Future Carrier (Including Costs)
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Torygraph: Navy carrier plans delayed as MoD and builders argue price
A decision on building two Royal Navy aircraft carriers faces further delays because the Ministry of Defence and manufacturers cannot agree on the price.
However, a decision on awarding two other huge defence contracts is thought to be imminent.
The MoD is expected to push back announcing a production timetable for the carriers until next year. Agreeing a production schedule, originally planned for this year, is key to getting the carriers into service as it paves the way for companies to begin employing staff and budgeting for costs. A long-delayed decision had been expected to be reached this year, but sources on both sides said yesterday that this is unrealistic.
As The Daily Telegraph disclosed earlier this month, the alliance of companies building the carriers said the project could not be done for less than £3.8bn – some £200m above the MoD's estimate. It was hoped this price difference could be overcome by an incentive scheme under which the companies would share any cost savings. But a source said: "This is proving far more difficult to agree than was first thought."
Separately, the MoD is close to announcing the winner of a £4bn contract to privatise the armed forces' military flight training. A decision on the MoD's preferred bidder could be announced as early as tomorrow.
Also, a decision on supplying mid-air refuelling aircraft may be brought forward. Sources say the MoD may give the go-ahead for the £2bn Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (FSTA) next month, rather than next March as forecast......
A decision on building two Royal Navy aircraft carriers faces further delays because the Ministry of Defence and manufacturers cannot agree on the price.
However, a decision on awarding two other huge defence contracts is thought to be imminent.
The MoD is expected to push back announcing a production timetable for the carriers until next year. Agreeing a production schedule, originally planned for this year, is key to getting the carriers into service as it paves the way for companies to begin employing staff and budgeting for costs. A long-delayed decision had been expected to be reached this year, but sources on both sides said yesterday that this is unrealistic.
As The Daily Telegraph disclosed earlier this month, the alliance of companies building the carriers said the project could not be done for less than £3.8bn – some £200m above the MoD's estimate. It was hoped this price difference could be overcome by an incentive scheme under which the companies would share any cost savings. But a source said: "This is proving far more difficult to agree than was first thought."
Separately, the MoD is close to announcing the winner of a £4bn contract to privatise the armed forces' military flight training. A decision on the MoD's preferred bidder could be announced as early as tomorrow.
Also, a decision on supplying mid-air refuelling aircraft may be brought forward. Sources say the MoD may give the go-ahead for the £2bn Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (FSTA) next month, rather than next March as forecast......
My apologies if this has been discussed before but if this - http://navy-matters.beedall.com/masc.htm - is true the Sea King ASaC Mk7 is to run on until at least 2018, which would infer both CVFs are to be fitted for SK, with an upgrade to MASC at first refit. That’s a tricky one to cost, or apportion costs, as by then most of the cabs will be nearly 50 and may have needed a life extension programme, but on the other hand it would certainly spread the financial pain of CVF.
Join Date: Jul 2006
Location: Hampshire
Age: 62
Posts: 144
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I think anyone mentioning the "financial pain" of CVF should be shot on sight- that Torygraph article mentions two other contracts, one for £2bn and one for £4bn without batting an eyelid. CVF is not expensive. 
Join Date: May 2006
Location: 2 m South of Radstock VRP
Posts: 2,042
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Sunk
“I think anyone mentioning the "financial pain" of CVF should be shot on sight- that Torygraph article mentions two other contracts, one for £2bn and one for £4bn without batting an eyelid. CVF is not expensive”.
You’re quite willing to try, but given the crap ammunition the Services reportedly have you’d probably miss or have a stoppage. Now, back to Immediate Action…
I never said CVF is expensive, but the headline cost we read about does not, I believe, include MASC. This is a Cat A project within a CAT A project, and you seldom hear it mentioned. What is clear, however, is that there a number of CAT A projects in progress, not just aircraft, with very noticeable peaks in expenditure anticipated in certain years (if you collate the data in recent NAO reports). This is the “pain” I talk of, and the normal way of smoothing these peaks is to “spread” the pain. If this can be done by meeting the headline target (in this case, two CVFs), the non-delivery or delay of a complementary MASC capability will be lost in the PR noise.
