Nimrod crash in Afghanistan Tech/Info/Discussion (NOT condolences)
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Because CAS said so. Supposedly he has followed the lead set by the Army and the Navy for Serving witnesses at Inquests. This is also consistent with members of HM Forces being seen in Uniform in the 'public eye' more frequently.
Erm, Strongbowfan, because they were/are witnesses at an inquest, I guess. An inquest which is, like all inquests, not a trial, but a means of establishing who the dead people were, and when, where and how they died. As the coroner explained today.
I mean, why should service personnel not be named at an inquest? No one else (well practically no one) gets anonymity.
I would have thought a better question would have been 'why were so many of the service witnesses at the Hercules inquest identified only by letters?' In fact, in the case of one of them, he named himself, and the coroner said he was not to be named by the press. No explanation given.
Today's RAF witnesses didn't all have to be in uniform - one was in a suit.
I suppose the very occasional one might become threatened by having their photo and/or moving pix broadcast to the world - but surely not many, and anyone who is seriously worried can presumably ask for anonymity.
I'm sure that the MoD's barrister David Evans (I presume I can name him here?) would have been out of the trap like a shot if he thought someone was possibly courting the tiniest smidgeon of lack of security.
I suggest that there is sometimes a bit too much 'special pleading' for members of the armed forces to be treated differently to other citizens of this country that we're all proud to be part of.
It's that kind of attitude that can lead, if we're not very careful, to the MoD using security as an excuse for not telling the taxpayer why they've screwed up. Fortunately, they'd never do that, would they?
airsound
I mean, why should service personnel not be named at an inquest? No one else (well practically no one) gets anonymity.
I would have thought a better question would have been 'why were so many of the service witnesses at the Hercules inquest identified only by letters?' In fact, in the case of one of them, he named himself, and the coroner said he was not to be named by the press. No explanation given.
Today's RAF witnesses didn't all have to be in uniform - one was in a suit.
I suppose the very occasional one might become threatened by having their photo and/or moving pix broadcast to the world - but surely not many, and anyone who is seriously worried can presumably ask for anonymity.
I'm sure that the MoD's barrister David Evans (I presume I can name him here?) would have been out of the trap like a shot if he thought someone was possibly courting the tiniest smidgeon of lack of security.
I suggest that there is sometimes a bit too much 'special pleading' for members of the armed forces to be treated differently to other citizens of this country that we're all proud to be part of.
It's that kind of attitude that can lead, if we're not very careful, to the MoD using security as an excuse for not telling the taxpayer why they've screwed up. Fortunately, they'd never do that, would they?
airsound
Last edited by airsound; 7th May 2008 at 19:21. Reason: word missing
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Any chance that they might just admit, one day, that the things that were and are not very pointy things have been underfunded for decades. And that those investment decisions were mostly made by promoted former operators of said pointy things.
Oh, and perhaps there was an interest in Whitehall of agreeing with chancellors various to keep British Waste of Space in business and thus guaranteeing promotion in the Building and future employment after retirement elsewhere?
Oops - written in the early hours - but I hope people get my gist!
Oh, and perhaps there was an interest in Whitehall of agreeing with chancellors various to keep British Waste of Space in business and thus guaranteeing promotion in the Building and future employment after retirement elsewhere?
Oops - written in the early hours - but I hope people get my gist!
Tried to post the Terms of Reference set by the SoS, but the quote fragmented into computer gobbledygook, Flipster. Review website is at
http://www.nimrod-review.org.uk/
The only person who can truly answer your $64,000 question is Mr Browne. Of course, it now appears that his tenure may not allow him to be around when this review presents, nor come to that his own Mull Review (will he be mailing that in from his retirement cottage?). Some might say that the reason for these reviews and his early departure were not unconnected, but I could not possibly comment. Of course the Coroners Inquest is into the deaths of the occupants of the aircraft, whereas the review seems to be aimed more at the aircraft itself, but the difference is merely one of semantics I guess.
http://www.nimrod-review.org.uk/
The only person who can truly answer your $64,000 question is Mr Browne. Of course, it now appears that his tenure may not allow him to be around when this review presents, nor come to that his own Mull Review (will he be mailing that in from his retirement cottage?). Some might say that the reason for these reviews and his early departure were not unconnected, but I could not possibly comment. Of course the Coroners Inquest is into the deaths of the occupants of the aircraft, whereas the review seems to be aimed more at the aircraft itself, but the difference is merely one of semantics I guess.
