Military rotary wing assets: Army or RAAF
 

I’ve started this thread due to a comment made by Wiley in another thread. I’m assuming that Wiley is a former Ronnie who is very stuck in his ways regarding things that fly should remain in the RAAF, and possibly out of touch with modern day goings on (apologises if I’m way off the mark).

My big question here is when was the last time that RW assets did anything except provide support to the Army? Given the difference in culture between Army and RAAF I believe it is was a very smart, quite possibly essential, move to transfer the RAAF RW assets to the Army.

I would also go as far as to suggest that this should also occur with the Caribou and its replacement (if any such thing was ever to occur). When was the last time the Bou’s did anything other than work with and support Army personnel and units?

S64

Been waiting for this one to come up.

Now listen here sonny, you leave the mighty Bou alone.. don't need no Mangos up the front, bad enough that they let them in the back. ;)

This discussion is likely to quickly become a "Is so, is not, is so...." type head-butting match, but before all that starts, a few comments if I may:

Of course RW assets and the Bous do a lot of Army tasking - it's what they're for.
However, they also work really well in disaster relief ops (eg. cyclone, flood, tsunami) and things like support to UN-type peacekeeping forces, for example.

I don't agree at all that it was a particularly smart move to transfer the RW assets to the Army, because before that happened, there were 4 competent and effective RAAF helicopter squadrons providing good support to user units, slotting nicely into the Army command system when allocated to various tasks or exercises and generally doing a well-respected and good job.

There followed a period of great disruption as the capability was handed over to Army Aviation, who had a massive job on their hands to ramp up and take over new types and capabilities. Not many RAAFies came over, so they basically had to crank it all up from semi-scratch - a big ask.
To their credit, they made a good fist of it in my view, and have gone on to introduce newer technology and ways of operating into the picture too.

However, I contend that the transfer was an unnecessary, expensive and ultimately pointless exercise that could be summarised as follows:
a) Not broken, but a certain honcho thinks it needs to be fixed and rides roughshod over much good advice to the contrary.
b) Capability suffers as systems are dismantled and laboriously built up again.
c) Over time, capability returns to normal and is probably much the same as it would have been anyway, but there's been a lot of stuffing around in the meantime.

To piggy back on AOTWs' post, the decision to transfer RAAF rotary wing assets to Army was purely political. Unfortunately for the RAAF the CDF was Army, and the RAAF lost.
As a rebuttal to Super 64 (and using the same logic): given the size of the ADF (i.e. small!) wouldn't it make more sense (financially, operationally etc) to have all maritime assests owned and operated by the Navy, all land assts owned and operated by the Army, and all air assets owned and operated by the Air Force?

Logic? What logic? This is regarding the ADF there is no logic!
 

The logic I was using that given the Army and RAAF have very different cultures, and operate quite differently that those that directly support them should be under their command. I would also argue (using the same logic) that perhaps the P3's might be better suited being under RAN command.

Well given the 'we're very small' logic CAPT SD, I would actually argue that given our size do we even need an air force, or an army for that matter? If we really wanted to go about streamlining things I suggest we just have the RAN with an extended FAA and marines to do the ground stomping!

Given that marines were the first troops here, and that we are an island nation, I could never understand why we never had them from the beginning.

Don’t forget way back when (even before you Wombat35!) that the RAAF was born out of the Army.


S64

The problem that the US Army always had in requesting something from the Air Force, was because the "Green Machine" could never really depend on the "Blue-boys" to get one where it was needed, when it was needed, and for as long (and to where) as it was needed.

The "Flyboys" frequently had something else they thought the helo should be doing... like ferrying Generals and the like (or their "special supplies") around for a "look-see".

A Priority 1 request from the Army was always at least a full notch lower than an Air Force Priority 1. And there was a difference of opinion as to what qualified for top priority.


This is also why the US Army wants its own C-27J/CN-235 fleet, so it can move its own light cargo without having to first argue with the USAF about whether they really need it now, then wait for the Zoomies to get done with their card game/nap.

It’s pretty simple. The RAAF are in the game of providing air power. They don’t understand, and probably never will, land manoeuvre.