I asked a simple question as to whether the article I linked has any substance. If the SK is run on until a refit is due, I imagine the initial cost of CVF would be lower compared to CVF + MASC. If for no other reason than the programme has, for around a decade, assumed transfer of Cerberus to FOAEW/MASC, and along with it the hugely expensive onboard support facilities. In cases like this one normally sees financial sleight of hand whereby, for example, CVF would not pay any costs associated with retaining SK, thus artificially reducing the cost of CVF. SK would have to pay it, probably out of their existing budget, which in turn would affect other Marks. Doing this is so common as to be almost policy and is a de facto cut in Defence expenditure. Then, when it comes to first refit, and delivery of MASC, it is spun as an enhancement to capability, conveniently ignoring reality. I’m not saying there is anything necessarily wrong with most of this scenario – it’s just that this is seldom discussed.
But if I’m wrong or misunderstand, I apologise.
“I think anyone mentioning the "financial pain" of CVF should be shot on sight- that Torygraph article mentions two other contracts, one for £2bn and one for £4bn without batting an eyelid. CVF is not expensive”.
You’re quite willing to try, but given the crap ammunition the Services reportedly have you’d probably miss or have a stoppage. Now, back to Immediate Action…
I never said CVF is expensive, but the headline cost we read about does not, I believe, include MASC. This is a Cat A project within a CAT A project, and you seldom hear it mentioned. What is clear, however, is that there a number of CAT A projects in progress, not just aircraft, with very noticeable peaks in expenditure anticipated in certain years (if you collate the data in recent NAO reports). This is the “pain” I talk of, and the normal way of smoothing these peaks is to “spread” the pain. If this can be done by meeting the headline target (in this case, two CVFs), the non-delivery or delay of a complementary MASC capability will be lost in the PR noise.
I asked a simple question as to whether the article I linked has any substance. If the SK is run on until a refit is due, I imagine the initial cost of CVF would be lower compared to CVF + MASC. If for no other reason than the programme has, for around a decade, assumed transfer of Cerberus to FOAEW/MASC, and along with it the hugely expensive onboard support facilities. In cases like this one normally sees financial sleight of hand whereby, for example, CVF would not pay any costs associated with retaining SK, thus artificially reducing the cost of CVF. SK would have to pay it, probably out of their existing budget, which in turn would affect other Marks. Doing this is so common as to be almost policy and is a de facto cut in Defence expenditure. Then, when it comes to first refit, and delivery of MASC, it is spun as an enhancement to capability, conveniently ignoring reality. I’m not saying there is anything necessarily wrong with most of this scenario – it’s just that this is seldom discussed.
But if I’m wrong or misunderstand, I apologise.
Thread Starter
I can't remember where I saw it (somewhere on the internet) but some sources are now suggesting that the Sea Harrier FRS 51s of the Indian Navy will continue in service for six years longer than planned. Which is interesting.....
So now more delays. Any offers as to whether CVF or CVN21 will enter service first?
Also, you may remember my comments regarding cuts and overstretch in the surface fleet. Well see this article from Janes.
It strikes me that there is a catch 22 type situation here. Cuts are justified in the name of better equipment for high intensity operations, but the reduction in numbers causes us problems with low intensity operations, with increases the chances of high inensity operations, which then causes more problems....
The UK Royal Navy's (RN's) most senior officer has argued that the service should accept sacrificing quality for quantity if it is to maintain a surface fleet of sufficient size to contribute to maritime security operations on a global scale.
The size of the RN's frigate/destroyer force has seen a significant decline over the past decade, falling from 35 ships in 1996 to 25 today. Admiral Sir Alan West, Adm Band's predecessor as Chief of Naval Staff and First Sea Lord, was public in his opinion that this level is too small to meet the full spectrum of taskings, noting that the figure of 25 was based on analysis of high-intensity warfighting tasks alone and did not address wider maritime security needs, or make any allowance for attrition.
