Future Carrier (Including Costs)

[Not_a_boffin]

Binning the amphibs (and reading between the lines on Fox's letter) replacing them with one (big deck) LPH and potentially a CVF makes no sense. There is no scope in such a platform for any sort of vehicle stowage or transfer ashore, leaving Royal utterly reliant on helos for movement and logistics ashore. We know where reliance on helos for everything leads to.......

[Impiger]

Decent RPC on Victory too.

Still I suspect the new carriers will be able to mount a good party just hope there's still a Bootnecks Band to come down on the aircraft lift!

Pass another pinkers Carruthers my eyes seem to be watering this one down a tad.

[Entaxei]

Missing element?

With all the statistics, estimates, performance figures of various options, etc., it seems to me that one area of vital political importance is being ignored. What is the impact in personal, financial and political terms of cancelling the CVs, let alone the Trident replacements, such moves have the ability to devastate the entire shipbuilding and engineering industry of the UK, specifically Scotland and the north of England.

It also likely to ensure that the UK as a whole will never again have a major shipbuilding industry, nor of course the corresponding engineering industries. We have already seen the announcement of the closure of the MBT Challenger Mk2 production and the associate specialist armour technology, buying decisions for armoured vehicles being directed to foreign companies, Hoon the loon's proud statement a few years ago when he signed up to the F35 "that the UK will never again build a fighter aircraft".

Aside from all else, extending from there and with a potential population of circa 60mill, there are only so many educational establishments available to issue degrees in tourist geography ........ so back to benefit culture and ring fenced aid donations ??

[skippedonce]

More RN Tub-thumping (Independent, Letters, 29 Sep 10)

Why we need our aircraft carriers

David Applegate (letter, 16 September) is ill-informed on aircraft carriers.
In modern operations, the support required is small and depends on the threat. One escort and supply ship are routinely sufficient. (If there is no threat!)
Compare this investment with the acres of vulnerable infrastructure in the UK's operating bases in Basra, Lashkar Gar, and Sangin. Unlike these exposed bases, carriers are immune to cheap mortars, IEDs, and suicide terrorists. (But how do they hold ground?) The last serviceman killed as a result of enemy action in a British carrier was in 1945, whereas the death toll on Britain's Iraq and Afghanistan land bases continues to mount, even now. (But don't mention the British servicemen, both RN and Army, who became casulaties on RN escorts and RFAs during the Falklands; as a result of attacks from Land-based air!)
The modern carrier, properly equipped, has a radius of action that allows it to attack targets many hundreds of miles away. The Americans understand this strategic capability and almost all their close air support operations in Afghanistan are from carriers in the Indian Ocean. (I suspect the USAF and NATO Air Forces operating in Afghanistan and from further afield into the theatre, and providing the AAR for carrier-based CAS, may dispute this.)
As well as enabling us to project UK power worldwide without getting our hands trapped in strategic mangles, the new carriers will allow us to patrol our territorial waters and exclusive economic zones in depth, defend our overseas territories, and provide cover for the vital supplies of food and energy on which our island's security critically depends. (... and cure world hunger.)
Before pontificating on carriers, it is as well to refer both to the realities of experience and to the experts, the Royal Navy and its Fleet Air Arm, who are this country's carrier professionals. (and how many RAF Harrier and RW pilots fly off CVS?)
Admiral Sir Sandy Woodward
Admiral Sir Michael Layard
Rear Admiral Jeremy Larken
Commodore Neill Thomas
Commodore Steven Jermy
Captain Michael Clapp
Commander Nigel Ward
Commander Tim Gedge
Totnes, Devon

What a load of old ; both the contributors and their spin.

[Clockwork Mouse]

SD
What's wrong with that? Seems a balanced, sensible and pretty convincing explanation of the RN point of view by some ex-sailors who have seen a fair bit of action. As a crab, of course, you feel threatened so have to rubbish it, but your closing comment is a bit over the top, bordering on puerile. Incidentally I have no naval connections myself, though I was born in Pompey.

[LowObservable]

Frostchamber:

Super Hornet carries more stuff (both in pounds and variety) over a longer distance, equal or better speed, better maneuver, has sensor-fusion tricks today that Dave won't get until 2020, has a two-seat option for FAC-A, can be used as a combat tanker, has an EA variant available now with a funded roadmap for improvement, has an internal gun, and its LO may surprise you.