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Why shouldn't serving officers be named? Christ.. they're happy enough to be seen and named, booted and spured in RAF News when it suits them. So to do it for the interests of justice doesn't seem unreasonable to me. One of the reasons that we have one avoidable debacle after another like this is because nobody has the balls or the moral authority to submit themselves to accountability, or to demand it from others.
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Strictly, I don't know why it was deemed necessary to have the Review as well as the Inquest. However, the scope of the Review is clearly different to the Inquest so we can take a pretty good guess. The ToRs for the Review are:
The first two bullets focus on Nimrod and thus will overlap with the Inquest significantly. I believe that the third bullet, though somewhat vague, indicates that the scope of the Review covers MoD's approach to Safety Cases in general and not just for the Nimrod. (I suppose it's conceivable that the scope of the third bullet may end up being confined to aircraft Safety Cases, to make it practicable.)
In light of the board of inquiry report:
· To examine the arrangements for assuring the airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod MR2 in the period from its introduction in 1979 to the accident on 2 September 2006, including hazard analysis, the safety case compiled in 2005, maintenance arrangements, and responses to any earlier incidents which might have highlighted the risk and led to corrective action;
· To assess where responsibility lies for any failures and what lessons are to be learned;
· To assess more broadly the process for compiling safety cases, taking account of best practice in the civilian and military world;
· And to make recommendations to the Secretary of State as soon as practicable, if necessary by way of interim report.
· To examine the arrangements for assuring the airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod MR2 in the period from its introduction in 1979 to the accident on 2 September 2006, including hazard analysis, the safety case compiled in 2005, maintenance arrangements, and responses to any earlier incidents which might have highlighted the risk and led to corrective action;
· To assess where responsibility lies for any failures and what lessons are to be learned;
· To assess more broadly the process for compiling safety cases, taking account of best practice in the civilian and military world;
· And to make recommendations to the Secretary of State as soon as practicable, if necessary by way of interim report.
The first two bullets focus on Nimrod and thus will overlap with the Inquest significantly. I believe that the third bullet, though somewhat vague, indicates that the scope of the Review covers MoD's approach to Safety Cases in general and not just for the Nimrod. (I suppose it's conceivable that the scope of the third bullet may end up being confined to aircraft Safety Cases, to make it practicable.)
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BBC - RAF Nimrods 'had fuel problems' http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7390471.stm
Sergeant Andrew Whitmore said he first noticed the corrosion while investigating the cause of a fuel leak on a Nimrod in the same fleet as the XV230, before the tragedy.
He described it as "quite shocking" and said the "salty air" was the most likely cause of the corrosion on the aircraft, which is heavily used for air-sea rescues.
But the court heard that a check of all the couplings across the entire fleet was only ordered after the incident.
At that point the fleet was grounded and engineers found further corroded couplings.
"We didn't find any leaks but it was only a matter of time," said Sgt Whitmore.
"We found dinted fuel pipes and broken bonding leads."
The RAF continued air-to-air refuelling after the tragedy but a further two incidents involving fuel leaks led to the practice being suspended, the court heard.
He described it as "quite shocking" and said the "salty air" was the most likely cause of the corrosion on the aircraft, which is heavily used for air-sea rescues.
But the court heard that a check of all the couplings across the entire fleet was only ordered after the incident.
At that point the fleet was grounded and engineers found further corroded couplings.
"We didn't find any leaks but it was only a matter of time," said Sgt Whitmore.
"We found dinted fuel pipes and broken bonding leads."
The RAF continued air-to-air refuelling after the tragedy but a further two incidents involving fuel leaks led to the practice being suspended, the court heard.
And if a civilian operator did this....
The RAF Nimrod aircraft that exploded in mid-air over Afghanistan killing all 14 servicemen on board was “beyond its sell-by date”, a former senior air force commander admitted at an inquest yesterday.