Alternatively, procure low cost vessels specifically for maritime security tasks to augment the FF/DD force - perhaps similar to the Italian Commandante Class Light Combatant Ships. Not very useful in a high intensity war situation, but more than capable of maritime security operations, board and search operations etc.
I can't help feeling that there's a real danger that CVF will be seen in isolation.
So now more delays. Any offers as to whether CVF or CVN21 will enter service first?
Also, you may remember my comments regarding cuts and overstretch in the surface fleet. Well see this article from Janes.
It strikes me that there is a catch 22 type situation here. Cuts are justified in the name of better equipment for high intensity operations, but the reduction in numbers causes us problems with low intensity operations, with increases the chances of high inensity operations, which then causes more problems....
The UK Royal Navy's (RN's) most senior officer has argued that the service should accept sacrificing quality for quantity if it is to maintain a surface fleet of sufficient size to contribute to maritime security operations on a global scale.
The size of the RN's frigate/destroyer force has seen a significant decline over the past decade, falling from 35 ships in 1996 to 25 today. Admiral Sir Alan West, Adm Band's predecessor as Chief of Naval Staff and First Sea Lord, was public in his opinion that this level is too small to meet the full spectrum of taskings, noting that the figure of 25 was based on analysis of high-intensity warfighting tasks alone and did not address wider maritime security needs, or make any allowance for attrition.
Alternatively, procure low cost vessels specifically for maritime security tasks to augment the FF/DD force - perhaps similar to the Italian Commandante Class Light Combatant Ships. Not very useful in a high intensity war situation, but more than capable of maritime security operations, board and search operations etc.
I can't help feeling that there's a real danger that CVF will be seen in isolation.
Suspicion breeds confidence
Webf,
The integration of the Elta radar into the FRS51 has not gone smoothly and many problems exist. I understand that four airframes from Shawbury have been purchased as parts (minus the fun bits).
I'm reasonably confident that CVF will pass MG but the precise details are yet to be seen. For better or for worse the RN has hung its hat on CVBG mentality and that is what it will become. A good amphib force backed up by a CVBG with an escort force to support both. Take it or leave it.
The integration of the Elta radar into the FRS51 has not gone smoothly and many problems exist. I understand that four airframes from Shawbury have been purchased as parts (minus the fun bits).
I'm reasonably confident that CVF will pass MG but the precise details are yet to be seen. For better or for worse the RN has hung its hat on CVBG mentality and that is what it will become. A good amphib force backed up by a CVBG with an escort force to support both. Take it or leave it.
Join Date: May 2003
Location: anywhere except home
Posts: 31
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hip, Hip, Hypocrisy
... Admiral Sir Alan West, Adm Band's predecessor as Chief of Naval Staff and First Sea Lord, was public in his opinion that this level is too small ...
A bit rich from the man who oversaw the Fleet reductions both as CINCFLEET and 1SL!
Shame he didn't put his opinions forward then, oh I've just realised ...
A bit rich from the man who oversaw the Fleet reductions both as CINCFLEET and 1SL!
Shame he didn't put his opinions forward then, oh I've just realised ...
I'm very much afraid that the real danger is not CVF being seen in isolation. The real danger is that we are sleepwalking to extinction via a raft of commonly held misconceptions and assumptions which have somehow achieved the status of fact.
Assumption the first - the EP line as stands is sacrosanct and can in no way be increased, even though it represents a significant fall in real terms CAPEX.
Assumption the second - as ships are getting progressively more expensive (no one seems to question why?), we will be able to afford fewer of them.
Assumption the third - base (and supplier) infrastructure must fall to reflect the above. See the recent comments by the senior civil servant i/c the Maritime Industrial Strategy.
Much of the above hinges on assumption 1. Why, in a world where our forces are busier than they have been in decades and where the bunch of charlatans currently in power can lavish £64Billion in benefits last year alone, can we not assume an increase in real terms defence CAPEX AND resource funding. That is the debate that should be being held, NOT the current "how can we save as much as we can given the budget constraints" exercise in futility.
