PAF-
Army.. throwing a spanner in the works of an efficient aviation operation.
Perhaps that was the attitude that lead to army needing to control battlefield aviation.
A-O-T-W
Before I address some of your points. I don’t buy your response about the Caribou replacement. Replacing a weapon system requires significant staff work and impetus from senior commanders (chiefly the CAF). Since the Caribou was supposed to be replaced we have upgraded almost all other platforms, and the venerable old girl is well past its used by date and not viably operational (Certainly hasn’t been deployed in more challenging theatres). But I would be interested in how you see the RAAF withdrawal of the CH47 – what message did that give about the seriousness of battlefield/tactical transport from our blue brethren. I clearly remember the FAA withdrawing A4 in the knowledge that the RAAF would provide fleet support. We know were that lead, leasing our own A4’s back from the Kiwi’s. So, I can demonstrate that on two occasions in recent history the RAAF have failed to provide necessary aviation support to the navy and army.
Your point about your three week ‘exercise’. Let us go one step further and say the RAAF, under your paradigm, is supporting a land operation in a theatre of war. I, as brigade staff develop a plan for the Bde COMD that involves risk – a JAAT that will destroy the en’s reserve (an en BG) and thus undermine his ability to conduct offensive operations (this will almost certainly reduce casualties amongst our ground guys). I go to the TACP and provide the plans and say that there is a chance of loosing an aircraft (or two) but it will significantly reduce the likelihood of the brigade becoming decisively engaged – we may save 50-100 lives. Who accepts the risk – the RAAF comd (I am guessing it will be approved by the air comd) or the land component commander? A vital point- can the RAAF refuse to do the task?
The point being, the pretty picture you drew above makes no difference. The land comd needs autonomy of ‘his’ assets. He needs to command them and needs to accept the risk of loss. He cannot afford to have assets withdrawn or have tasks knocked back – much as Brian described with the initial refusal of RAAF to support the resupply at Long Tan.
Trapizoid,
I was going to be harsh and say that if you don’t understand the terms stated then this is not the thread for you, but I shan’t. I am guessing you are a pilot – how then do civilians view ‘pilot’ jargon? (they probably think it is a whole lot of meaningless terms). Have you heard FJ guys talk? - they have a common language, hard to understand (but necessary). I assure you the terms I have used are commonly used in planning, briefings and orders of land operations - including army aviation (and a hell of a lot more terms). Dare I say, that if those providing ‘support’ had a better understanding of the language (and doctrine) of the ‘customer’, this topic would never need to be raised.