RAF Meltdown - Has it begun?
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FJ, or in fact any expensively trained drivers are not the issue here. Take those away and where's your Air Force? The issue is the large number of senior airships, Groupies etc.. that occupy well paid and lucrative positions, and perhaps the need to downsize or modernise, to save some much needed cash. Why are we culling the shopfloor and not the rest?
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TAC Int Bloke
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I have to agree with young Dallas, as a dyed in the wool "sexist, misogynist dinosaur. A relic of the Cold War" I too was slow to appreciate the game had changed, the powers-that-be want soldiers that can sort-of do the difficult stuff as well rather than professional airmen/women that don't want to play squaddie in the first place, hence letting us old bu@@ers drip on whilst indoctrinating the youngsters with the spirit of the Hitler Youth and leveraging us out with BFT/CFT/CCS/FT secondments to the army, 16 AA and the rest. Try telling them "I didn't join-up for this" and be described as 'gasp' “resistant to change!”
The future's dull, the future's purple*
For purple read ARMY -the fun's over chaps
The future's dull, the future's purple*
For purple read ARMY -the fun's over chaps
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Hmmm, times come around.
Just reading Brigadier Allan Mallinson´s latest book (Matthew Hervey series, up to 4 of them now, well worth reading). He has the following in his foreward. There is more, but I precis it for brevity...
"...After 1819 [Waterloo] the threat of major disorder - of revolution even - receded too, and by 1825 the number of troops in Britain had fallen to 44,000. Financial retrenchment generally was the order of the day. The army estimates in 1815 had been 43 million, in 1829 they were less than a quarter of that, and by the end of the decade they had fallen even further, for by then the army was less than half the size of its high point at the time of Waterloo. And yet, as today, the army found itself called on to do more, not less, as imperial commitments began to mount....... In the 1820s and 30s up to seventy-five per cent of the the Brtish Infantry were stationed abroad or were in transit...
I have been surprised by remarks by otherwise kind reviewers on the question of what captain Matthew Hervey and the 6th Light Dragoons would find to do after Waterloo, the inference being that the world was at peace. The answer, then as today, is that the British army is never at peace. Not one year has gone by since that great battle without a British soldier dying by hostile hand. No other army in the world, save perhaps that of India, can claim such a testimony.......
Just reading Brigadier Allan Mallinson´s latest book (Matthew Hervey series, up to 4 of them now, well worth reading). He has the following in his foreward. There is more, but I precis it for brevity...
"...After 1819 [Waterloo] the threat of major disorder - of revolution even - receded too, and by 1825 the number of troops in Britain had fallen to 44,000. Financial retrenchment generally was the order of the day. The army estimates in 1815 had been 43 million, in 1829 they were less than a quarter of that, and by the end of the decade they had fallen even further, for by then the army was less than half the size of its high point at the time of Waterloo. And yet, as today, the army found itself called on to do more, not less, as imperial commitments began to mount....... In the 1820s and 30s up to seventy-five per cent of the the Brtish Infantry were stationed abroad or were in transit...
I have been surprised by remarks by otherwise kind reviewers on the question of what captain Matthew Hervey and the 6th Light Dragoons would find to do after Waterloo, the inference being that the world was at peace. The answer, then as today, is that the British army is never at peace. Not one year has gone by since that great battle without a British soldier dying by hostile hand. No other army in the world, save perhaps that of India, can claim such a testimony.......
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Not one year has gone by since that great battle without a British soldier dying by hostile hand.
What about 1969 ?
'We knew how to whinge but we kept it in the NAAFI bar.'
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The bottom line, we, as a nation, cannot afford to run an armed force as large as we currently have. The problem comes when we have a prime minister who's foreign policy involves committing british troops to every trouble spot in the world, whilst having a chancellor who is unwilling to increase expenditure on defence (you don't win votes by spending on defence unless the public can see, or imagine the enemy marching up their street). Whilst these two pull in opposite directions it will always be the folk in uniform who get stretched. What's needed is to lose one of these characters, which would appear to be exactly what's happening in the near future. So Mr Brown, what are you going to do when you sit down in the big chair? no more excuses then, if you argue with yourself, they'll cart you off to the funny farm and rightly so.
Meltown
Rant on
I have always maintained that since options for change we were/are in danger of becoming a third world air force.