Dave B is stealthier.

[skippedonce]

Old and bold yes, but credible?

CM,

I'm sure the admirals' arguments are 'balanced, sensible and pretty convincing explanation' to the average Sun reader who doesn't look past the distinguished names appended to the letter to try to discern fact from fiction. (Ok, maybe they don't even look that far, but you apparently do and more power to you for it.)

I have no issue with the need for CVF, as I believe it is required for secure basing, power projection and (at a pinch) SLOC security however, assertions by the ex-RN great and good that 'the Americans understand this strategic capability and almost all their close air support operations in Afghanistan are from carriers in the Indian Ocean' are complete fabrications and do the signatories no good if they wish to appear credible to an informed audience, rather than continuing with single service tub-thumping. I make no accusations against the RN in favour of my own service, but would be interested to see the evidence behind their assertions, which is what I question, particularly as they make those assertions in a national newspaper in the lead-up to what will doubtless (for all services) be a very painful SDSR.

SO

[ORAC]

and almost all their close air support operations in Afghanistan are from carriers in the Indian Ocean

Ignoring why we're there in the first place; providing air support from carriers that far away is ridiculously impractical due to the distances involved. It's also only made possible by providing ISTAR, AAR and all manner of otheer support from ground bases.

It doesn't prove the value of having Carrier Battle Groups, just the insanity and stupidity of our current operations. In retrospect, the last 10 years will make Vietnam look like a a relatively sane way of fighting a war - albeit with the same probable result.

[LowObservable]

Defense.gov: Contracts for Wednesday, October 06, 2010

Lockheed Martin Corp., Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., Ft. Worth, Texas, is being awarded a $13,035,539 modification to a previously awarded cost-plus-award-fee contract (N00019-02-C-3002) to incorporate the shipborne rolling vertical landing capability into the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter for the United Kingdom. Work will be performed at Fort Worth, Texas (54 percent); Warton, United Kingdom (35 percent); El Segundo, Calif. (7 percent); and Orlando, Fla. (4 percent). Work is expected to be completed in October 2013. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity.

Are you prepared, Mr Boffin?

[Navaleye]

An interesting development.

Question for John Farley: John what do you think this would involve? I can only think of an uprating of the braking system, but there may be something else.

[oldnotbold]

Defence review: 'Carriers give politicians options – not dead ends'


Defence review: 'Carriers give politicians options – not dead ends' - Telegraph

Also

"The Secretary of State for Defence, Liam Fox made a speech on 13 August 2010 in which he validly described the need for armed forces with a “flexible, adaptable posture [that] will maintain the ability to safeguard international peace and security, to deter and contain those who threaten the UK and its interests, and where necessary to intervene on multiple fronts … capable of maritime-enabled power projection, the capacity to control air-space to guarantee freedom of manoeuvre and the ability to deploy land power with the logistical strength to sustain it”.

It’s impossible to imagine a better fit to the Secretary of State’s vision than the Royal Navy’s Carrier Strike and Amphibious Task Groups. But cancellation of the new Queen Elizabeth-class future aircraft carriers (CVF) has for a decade been offered as the 'silver bullet' solution to the MoD’s funding crisis, and it is yet again being promoted with amazing success (at least in terms of column inches) by a segment of the media and defence establishment who seem to have a pathological hatred of any large grey warships that are able to carry aircraft. In practice – with over £1.2 billion in contracts already placed and the UK shipbuilding industry now totally dependent on the project - construction of the new carriers has almost certainly passed the point at which cancellation is viable under any rational criteria, however significant changes to the CVF programme are still quite possible. The most obvious problem is finding aircraft and helicopters to form air groups for the new carriers. The UK has theoretically committed to buying up 138 of the Lockheed Martin Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) to meet its Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA) requirement; indeed it has already ordered three of the Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) JSF variant (designated F-35B). However there seems to be little chance that more than 50 JCA's (costing nearly £100 million each) will be affordable. One of the surprises of SDSR might be a decision to abandon the F-35B version for the F-35C which can carry a higher payload over a longer range. The F-35C is also slightly cheaper, but this will be negated by the cost of fitting at least one of the new carriers with two catapults and arresting gear. Adoption of the F-35C will avoid the dangerous looking 'rolling landing' technique that the UK has been studying for the F-35B in order to overcome its payload 'bring back' weight restrictions. Another potential advantage with the F-35C is that the Royal Navy would be able to cross deck aircraft with United States and French Navy aircraft carriers for the first time since 1978.

