What does a Latte cost?
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What does a Latte cost?
Vietnam was said to have a 1:10 ration of actual combat troops to logistics personnel. Things seem to have gotten worse over the years. Fixed bases require a lot of effort and resources to set up, operate, maintain, and protect.
Our enemies aren't drinking lattes
Author:
Max Boot, Senior Fellow for National Security Studies
July 5, 2006
Los Angeles Times
“Amateurs talk strategy. Professionals talk logistics.” That well-worn saying, sometimes attributed to Gen. Omar Bradley, contains an obvious element of wisdom. Modern militaries cannot fight without a lengthy supply chain, and the success or failure of major operations can turn on the work of anonymous logisticians.
Yet there is a danger of professional soldiers becoming so focused on supply lines that they lose sight of larger strategic imperatives. In Afghanistan and Iraq, we may already have crossed that threshold.
In the past few months, I have traveled across U.S. Central Command’s area of operations—a vast domain stretching from the deserts of Arabia to the mountains of the Hindu Kush. Everywhere, I have found massive bases fortified with endless rows of concrete barriers and stocked with every convenience known to 21st century Americans.
Some front-line units continue to operate out of spartan outposts where a hot meal is a luxury and flush toilets unknown. But growing numbers of troops live on giant installations complete with Wal-Mart-style post exchanges, movie theaters, swimming pools, gyms, fast-food eateries (Subway, Burger King, Cinnabon) and vast chow halls offering fresh-baked pies and multiple flavors of ice cream. Troops increasingly live in dorm-style quarters (called “chews,” for “containerized housing units”) complete with TVs, mini-refrigerators, air conditioning/heating units and other luxuries unimaginable to previous generations of GIs.
No one would begrudge a few conveniences to those who have volunteered to defend us. But the military’s logistics feats come with a high price tag that goes far beyond the $7.7 billion we spend every month on operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. U.S. troops in those countries consume 882,000 liters of water and 2.4 million gallons of fuel every day, plus tons of other supplies that have to be transported across dangerous war zones. Centcom has more than 3,000 trucks delivering supplies and another 2,400 moving fuel—each one a target that has to be protected.
Among the more surrealistic moments of my travels was pausing at a base near Baqubah—a far-from-pacified Iraqi city that was Abu Musab Zarqawi’s last base of operations—to enjoy a fresh-brewed iced latte at a Green Beans coffee shop. It hit the spot, but when I later told a Marine captain about the experience, he took away some of my enjoyment by asking, “I wonder how many men had to die to get those coffee beans to Baqubah?”
Good question. Supply lines are indeed vulnerable. So are the bases themselves. Keeping everything running safely and smoothly eats up a lot of scarce manpower. According to Centcom, there are 20,000 combat service support troops in its area of operations and another 80,000 contracted civilians. (The U.S. has a total of 150,000 troops in Afghanistan and Iraq.) The latter figure no doubt includes many private security guards, but numerous soldiers are also needed to protect all of these logistics lines, and casualties are inevitable.
In large part for reasons of security and convenience—a few big installations are easier to defend and supply than a lot of small ones—more and more soldiers and support personnel are congregating in a handful of mega-bases, such as Logistics Support Area Anaconda in Iraq, which has about 30,000 inhabitants. When spending time on such installations, it’s easy to forget where you are. The only reminder that you're not in Ft. Hood, Texas, comes in the form of occasional, inaccurate mortar rounds or rockets fired by insurgents.
Successful counterinsurgency operations require troops to go out among the people, gathering intelligence and building goodwill. But few Iraqis are allowed on these bases, and few Americans are allowed out—and then only in forbidding armored convoys.
Most of our resources aren’t going to fight terrorists but to maintain a smattering of mini-Americas in the Middle East. As one Special Forces officer pungently put it to me: “The only function that thousands of people are performing out here is to turn food into [excrement].”
How to explain this seemingly counterproductive behavior? My theory is that any organization prefers to focus on what it does well. In the case of the Pentagon, that’s logistics. Our ability to move supplies is unparalleled in military history. Fighting guerrillas, on the other hand, has never been a mission that has found much favor with the armed forces. So logistics trumps strategy. Which may help explain why we're not having greater success in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Author:
Max Boot, Senior Fellow for National Security Studies
July 5, 2006
Los Angeles Times
“Amateurs talk strategy. Professionals talk logistics.” That well-worn saying, sometimes attributed to Gen. Omar Bradley, contains an obvious element of wisdom. Modern militaries cannot fight without a lengthy supply chain, and the success or failure of major operations can turn on the work of anonymous logisticians.