We have the people across all ranks and trades to get us out of the mire most of the time, but there being asked to do it with equipment that is increasingly outdated and with every corner cut in the drive to save money, hence brain dead schemes such as front line farce.
Were getting a new fighter (At last) but we seem to be lacking in every other department. Not enough tankers, transport aircraft etc. The list is endless. Couple this with the British fascination of upgrade after upgrade of 30 year old designs and a budget that only allows the charter of "wogahumphdemumph" Airlines and its little wonder questions are now being asked about safety for those at the coal face. Yes being a serviceman carries a degree of danger, that degree should not,however, include the age and state of the equipment they are required to operate.
Look at the recent farce in Lebanon, get the civvies out quick was the cry from around the globe - what do we do? Send the Navy because we simply did not have the capability to carry out an airlift. That to me is shameful.
Meltdown? Not quite, but it's close.
rant off
as ever not spil chkd
I have always maintained that since options for change we were/are in danger of becoming a third world air force.
We have the people across all ranks and trades to get us out of the mire most of the time, but there being asked to do it with equipment that is increasingly outdated and with every corner cut in the drive to save money, hence brain dead schemes such as front line farce.
Were getting a new fighter (At last) but we seem to be lacking in every other department. Not enough tankers, transport aircraft etc. The list is endless. Couple this with the British fascination of upgrade after upgrade of 30 year old designs and a budget that only allows the charter of "wogahumphdemumph" Airlines and its little wonder questions are now being asked about safety for those at the coal face. Yes being a serviceman carries a degree of danger, that degree should not,however, include the age and state of the equipment they are required to operate.
Look at the recent farce in Lebanon, get the civvies out quick was the cry from around the globe - what do we do? Send the Navy because we simply did not have the capability to carry out an airlift. That to me is shameful.
Meltdown? Not quite, but it's close.
rant off
as ever not spil chkd
Last edited by Skeleton; 21st Nov 2006 at 11:45. Reason: Cos i support the hammers
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We sent some Chinny's. At the drop of a hat. That got on with the job and were airlifting 36 hrs after getting a "How about it fellas?" telephone call from above.
Needless to say, the might of the Navy publicity machine was no match for the chaps who were too busy operating to self-publicise.
Well done to those involved. And actually, if the Navy can show their relevance in today's world then fair play to 'em; it's more than Typhoon can muster.
Needless to say, the might of the Navy publicity machine was no match for the chaps who were too busy operating to self-publicise.
Well done to those involved. And actually, if the Navy can show their relevance in today's world then fair play to 'em; it's more than Typhoon can muster.
WPH,
I sense a semblance of irritation in your post! Don't forget that there were RN aircrew on 1 and 3(F) squadrons as well.
I do think that it is extremely obtuse of you (if you are serving RAF) to lay blame at the foot of the RN for some of the publicity it has generated. I suppose it is payback for all those grey Seakings being called RAF and all those Mark 4s being called RAF or Army. If the RN does not publicise it's activities, then the tax paying public will not be aware of it's highly important role. Out of sight, out of mind and the subsequent cuts. You don't see many warships sailing down Lincoln or Aldershot town centre, or flying over your house.
I fully support anyone who emphasises that the RN has been in the Gulf continously, since the Iran Iraq war, supported the assault on Al Fawr, supported air ops over Bosnia, supported ops in Sierra Leone, assisted evacuation in Beirut, gave support post Boxing DayTsunami, gave support in Kurdistan post GW1, gave support in Pakistan after the earthquake and much more.
My final note is that yes, these tasks were not done alone, they were conducted with the full support (most of the time) of the other two services. This final point, is a key lesson that some on Pprune could learn. Don't forget to give credit to others where it is due.
My best regards to all of you, especially those too busy operating to sit posting on here!
I sense a semblance of irritation in your post! Don't forget that there were RN aircrew on 1 and 3(F) squadrons as well.
I do think that it is extremely obtuse of you (if you are serving RAF) to lay blame at the foot of the RN for some of the publicity it has generated. I suppose it is payback for all those grey Seakings being called RAF and all those Mark 4s being called RAF or Army. If the RN does not publicise it's activities, then the tax paying public will not be aware of it's highly important role. Out of sight, out of mind and the subsequent cuts. You don't see many warships sailing down Lincoln or Aldershot town centre, or flying over your house.