Wing Commander John Bromehead, the officer commanding Logistics Support Wing at RAF Kinloss, home of the Nimrods, at the time of the crash in September 2006, believed the accident was caused by leaking fuel igniting on a hot air pipe. The 37-year-old surveillance aircraft burst into flames at 3,000ft.
He told the Oxford hearing: “The bathtub curve is a general engineering principle, that is when something gets old it is more likely to break. I did have concerns that the Nimrod may be hitting the far end of the bathtub curve.” Wing Commander Bromehead revealed that in recent years there had been “a dilution of skills and experience” among RAF engineers, which made it more likely that problems with aircraft could be missed.
Continual cost-cutting and management restructuring had created “turmoil” in the RAF, which was why he had decided to leave the air force.
Wing Commander John Bromehead, the officer commanding Logistics Support Wing at RAF Kinloss, home of the Nimrods, at the time of the crash in September 2006, believed the accident was caused by leaking fuel igniting on a hot air pipe. The 37-year-old surveillance aircraft burst into flames at 3,000ft.
He told the Oxford hearing: “The bathtub curve is a general engineering principle, that is when something gets old it is more likely to break. I did have concerns that the Nimrod may be hitting the far end of the bathtub curve.” Wing Commander Bromehead revealed that in recent years there had been “a dilution of skills and experience” among RAF engineers, which made it more likely that problems with aircraft could be missed.
Continual cost-cutting and management restructuring had created “turmoil” in the RAF, which was why he had decided to leave the air force.
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Nimrod accident
Is it only Wg Cdr Bromehead who believes the cause of the Nimrod accident was fuel leaking onto a bleed air pipe? At 3000' a SAM could well have been involved. The fact that the Nimrod was 37 years old may or may not have been a factor. There are many aircraft much older than 37 years of age still flying safely. On going maintenance over the years often results in the aircraft age becoming irrelevant. Lets wait for the official findings before getting too judgemental.
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Is it only Wg Cdr Bromehead who believes the cause of the Nimrod accident was fuel leaking onto a bleed air pipe?
BoI Report
A precised version is available on the BBC website. BoI Briefing
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OF - since when was 3000' anywhere near FL220 
We have a published BoI which may one suggest you read... and then decide the purpose and scope of the inquest re the direct causes of the accident v the broader environment that led to those cause
NoD
We have a published BoI which may one suggest you read... and then decide the purpose and scope of the inquest re the direct causes of the accident v the broader environment that led to those cause
NoD
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Nimrod accident
NoD and srobarts. My apologies for responding to the post of JimBall without first referencing the BoI report. JimBall says "The 37 year old surveillance aircraft burst into flames at 3000 feet" which was the basis of my comment re SAM's. I will read the BoI report to properly inform myself of the findings. Addition. I have read the BoI Briefing and whilst I accept that there was indeed fire present from shortly after the refuel operation at FL220, the fact that the explosion did not occur until 3000' AGL could reasonably lead to the possibility that a SAM was involved in the final moments of the fatal flight. The BoI Briefing states that much of the wreckage was not recovered due the hostile environment and the scavenging by nationals.
Last edited by Old Fella; 10th May 2008 at 09:50. Reason: Further information from BoI Briefing
What an amazing coincidence that Johnny Taliban would have chosen exactly the right place in time and space to watch the stricken Nimrod descend from FL220 and level off right into Johnny's SA-7 threat envelope at a very handy 3000'.
This shows that Johnny Taliban must have massively superior I&W and seemingly limitless supplies of MANPADS to spread around Afghan in the event of stricken Nimrods descending into the threat band.
I say again, either amazing luck, or superior intelligence and C2, or perhaps...
(RIP fellas
)
This shows that Johnny Taliban must have massively superior I&W and seemingly limitless supplies of MANPADS to spread around Afghan in the event of stricken Nimrods descending into the threat band.
I say again, either amazing luck, or superior intelligence and C2, or perhaps...
(RIP fellas
)
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Today's Times;
Nimrod fuel leaks unrepaired in 'cuts turmoil'
Michael Evans, Defence Editor
The RAF Nimrod aircraft that exploded in mid-air over Afghanistan killing all 14 servicemen on board was “beyond its sell-by date”, a former senior air force commander admitted at an inquest yesterday.