If SDSR did decide to go for the F-35C over the F-35B, it’s the second CVF - HMS Prince of Wales - that would be adopted to the operate the aircraft. HMS Queen Elizabeth will be completed largely as planned, including a bow ski-jump. She would initially operate Harrier's (assuming that they stay in service as currently planned until 2019). Thereafter she would operate as a super-sized helicopter carrier (LPH), effectively replacing HMS Ocean, with the possibility that funding priorities might eventually permit her to be upgraded to the same standard as Prince of Wales."

Navy Matters | Home Page

[Occasional Aviator]

Dr Malcolm Davis, responding to the PM’s speech on SDSR

Our politicians must put the nation’s battles before their own - Telegraph accessed 7 Oct 10 at 10:05 Kabul Local Time

I think that a key issue here is that you simply can't know what challenges the future security environment will bring. Any credible defence policy must look long-term because that is the procurement cycle. Capabilities take a long time to develop, and must remain effective decades into the future. So it is a fundamental error to base a defence policy purely on the challenges and tasks that the UK Armed Forces are currently facing - COIN and counter-terrorism in Afghanistan for example. Those are going to be enduring roles, though one would hope that we won't still be in Afghanistan in 20 years time! But the key reality is the world is moving on rapidly, and the challenge posed by Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan will be eclipsed in coming years by a broad range of threats from a broad range of actors - both state and non-state.

The UK must maintain a balanced force to deal with a broad range of military threats, and strategic possibilities - ranging from low end ones like terrorism, through to major state conflict, including the possibility of future tension with Russia. To do anything else invites disaster because the UK Armed Forces are then equipped only for one type of conflict - the COIN and counter-terrorism fight - which in 2030 is unlikely to be the most pressing challenge.

The real challenge is how to maintain balanced forces given absolutely dire financial circumstances, which demand immediate cuts in defence spending. There are no easy answers, but certainly the worst solution is to massively cut key capabilities, and in the process, lose long-term skills and abilities. Its imperative that the SDSR is based on an accurate reading of the long-term strategic context out to 2030, not a snapshot of the current environment. Although I certainly don't profess to have the gospel truth on how things will turn out, the trends suggest that the international system is moving into a competitive multipolar world, in which the nation-state is the dominant actor, and traditional Realist approaches to international affairs hold sway. Major power competition will extend from Asia to Europe, and will directly influence European security and stability. Although the focus of major power competition is going to be in the East - particularly given the rapid rise of China - its important not to dismiss a more assertive Russia along Europe's periphery. Nor can WMD armed rogue states such as Iran be ignored. Just because the UK's current focus is on counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, does not imply that this will continue to be the most pressing challenge twenty years out. The security environment of 2030 is not known, and thus the following suggestions on the basic direction and thrust of the SDSR need to be considered.

The UK should scale back its global ambitions, and focus on firstly ensuring the defence and security of its home territory against both external and internal challenge. This requires an emphasis on air and naval forces to respond to external threats, should they emerge, but also greater investment in broad 'whole of government' approaches to internal security to deal with the threat posed by terrorism.

The UK needs to reinforce its commitment to the security of Europe, through NATO. This is where air and naval forces can play a very significant role. A strong naval capability - nuclear powered submarines and a credible surface combatant fleet, as well as effective amphibious capability for deploying rapid reaction forces ashore, and supporting them with mission-specific air capabilities - is essential. Effective land-based airpower is vital. So both the essential capability of the RN, and the RAF, needs to be protected, and the UK needs to be able support NATO with rapid reaction forces which can be deployed by sea and air where needed on the continent. Such forces will be lighter rather than consist of heavy armour, but the light force can be supported by long-range strike capabilities - the Typhoons and JSF, and its own organic air support - the Apache, and ideally STOVL JSF. The RAF also needs to main credible air combat capability in terms of effective fast jet forces which can match the best likely opponent forces - the Russian PAK FA should be the benchmark. Tranche 3 Typhoon armed with Meteor and equipped with AESA is a good start. The UK needs to stop the senseless cutbacks to what is a critical capability, and realise that its still absolutely critical to gain and sustain control of the air in future combat environments, because it will be challenged in the air.