Yet there is a danger of professional soldiers becoming so focused on supply lines that they lose sight of larger strategic imperatives. In Afghanistan and Iraq, we may already have crossed that threshold.
In the past few months, I have traveled across U.S. Central Command’s area of operations—a vast domain stretching from the deserts of Arabia to the mountains of the Hindu Kush. Everywhere, I have found massive bases fortified with endless rows of concrete barriers and stocked with every convenience known to 21st century Americans.
Some front-line units continue to operate out of spartan outposts where a hot meal is a luxury and flush toilets unknown. But growing numbers of troops live on giant installations complete with Wal-Mart-style post exchanges, movie theaters, swimming pools, gyms, fast-food eateries (Subway, Burger King, Cinnabon) and vast chow halls offering fresh-baked pies and multiple flavors of ice cream. Troops increasingly live in dorm-style quarters (called “chews,” for “containerized housing units”) complete with TVs, mini-refrigerators, air conditioning/heating units and other luxuries unimaginable to previous generations of GIs.
No one would begrudge a few conveniences to those who have volunteered to defend us. But the military’s logistics feats come with a high price tag that goes far beyond the $7.7 billion we spend every month on operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. U.S. troops in those countries consume 882,000 liters of water and 2.4 million gallons of fuel every day, plus tons of other supplies that have to be transported across dangerous war zones. Centcom has more than 3,000 trucks delivering supplies and another 2,400 moving fuel—each one a target that has to be protected.
Among the more surrealistic moments of my travels was pausing at a base near Baqubah—a far-from-pacified Iraqi city that was Abu Musab Zarqawi’s last base of operations—to enjoy a fresh-brewed iced latte at a Green Beans coffee shop. It hit the spot, but when I later told a Marine captain about the experience, he took away some of my enjoyment by asking, “I wonder how many men had to die to get those coffee beans to Baqubah?”
Good question. Supply lines are indeed vulnerable. So are the bases themselves. Keeping everything running safely and smoothly eats up a lot of scarce manpower. According to Centcom, there are 20,000 combat service support troops in its area of operations and another 80,000 contracted civilians. (The U.S. has a total of 150,000 troops in Afghanistan and Iraq.) The latter figure no doubt includes many private security guards, but numerous soldiers are also needed to protect all of these logistics lines, and casualties are inevitable.
In large part for reasons of security and convenience—a few big installations are easier to defend and supply than a lot of small ones—more and more soldiers and support personnel are congregating in a handful of mega-bases, such as Logistics Support Area Anaconda in Iraq, which has about 30,000 inhabitants. When spending time on such installations, it’s easy to forget where you are. The only reminder that you're not in Ft. Hood, Texas, comes in the form of occasional, inaccurate mortar rounds or rockets fired by insurgents.
Successful counterinsurgency operations require troops to go out among the people, gathering intelligence and building goodwill. But few Iraqis are allowed on these bases, and few Americans are allowed out—and then only in forbidding armored convoys.
Most of our resources aren’t going to fight terrorists but to maintain a smattering of mini-Americas in the Middle East. As one Special Forces officer pungently put it to me: “The only function that thousands of people are performing out here is to turn food into [excrement].”
How to explain this seemingly counterproductive behavior? My theory is that any organization prefers to focus on what it does well. In the case of the Pentagon, that’s logistics. Our ability to move supplies is unparalleled in military history. Fighting guerrillas, on the other hand, has never been a mission that has found much favor with the armed forces. So logistics trumps strategy. Which may help explain why we're not having greater success in Iraq and Afghanistan.
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Vietnam was said to have a 1:10 ration of actual combat troops to logistics personnel
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Except for our Moonlight Requistioning.....facilitated by 16 Chinooks at hand....you are right. Our PX...as it was called...had a very good selection of....empty shelves. Flush toilets? Running water? Hot shower?
After eleven months...got to Sydney for R&R. First order of business was simply a hot shower, steak and eggs, strong drink....a real bed.
Now the Air Force....that was another story! Pizza parlours, cafeterias, proper BX's with shelves of neat kit. A/C and hot running water, flush toilets...they knew how to live in a combat zone.
