were of course also all the Nimrod MR1 spares. Did they get them back, I wonder? Maybe not.
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I always thought that the fire bottle in the pt side of the galley was there for the Hyd, Aileron and Elevator bays and not the bomb bay, hence the three positions the hose can locate into marked 'H', 'A' and 'E'.
Cant remember one marked 'BB', had a look today, no.
TD in answer to your question to my knowldge there are no fire bottles fitted to a Nimrod in the bomb bay.
Cant remember one marked 'BB', had a look today, no.
TD in answer to your question to my knowldge there are no fire bottles fitted to a Nimrod in the bomb bay.
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"Regarding the bomb bay fire extinguisher issue. The Nimrod has a 'trooping role' and in order to be used in that manner 6 extended range fuel tanks would be fixed in the bomb bay. With this fit 10 fire extinguishers would also be fitted. However, in the normal fit we do not have either the extended range tanks or the fire extinguishers fitted. That means that day to day there is no fire protection in the bomb bay. However, the bomb bay fire drill calls for all stores to be jettisoned, and to my knowledge there has only been one actual bomb bay fire in the life of the ac. This was caused by an electrical fault causing a flare to ignite when power was supplied to the weapons carrier."
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Kapton Wiring
For those interested in the Kapton wiring debate. From Monday's written answers.
Nimrod Aircraft
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether Kapton wiring is used in the Yellow Gate system in place in Nimrod aircraft; when this system was fitted in Nimrods; what wiring is used on other Nimrod electrical systems; and if he will make a statement. [140911]
Mr. Ingram: Kapton wiring is not used in the Yellow Gate system on the Nimrod aircraft but KTCL, a hybrid Kapton wiring, was introduced on the Nimrod MR2 as a part of the Yellow Gate modification programme during the period 1980 to 1985. The wiring used in the electrical systems of the Nimrod MR2 and Rl consists of: Nyvin, Minyvin, Efglas, KTCL, Febsil, ACT260, Raychem 44A and Raychem 55A.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether Kapton wiring is used in the Yellow Gate system in place in Nimrod aircraft; when this system was fitted in Nimrods; what wiring is used on other Nimrod electrical systems; and if he will make a statement. [140911]
Mr. Ingram: Kapton wiring is not used in the Yellow Gate system on the Nimrod aircraft but KTCL, a hybrid Kapton wiring, was introduced on the Nimrod MR2 as a part of the Yellow Gate modification programme during the period 1980 to 1985. The wiring used in the electrical systems of the Nimrod MR2 and Rl consists of: Nyvin, Minyvin, Efglas, KTCL, Febsil, ACT260, Raychem 44A and Raychem 55A.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Mick,
That looks like a typical politician's answer, explicit and precise and at the same time avoiding the issue.
That looks like a typical politician's answer, explicit and precise and at the same time avoiding the issue.
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TD, getting the BAES safety case may not provide the answers you are after. JSP 553 has 3 level of safety case:
1) that produced by the designer (essentially covering what they have sold you)
2) that produced by the IPT - The IPTL's safety case consists of the Designer’s safety case for the as-built standard of aircraft plus the safety justifications used by the IPTL to underpin his certification of the initial draft RTS or, for legacy platforms, the issue of the MA Release.
3) that produced by the Release to Service Authority (RTSA)- The RTSA’s safety case will initially comprise the IPTL’s safety case plus the safety justifications used by the RTSA to underpin the issue of the RTS and is applicable to the configuration of the aircraft ‘as-flown’ by the Service.
tuc, there is nothing wrong with the concept of the top down approach as long as it goes far enough in getting the evidence required. I understand that some well known people in the field were brought in by the IPT to provide a top down argument in Goal Structuring Notation. However, I know nothing of the content of that argument.
sw
1) that produced by the designer (essentially covering what they have sold you)
2) that produced by the IPT - The IPTL's safety case consists of the Designer’s safety case for the as-built standard of aircraft plus the safety justifications used by the IPTL to underpin his certification of the initial draft RTS or, for legacy platforms, the issue of the MA Release.
3) that produced by the Release to Service Authority (RTSA)- The RTSA’s safety case will initially comprise the IPTL’s safety case plus the safety justifications used by the RTSA to underpin the issue of the RTS and is applicable to the configuration of the aircraft ‘as-flown’ by the Service.
tuc, there is nothing wrong with the concept of the top down approach as long as it goes far enough in getting the evidence required. I understand that some well known people in the field were brought in by the IPT to provide a top down argument in Goal Structuring Notation. However, I know nothing of the content of that argument.
sw
Safeware
I agree -re top down. I just expressed the hope they reached the equipment level. Routinely maintaining the build standard of equipment (which includes safety) was ditched as a policy in around 1991. I worry there is insufficient funding and experience to resurrect these build standards - in which case the 3 levels you describe are immediately compromised, as there is no seamless audit trail.
This is entirely relevant to, for example, Mull.
I agree -re top down. I just expressed the hope they reached the equipment level. Routinely maintaining the build standard of equipment (which includes safety) was ditched as a policy in around 1991. I worry there is insufficient funding and experience to resurrect these build standards - in which case the 3 levels you describe are immediately compromised, as there is no seamless audit trail.
This is entirely relevant to, for example, Mull.
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XferSymbol - don't need to ask the OCU or Standards - I taught most of them.