Army and navy aviation is integral to the land and naval battle. In the army, they are part of the combined arms team. Indeed with the Hardened and Networked Army (HNA) aviation has the opportunity to form a Battle Group HQ. The RAAF are simply unable to have this ability. They can ‘support’ the army from an airpower point of view (the provision of CAS/fires and transport) but they do not want to understand land manoeuvre.

Many will ask why it is it important to understand land manoeuvre, is it not just about providing ordinance at the desired time and place? The same questions can be asked about operating in a combined arms team. The answer is simple – no. I can quack on about forming habitual relationships, understanding commanders intent, knowing and understanding ground manoeuvre and understanding command and control. I can also discuss command relationships and how critical command and control is – those who have done task org matrixes will understand. This is a language that is foreign to the RAAF and is not RAAF core business.

I would point out the extraordinary success of the US army Cav. They have fully integrated the combined arms team principles. I suspect both the UK and aus hold this model as something to aspire too.

With the exception of the FJ boys, I have always felt the RAAF have been in the business of flying, not warfighting. I have no idea why a graduate from 2FTS would wish to fly BBJs, except to position him/herself a Qantas career. They are more interested in the myriad aspects of how various pressure instruments work, or how thunderstorms form or what are the twenty three reasons for conducting a missed approach rather than the how do you select a BP, FP/OP, LZ/PZ, bounding considerations, EA development etc etc.

The other thing is to deploy a RAAF detachment is like staging extravaganza – it involves a cast of thousands – there is nothing lean or mean about a RAAF deployment.

There are advantages of the RAAF system – I invite a counter argument for those who wish to point them out. I have intentionally taken a very one eyed view in order to allow someone to balance my views.

Handing over.

Can't help wondering if you were to sit down today with a clean sheet of paper and create an armed force for a country would it entail three distinct branches? methinks not.

Its very hard to dispense with tradition though...:sad:

Griffin Black, you have a point that the average RAAF pilot probably doesn't understand the intricacies of ground warfare.
However, as I alluded to above, when the RAAF operated helicopters in support of the Army prior to the handover, the squadron execs and line drivers involved in day-to-day work with battlefield units had a good understanding of the ground commander's intentions not only with respect to the individual task at hand, but also in how the battle was expected to unfold and the anticipated work required of the helicopter assets.
Everyone had intel briefs on how the battle was progressing, the air mission commander for a task would have face-to-face planning meetings with infantry, arty and cav commanders to work out integration, the BALO or DALO would be there at the appropriate commander's side for advice and liaison, and it all worked well.

After the handover, we still had a similar number of air assets (less capable for a while as transitional issues were overcome) to go round a lot of would-be user units, so in reply to GreenKnight121's point, "A Priority 1 request from the Army was always at least a full notch lower than an Air Force Priority 1", this was far from the case for our Defence Forces when I was involved. Our number one priority as RAAF helicopter units was to provide support to our main customers, the Army battlefield units, and I don't believe there was a significant increase in the quality or quantity of support given after the transfer.
If X aircraft + Y crews gave you Z amount of support available each year, changing ownership of the machines was never going to give you more than Z sustainably, particularly as the operators of said machines already integrated nicely into the command structure of the units they supported.
These days, the hands-on knowledge of this stuff is gone from the RAAF and belongs to the Army, so trying to go back would be as stupid as I think the original transfer was, but I will strongly defend the RAAF's ability to do the job well when we were doing it.

Re the comments about RAAF bigger-than-Ben Hur deployment requirements, again, 'when I were a lad' we had squadrons deployed in the bush for numerous exercises, in hutchies, doing stand-to, digging holes and generally doing our best to fit in with the grunts, all quite 'lean' and not a luxury item in sight - in fact, I dug more gun pits as a RAAFie than I ever did when I actually joined the Army to do a similar job.
All the junior pilots used to do Joint Warfare course and be assigned to the Brigade TACP to learn about what those crazy pack-toting members of the Green Machine got up to and how we could all operate together, so there you go.

Then, A-O-T-W, the RAAF was doing a far better job than the USAF ever did in the "understand the customer" department... or does now, even.