I fully support anyone who emphasises that the RN has been in the Gulf continously, since the Iran Iraq war, supported the assault on Al Fawr, supported air ops over Bosnia, supported ops in Sierra Leone, assisted evacuation in Beirut, gave support post Boxing DayTsunami, gave support in Kurdistan post GW1, gave support in Pakistan after the earthquake and much more.
My final note is that yes, these tasks were not done alone, they were conducted with the full support (most of the time) of the other two services. This final point, is a key lesson that some on Pprune could learn. Don't forget to give credit to others where it is due.
My best regards to all of you, especially those too busy operating to sit posting on here!
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My point is that, in equipment terms, following otions for change there is clearly no intent to become a third rate Air Force. In fact, I would argue that the equipment programme is the envy of most air forces (USAF excepted). I would further argue that, in the very near future, our trooping, freighting, tanking, MPA, ISTAR, and multiple target attack capibilities (i.e. the actual number of kills we are able to achieve) will be greater than in any part of the RAF's History and probably is right now.
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Power is nothing without control
Charliesbar,
1. Despite all of the new aircraft and missiles, they are no good if there are no lads and lasses to maintain and deploy them.
2. Yes I agree the is no Intent to become a 3rd world air force, but if there is no support infrastructure (read -lads and lasses to maintain and deploy them) then you can't fly on hope and dreams.
3. BLACK BUCK springs to mind, as we couldn't do that tommorow even if we wanted to, so therefore we are weaker than 25 years ago on the tanking front.
4. I really, really don't want to be proved right, but I think it's only when the accident rate goes through the roof - and we loose people - that we realise we can't have defence on the cheap.
"For gods sakes be careful out there!"
1. Despite all of the new aircraft and missiles, they are no good if there are no lads and lasses to maintain and deploy them.
2. Yes I agree the is no Intent to become a 3rd world air force, but if there is no support infrastructure (read -lads and lasses to maintain and deploy them) then you can't fly on hope and dreams.
3. BLACK BUCK springs to mind, as we couldn't do that tommorow even if we wanted to, so therefore we are weaker than 25 years ago on the tanking front.
4. I really, really don't want to be proved right, but I think it's only when the accident rate goes through the roof - and we loose people - that we realise we can't have defence on the cheap.
"For gods sakes be careful out there!"
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Originally Posted by Mr Blake
I sent off a version of the following as a letter to the RAF News a while back, and have yet to receive a reply for some reason. It will be interesting to hear other peoples opinions on the contents.
I was pleased to see the letter from Sgt Mark Clay in issue 1136 of the RAF News, I'm sure his comments are welcomed by many, his point about the low morale of many personnel within the ground trades should cause concern. In recent months many have been affected by E2E Studies, Leaning and amalgamation, no doubt more will be, either by loss of individual posts, whole sections, or by leaving the service due to redundancy or natural wastage. The changes occurring within most ground trades vary from mild to traumatic, the rapidity of some of these changes in the interest of saving money does smack of knee jerk reactions to political or monetary pressure, it's only a matter of time before a few baby's get thrown out with the bathwater.
My reason for putting pen to paper is to ask if/when the people who have made all the changes to date are to be 'leaned', namely the management structure and the officer corps. The collocation of the two Command Headquarters may see a reduction of manpower by 1000, but most of this manpower will be civilians who are no longer needed when one Headquarters closes. Interesting debates will no doubt follow if this letter is published; here are a few points to ponder.
Why are there 11,115 officers between the rank of Group Captain and Pilot Officer? This figure includes aircrew, who are obviously needed, yet 1166 of the 3762 Flying branch posts are non-flying duties. In the other branch posts there are 414 Group Captains, 1341 Wing Commanders, 2337 Squadron Leaders and 3263 Flight Lieutenants and below. The figures quoted above are from the RAF Appointments Register, and can be found easily enough, not included in this list is the number of officers in training or holding awaiting a posting. How many of these posts can be justifiably classed as essential cogs in the machine required to produce a cost effective operational force? The ratio of executive officers per operational airframe must cause some raised eyebrows in Whitehall; add all the pay, gratuities and pensions together over 10 years and you can easily afford a few more Typhoons or JCA's. Why can't some of the posts occupied by junior officers be filled by Warrant Officers or Flt Sgts who have years of experience in their field? I have found no information on the number of serving Air Officers, but judging by the amount of Group Captains on the books this number must be high.