Wing Commander John Bromehead, the officer commanding Logistics Support Wing at RAF Kinloss, home of the Nimrods, at the time of the crash in September 2006, believed the accident was caused by leaking fuel igniting on a hot air pipe. The 37-year-old surveillance aircraft burst into flames at 3,000ft.
He told the Oxford hearing: “The bathtub curve [As described here byTuc], is a general engineering principle, that is when something gets old it is more likely to break. I did have concerns that the Nimrod may be hitting the far end of the bathtub curve.” Wing Commander Bromehead revealed that in recent years there had been “a dilution of skills and experience” among RAF engineers, which made it more likely that problems with aircraft could be missed.
Continual cost-cutting and management restructuring had created “turmoil” in the RAF, which was why he had decided to leave the air force.
He had not been told in the months before the crash of a rise in fuel leaks on Nimrods, which he admitted was a “really serious failure”. However, he said that when leaks occurred, they were not always repaired. They were dealt with according to severity, with engineers ensuring that they were within “prescribed limits”.
When the board of inquiry report was published in December, Des Browne, the Defence Secretary, apologised to the families of the victims for the shortcomings that led to the crash.
Ten of the victims were serving with the RAF, one was from the Parachute Regiment and the other was a Royal Marine. The inquest was adjourned until Monday.
Nimrod fuel leaks unrepaired in 'cuts turmoil'
Michael Evans, Defence Editor
The RAF Nimrod aircraft that exploded in mid-air over Afghanistan killing all 14 servicemen on board was “beyond its sell-by date”, a former senior air force commander admitted at an inquest yesterday.
Wing Commander John Bromehead, the officer commanding Logistics Support Wing at RAF Kinloss, home of the Nimrods, at the time of the crash in September 2006, believed the accident was caused by leaking fuel igniting on a hot air pipe. The 37-year-old surveillance aircraft burst into flames at 3,000ft.
He told the Oxford hearing: “The bathtub curve [As described here byTuc], is a general engineering principle, that is when something gets old it is more likely to break. I did have concerns that the Nimrod may be hitting the far end of the bathtub curve.” Wing Commander Bromehead revealed that in recent years there had been “a dilution of skills and experience” among RAF engineers, which made it more likely that problems with aircraft could be missed.
Continual cost-cutting and management restructuring had created “turmoil” in the RAF, which was why he had decided to leave the air force.
He had not been told in the months before the crash of a rise in fuel leaks on Nimrods, which he admitted was a “really serious failure”. However, he said that when leaks occurred, they were not always repaired. They were dealt with according to severity, with engineers ensuring that they were within “prescribed limits”.
When the board of inquiry report was published in December, Des Browne, the Defence Secretary, apologised to the families of the victims for the shortcomings that led to the crash.
Ten of the victims were serving with the RAF, one was from the Parachute Regiment and the other was a Royal Marine. The inquest was adjourned until Monday.
Times Report
I’m not entirely comfortable with the Wg Cdr being described as “a senior air force commander”. While pprune readers know very well that a “mere” Wg Cdr is s##t under the feet of most of his seniors, it gives the public (perhaps including some of the bereaved) a false impression that he was in a position to fix the problem; and deflects attention away from those of his seniors who were advised many years ago of the problems and did nothing. Rather like flipster’s evidence and experiences.
He mentions the “bathtub curve”. Fine. Was this followed by an explanation of cause and effect, and how we are taught to mitigate the effects? Or a (retired) Air Vice Marshal being asked to explain why, in 1992, he supported his non-engineering staffs (in AMSO) when they reduced support funding on the basis that “reliability improves with age, so we don’t need funding for spares and repairs”. That is, their bathtub was open ended and all their toys floated out, only to be grounded. Sorry, a little humour. If a Wg Cdr made such a decision, it may only affect his small area of responsibility. When an AVM pronounces, it affects ALL aircraft support across 3 Services. And, as I always say, once cut it is almost impossible to get it back.
The most senior people knew of this. That is why the QC’s review must be wide ranging. What I’ve just described is a failure to implement airworthiness regs. In fact, it drove a bus through them. That cavalier and self-serving attitude toward airworthiness is precisely what ACM Loader was alluding to in his comments which forced SoS to admit liability.
