Future Carrier (Including Costs)

[WE Branch Fanatic]

But CVF was planned to arrive in 2012 and 2015 ergo the Sea Harrier was intended to last until 2012, and some of the aircraft were built in the mid/late 90s and would have had no issues with airframe hours.

Surely many of the older Sea Harrier pilots were veterans of operations over Bosnia, including reece and ground attack, so I don't quite understand what has happened.............

Anyway, why are we discussing the past and not the future? Talking of the future, when will CVF pass main gate?

[Navaleye]

Unfortunately, you can't talk about the future without considering the mess we are in now. However we have regressed from having a healthy number of pilots in the Shar days and now we are struggling to find them. Perhaps someone should have asked the question as to why people join the Navy and be part of it. Not some small time operation in the corner of an RAF station training to fly in Afghanistan which doesn't appear to have a coastline.

[Not_a_boffin]

Three years ago, the RN had three fully manned squadrons sitting southside, with 899 as the HQ SHAR unit with ~ 16 pilots. IIRC the two deployable squadrons had 6 a/c each with (at peacetime rates) 9-10 pilots. That gives 34-36 trained/training aircrew and there had been no such rumbles of impending shortages - quite the contrary, the expectation was that CVF was going to lead to bigger 10-12 a/c squadrons with concomitant increase in aircrew strength.

I suspect that the loss of 899 and the subsequent folding in of that unit to the RAF OCU had a lot to do with the present shortage, although going to Cott will also have had a major impact. On top of that, there is no FAA Flag officer to fight the corner any more. Rear Adm FAA is now a sub-function of 2SL, rather than a dedicated post.

Whatever the causes, the RN needs to get a grip of the situation sharpish.

[Lone Kestrel]

How many of the 36 or so pilots were only staying in to collect the FRI and have since left once the money/commitment ran out?

Given an average return of service of say 15 years per pilot and the RN fast jet pilot IPS of about 4 or so per year gives a total of 60 RN pilots to fill all the required slots, that includes the frontline, OCU, QFIs, ship-command appointments and staff posts. Any failure to meet the Harrier IPS with the resultant filling up of the slots on the OCU with helo retreads (who by their very nature will not give a 15 year ROS), as has been the case over the last few years, has a significant impact on the long term manning of the FAA– hence the current, and probably on going, pilot shortfall.

[Not_a_boffin]

Which still begs the question - why is the FAA having trouble filling its IPS slots? Never mind the common problem that you can make more money outside, that's common to RAF and FAA. Is it perhaps that not enough is made of the fact that FAA fly fast jets? Is it that the recruiting target is set too low, so that even if the slots are filled, the squadron programmes are so busy that people PVR just to get a decent shore tour interval? (Yes, I know the RAF Harrier force is working at least as hard in the Stan, but they are from a larger overall community).

Whatever - who is in charge of rectifying the situation and do they have a plan?

[Lone Kestrel]

The main problem is that to fly fixed wing in the RN the only outlet is Harrier. Trying to identify the person with the aptitude etc at the recruitment stage is still a bit of a black art and therefore the failure rate is unpredictable. The RAF has the advantage of streaming pilots onto other platforms, be it 2 seat FJ or the Multi Forces. Therefore, if the RN were to make sure that they had sufficient Harrier pilots on the OCU it would need to train a disproportionate number of pilots. In essence, the RN system is becoming too expensive/inefficient given the small size of its frontline. It is now faced with the problem that in order to grow it needs more pilots to enter service but this would lead to a very diluted, and hence non-combat ready, frontline just when the Harrier Force is deployed on ops. The time has come for the RN to accept that fixed wing aviation is not a game they should be in and allow the RAF to provide FJ embarked aviation when the need arises.

[Not_a_boffin]

Fair point & illuminating explanation. However, if it's a question of having let the system atrophy to a degree where it needs a major infusion of cash to regenerate, then why not do so? The MN seems to manage quite well for a similar sized force and 800/801/899 were suitably manned until the move from Southside. If (god forbid) we bought the right MASC aircraft, the FAA would even have a Multi stream to offer those who didn't make the F35 cut (or point them at deepest Cornwall). The option of letting RAF provide FW embarked air is theoretically good, but historically has never worked well. How many of 809/892 RAF exchange would have been there if they knew they were tagged for Ark in perpetuity?