Regarding the aircraft carriers. They would be nice to have, and in less dire economic circumstances, I'd be fully supportive of them. The problem is that it would appear the UK can either have the carriers - and little else - or it can scrap the carriers and have greater flexibility on ensuring a credible defence capability. I think its simply not worth gutting the RN's surface combatants, and the RAF's fast jet fleet, simply to have two big-deck aircraft carriers and 135 JSFs. I accept that its much better to have big-deck carriers than STOVL 'through deck cruisers', but beggars can't be choosers in this environment. The UK could look again at smaller STOVL carriers, or get radical and consider smaller vessels designed to operate Unmanned Combat Air Systems (UCAS) rather than manned combat aircraft. But I think the cost of the two CVFs is too high, and the UK ultimately may have to lose aircraft carriers if it is to maintain credible armed forces. Make no mistake, aircraft carriers is a capability that can be revisited in the future if the UK's financial circumstances allow it.

The key change should be to cut back very significantly on UK deployments out of the NATO area. The UK should not be embarking on future commitments for 'nation building' or supporting governments like the current one in Afghanistan, in endless, costly, and ultimately, un-winnable conflicts. This will mean communicating this message firstly to the Americans to ensure they understand that the UK will support US interests in a stable and secure Europe - and is willing to accept a greater burden sharing role there, rather than in Southwest Asia. The UK will strengthen its capability to ensure the security of the European continent and its maritime approaches, but will not look to go further unless its direct interests are threatened. It will require dialogue with our NATO partners to ensure a more robust European role for the UK is understood. And it will require challenging some sacred cows about threat perception, and changing mindsets which have emerged since 9-11, and which have skewed British defence policy. I am alarmed when I see the PM suggest that the long-term future of the UK Armed Forces should be based on current conflicts - not what is likely in the future. It suggests short-term mindsets which fail to consider how different the future will be from the present.

So, I suppose Army is a loser in this approach - they don't get so much of an expeditionary role beyond Europe, and that is sure to have force structure and force priority implications for them. They still have an essential role to play in the defence of the realm, and in securing Europe, that will require different types of capability. I would add that key distant territories - such as the Falklands - need to be protected, but we need to be able to do that effectively through long-range rapid response forces. That's a challenge, but its one that if solved, will add flexibility and new capability to the UK Armed Forces.

What about the nuclear deterrent? If the cost is to come out of the defence budget, as has been suggested, then the UK needs to seriously review the type and scale of its deterrent capability. It should NOT give up a nuclear deterrent. The future is unknowable, and current indications are that it will be more dangerous and unstable than the present one. It is likely to be a competitive multipolar world, with major powers competing for influence, presence and resources. This will be the dominating characteristic, not asymmetric threats from terrorism and insurgents. The nuclear deterrent will play a critical role in ensuring UK security against the most severe threats. But what form it will take should be open for discussion - it should not necessarily be a 'like for like' replacement of Vanguard/Trident. A more flexible approach might be long-range high speed cruise missiles, armed with nuclear warheads, that can be delivered by the RN's hunter-killer submarines, as well as potentially RAF combat aircraft. The JSF will be nuclear capable, so why not consider it as a delivery system. Alternatively, the US is developing a new long-range bomber capability, and the UK needs to consider restoring a long-range strike capability with its air force, not just in a nuclear deterrent role, but also for conventional, non-nuclear operations. So a joint US-UK programme which shares costs and delivers benefit to both is an idea that should be considered, and which could lead to a 'Vulcan for the 21st Century'. By embracing a 'dyad' the UK deterrent credibility will have a second strike capability, whilst a submarine-launched cruise missile maintains a relatively undetectable deterrent posture, complemented by an air-delivered approach which allows flexibility - in terms of both non-nuclear and nuclear missions. Cruise missiles are certainly slower than ballistic missiles - so the UK loses the immediacy of the response, and there is a greater risk of them being shot down by advanced air defence systems. These are certainly challenges that need to be solved, and a range of technological approaches are on the horizon that could mitigate these potential shortcomings, such that at the end of the day, the UK can respond in a credible manner, and thus maintain a credible deterrent posture, probably for lower cost and with greater operational flexibility than sinking massive amounts of funding into a Vanguard/Trident replacement.