Assumption the first - the EP line as stands is sacrosanct and can in no way be increased, even though it represents a significant fall in real terms CAPEX.
Assumption the second - as ships are getting progressively more expensive (no one seems to question why?), we will be able to afford fewer of them.
Assumption the third - base (and supplier) infrastructure must fall to reflect the above. See the recent comments by the senior civil servant i/c the Maritime Industrial Strategy.
Much of the above hinges on assumption 1. Why, in a world where our forces are busier than they have been in decades and where the bunch of charlatans currently in power can lavish £64Billion in benefits last year alone, can we not assume an increase in real terms defence CAPEX AND resource funding. That is the debate that should be being held, NOT the current "how can we save as much as we can given the budget constraints" exercise in futility.
Thread Starter
Wow! Three misunderstandings from a single post.
Swampy
But he did. See this interview with WarshipsIFR.
"I have been in the Navy for 40 years and in my time have fought in a fairly large maritime war - the Falklands - where, of 23 frigates and destroyers sent to the South Atlantic in the task force, four were sunk and eight were damaged. My own ship was sunk in Falkland Sound. It was a pretty high attrition rate. Therefore having only a dozen major surface warships available for an operation is indeed likely to be unrealistic. In fact, this country needs about 30 surface combatants to carry out standing tasks and handle contingencies like sending a task group to take part in a major operation. The reduction from 32 to 25 frigates and destroyers was only accepted with great reluctance. However, the package of money that the Royal Navy receives does not allow us to have 30 destroyers and frigates, especially as the future carrier, amphibious ships and other programmes are a high priority."
Or here from the Telegraph.
There were other times when Admiral West was candid - interestingly a Google search found the Sea Jet thread - particularly the evidence to the Defence Select Commitee.
Navaleye
Yes I know, but is 25 escorts enough? Really capable OPVs could relieve some of the problems caused by too many tasks.
N_a_b
I apolegise for what was a throwaway line. Last year I saw a briefing by a COMATG Staff Officer, and worryingly CVF never got a mention. Sometimes it feels as if carrier aviation, amphibious forces and escorts are seen in isolation from each other. For example, cutting escort numbers increases the importance of the future carriers and the capabilities of the air groups. I feel that the media/public fail to understand this and this is what I meant.
Swampy
But he did. See this interview with WarshipsIFR.
"I have been in the Navy for 40 years and in my time have fought in a fairly large maritime war - the Falklands - where, of 23 frigates and destroyers sent to the South Atlantic in the task force, four were sunk and eight were damaged. My own ship was sunk in Falkland Sound. It was a pretty high attrition rate. Therefore having only a dozen major surface warships available for an operation is indeed likely to be unrealistic. In fact, this country needs about 30 surface combatants to carry out standing tasks and handle contingencies like sending a task group to take part in a major operation. The reduction from 32 to 25 frigates and destroyers was only accepted with great reluctance. However, the package of money that the Royal Navy receives does not allow us to have 30 destroyers and frigates, especially as the future carrier, amphibious ships and other programmes are a high priority."
Or here from the Telegraph.
There were other times when Admiral West was candid - interestingly a Google search found the Sea Jet thread - particularly the evidence to the Defence Select Commitee.
Navaleye
Yes I know, but is 25 escorts enough? Really capable OPVs could relieve some of the problems caused by too many tasks.
N_a_b
I apolegise for what was a throwaway line. Last year I saw a briefing by a COMATG Staff Officer, and worryingly CVF never got a mention. Sometimes it feels as if carrier aviation, amphibious forces and escorts are seen in isolation from each other. For example, cutting escort numbers increases the importance of the future carriers and the capabilities of the air groups. I feel that the media/public fail to understand this and this is what I meant.
No need to apologise WEBF - my ire is directed at those in positions of responsibility in MB, ABW and elsewhere, who tamely swallow this guff and then spend endless time and money trying to square an irreconcilable problem.