The career structure of the officer corps can also be improved upon, why is it that officers only do 2-year tours; can this be classed as good value for money? The methods used in End to End studies is to compare the work done to a large factory, using phrases such as 'customer', 'product' and 'materials'; continuing the theme, any civilian company worth it's salt would bend over backwards to keep a good manager in place, and would act quickly to move on or dismiss the worst. A two year tour gives little time for development, the first six months learning the job and getting to know people leaves just 18 months of actual productivity. Officers who excel within a certain post move on all too soon, often to an area that bears little or no relationship to the post they leave behind. With competent NCOs shouldering the burden a less adept manager can keep a low profile for 2 years relatively easily. A four year tour will allow the better officer to shine through career-wise, and allow the less competent to be seen for what they are and, hopefully, correct their failings. Other benefits would be increased stability for the individual, not to mention a reduction in training and movement costs.
I read with interest the article by ACM Sir Brian Burridge in issue 1,135 of the RAF News entitled 'RAF is adapting to new challenges', where he made some interesting comments on the changes to the structure of the RAF currently being undertaken. He concluded by saying 'we need a relevant Air Force; that's relevant operationally, and relevant in an economic or a value for money sense.' Adding 'We need fewer, but more adaptable people.' I have served over 26 years and like Sgt Clay have seen many changes, from the end of the Cold War to today's E2E; adaptability and the good old 'can do' attitude have been bywords that have been applied to airmen throughout. Speaking as an engineer we have seen the demise of the Flight Line Mechanic, Direct Entrant technician and the Apprentice, the Mech(Mech) and Mech(Tech) system quickly replaced with the SAC Tech causing the loss of the J/T rank, amalgamation of TG1 trades and the re-introduction of the Flight Line Mechanic in the form of the AMM. One area that has never changed in this time is the way the officer corps functions, and to my knowledge no one has looked into it's efficiency and effectiveness; with the future manning of the RAF giving a ratio of almost 1 officer for 2 airmen perhaps it's time to do so now.
In the late 80's it was said that you could get the whole of the RAF into Wembley, nowadays everyone would fit into the average Division 1 ground; but if seats were allocated by status the terraces would look empty, whilst the VIP boxes would be packed solid.
I was pleased to see the letter from Sgt Mark Clay in issue 1136 of the RAF News, I'm sure his comments are welcomed by many, his point about the low morale of many personnel within the ground trades should cause concern. In recent months many have been affected by E2E Studies, Leaning and amalgamation, no doubt more will be, either by loss of individual posts, whole sections, or by leaving the service due to redundancy or natural wastage. The changes occurring within most ground trades vary from mild to traumatic, the rapidity of some of these changes in the interest of saving money does smack of knee jerk reactions to political or monetary pressure, it's only a matter of time before a few baby's get thrown out with the bathwater.
My reason for putting pen to paper is to ask if/when the people who have made all the changes to date are to be 'leaned', namely the management structure and the officer corps. The collocation of the two Command Headquarters may see a reduction of manpower by 1000, but most of this manpower will be civilians who are no longer needed when one Headquarters closes. Interesting debates will no doubt follow if this letter is published; here are a few points to ponder.
Why are there 11,115 officers between the rank of Group Captain and Pilot Officer? This figure includes aircrew, who are obviously needed, yet 1166 of the 3762 Flying branch posts are non-flying duties. In the other branch posts there are 414 Group Captains, 1341 Wing Commanders, 2337 Squadron Leaders and 3263 Flight Lieutenants and below. The figures quoted above are from the RAF Appointments Register, and can be found easily enough, not included in this list is the number of officers in training or holding awaiting a posting. How many of these posts can be justifiably classed as essential cogs in the machine required to produce a cost effective operational force? The ratio of executive officers per operational airframe must cause some raised eyebrows in Whitehall; add all the pay, gratuities and pensions together over 10 years and you can easily afford a few more Typhoons or JCA's. Why can't some of the posts occupied by junior officers be filled by Warrant Officers or Flt Sgts who have years of experience in their field? I have found no information on the number of serving Air Officers, but judging by the amount of Group Captains on the books this number must be high.