Buoy 15 - I may not have 50 topcovers in my log book, but from my seat I have a better grasp of Nimrod SAR than a wetty, even a really old one. I agree that a Nimrod is useful at extreme range, but I have no recollection of a topcover SAR where the rescue WOULD not have happened if the Nimrod was not there. Although nice for the SAR crews to have a Nimrod there, when the fleet is struggling it is an inefficient use of the a/c, which is the reason that over the last year there has been a reduction in the number of topcover sorties flown, not because fihermen are being more careful.
The topic has diverged from the original thread so my rant is over.
Buoy 15 - I may not have 50 topcovers in my log book, but from my seat I have a better grasp of Nimrod SAR than a wetty, even a really old one. I agree that a Nimrod is useful at extreme range, but I have no recollection of a topcover SAR where the rescue WOULD not have happened if the Nimrod was not there. Although nice for the SAR crews to have a Nimrod there, when the fleet is struggling it is an inefficient use of the a/c, which is the reason that over the last year there has been a reduction in the number of topcover sorties flown, not because fihermen are being more careful.
The topic has diverged from the original thread so my rant is over.
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As ex SAR, I have to say that when you are 200 miles out, a Nimrod is very reassuring.
Never been exactly sure why, because we would still be in the water, but nice to know someone would be calling for help etc
Never been exactly sure why, because we would still be in the water, but nice to know someone would be calling for help etc
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tuc,
Defining the assessed standard is one of the key things about the advice from Boscombe (and any VALID safety case). However, how an IPT maintains their audit trail, or how the precession of evidence through the 3 safety cases is justified may be another matter. Reminds me of the story about the crock of sh!t that becomes policy.
sw
Defining the assessed standard is one of the key things about the advice from Boscombe (and any VALID safety case). However, how an IPT maintains their audit trail, or how the precession of evidence through the 3 safety cases is justified may be another matter. Reminds me of the story about the crock of sh!t that becomes policy.
sw
Last edited by Safeware; 12th Jun 2007 at 22:27. Reason: (and any valid safety case)
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Strato Q: Mr Point - no I would not be happy on one engine 240 nm from the shore, that is why I tend to have 4.
Having a Nimrod available to give you an accurate position on the way out to an incident means that you don't have to waste precious fuel searching for the vessel in distress. This gives you the largest possible margin for error when it comes to on-scene endurance during a long-range incident.
There hasn't been a long-range ditching of a Sea King because of good fortune, not because of planning: the Wessex force wasn’t quite so lucky.
As a crew member on an aircraft with 4 hydraulic systems that can serve the flying controls, and also 4 engines, do you really think that providing topcover once every 6 weeks is really burdening the Nimrod fleet?
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Gents, gents, gents
Topcover is a very good idea - I have many in my log book from SAR trails to shepherding a 100Kts Sea King home from 200+ miles off shore (Not easy at 200Kts-lots of dog legs). Even went out to meet a helo trogging down from Kef and followed her back.
However, that was a while ago. I seem to fell that, once we went to a 2hr call out time, the number of helo top covers reduced dramatically. Shame, nothing worse than waiting to go flying, and not. (Not wishing ill on mariners etc. Bit like being an Ambulance Paramedic - a job is good for you, but bad for the poor injured person!)
And as for spares - I recommend you read Vulcan 607. I was astounded, it was my life only 25 years ago.
Can do, will do, have to do - that's all there is. No maliciousness, no weak leadership (a little misunderstanding perhaps), but years of reduced funding and not being able to justify to the Politicians maintenance of a capability that doesn't appear to be required.
Tappers Dad. I do sympathise with you tremendously. I lost friends and wish there had been a way of avoiding it - of course, for the grace of God, it could have been me for I would have flown equally willingly. I'm afraid I can't see any one root cause. We had hoped, (and the precautions we took to reduce the risk of fire worked), hoped that one of last year's fuel leaks would provide the answer to XV230. It didn't. The aeroplane is just old. I hope you get the answer you need. You may not be ultimately satisfied, because I don't believe there is an answer. But PLEASE, don't get involved in all the other speculation on this site - it appears to degrade your core search.
We will remember them. Rest well.
Snow Dog
Topcover is a very good idea - I have many in my log book from SAR trails to shepherding a 100Kts Sea King home from 200+ miles off shore (Not easy at 200Kts-lots of dog legs). Even went out to meet a helo trogging down from Kef and followed her back.
However, that was a while ago. I seem to fell that, once we went to a 2hr call out time, the number of helo top covers reduced dramatically. Shame, nothing worse than waiting to go flying, and not. (Not wishing ill on mariners etc. Bit like being an Ambulance Paramedic - a job is good for you, but bad for the poor injured person!)
And as for spares - I recommend you read Vulcan 607. I was astounded, it was my life only 25 years ago.
Can do, will do, have to do - that's all there is. No maliciousness, no weak leadership (a little misunderstanding perhaps), but years of reduced funding and not being able to justify to the Politicians maintenance of a capability that doesn't appear to be required.
Tappers Dad. I do sympathise with you tremendously. I lost friends and wish there had been a way of avoiding it - of course, for the grace of God, it could have been me for I would have flown equally willingly. I'm afraid I can't see any one root cause. We had hoped, (and the precautions we took to reduce the risk of fire worked), hoped that one of last year's fuel leaks would provide the answer to XV230. It didn't. The aeroplane is just old. I hope you get the answer you need. You may not be ultimately satisfied, because I don't believe there is an answer. But PLEASE, don't get involved in all the other speculation on this site - it appears to degrade your core search.
We will remember them. Rest well.
Snow Dog