As you mention surface combatants, FSC is a classic case in point. The broad requirement for the ship has not changed materially in ten years (a brief aberration in the direction of a US-style LCS excepted). We were told "it's unaffordable within the EP, pull the project and we'll start again in a couple of years when we have some better OA". Two years later - same answer in terms of ship capability, cost and numbers (although the tupperwares were binned, "cos it can all be done with UUV"), but "still unaffordable and in any case industry can't design and build it in the timescale", so the Coherency study was put in place to balance EP, industrial capability etc, but the IPT was binned before it reported. Now we have the Pathfinder / S2C2 study which will come up with the same answer - broadly 16-20 new combatants, some ASW, all capable of defending themselves. In the background the muppets are trying to close a naval base "because numbers are going to fall", when in fact the ships are getting bigger and more berths are required.
It's all driven by the initial half-@rsed assumptions........
As you mention surface combatants, FSC is a classic case in point. The broad requirement for the ship has not changed materially in ten years (a brief aberration in the direction of a US-style LCS excepted). We were told "it's unaffordable within the EP, pull the project and we'll start again in a couple of years when we have some better OA". Two years later - same answer in terms of ship capability, cost and numbers (although the tupperwares were binned, "cos it can all be done with UUV"), but "still unaffordable and in any case industry can't design and build it in the timescale", so the Coherency study was put in place to balance EP, industrial capability etc, but the IPT was binned before it reported. Now we have the Pathfinder / S2C2 study which will come up with the same answer - broadly 16-20 new combatants, some ASW, all capable of defending themselves. In the background the muppets are trying to close a naval base "because numbers are going to fall", when in fact the ships are getting bigger and more berths are required.
It's all driven by the initial half-@rsed assumptions........
Last edited by Not_a_boffin; 30th Nov 2006 at 12:57.
Thread Starter
Do the right sort of people get employed by the MOD? Several years ago I stumbled on a page on the net about some Social Science graduate who had left university and walked into a job in procurement working on JCA. This is true - unfortunately.
Perhaps I am being unfair on this individual, but to take a graduate in a non technical subject with no relevant experience..........
...although the tupperwares were binned, "cos it can all be done with UUV"...
Hmm. Who decided this, and why? Have they thought this one through? Off the top of my head I can't help wondering:
How will these things be launched and recovered?
How will they be controlled?
Will they need maintenance, refuelling, recharging?
Will they just find the mines (in which case you still need a means of disposal) or will they destroy them themselves?
Will a one shot UUV not be prohibitively expensive? Cheaper to build new Minehunters, using non magnetic steel would be cheaper than GRP.
How will a UUV signal to the Tasking Authority that a mine has been found? Or neutralised?
How would the boundary of a minefield be established if no suitably equipped surface vessels (ie with specialist minehunting sonar which is different from the sort used for finding subs - with totally different transducers) are available?
Wouldn't it be more sensible to see UUVs as being the weapon of cheaper, non GRP Minehunters? Instead of the UUVs doing all the searching, find the minefield with minehunting sonar, then use it to locate and identify individual mines, then send the UUV........not very different from the current approach?
Will UUVs really be cheaper (in terms of £ per mine destroyed)?
What about the routine route survey and patrol work undertaken by MCMvs and Minehunters? Will there be extra patrol and survey vessels? If so, will they cost of these be taken into consideration by the "UUVs are cheaper" brigade? Will it appear to be cheaper as it would come out of another part of the budget?
Would I be right in suspecting that the people who came up with this policy lack the imagination and insight that unmanned may not be cheaper or more effective?
Mines are a threat worldwide, particularly in the littoral. Lack of effective and reliable MCM capabilities may cause forces to stay further offshore than desired, increasing transit times for carrierborne aircraft. This is a particular issue for helicopters.
On a slightly happier note, the Sea Harrier wins again.
Perhaps I am being unfair on this individual, but to take a graduate in a non technical subject with no relevant experience..........