After eleven months...got to Sydney for R&R. First order of business was simply a hot shower, steak and eggs, strong drink....a real bed.
Now the Air Force....that was another story! Pizza parlours, cafeterias, proper BX's with shelves of neat kit. A/C and hot running water, flush toilets...they knew how to live in a combat zone.
2 of the most surreal moments in my career were ordering a latte in the US embassy in Baghdad, then going outside to watch a pool party in progress with gunfire in the background. The IZ and Victory/Slayer are worlds apart from the real Iraq.
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SASless
An interesting thought.
On 1 May 1945 the RAF numbered 1,079,835 personnel, of whom 193,313 were Aircrew (17.9 %). If your Infantry/ Armoured units (sorry for the proper spelling but we did invent the Tank - even if it was the Royal Navy who did so) are down to a combat ratio of 1:9 then someone needs to start banging some heads together. A 10% conversion of support personnel to combat duties would almost double the number of effectives "on the ground".
An interesting thought.
On 1 May 1945 the RAF numbered 1,079,835 personnel, of whom 193,313 were Aircrew (17.9 %). If your Infantry/ Armoured units (sorry for the proper spelling but we did invent the Tank - even if it was the Royal Navy who did so) are down to a combat ratio of 1:9 then someone needs to start banging some heads together. A 10% conversion of support personnel to combat duties would almost double the number of effectives "on the ground".
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The size of the logistics chain in modern operations is very much due to the complexity of many of the systems that modern 'teeth arms' use.
Complex equipment has complex supply problems.
Complex equipment has complex supply problems.
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But growing numbers of troops live on giant installations complete with Wal-Mart-style post exchanges, movie theaters, swimming pools, gyms, fast-food eateries (Subway, Burger King, Cinnabon) and vast chow halls offering fresh-baked pies and multiple flavors of ice cream.
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The Helpful Stacker,
Sorry, I was making the assumption that in 1945 the RAF WAS at the fore-front of Military technology. Also you had to factor in something like a 25% loss rate to enemy action. In 1942/3 you could probably make that 50%.
Sorry, I was making the assumption that in 1945 the RAF WAS at the fore-front of Military technology. Also you had to factor in something like a 25% loss rate to enemy action. In 1942/3 you could probably make that 50%.
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Hit the nail on the head, Caz. These days of lean and just-in-time logistics, there IS no 'fat' which you can factor in. Lose half a dozen Chinooks and you're up the creek without the proverbial. [Like the Falklands?]
I certainly don't begrudge ANY comfort that can be provided for the men at the front. Just a shame that they ALL don't have the facilities...
I certainly don't begrudge ANY comfort that can be provided for the men at the front. Just a shame that they ALL don't have the facilities...
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Originally Posted by cazatou
The Helpful Stacker,
Sorry, I was making the assumption that in 1945 the RAF WAS at the fore-front of Military technology. Also you had to factor in something like a 25% loss rate to enemy action. In 1942/3 you could probably make that 50%.
Sorry, I was making the assumption that in 1945 the RAF WAS at the fore-front of Military technology. Also you had to factor in something like a 25% loss rate to enemy action. In 1942/3 you could probably make that 50%.
In days gone by nearly everything on a WS or a/c could be bodged to work one way or the other by the operator, liney. Now days most WS's and a/c are reliant on many black boxes, none of which are generally 1st line repairable, necessitating large FAP's (in the case of a/c) to support each airframe. The FAP's themselves need looking after, transporting etc. Then the vehicle that transported them needs looking after, transporting etc, and on and on.
Modern wizz bang a/c are great, until they go tits up and then that logistics footprint really grows.
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Originally Posted by BEagle
"Complex equipment has complex supply problems."
But you still can't have it - it's the last one and someone might want it!
But you still can't have it - it's the last one and someone might want it!
And its no good pointing, USAS says its not there.
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The Helpful Stacker,
Sorry, but I don't think you get the point. The aircraft that were lost were gone. The ones that were damaged were repaired and a new (probably unbloodied) crew were assigned. The Offensive continued.
Today, we do not have the aircraft; there are precious few spares and, more importantly, we do not have any reserves of Aircrew to replace Casualties or those who are just "Burnt Out".
Innsworth never even bothered to reply when I notified them of my change of address. How many people have they lost contact with through incompetent staff work? A Postcard would have done!!!!
