Military rotary wing assets: Army or RAAF

[ClockwinderWO]

Very interesting debate, even if, at times, the "message" is lost in deeply held personal bias.
Having been in the RAAF at the time of the "switch", and knowing a lot of blues who became green on the groundie side, it takes me back. Anecdotally, nearly all those guys thought the change was positive and liked NOT being deployed as much as when in their blue suits.
I offer only one comment - The Army never forgave the RAAF's performance at Long Tan, and no matter what argument you make plus or minus, the entire "switch" is directly attributable to the perception that 9 SQN didn't conform to Army doctrine when engaged in close quarters combat.
Grounding and storing perfectly capable RAAF 12SQN Chinooks for years didn't help either!!!
Another can-of-worms, I suspect.
I'll leave my own deeply held bias regarding Bou work in the Blue bucket.

[SASless]

Is this argument much the same as the American Military went through in the past....the Air Force wanted to be the Air Arm and fought to deny the Army the capability it now has?

http://www.aircav.com/histavn.html

[baffler15]

[quote=ClockwinderWO;3009042]I offer only one comment - The Army never forgave the RAAF's performance at Long Tan, and no matter what argument you make plus or minus, the entire "switch" is directly attributable to the perception that 9 SQN didn't conform to Army doctrine when engaged in close quarters combat.[quote]

Clockwinder,

Having read several books about the Battle of Long Tan, I can't recall there being any bad sentiment about the performance of 9 Sqn at that time. In fact, given that rain was bucketing down, the delivery of much-needed ammunition at tree top height, on a dark night (without NVGs!) would suggest that the RAAF crews probably wouldn't have paid for a drink for quite some time in any boozer over in Vietnam!

The Baffler

[Arm out the window]

Yes, I believe it wasn't Long Tan, but other experiences the future Gen. Bennett had when he was fighting in Vietnam that led to him to so vehemently pursue the transfer of helicopters from RAAF to Army.
Someone may be able to cast more light on this, but that was certainly the word going round at the time, so I figure it's fair enough to put it on a rumour network.

[Doors Off]

Pass The Bozo
Many don't know but in East Timor, the army choppers were tasked out of the Air Component. That's right, under the control of an Air Force Air Commodore. So who wants to throw rocks at the Army Blackhawk’s in Timor? They were doing what Air Force told them to do.
Your comment really depends on your interpretation of WHO was doing as they were told. Some enlightened research in to the system of tasking requests etc may well enhance your understanding of the fact that the Air Force and AAAvn were doing what the army had requested, by providing Aviation Support to the Land Force. A very noble task, whether you are a frustrated fixed wing pilot in the RAAF wishing you were flying helicopters but too scared to dig a hole, or a frustrated army pilot looking up at some big aircraft with creature comforts and a chain of command focussed primarily on aviation but too scared to be alone in a motel room.

[ClockwinderWO]

Long Tan

Baffler,

I agree your sentiments. Note my use of the word "perception". You're right re the performance of 9 Sqn. Remember too, they were "in country" only a short time too. However, did the books you read also mention the sad fact that the ammunition delivered at tree top height in pouring rain at night, was still banded? The Diggers sure did get their critical combat deliveries, but in steel banded boxes! When you're up to the eyes in the sh1t, you don't want to be looking for a band cutter!! This was the the single biggest criticism to come out of the whole operation, by some.
Of course, we all know it wasn't the aircrew to "blame". Some REMF Supply wonk made a very stupid decision (or rather never thought about it all).

[quote=baffler15;3010048][quote=ClockwinderWO;3009042]I offer only one comment - The Army never forgave the RAAF's performance at Long Tan, and no matter what argument you make plus or minus, the entire "switch" is directly attributable to the perception that 9 SQN didn't conform to Army doctrine when engaged in close quarters combat.

Clockwinder,

Having read several books about the Battle of Long Tan, I can't recall there being any bad sentiment about the performance of 9 Sqn at that time. In fact, given that rain was bucketing down, the delivery of much-needed ammunition at tree top height, on a dark night (without NVGs!) would suggest that the RAAF crews probably wouldn't have paid for a drink for quite some time in any boozer over in Vietnam!

The Baffler

[SASless]

Per Harry Smith, OC of the troops at Long Tan....

At about this time we started running short of ammunition, and I requested helicopter re-supply. This arrived some time after, no mean feat by the pilots in monsoon rain conditions, and was dropped through the trees right into our position during a lull in the VC onslaught, and the ammunition was quickly distributed. Without this re-supply, there is little doubt we would not have survived.