...although the tupperwares were binned, "cos it can all be done with UUV"...
Hmm. Who decided this, and why? Have they thought this one through? Off the top of my head I can't help wondering:
How will these things be launched and recovered?
How will they be controlled?
Will they need maintenance, refuelling, recharging?
Will they just find the mines (in which case you still need a means of disposal) or will they destroy them themselves?
Will a one shot UUV not be prohibitively expensive? Cheaper to build new Minehunters, using non magnetic steel would be cheaper than GRP.
How will a UUV signal to the Tasking Authority that a mine has been found? Or neutralised?
How would the boundary of a minefield be established if no suitably equipped surface vessels (ie with specialist minehunting sonar which is different from the sort used for finding subs - with totally different transducers) are available?
Wouldn't it be more sensible to see UUVs as being the weapon of cheaper, non GRP Minehunters? Instead of the UUVs doing all the searching, find the minefield with minehunting sonar, then use it to locate and identify individual mines, then send the UUV........not very different from the current approach?
Will UUVs really be cheaper (in terms of £ per mine destroyed)?
What about the routine route survey and patrol work undertaken by MCMvs and Minehunters? Will there be extra patrol and survey vessels? If so, will they cost of these be taken into consideration by the "UUVs are cheaper" brigade? Will it appear to be cheaper as it would come out of another part of the budget?
Would I be right in suspecting that the people who came up with this policy lack the imagination and insight that unmanned may not be cheaper or more effective?
Mines are a threat worldwide, particularly in the littoral. Lack of effective and reliable MCM capabilities may cause forces to stay further offshore than desired, increasing transit times for carrierborne aircraft. This is a particular issue for helicopters.
On a slightly happier note, the Sea Harrier wins again.
WEBF
“Do the right sort of people get employed by the MOD? Several years ago I stumbled on a page on the net about some Social Science graduate who had left university and walked into a job in procurement working on JCA. This is true - unfortunately.
Perhaps I am being unfair on this individual, but to take a graduate in a non technical subject with no relevant experience..........”
Unfortunately, what you describe has been increasingly common since the last CDP announced some 10 years ago that he did not want technical project managers, and was getting rid of 500. (I think in the end 350 or so left). That was a huge percentage of PE’s technical experience, given the majority of staff at Abbey Wood are in non-technical and/or non productive posts. That is, they do not contribute directly to the primary aim – delivering technology in the form of equipment capability. To be fair to the current incumbent, he regularly trashes the barking decisions of previous administrations.
Historically, one typically needed 5 or more promotions to get to the lowest civilian technical grade in DPA (C2/HPTO) – now, as you say, they not only slot people straight in at this grade but they need not be engineers. Nor are they expected to catch up on the core experience they lack, yet is expected of others of the same grade. (Remember, at a grade lower a civilian will often have been in charge of a 100 strong engineering team. A C2 at a workshop, where unsurprisingly they have few direct entrants, will be a Production or Engineering Manager). So, you have a two tier system in MoD now. A direct entrant will often be a minor cog in a team, or charged with delivering the most simple project – then he is promoted. Many are little more than minutes secretaries. On the other hand, someone of the same grade with proper experience will often have numerous large and complex projects to run, by himself. There have been, and remain, whole IPTs in DPA whose task is minuscule compared to a single project manager in other IPTs.
To repeat a truism – You can always predict the problems on a project by checking the PM’s background.
“Do the right sort of people get employed by the MOD? Several years ago I stumbled on a page on the net about some Social Science graduate who had left university and walked into a job in procurement working on JCA. This is true - unfortunately.
Perhaps I am being unfair on this individual, but to take a graduate in a non technical subject with no relevant experience..........”
Unfortunately, what you describe has been increasingly common since the last CDP announced some 10 years ago that he did not want technical project managers, and was getting rid of 500. (I think in the end 350 or so left). That was a huge percentage of PE’s technical experience, given the majority of staff at Abbey Wood are in non-technical and/or non productive posts. That is, they do not contribute directly to the primary aim – delivering technology in the form of equipment capability. To be fair to the current incumbent, he regularly trashes the barking decisions of previous administrations.