Furthermore, the debate over Trident needs to be a bit more sophisticated, and start to consider more modern conventional strike capabilities, such as long-range rapid strike missiles, cyberwarfare, counter-space capabilities, and electronic attack measures. All are far less destructive than nuclear weapons, but applied in a coherent manner, can still rapidly impose strategic effect, and potentially even, deny an adversary the ability to use its nuclear capabilities, without inflicting horrific death and destruction on helpless civilians.

In one way, I'm recommending a 'back to the future' approach - a greater emphasis on Europe and the UK, and moving away from expeditionary operations in distant deployments. The UK needs to prioritise its needs and calibrate its policy with the likely strategic outlook. I do not believe that those advocating that the future is more of the same have it right. I believe they have it fundamentally wrong. If the UK falls into the trap of basing its defence policy on a snapshot of the here and now, and saying that that is the future, it courts disaster.

Malcolm Davis
Canberra, Australia

[Occasional Aviator]

Oh, and can I just add my bit to ORAC's point - I'm in a position to know at the moment and he is absolutely right. I have seen this line about most of the CAS in Afghanistan being provided from carriers - it is simply wrong. Yes, they contribute, but they provide much less flexible air than the majority of the land-based CAS, and at a significant bill to tankers and other enablers.

[John Farley]

Navaleye

I don't know the answer to your question but I imagine it could include such matters as approach guidance software for the HUD and flight trials. As such contracts go it is hardly a big one. Give GT a ring!

[oldnotbold]

"The question of aircraft carrier viability in the 21st Century has risen in the past years. “Where is the nearest carrier?” Every American president since the Presidency of Harry S. Truman has asked this question. “Carrier-based aviation, because it can bring firepower to bear on a target without getting permission to land somewhere.” Such flexibility is one of the essential the reason for the further development of the aircraft carriers. The strongest argument in favor of the aircraft carrier is that no aircraft carrier built during or since World War II has been sunk in combat. This issue of aircraft survivability demonstrates the strength of the assets of the Air Force and Navy. The counter argument has been that the weakness of a carrier is that does not have to be sunk; it simply has to be damaged to the point where it can no longer sustain flight operations. With that said, being that the nuclear threat has been diminished, at least in terms of our Post-Cold War status, the Weapons of Mass Destruction have become crude and simple weapons, of chemical and biological nature. Such weapons possess the killing power of nuclear weapons and are delivered by means of “row-boats and Ryder trucks.The question of aircraft carrier viability in the 21st Century has risen in the past years. “Where is the nearest carrier?” Every American president since the Presidency of Harry S. Truman has asked this question. “Carrier-based aviation, because it can bring firepower to bear on a target without getting permission to land somewhere.” Such flexibility is one of the essential the reason for the further development of the aircraft carriers. The strongest argument in favor of the aircraft carrier is that no aircraft carrier built during or since World War II has been sunk in combat. This issue of aircraft survivability demonstrates the strength of the assets of the Air Force and Navy. The counter argument has been that the weakness of a carrier is that does not have to be sunk; it simply has to be damaged to the point where it can no longer sustain flight operations. With that said, being that the nuclear threat has been diminished, at least in terms of our Post-Cold War status, the Weapons of Mass Destruction have become crude and simple weapons, of chemical and biological nature. Such weapons possess the killing power of nuclear weapons and are delivered by means of “row-boats and Ryder trucks.The question of aircraft carrier viability in the 21st Century has risen in the past years. “Where is the nearest carrier?” Every American president since the Presidency of Harry S. Truman has asked this question. “Carrier-based aviation, because it can bring firepower to bear on a target without getting permission to land somewhere.” Such flexibility is one of the essential the reason for the further development of the aircraft carriers. The strongest argument in favor of the aircraft carrier is that no aircraft carrier built during or since World War II has been sunk in combat. This issue of aircraft survivability demonstrates the strength of the assets of the Air Force and Navy. The counter argument has been that the weakness of a carrier is that does not have to be sunk; it simply has to be damaged to the point where it can no longer sustain flight operations. With that said, being that the nuclear threat has been diminished, at least in terms of our Post-Cold War status, the Weapons of Mass Destruction have become crude and simple weapons, of chemical and biological nature. Such weapons possess the killing power of nuclear weapons and are delivered by means of “row-boats and Ryder trucks."