And the converse of that argument is that Army and Navy understand nothing of air power – a patently false assumption.
Just as some Army users do not want to understand that overloading an aircraft is potentially dangerous, or that changing a LZ at the last moment during a night insert is lethal.
Hmmmm, let’s see now…….
A P3 pilot not only flies the aircraft but knows a bunch about sea warfare.
A FAC pilot not only flies the aircraft but knows a bunch about ground warfare – after all it’s the same (RAAF!) FAC pilots that teach ground FAC to the Army!
A Caribou pilot not only flies the aircraft but knows a reasonable amount about ground ops as well – after all, they spend most of their life carting grunts around.
If you’re talking about why an individual would want to fly a BBJ, well why not?! It's a nice aircraft! If you’re alluding to why 34SQN exist, it’s to cart pollies around and therefore would be the last ADF flying unit the pollies would mess with. IMHO, 34SQN is a waste of ADF resources and should be disbanded ASAP.
Ummmm……..this would be called “professionalism”, I believe.
Well as I’ve eluded to above, not only do “they” need to know their basic trade (flying aircraft) inside out, “they” also know quite a bit about why they’re doing it.
Well have a look at the aircraft being deployed. Somewhat more complex than the average Army aircraft. Oh and BTW, I don’t recall RAAF UH-1H deployments being “extravaganzas”! In fact, many of the Army detachments had more "home comforts".

Ask how many Army aviators have transferred to the RAAF, and then ask how many have gone the other way.

Captain Sand Dune,

Good to see someone take up the challenge!



I will however address A-O-T-W’s points first. Yes, the RAAF did provide adequate support but it was as a support arm not as part of the combined arms team. I can only surmise the RAAFs commitment to tactical transport based on their decision to discontinue Medium lift support in the late 80s (the withdrawal of the CH47) and there refusal to upgrade/replace the venerable (to put politely) Carabou.


C-S-D

This is irrelevant to my original point about the RAAF not understanding land manoeuvre. You have provided no evidence to prove me wrong. I will however say that in my experience most Bde Comds don’t really give a toss about air power they just want to know if the RAAF can move their sh1t and if the will provide the bombs when needed – the intricacies is lost on them (indeed we find it hard enough to educate the general army on how to use army aviation). In case you missed it first time, I will restate – the RAAF do not understand land manoeuvre

I assure you no one is more aware of this than army aviators. And why should a Battle Group Commander worry about the intricacies of C130 weight and balance – they are trying to keep 600 blokes alive – that is our job to let him know and be part of his staff to advise and plan with him. And by the way commanders don’t change LZ at the last moment on a whim.

P3 drivers – I can’t really comment, but I always understood that the TACCO directed and planed the engagements – the drivers placed the weapon system (just flew the acft!!)
FAC – Sorry, having had some experience with FACDU, they know very little about ground warfare. They teach the provision of CAS – a tactic, not a mission, and certainly only a small part of ‘ground warfare’. And I reiterate, they have little understanding of land manoeuvre and no understanding of how to operate as a combined arms team.
A caribou pilot – pleeeaase. They are, in army parlance, a support arm (taxi drivers).

So you agree with me?

You mix professionalism (the ability to conduct warfighting (safely, efficiently and as violently as possible/needed)) with knowing sh1t you can’t effect while airborne, but because some QFIs don’t know how to warfight, they have got to have ‘an angle’. I won’t continue with this line, if you guys feel you need to know this stuff- fill your boots.

We only ‘fly’ the aircraft IOT ‘fight’ the aircraft. Yes, this needs to be done safely, indeed with a great deal of precision – its rather hard to get decent terminal effects with rockets when you are flying like a bag of sh1t. Therefore, you do need to understand your weapon system – but only IOT to ‘fight’.

You must be talking about the ‘other’ regiment.

Have you seen the ARH?

Irrelevant

Finally, tell me how the RAAF could contribute to land manoeuvre (within the CT/BG context) and more importantly how could operate seamlessly with the combined arms team?

I tend to aggree with Arm out of the window. Having been on both sides of the fence, lived the dream and now grown up a bit I have a slightly more mature perspective than I once had. A number of observations above are short sighted and fail to take the broader view. My view is that each organisation is trying to achieve the aim within the limitations and resources they are faced with. I clearly remember figures being touted by Army on the reduced numbers of people required to support the helicopters when compared to RAAF. Unfortunately, the same figures failed to acknowledge all the RAAF people that continued to provide support to Army. Add them and surprise surprise the numbers were the same.