Taken from http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages-...s/long_tan.htm

[Charlie Luncher]

oh dear

Griffin
Think we are stuck in a time warp daddy'o, put away the flared white jumpsuit man .
Even if you read AAP1000 instead of the latest flight sim manual, it would only give you a broad brush view of the RAAF today. Suggest you look in to ISTAR and where the aviation units of the ADF are deployed on operations instead.
Giving the RAN control of P3s is fine as long as they don't get their filty mitts on the AP3Cs, it just wouldn't be right .
Charlie sends

[griffinblack]

Some good points. I was hoping to continue to pursue the ‘cultural issues’ but will leave that one alone for the time being. There was also some mention of how ‘support’ was used – a related issue to culture. Now that army aviation is a combat arm (this has only formally occurred in the last three or four years) rather than a support arm, the meaning of ‘support arm’ versus ‘combat arm’ and how it is applied is most relevant. Irrespective of how unpalatable it is, the support provided by RAAF tactical lift is one of a ‘support arm’.

The main focus in this thread has been one of command and control. And despite some strident assertions otherwise, this issue continues to be significant for the ground commander. By the way, my view of the support provided during Long Tan was that the Hueys did a magnificent job.

Commanders wish to task organise their forces. This allows them to change structure and design combined arms teams for specific missions. It will often involve re-grouping. A commander relies on the forces ‘allocated’ to him to achieve the mission. Army aviation units will generally (this also depends on what types/unit you are allocating) be allocated OPCOMD or TACOMD for phases or missions (noting that there can be several phases for a mission, with a phase changing either when ME changes or a re-group occurs). Control implies either OPCON or TACON – the maximum level of C2 expected from a RAAF unit.

Very briefly, being assigned OPCOMD or TACOMD (under command) allows a commander to specify missions and tasks and allocate those forces to his CT’s ( invariably his Main Effort – ME). This is not possible under TACON/OPCON. That means if the RAAF allocate a unit to 3 bde, the 3 Bde commander is unable to further assign that unit to his ME. He may not task the unit assigned to him.

I won’t join the dots, I will let the collective brains here determine why Commanders need ‘command’ of assigned forces to successfully operate as a combined arms team. That is not to say TACON/OPCON does not work – it does, but only for very proscriptive operations that is unlikely to change and is rather simple in nature and complexity.

Unless the RAAF would be prepared to allocate forces ‘under command’, C2 would always be a war stopper.

[Arm out the window]

griffinblack, a couple of points:
combat arm vs. support arm - unpalatable? Why? Everyone's hopefully doing their bit to make the battle go as well as possible, so I don't think a classification either way is a biggie as long as that happens.
On that note, and harking back to the pre-helicopter transfer days (obviously not relevant to today's situation, but part of the original premise for the debate), what would the RAAF gunships and slicks carrying out an airmobile insert as part of a coordinated battle plan (eg artillery stops, gunships soften up the area around the LZ, slicks land and deplane troops who then go directly into battle) be classified as?

Command & control:
How does this sound? Exercise of, say, three weeks main 'fighting' with periods of preparation and wash-up before and after. Helicopter squadrons tasked out of a nearby base for the 'admin' periods via normal RAAF tasking system, but when the 'real war' starts, deploy in bush near supported battalion / brigade - RAAF TACP is in the commander's HQ, assets are there for him to use as needed, tasking comes from the TACP to squadron CP, squadron GLO and Intello provide timely liaison and intel, air assets move around the battlefield coordinated with arty, naval gunfire, CAS and other air movements. Also provide a SAR capability.
Helicopters are positioned there to work for that infantry commander and do the jobs he wants done, do that for the assigned period, then go back to base - impossible you say? Those RAAFies wouldn't be able to do it!
Next you'll be telling me that these days, each ground commander has an eager squadron of helicopters with pilots cammed up and sitting in the cockpit waiting for him to shout 'Scramble!'

[baffler15]

Originally Posted by ClockwinderWO

However, did the books you read also mention the sad fact that the ammunition delivered at tree top height in pouring rain at night, was still banded? The Diggers sure did get their critical combat deliveries, but in steel banded boxes! When you're up to the eyes in the sh1t, you don't want to be looking for a band cutter!! This was the the single biggest criticism to come out of the whole operation, by some.
Of course, we all know it wasn't the aircrew to "blame". Some REMF Supply wonk made a very stupid decision (or rather never thought about it all).

F 'n Q-ees!

Baffler

[trapezoid]

Curious

For GriffinBlack,

You have certainly rolled out the cliches. Lets see if I have them all:

Land Manoeuvre
Combined Arms Team
Hardened and Networked Army WTF?
Commander's Intent
Task Org Matrixes (sic)

Do you really believe it or have you just done staff college?

Did Douglas McCarthur or Chester Nimitz worry themselves with Task Org Matrices?

Can a force that is bogged down in doctrine react quickly?