[oldnotbold]

The Global Aircraft Carrier Perspective | Indian Defence Review

The Global Aircraft Carrier Perspective
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By Vice Adm (Retd) GM Hiranandani
Issue: Vol 21.4 Oct-Dec 2006

Overview

Navies have Aircraft Carriers to provide instantly available air power to fleets at sea. The number of aircraft carriers that a Navy requires derives from how many are needed during war to counter adversaries and also whether their peacetime presence in areas of national interest has to be permanent or occasional.

In the 1939-45 World War, Japan had strategic interest in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Britain had strategic interest in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. America had strategic interest in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. America, Japan and Britain had a large number of aircraft carriers. The Soviet Union and China had no strategic oceanic interest and hence no carriers.

vice-adm-gm-hiranandaniDuring this war, Japan’s aircraft carriers inflicted heavy damage. By the end of the war, American carrier-borne aircraft had sunk Japan’s carriers. America emerged as the world’s dominant naval power and took over the global oceanic naval responsibilities that Imperial Britain had assumed from 1815 onwards after Europe’s Napoleonic wars.

After this World War, Britain disposed of its surplus aircraft carriers to India and other countries, each of whom started its naval air arm with a single, second-hand, British aircraft carrier.

During the Cold War from 1946 to 1991, America had two strategic naval objectives. The first was to encircle from seaward the Soviet Union, Communist China, North Korea and North Vietnam. The second was to prevent the Soviet Union from disrupting the movement of tankers carrying oil from the Persian Gulf to the rest of the world.

Encirclement required the permanent presence of American aircraft carriers in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, in the Mediterranean Sea and in the South China Sea. Ensuring uninterrupted oil supplies required their occasional presence in the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf.

These prolonged distant deployments and the need for speedy redeployment to distant trouble spots led America to develop nuclear propulsion for its aircraft carriers.

In the 1960s, the Soviet Union decided that its national interest required oceanic presence and it began constructing aircraft carriers. Britain and France built fewer, smaller carriers.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 ended the Cold War. America, emerged as the world’s sole superpower and, along with Britain and France, reviewed the number and type of carriers they would need in the early decades of the next century. Communist China also decided to acquire aircraft carriers.

The ensuing perspective till 2020 deals mainly with selected navies likely to operate their carriers in the Indian Ocean. The overview at the end makes a mention of the remaining navies and also takes note of helicopter carriers.

Contemporary Aircraft Carrier Design

Aircraft carriers have to be designed for the type and numbers of aircraft to be operated. In round figures, naval carrier borne aircraft have a life of 25 years. Aircraft carriers are designed for a life of 50 years. Aircraft carrier design has, therefore, to cater for operating two generations of carrier-borne aircraft.

Naval carrier-borne aircraft are usually navalised variants of Air Force shore-based aircraft – they cost less because of the economies of scale in development and production. In special cases like Airborne Early Warning (AEW), a naval variant has had to be developed separately.

An aircraft carrier is a floating airfield. Aircraft are launched by a catapult; they land by engaging their tail hooks in one of the arrestor wires spread across the rear end of the flight deck.

To operate Short Take-off/Vertical Landing (STOVL) combat aircraft, the carrier has to have a ski jump at the front end of the flight deck to assist short take-off – this dispenses with the need for a catapult. Vertical landing dispenses with the need for arrestor wires. Dispensing with the catapult and the arrestors reduces the length of the carrier and, therefore, hits tonnage and cost. In this case, the airborne early warning task has to be performed by dedicated AEW helicopters.