I note the comment that CDF was Army when the decision was made. I suspect that his decision was made based upon some bitter experiences in Vietnam, and more importantly from some of the terrible comd and control construct from the late 70's early 80's. What was missed was the frustration at the coal face by both Army and RAAF operators during this period. You just have to look at Exercise K83 when the current CDF as SQN XO was able to provide support but was prevented by the slow decision making in the chain of command. By the time the decision to transfer battle field helo was made these problems had been fixed. Having said that its too late to change the decision and I don't think we should. In my view the next step is a purple aircrew and a purple training system with movement between all three organisations. It can only help. In some respect this has started to happen as future Tiger pilots are training as Hawk pilots. It all leads to a better ADF. Unfortunately turf wars and vested interests will prevent this.

Just one other point close to my heart. While some of you think 34SQN is a waste of resources, don't forget they are the face of the ADF and represent you to the pollies. Just like other units they work just as hard, respond to every ADF callout. The 1st ADF asset into East Timor, 34SQN. 1st ADF asset to arrive after the Bali bomb (8hrs), 34SQN. I guess what I'm saying is we tend to bag without understanding. Obviously, they are thinking about the instrument approach on arrival while disregarding the int brief. Yes, I'm sure that pilots at 34SQN want airline jobs, but so do pilots at Armys 173 SQN and 5AVN REGT as well as 32, 33,36,37, 1,3,6,9,10 SQNs etc etc. Funny thing is some want to come back once they go to Qantas etc.

Back to you lot

If X aircraft + Y crews gave you Z amount of support available each year, changing ownership of the machines was never going to give you more than Z sustainably, particularly as the operators of said machines already integrated nicely into the command structure of the units they supported.QUOTE]



Not sure if what you are stating here is correct, my understanding is the Army now gets about 70% of the flying hours on task, as opposed to about 30% when the RAAF "owned" the aircraft.
Me thinks Army has a much better utilisation rate now?????:=

griffinblackI don't think anyone is going to give you such evidence....why would they? So you are saying that if you don't understand land manoeuvre you can be of no benefit to the army? A lot of people get hung up on the colour of the uniform.
Nice. I guess if Army gets the new tactical transport as you suggest, then army aviators can look forward to being regarded by the hierarchy in such terms.
Professional knowledge is a bloody good thing to have in your back pocket. Any army aviator will tell you that and will no doubt possess the same knowledge. Pretty narrow view of pilots there Griffin. When I graduated from 2FTS 'Huey gunships' were not an option, had they been, I'd have been there in a shot, and anecdotally I believe there was never a problem filling those slots. So your example of someone wanting to fly BBJs is a bit misleading, it is about whats on offer at the time.
I've can count plenty of mates who left the Army to join Qantas, albeit, with a quick transfer to the RAAF beforehand.
I think AOTW has already said this was working pretty well before the assets were transferred.
Grab yourself a copy of the Air Power Manual and have a read.

GriffinBlack, you seem to be continuing your self-described policy of taking the 'one-eyed view' for the sake of escalating the argument, which I'm finding pretty tiresome. Just saying what you really mean in non-emotive terms would be the way to go, in my view.
There are many points you make which beg replies to the contrary, but to take one:
"and there refusal to upgrade/replace the venerable (to put politely) Carabou."
The RAAF have wanted and argued for a Caribou replacement for 20 years, but even when it gets to project status it keeps falling off the back of the budget - hardly a refusal on the part of the RAAF to go and buy one, as you imply.

Sagy, I think it's likely the change in percentage of tasks being Army as opposed to RAAF these days would be because of how training is reported, ie Army aircrew training is an Army task, so it goes into that bucket.
As I recall, our tasking consisted mainly of Army support like exercises and brigade air famils, aircrew training, comsurv, SAR and relief ops when they came up, RAAF support such as positioning safety officers for knuck exercises, and the other ring-ins like carting pollies to see cyclone-affected areas etc - maybe the Army has dumped the RAAF support, I don't know, but the main ones were Army support and our own training, so I wouldn't expect too much has changed there.

I started reading this thread and began to enjoy the logic and parry that I would come to expect from Officers underpinning a sound arguement. Sadly it has narrowed in logic.

I suppose if a Bou driver in Army parlance is a taxi driver, what is a Blackhawk driver or a Chinook driver.