Interested

[Brian Abraham]

Re Long Tan - Army Major Peter Young worked in intelligence (yes I’ve heard the oxymoron jokes) in Vietnam and became “The Australian” newspaper defence correspondent following his service. Many years ago during the course of a book review about the conflict he related that when the request for resupply came in the RAAF declined (maybe due to the god awful weather, but who knows) where upon the US Army rep said they would do the job. The RAAF then accepted the task.

I have some sympathy for the Army if the one and only time I worked (1972) with the RAAF was an indication of how business was done. The SAS approached the RAAF for Huey support to make a dawn helo insertion from the aircraft carrier to Beecroft range. The RAAF declined on the basis the Huey was not cleared to operate from ships. The SAS then approached the Navy thinking they might be able to use the Wessex. It was explained that stripping the anti sub gear was one hell of a job and so why not use the Hueys (Navy had 5). But the RAAF told us ………. they said. The deal was done and then the RAAF found that Hueys could operate from ships and so would participate. The idea was for crews to stay over night on the ship, brief and fly the dawn mission. The RAAF decided the ships accommodation was sub standard and they would be unable to get adequate rest because of the unfamiliar noises. It was suggested they stay in the Nowra mess but that too was considered sub standard and because it was an airfield aircraft operations would disturb their rest. That meant staying in a motel in town. All this then raised other issues. They would be unable to position to the ship in time because they were not permitted to fly over water at night (ship was to be one mile off shore) because they didn’t have RADALTS. And they couldn’t fly before having breakfast so everything swung around the time of breakfast being served in the motel. The SAS got to the beach in time for lunch (just). I make no judgement, just relating what happened.

[Little Fish]

Surely it doesnt make any real difference who flies the aircraft. Whether a guy (or gal these days) ticks the blue or green box is irrelevent. It all comes down to training. Why not send someone who is going to operate an aircraft in support of the land battle to do courses like COAC. Surely it is an individuals personality and the culture of their sqn that makes the difference. I can assure you all, there is just as big a diference in culture between a recce and an airmobile sqn as there is is between a lift and fighter sqn.

We have this argument at work all the time. There are currently Raafies in AAAvn (and there have been more in the past both recce and airmobile) and all of them are doing a sterling job. It's not the uniform but the individual and their training that makes the difference. Why not give all the air assets from army and navy (including UAV's to the air force) but then make different FEGs do either maritime or land courses. As far as C2 goes why not rally to have assets assigned OPCOMD or TACOMD so that the job can get done.

After all, egos aside, we are all on the same team.

LF

[griffinblack]

PAF-

Army.. throwing a spanner in the works of an efficient aviation operation.

Perhaps that was the attitude that lead to army needing to control battlefield aviation.

A-O-T-W

Before I address some of your points. I don’t buy your response about the Caribou replacement. Replacing a weapon system requires significant staff work and impetus from senior commanders (chiefly the CAF). Since the Caribou was supposed to be replaced we have upgraded almost all other platforms, and the venerable old girl is well past its used by date and not viably operational (Certainly hasn’t been deployed in more challenging theatres). But I would be interested in how you see the RAAF withdrawal of the CH47 – what message did that give about the seriousness of battlefield/tactical transport from our blue brethren. I clearly remember the FAA withdrawing A4 in the knowledge that the RAAF would provide fleet support. We know were that lead, leasing our own A4’s back from the Kiwi’s. So, I can demonstrate that on two occasions in recent history the RAAF have failed to provide necessary aviation support to the navy and army.

Your point about your three week ‘exercise’. Let us go one step further and say the RAAF, under your paradigm, is supporting a land operation in a theatre of war. I, as brigade staff develop a plan for the Bde COMD that involves risk – a JAAT that will destroy the en’s reserve (an en BG) and thus undermine his ability to conduct offensive operations (this will almost certainly reduce casualties amongst our ground guys). I go to the TACP and provide the plans and say that there is a chance of loosing an aircraft (or two) but it will significantly reduce the likelihood of the brigade becoming decisively engaged – we may save 50-100 lives. Who accepts the risk – the RAAF comd (I am guessing it will be approved by the air comd) or the land component commander? A vital point- can the RAAF refuse to do the task?

The point being, the pretty picture you drew above makes no difference. The land comd needs autonomy of ‘his’ assets. He needs to command them and needs to accept the risk of loss. He cannot afford to have assets withdrawn or have tasks knocked back – much as Brian described with the initial refusal of RAAF to support the resupply at Long Tan.

Trapizoid,

I was going to be harsh and say that if you don’t understand the terms stated then this is not the thread for you, but I shan’t. I am guessing you are a pilot – how then do civilians view ‘pilot’ jargon? (they probably think it is a whole lot of meaningless terms). Have you heard FJ guys talk? - they have a common language, hard to understand (but necessary). I assure you the terms I have used are commonly used in planning, briefings and orders of land operations - including army aviation (and a hell of a lot more terms). Dare I say, that if those providing ‘support’ had a better understanding of the language (and doctrine) of the ‘customer’, this topic would never need to be raised.