The career structure of the officer corps can also be improved upon, why is it that officers only do 2-year tours; can this be classed as good value for money? The methods used in End to End studies is to compare the work done to a large factory, using phrases such as 'customer', 'product' and 'materials'; continuing the theme, any civilian company worth it's salt would bend over backwards to keep a good manager in place, and would act quickly to move on or dismiss the worst. A two year tour gives little time for development, the first six months learning the job and getting to know people leaves just 18 months of actual productivity. Officers who excel within a certain post move on all too soon, often to an area that bears little or no relationship to the post they leave behind. With competent NCOs shouldering the burden a less adept manager can keep a low profile for 2 years relatively easily. A four year tour will allow the better officer to shine through career-wise, and allow the less competent to be seen for what they are and, hopefully, correct their failings. Other benefits would be increased stability for the individual, not to mention a reduction in training and movement costs.
I read with interest the article by ACM Sir Brian Burridge in issue 1,135 of the RAF News entitled 'RAF is adapting to new challenges', where he made some interesting comments on the changes to the structure of the RAF currently being undertaken. He concluded by saying 'we need a relevant Air Force; that's relevant operationally, and relevant in an economic or a value for money sense.' Adding 'We need fewer, but more adaptable people.' I have served over 26 years and like Sgt Clay have seen many changes, from the end of the Cold War to today's E2E; adaptability and the good old 'can do' attitude have been bywords that have been applied to airmen throughout. Speaking as an engineer we have seen the demise of the Flight Line Mechanic, Direct Entrant technician and the Apprentice, the Mech(Mech) and Mech(Tech) system quickly replaced with the SAC Tech causing the loss of the J/T rank, amalgamation of TG1 trades and the re-introduction of the Flight Line Mechanic in the form of the AMM. One area that has never changed in this time is the way the officer corps functions, and to my knowledge no one has looked into it's efficiency and effectiveness; with the future manning of the RAF giving a ratio of almost 1 officer for 2 airmen perhaps it's time to do so now.
In the late 80's it was said that you could get the whole of the RAF into Wembley, nowadays everyone would fit into the average Division 1 ground; but if seats were allocated by status the terraces would look empty, whilst the VIP boxes would be packed solid.
I have to say that on EVERY occasion I have had cause to visit a line or hangar, on every stn I have been posted to (there have been MANY occasions on many stns), I haven't actually SEEN a great deal of 'work' going on. I have always, however, seen alot of lineys, sneks and jnrs, standing around in Control doing sweet FA - or in the tea bar. Why this seems to be so at a MOB is odd, because on a det the exact opposite is true - you won't find any techie / liney of ANY description doing anything other than working their arses off. A point in case - why does the line at LYE insist on having 4hrs for a role change, when the same can be done by the crew in 30 mins? Or even quicker than that by guys on an eng det with less manpower working in worse conditions?
If you're gonna throw stones, fellas, at least aim them in the right direction. Whilst it is blatantly obvious that the Officer Corp of the RAF is severely bloated, bear in mind that these figures are grossly distorted by the fact that all front-end aircrew are comissioned. Flt Lts / Fg Offs are the workers on Sqns, not the management - and some kind of attainable career path needs to be open to guys in order to retain them. Though quite why the blunter arms of the RAF need to structure themselves in a similar way, leaving way too much fat at the top, is beyond me.
For those who think replacing JO posts with SNCOs is the answer, remember that the average FS / WO costs the RAF, financially, just as much, if not more than, the average JO, in terms of both salary and pension - non-aircrew JOs are NOT very well paid! And there are just as many fat, useless, lazy, obstructive, unioinized SNCOs as there are stupid, aloof, incompetent, self-interested JOs - across ALL trades and branches.
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Inquisitor,
How dare you call SNCOs fat, I'll have you know that I have done my annual 8 pressups 15 sit ups and 3.1 bleep test without complaint for many years. Granted my Ron Hills are a bit thong like , but I can still cut a rug in my crimpelines at a Mess dance.
How dare you call SNCOs fat, I'll have you know that I have done my annual 8 pressups 15 sit ups and 3.1 bleep test without complaint for many years. Granted my Ron Hills are a bit thong like , but I can still cut a rug in my crimpelines at a Mess dance.