To operate longer range, heavier armed, combat and AEW aircraft, the carrier needs to have both catapult and arrestor gear – the length of the carrier increases as does its tonnage and cost.

Given the uncertainty of which type of aircraft would be operating 25 years into the future, carrier design has emerged in three variants:

• One is STOBAR – Short Take-off but Arrested Recovery. In this case, the tonnage of the carrier can be kept low by foregoing the catapult and retaining arrestor wires for the aircraft to hook on to. However, it would never be possible to retrofit a catapult.

• The other is CATOBAR – Catapult Assisted Take-off but Arrested Recovery. In this case, the carrier initially has a ski jump and arrestors to operate the present generation of aircraft in the STOBAR mode. It would also be long enough to retrofit a catapult for the next generation of aircraft in the CATOBAR mode.

• A third hybrid variant is a carrier having a STOVL ski-jump with an angled flight deck, catapults and arrestor wires. This design permits operation of STOVL fighter aircraft and CATOBAR AEW aircraft.

American Aircraft Carriers

From the 1960s onwards, the American Navy has invested heavily in large, nuclear propelled aircraft carriers carrying a large number of high performance combat aircraft having advanced weapons and systems. The rationale has been

• Global strategic interests

• Coercive and deterrent effect when deployed to a trouble spot.

• Ability to operate the largest possible range of aircraft in the widest possible range of roles.

• Ability to operate offensive aircraft abroad when foreign basing may be denied.

• Instant availability of all required space and infrastructure for air operations. Where foreign bases are available for land-based combat aircraft, they are not always available early in a conflict and infrastructure is often lacking.

The nuclear powered carriers of the 1970s Enterprise class were followed by the super-carriers of the Nimitz class, of which nine have been built. Construction of the last carrier of this class commenced in 2001 – it is expected to commission in 2009.

The Nimitz Class

These 100,000 ton super-carriers have a maximum speed of 30 knots (56 km per hour) and, being nuclear powered, almost unlimited range.

Their typical air wing comprises 20 to 24 aircraft for air-to-air combat or ground attack; 20 to 24 aircraft for air defence of the carrier and its accompanying strike group; 14 aircraft for all-weather bomber attack; 5 aircraft for electronic warfare; 8 aircraft for anti-submarine warfare; and 4 helicopters for search-and-rescue and for anti-submarine warfare. Other aircraft on board include support aircraft and vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) Harrier attack aircraft used by the US marines

Of the total manpower of 5700 on board a carrier of this class, 3,200 operate and maintain the ship and 2500 operate and maintain the air wing.

The CVN 21 Class

The Nimitz class is going to be followed by the CVN 21 class. Three of these 100,000 ton super-carriers are envisaged for delivery in 2015, 2018 and 2021. Construction of the first ship is to commence in 2009 and be delivered in 2015.

Whilst retaining the basic hull design of the preceding Nimitz-class. the CVN-21’s updated features include a newly designed nuclear reactor, “stealth” design to reduce radar profile, electromagnetic catapults and improved arrestor gear. The tentative cost, at today’s prices, is estimated as 8 billion dollars (approximately 36,000 crores).

In view of the high cost and the 50-year life of these “next generation carriers”, the US Navy researched many key areas. Two of the major ones were:

• It carried out an unprecedented survivability test. The aged aircraft carrier USS America was subjected to a month-long bombardment to understand how much damage a super-carrier could withstand before succumbing to battle damage – she was eventually scuttled in May 2005. The lessons of this test are being incorporated in the design of the CVN 21 class.

• To reduce manpower costs by extensive use of automation, condition-based maintenance, changes in operational procedures, semi-automatic refuelling and servicing of aircraft, material movement devices, semi-autonomous gravity-compensated weapon handling devices and automated damage control systems and components, modern equipment, and new materials. The aim is to reduce the number of officers and sailors required to operate and maintain the carrier and its air wing to about half that of the 5700 of the Nimitz class.

Russian Aircraft Carriers

By the 1980s, the Soviet Navy (now the Russian Navy) had three 42,000-ton Kiev class aircraft carriers – Kiev (1975), Minsk (1978) and Novorossiysk (1982). They were designed to operate VTOL YAK 38 aircraft, analogous to the British Sea Harriers that had entered service in other navies in the early 1980s.