[Arm out the window]

Griffinblack,
Re the Caribou: buy my response or not as you see fit, but projects have been under way for donkey's years to get a replacement, and each time it's come close the money has not been forthcoming due to other requirements seen as more pressing. The last time this happened, they were down to the short short list when it fell off the budget - much time and money had been spent getting to that stage which the RAAF would hardly have wasted if they'd never wanted to replace it at all.

Chinooks: I don't know the full story as to why the 12 SQN machines were mothballed, but I think at least in part it was a reaction to the loss of the rest of the helicopter assets - ie. after all our best efforts and advice, the transfer has gone ahead, so OK, we're not wasting any more time and assets on this.
This happened after the utility helo transfer, so in no way is it an indication of the seriousness with which the RAAF previously approached its battlefield/tac transport duties, as you imply. Previous to that, and as I've discussed above, the Army were getting good service.

Re your point about who accepts the risk in a task: in the scenario I mentioned in the last post (which is not my pretty picture but rather how we were working prior to the helicopter transfer, albeit on exercises rather than real operations), helicopters were used in the ways I mentioned and therefore being placed in risky positions as much as anyone else on the battlefield.
The BALO or DALO as the case may be wasn't going up the chain to ask his boss whether a task was acceptable or not, he was working with the ground commander/s to advise on the sensible use of air assets and come up with a reasonable plan, something that I'm sure would still happen with Army-owned assets, ie infantry boss wants to do something with his helicopters and his air advisors tell him what they think about it.
As the air assets are expensive and hard to replace no matter who owns them, the answer as to what would be an acceptable risk would likely be similar whether it was RAAF or AAAvn helicopter guys doing the talking.

[trapezoid]

Don't Be Harsh

Griffinblack,

20 years as a military aviator, QFI (real one from CFS), served in real conflict, happily retired (still flying) long time interested in real conflicts from the great wars: land, naval, and air.

Don't be thinking that RMC is the only place that one can be a student of warfare. Your arrogance belies your military origin.

Having drawn such a long bow at the RAAF (my military origin) you need to answer some of my questions or pull your head in.

Which brings me to the still unanswered first question. Do you really believe it? Can you react?

The badhats are coming over the hill, this calls for an immediate task org matrix.

BTW, I never said that I didn't understand those terms, an incorrect assumption on your part. Happy to listen to your argument, just spare us the aide memoire fervour.

Hardened and networked? Come on.

[Arm out the window]

I must add a bit of fuel to the fire here:
A couple of years after the helo transfer, I actually jumped the fence and put on the green uniform with the blue cordy thing that goes in your pocket for a few years, before going back the other way.
I went back to the same base doing a very similar job to what I'd been doing previously in the blue uniform. So what were the changes in capability?

1. From the Army's point of view, there was a big expansion going on and lots of learning to do.

2. Some of the Army guys running the troops and squadrons had worked with the RAAF as a transition measure, so the procedures and tactics didn't change a great deal. Lifting people and objects round the battlefield and brassing things up with gunships was done much as it had been previously.

3. Aircraft availability went down somewhat because every bastard was off doing PT, or away on subject 3 for Corporal or whatever all the time. Additionally, the maintainers were on the same big learning curve as the aircrew.

4. The deeper knowledge of the ground commander's intentions supposedly posessed by the newly-appointed aviation commanders made bugger-all difference to what we did, how we did it or how well it worked.

5. The depth of aviation experience posessed by those guys running the outfit at most levels was relatively less than before, and there was a different attitude from some pilots (certainly not all, there were some really good operators too) about how much they should know about their craft.

Example: As troop QFI I did an emergencies check on my troop commander.
For practice, I gave him a notional boost pump failure. 'If we were up in the hills, what height would we have to descend to now?'
No idea. A very straightforward emergency that he should have known like his two times table. The worst bit was that he didn't seem to think it was a big deal.
These guys were basically bograts thrust into a position of responsibility so they were snowed under with paperwork and regimental bull**** when they should have been getting really good at their primary job - flying well themselves and making sure our aviation tasks were done as well as possible.
I don't expect people to know how many rivets in the tail boom, but they should know their stuff properly before being let loose with a crew and pax.

Finally, Griffinblack, these blokes who I assume are the ones you refer to as having the knowledge required to be the aces of the battlefield for the infantry commander, had no advantage over a RAAFie with similar time in a working squadron, and in some cases were at a distinct disadvantage because of their relatively junior status for the jobs they were thrown into.

[Captain Sand Dune]

AOTW,

Give up mate. Experience, facts and logic are no match for Army staff college dogma!

[Arm out the window]

Maybe so, but those acronyms and such certainly sounded convincing for a bit!