Historically, one typically needed 5 or more promotions to get to the lowest civilian technical grade in DPA (C2/HPTO) – now, as you say, they not only slot people straight in at this grade but they need not be engineers. Nor are they expected to catch up on the core experience they lack, yet is expected of others of the same grade. (Remember, at a grade lower a civilian will often have been in charge of a 100 strong engineering team. A C2 at a workshop, where unsurprisingly they have few direct entrants, will be a Production or Engineering Manager). So, you have a two tier system in MoD now. A direct entrant will often be a minor cog in a team, or charged with delivering the most simple project – then he is promoted. Many are little more than minutes secretaries. On the other hand, someone of the same grade with proper experience will often have numerous large and complex projects to run, by himself. There have been, and remain, whole IPTs in DPA whose task is minuscule compared to a single project manager in other IPTs.
To repeat a truism – You can always predict the problems on a project by checking the PM’s background.
You might think that, one could not possibly comment......Clearly WEBF you are just not being "transformational" enough......(!)
Suspicion breeds confidence
JFH / 801 and Dave
Well I see that in an interview with AFM, the CO of JFH is confirming that 801 NAS will not be fully established for another 24 months (!). Reason lack of available personnel - All this for 9 aircraft.
Also an in service date of 2018 for the F-35 seems to be a given now. Hope they can keep those old Harriers in the air that long.
Also an in service date of 2018 for the F-35 seems to be a given now. Hope they can keep those old Harriers in the air that long.
Thread Starter
Why is the Navy so short of pilots? I know this has been talked about before on this thread and the good old Sea Jet thread but what is the reason?
Loss of the air defence role?
Move from Yeovilton to Cott/Witt?
Being under RAF control and used as an element of Strike instead of Fleet?
Lack of recruitment over the last x years?
The fall out from back to back CVS deployments to the Adriatic in the 90s?
The system has gone wrong somewhere.........
tucumseh
If Abbey Wood needed a new catering manager, they wouldn't employ someone who knew nothing about cooking, so why should Project Management (their raison d'etre) be different?
Incidentally, today (3rd December) is the anniversary of the first carrier landing by a jet aircraft in 1945. Lt Cdr (later Captain) Eric Brown landed a Sea Vampire aboard HMS Ocean in the English Channel. So much of the development of naval aviation was by British Pilots and Engineers (both Service and Civillian), only for mindless and short sighted politicians to discard their work like a discarded tissue.
Loss of the air defence role?
Move from Yeovilton to Cott/Witt?
Being under RAF control and used as an element of Strike instead of Fleet?
Lack of recruitment over the last x years?
The fall out from back to back CVS deployments to the Adriatic in the 90s?
The system has gone wrong somewhere.........
tucumseh
If Abbey Wood needed a new catering manager, they wouldn't employ someone who knew nothing about cooking, so why should Project Management (their raison d'etre) be different?
Incidentally, today (3rd December) is the anniversary of the first carrier landing by a jet aircraft in 1945. Lt Cdr (later Captain) Eric Brown landed a Sea Vampire aboard HMS Ocean in the English Channel. So much of the development of naval aviation was by British Pilots and Engineers (both Service and Civillian), only for mindless and short sighted politicians to discard their work like a discarded tissue.
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: Falmouth
Posts: 1,651
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Why is the Navy so short of pilots
Thread Starter
So why this lack of personnel, someone must know? Where did the 801 NAS people go?
Meanwhile (reference post 862) I found this snippet on Richard Beedall's website:
Future Auxiliary Combatant and Future Mine Counter Measures Capability
Has a degree of common sense returned to the MOD?
Meanwhile (reference post 862) I found this snippet on Richard Beedall's website:
Future Auxiliary Combatant and Future Mine Counter Measures Capability
Has a degree of common sense returned to the MOD?
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 4th Dec 2006 at 15:42.