For those interested, the good book (and it is a good book) says that if the failure rate increases you (the User HQ) address the following. (But first, you have to know the failure rate IS increasing. Funding for that has been slashed).
The regs also note you need trained staffs to not only monitor this, but manage it to a successful conclusion – two very different things. I once moaned and groaned that we had plenty monitors (which is something you do at school dinners) but few experienced managers. If I recall, the subject was a critical safety problem caused by a non-engineer making an engineering design decision. A (proper) senior officer told me I was splitting hairs. Really?
Did I mention – funding has been slashed. It doesn’t help that the same AVM I mentioned above deemed refusing to knowingly waste money a sackable offence. Management set the tone. When that particular tone emits, is it little wonder MoD is going to hell in a bucket?
I’m not entirely comfortable with the Wg Cdr being described as “a senior air force commander”. While pprune readers know very well that a “mere” Wg Cdr is s##t under the feet of most of his seniors, it gives the public (perhaps including some of the bereaved) a false impression that he was in a position to fix the problem; and deflects attention away from those of his seniors who were advised many years ago of the problems and did nothing. Rather like flipster’s evidence and experiences.
He mentions the “bathtub curve”. Fine. Was this followed by an explanation of cause and effect, and how we are taught to mitigate the effects? Or a (retired) Air Vice Marshal being asked to explain why, in 1992, he supported his non-engineering staffs (in AMSO) when they reduced support funding on the basis that “reliability improves with age, so we don’t need funding for spares and repairs”. That is, their bathtub was open ended and all their toys floated out, only to be grounded. Sorry, a little humour. If a Wg Cdr made such a decision, it may only affect his small area of responsibility. When an AVM pronounces, it affects ALL aircraft support across 3 Services. And, as I always say, once cut it is almost impossible to get it back.
The most senior people knew of this. That is why the QC’s review must be wide ranging. What I’ve just described is a failure to implement airworthiness regs. In fact, it drove a bus through them. That cavalier and self-serving attitude toward airworthiness is precisely what ACM Loader was alluding to in his comments which forced SoS to admit liability.
For those interested, the good book (and it is a good book) says that if the failure rate increases you (the User HQ) address the following. (But first, you have to know the failure rate IS increasing. Funding for that has been slashed).
- Improve reliability. Seldom the cheapest route as there are compensatory measures that can achieve the desired outcome. Anyway, funding has been slashed.
- Increase number of aircraft. Can’t, funding has been slashed.
- Reduce Flying Rate. Already done, but then increased again as we’re at war, but funding is still being slashed.
- Reduce repair pipeline time. This costs money, and funding has been slashed.
- Increase Recovery Rate at 1st line (and 2nd for equipment). This needs e.g. spares, trained manpower, facilities, up to date servicing procedures etc; all of which have been reduced due to slashed funding.
The regs also note you need trained staffs to not only monitor this, but manage it to a successful conclusion – two very different things. I once moaned and groaned that we had plenty monitors (which is something you do at school dinners) but few experienced managers. If I recall, the subject was a critical safety problem caused by a non-engineer making an engineering design decision. A (proper) senior officer told me I was splitting hairs. Really?
Did I mention – funding has been slashed. It doesn’t help that the same AVM I mentioned above deemed refusing to knowingly waste money a sackable offence. Management set the tone. When that particular tone emits, is it little wonder MoD is going to hell in a bucket?
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Tuc
Eloquent as ever - the break must have done you good!?
So, one can appreciate that funding has been slashed (!) ....but is there any answer to the MoD's failings on airworthiness?
Eloquent as ever - the break must have done you good!?
So, one can appreciate that funding has been slashed (!) ....but is there any answer to the MoD's failings on airworthiness?
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i have refrained from being involved in this but i would like to say that my thoughts and respect are with all the families and those affected by the tragic loss of those brave men. take heart from those trying to do what is right and trying to prevent this from ever occuring again. intentions are only good. sadly as i know all too well and as re iterated from the mouth of one officer (though he claims he can't recall) it will take someone being brought down and being killed to change things. sadly, we know too well of the reality of those words and how they haunt us. i want to say that i hope to god that the families are not subjected to the constant repeated phrase being spouted out from witnesses i cannot recall.
keep the faith
keep the faith