An Air Force relies, ultimately, on the capability of its Aircrews; if you have no reserves or replacements to continue a fight after the first couple of weeks then the money spent on that force has been wasted. You do not expect an Infantry Battalion to be in continual combat without any relief or reinforcements for a fortnight.
Sorry, but I don't think you get the point. The aircraft that were lost were gone. The ones that were damaged were repaired and a new (probably unbloodied) crew were assigned. The Offensive continued.
Today, we do not have the aircraft; there are precious few spares and, more importantly, we do not have any reserves of Aircrew to replace Casualties or those who are just "Burnt Out".
Innsworth never even bothered to reply when I notified them of my change of address. How many people have they lost contact with through incompetent staff work? A Postcard would have done!!!!
An Air Force relies, ultimately, on the capability of its Aircrews; if you have no reserves or replacements to continue a fight after the first couple of weeks then the money spent on that force has been wasted. You do not expect an Infantry Battalion to be in continual combat without any relief or reinforcements for a fortnight.
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Ok I'll put it another way.
My comments are in no way, not one little bit, to do with what you posted. My comments are aimed at the initial post, more specifically this,
My comments are in no way, not one little bit, to do with what you posted. My comments are aimed at the initial post, more specifically this,
Vietnam was said to have a 1:10 ration of actual combat troops to logistics personnel. Things seem to have gotten worse over the years.
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The US Mil have always gone in heavy with the 'Little America' side of things and I know my colleagues have always found it to be another world. However, when you send a lot of very young kids a long way from home, you have to give them something to do for a year or so.
We've just got b-ugger all and we make do with not quite enough. I can safely say our lines of supply are as taught as a taught thing, under constant scrutiny and I have no deployable Pizza Huts or Burger Kings in my posession, Sir!
We've just got b-ugger all and we make do with not quite enough. I can safely say our lines of supply are as taught as a taught thing, under constant scrutiny and I have no deployable Pizza Huts or Burger Kings in my posession, Sir!
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Originally Posted by The Helpful Stacker
The size of the logistics chain in modern operations is very much due to the complexity of many of the systems that modern 'teeth arms' use.
The size of the supply chain in modern operations is very much due to the self-licking lollipop mentality that runs like a rash through current deployments.
"So, how are our front line troops doing today?"
"Well sir, I'd love to show you on a smashing Powerpointless slide show thing I made earlier but the projector has blown a bulb and although OC Lighting, Fixtures'n'Fittings would LOVE to get a new one he reckons it'll be at least three weeks until his Landrover has had the comfy Recaro seats fitted which OC H&S says he needs in order to drive the whole 0.5 kms of loosely laid gravel track between here and the light bulb storage facility. Well, I say three weeks, the road itself is actually finished but the signs that read "Buckle up or die" (along with the 3mph speed limit signs) have been delayed because no one can decide if they should read "Obey the speed restriction: Drive with honor" or "Obey the speed limit: Drive with Honour".
And anyway, the bloke who actually makes the signs has had to go on an EO workshop after producing one that read "Accident blackspot". Should've read "Accident Spot of non-European origin"
What I can tell you is the Deployable All Arms Typing Pool are in town along with their 12-ISO rapid set-up cell (only took ten weeks to get here) and they're not happy. Apparently some troops are going on combat operations and simply can't be bothered to amend their accommodation status on JPA. According to OC Cleaning and Sanitationalisantionalism's latest computer projected model, this means an average of 57.49385766394% of rooms are being shown a rancid mop by a local intelligence officer where they needn't be and apparently this will swallow up vast swathes of the already stretched budget, especially after buying all that bunting for the visit by the Latvian Deputy Defence Secretary's Secretary. Think we made a lasting and valuable impression there don't you? Anyway, look at the time! The mess is open and you know how they only have a 20 minute window for lunch"
Front Line First. (Behind Supply, Admin and MT)
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
vast chow halls offering fresh-baked pies
Anyway are you allowed Pork Pies out there?
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Scenerio (true story) All aircraft in the force grounded - both front line and training squadrons- for the want of a bit of kit. Supply on base has sufficient on shelves to get all aircraft up and still have spares on shelf. We cant give you any cause what we got is minimum stock. 
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Or the stackers may well tell you that there is a shortage in the armed forces, not just RAF, for clear perspex to put in kneeboards!, BUT, you have just that very moment seen a drawer full of the things! but you cant have them because the stackers might run out! Recent occurence at an airbase in shropshire!