We all "drive", the speed, altitude and conditions vary. Having flown for all three, rotary and fixed and now on the outside, I can tell all of you that think they they are bigger than the rest, that the job of "driving" has each of it's own significances. The knowledge to fly at high level is different to low. Aided versus unaided, slow versus fast, embarked versus ashore, paddock versus flight deck. They are all there and they require specific knowledge. I am sure that a Kiowa driver would need do do some work to take a BBJ into JFK. And I am sure that a Seahawk driver would need to do some work to take an F18 on a mud run.

In short we chose to fly what we did because of our own circumstances, don't bag the other guy.

Miltary guys generally need to "fight" their aircraft. Flying needs to be second nature. In my experience the comment re the Tacco on the P3 is far from the truth, as it is re the NAv in a Pig or the Tacco in a Seahawk. Those that drop weapons, (as in missiles, bombs and torpedoes) have a particular knowledge required also. Correct me if I am wrong, when I say that the only guys who drop something, (other than firing door guns), is:

F18
F111
(Hawk and FAC included)
P3
Seahawk
SeaSprite (Steady, we don't know the outcome yet!)
Tiger

But that doesn't make a BBJ driver or a Seaking driver or a Blackhawk driver any less skillfull, IMHO

So far as who owns what, AOTW hit the nail, anyone can probobly do it, the disruption to the capability is the bit that is ovelooked by the headshed when making the decision, my opinion only of course.

Dons flak jacket :D

Ah, the so often debated issue of whether Rotary Wing Aviation is a maneuver or support element

Seems we once again miss the point due to ego and 'tradition'. There is a bigger picture.

As the helo hasn’t the range to do strategic shaping but is very capable in the shorter range ground commander battle who should it belong to?

Does helicopter aviation have a unique role in hauling troops and supplies and providing close-in fire support or it is a maneuver element in and of itself? It’s both.

When gunships range out in front of the force to destroy armour/hardpoint threats or carry out a screening mission do they do it as an arm of the ground commander ‘shaping of the battlefield’? Or are they executing the intent of the AC/JFAC and under his orders? (I’ll leave discussing of the ATO to another time).

IMHO, and from rather extensive experience, the JFAC could give a rats about the immediate battlespace the ground forces commander is concerned with. JFAC fills ASRs from the ground commander but they are frankly not his main interest. Are ASRS filled there? Yes, but after the rest of the JFAC originated targets are serviced.

The sorts of targets JFAC is after are generally deep ‘strategic shaping’ ones. Not generally suitable for helos. The ground commander is no less interested in strategic shaping but his means of influencing that are nil. Instead, he focuses on relatively close-in targets his assets can reach. His assets should therefore be helos and shorter range attack aircraft.

The helicopter is both an assault/logistic support asset and a battlefield shaper via gunships. It doesn’t have the range to do strategic shaping. Therefore, the majority of rotary wing assets should belong to the ground commander. The exceptions being Spec Ops and Rescue.

In regards to this particular statement: "And by the way commanders don’t change LZ at the last moment on a whim."

No, they don't... such last-minute changes are the result of the fluid way ground-warfare operates... what was a secure LZ when the flight was requested, and still was when it took off may no longer be so when it gets there.

Does that mean that the landing should be cancelled, and the aircraft (helo or rough-field transport) should return to base so a new LZ can be properly prepared, and the new flight and operation plan properly written out and approved by the Sqdn CO and the other planning/control elements before it can go again? That seems to be the preference of most Air-Force types.

Or does that mean that it orbits at a decent (safe) altitude and distance for a very few minutes while a new LZ is improvised, then carry out the mission? That is much more in line with the NEEDS (not the wants) of the Army elements involved.

Usually, an Army-operated helo or rough-field transport unit will be much more familiar with, prepared for, and ready to do, that kind of improvised, last-minute change in plans than an Air Force unit.

It has nothing to do with willingness to fight, or reluctance to support the ground element, it is inherent in the way of thinking embodied in the organization.

I have no doubt that the guys & gals of 34SQN do an excellent job, and it was never my intention to question that.

My point is that perhaps those resources (experienced aircrew, money etc) could be better used in the wider defence community.

IMHO the carraige of pollies should have been the first target of the inexorable march of civilianisation. An ideal job for a corporate charter type operation. I fail to see anything military about carting pollies around.