[Lone Kestrel]

If (god forbid) we bought the right MASC aircraft, the FAA would even have a Multi stream to offer those who didn't make the F35 cut (or point them at deepest Cornwall).

A big if, but why not give that MAC task to the RAF as well? It all comes down to cost and efficiency nowadays and any bespoke Force is pricing itself out of the market

Perhaps we need to think of the Carrier as just another JOB and only embark aviation on it when the need arises as apposed to sailing around waiting for something to happen. That way we can maximize the small number of FEAR that we have. Additionally, the time has long gone when we can afford to embark ac on a ship for a protracted time without then access to decent training.

But you are right – it would not be popular with the majority of RAF pilots if they found themselves at sea for a long time – hence only deploy/set sail when you need to, it is far cheaper!!!

[althenick]

How many of 809/892 RAF exchange would have been there if they knew they were tagged for Ark in perpetuity?

Agree with you there NAB
I posted this on Rum Ration. I've done a little research on this but would love to know what the PVR Rate is in JHF/JHC per service...
The Crabs don’t want to go to sea. If you don’t believe me then check here. It makes sense to me to have the dark blue operating Harrier/JSF purely because it streamlines the support system. And then again you can also look at the history of not just the UK but other countries
Fleet Air Arm of the RAF – Formed 1918, Squadrons manned 90% RAF and 10% RN (Observers). By 1921 Manning had changed to 75% RN and 25% RAF – Why? because a certain AVM Trenchard had decreed that Carrier Flying was too dangerous and his people DID NOT WANT TO GO TO SEA.
Italian Navy – Recently had to fight to get their own parliamentary law changed so they could operate Harriers at sea. The Italian Air Force seemingly has the responsibility of all fixed wing aviation but THEY DO NOT WANT TO GO TO SEA.
Brazilian Navy – Same as the Italains, Had to get their own laws changed. The Airforce operated Trackers off of Minas Gerias but were mainly crewed by BN Aircrew because the Brazilian Airforce Aircrew DID NOT WANT TO GO TO SEA.
Conclusion – The Crabs don’t want to go to sea, Why should they? Fair enough in times of crisis and war but regular cruises? I wonder how these lads and lasses are getting on in JFH/JHC and I wonder what the recruitment and retention figures are?

[Not_a_boffin]

LK - the point of having a carrier is that it's worked up for embarked ops to a level defined by it's readiness requirement. That means regularly embarking aircraft for extended durations, with the airgroup (not just aircrew) capable of providing the aircraft serviced, fuelled & armed, the aircrew briefed with full up planning for sustained ops. That means learning to work in a dangerous environment (and CVF will be much more so than CVS just from the sheer number of aircraft movment, never mind the increased JB and noise from the F35) moving, launching, recovering aircraft from/to the deck of the ship. Airgroup workups (from cold) take a couple of weeks - you can't just sail the ship to where you want to be and then rock up expecting to operate (as I'm sure you're well aware!). That means operate the ship on a regular basis with all elements embarked and worked up (including ships AE dept and the badgers).

Does sound a bit like what althenick is alluding to. An alternative to putting all f/w in the RAF would be to put all JFH in the FAA. Bigger force structure to absorb the training overhead, all recruited and trained with the expectation of going to sea for extended periods, but with the prospect of extended shore tours between embarked deployments to lessen the time spent away from UK. What's not to like?

[Lone Kestrel]

Agreed, you can skin the cat both ways. However, I am not convinced that deploying/embarking for protracted periods is the way forward in terms of cost and overall effectiveness – where will the weapons be kept for example (we wont have sufficient for 2 stock piles), if kept on board what happens if the JCA R1 ac are deployed to a land JOB in the Middle East and the carrier is sitting off the US West Coast supporting an exercise? The jets may be able to meet the readiness timescales but the support chain wont.

Additionally, if it is going to be that complicated to operate JCA off a carrier that requires such a large work up, then one has to question the overall benefit, especially if the payload and number of sorties is less at times of conflict and we certainly wont have the flying hours to be able to fly just to work up the ship’s company. I know that over flight etc could be a problem but if you had the big wing JSF and use a tanker you might be able to go around the problem!! From Gulf war 2 it was clear that a Carrier could not operate with any real effectiveness without substantial support from land based aviation anyway.

I also do not believe that it is just the RAF pilots who find long periods at sea a pain. I question anyone wanting to do back to back embarked ops. I know from my time with the USN that the majority of the aircrew had enough after the second and almost all by the 3rd 6-monther!!

[Not_a_boffin]

Very true - even a force the size of USN aviation is overstretched. Points to the need for more naval (or embarkable) aviation to increase the interval between deployments.

The logistics issue is difficult. Is it more expensive to maintain a small stockpile of warshot in one place (with ex rounds for training) and then airfreight it out to points around the world where it may (or may not) be used, but will certainly not be environmentally protected? Or buy more munitions, but control their stowage more closely? The same goes for ASE, tooling, BITE and all the other logistics tail. As for AVCAT / AVTUR, if you don't bring it with, then you either get HNS or you're stuffed.

I may be wrong, but I think the need for land-based air in GW2 was almost exclusively due to two factors - limited air corridors into Iraq, forcing the carriers south, coupled with the retirement of the KA6 and preponderance of Plastic Bugs A-D. IIRC no land-based air was allowed to operate out of Saudi and therefore most of the strike effort had to come from carriers operating with very limited searoom - a validation of embarked aviation if ever there was one.

[ORAC]

therefore most of the strike effort had to come from carriers operating with very limited searoom - a validation of embarked aviation if ever there was one.

I could list a rather large air orbat based in various bases in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE, Oman, Diego Garcia and other more distant points. But you can see the figures here: Iraqi Freedom - By the Numbers

The percentage of weapons they dropped was much less than that - mainly because, by themselves, the B-52s delivered over 40% of all munitions dropped by coalition forces.....

[Not_a_boffin]

Point taken - very interesting paper BTW. Was not trying to denigrate the contribution of land-based air to the campaign, but point out why embarked air appeared to need land-based support (most of which was tanking). Even by those numbers the embarked aviation delivered a large number of strike sorties and without needing base infrastructure ashore.

[rduarte]

from what I am reading ,the only way to save the FAA from the RAF ,is to buy the Rafale, and 2 CV and not 2 CVS.

[Navaleye]

But you are right – it would not be popular with the majority of RAF pilots if they found themselves at sea for a long time – hence only deploy/set sail when you need to, it is far cheaper!!!

But it is grossly inefficient, not to mention unpopular. For example, you have the problem of staying night qualified. All well and good on land, but its difficult to land on a ship at night when you may not have done for a long while, if at all, even more so in bad weather. Add to that an aircraft which is franjly unsuited to the task due to the absence of key sensors and an inadequate weapons fit and we can see where the unpopularity bit comes from.

I just heard the sound of a barn door banging in the distance...

[NURSE]

given the problems in the defence budget and the governments problems with coherent poilcy the navy won't be getting any carriers for a very long time and I suspect there will be more cuts in both surface and sub surface units in the near future. I would also sugest the army and the RAF will also lose major units and things will be gapped.
EG why have 3 transport aircraft 130J, C17 and A400m ?
Why does saxon need replacing and why do we need MBT's?

The rot and terminal decline of UK armed forces PLC has well and truely begun

[Lone Kestrel]

Navaleye

I can accept all you say for GR7/9, but JCA is supposed to so easy to land on board, day or night, that CQ time will be very short – a JSF team member told me that it’s just a press of a button if you wish!! Therefore, and noting Nurse's comments, do we not need to take the longer term view and see how we will use the Carrier in the future? In reality, due to the difficulty of re-supply etc, is it not just a floating JOB to be used if a shore based airfield is not available?

If this is the case why do we need to embark aviation while it sails around doing nothing? Is it not better for the aircrew to have access to training airspace and other assets to use the limited flying hours to good use as opposed to flying around the ship? However, I accept that the bods on board will need some sort of work up etc but that may well have to be part of the ship's exercise and readiness programme.

[Not_a_boffin]

LK - resupplying carriers is generally easier than resupplying forward deployed squadrons. The logs are already with you. The ships do much more than sail around doing nothing - presence is a military capability all of its own.

[Navaleye]

We already have would be gunnery officers shouting "bang". Maybe we can extended that to FDOs shouting "whoosh" and pilots shouting "dagger dagger dagger" (silly me they don't have a gun). No doubt some other good examples will emerge. Flight deck operation is a serious business and a perishable skill, you cannot train for it without aircraft.