The fourth ship of the class, Baku (1987), was a larger 44,500-ton angled deck improvement on the Kiev design to operate the YAK 141 supersonic V/STOL version of the earlier YAK 38 aircraft. Due to financial constraints, development of the YAK 141 was stopped and Baku’s air operations were limited to KA 27 helicopters.

The successors to the Kiev class were the two larger 67,000-ton angled deck carriers – the Tbilisi later renamed Kuznetsov (1991) and the Varyag. Both were designed with a ski jump for launch and arrestor gear for recovery of the navalised variants of Air Force SU 27 and MIG 29 aircraft.

In 1988, construction had also commenced of the Ulyanovsk, an 85,000-ton, nuclear powered successor to the Kuznetzov class.

With the end of the Cold War in 1991 and Russia’s ensuing economic crisis:

• The Kiev class carriers were placed in reserve.

• Varyag’s construction was interrupted. She was structurally complete but without electronics.

• The half-completed Ulyanovsk was scrapped.

• Development of the supersonic YAK aircraft was discontinued.

After the mid-1990s, the Russian Navy started disposing of their carriers:

• Novorossiysk was scrapped in 1997.

• Minsk and Kiev were sold to China who utilised them as museums. Kiev is still a museum. Minsk is reportedly on sale in the scrap market.

• Varyag was bought by the Chinese Navy in 1998. China is procuring the wherewithal to make her operational by 2010.

• Baku, renamed Gorshkov, was bought by India in 2004.

A new, nuclear-powered carrier design, with the newest materials, weapons and sensors is under development. Construction is expected to commence in 2010 and complete in 2016. The Russian Northern and Pacific Fleets are expected to have one each of this class.

Until these new aircraft carriers enter service, Kuznetsov is the Russian Navy’s only operational aircraft carrier. Its air group comprises SU 27 K and MIG 29 K aircraft (K connotes ship borne-navalised versions of the Air Force SU 27 and MIG 29) along with Kamov 27 ASW and Kamov 31 AEW helicopters.

British Aircraft Carriers

In the early 1960s, the Royal Navy’s plans had envisaged a large fleet carrier and three small (12,500 ton) anti-submarine helicopter carriers. Britain’s economic difficulties in the mid-1960s, led to the cancellation of the large carrier project and the transfer of naval strike aircraft to its Air Force.

The Royal Navy, however, remained reluctant to forego the tactical advantages that aircraft carriers conferred in distant naval operations that were beyond the reach of shore-based Air Force aircraft. It pursued two projects:

• The development of the naval version of the P 1127/Harrier V/STOL aircraft that had been in service with the US Marine Corps and the Royal Air Force since 1970. By the mid-1970s, the Sea Harrier had taken shape.

• A new smaller class of ship called the ‘Through Deck Cruiser’ that would have a “ski jump” to assist V/STOL aircraft to take-off from a carrier without having to be catapulted. The V/STOL capability also dispensed with the need for arrestor wires.

Apprehensive that the role of its Naval Air Arm might be permanently confined to helicopters, the Royal Navy intensified its involvement in the development of the navalised version of the land-based V/STOL Harrier fighter aircraft. The 12,500-ton design was reworked into a larger, 19,500-ton ship which it named as a “Through-Deck Cruiser” to make it politically acceptable for obtaining financial approval. The ship had a flight deck from which it could operate helicopters. The flight deck was then fitted with a ski jump to enable the Sea Harrier aircraft to do a Short Take-off (STO) into the wind instead of a Vertical Take-off (VTO) – the STO enabled increase in overall payload of fuel/weapons when getting airborne.

The first ship, Invincible commissioned in 1980. Her air group comprised Sea Harriers and Seaking anti-submarine helicopters.

In 1981, again because of financial difficulties, Britain considered whether its Navy should be essentially an Anti-Submarine force built around destroyers and frigates, whether the Through Deck Cruiser programme should be halted, whether the Hermes should be scrapped and whether the first through deck cruiser, Invincible, should be sold to Australia. These considerations were overtaken by the crisis precipitated by Argentina’s invasion of Britain’s Falkland Islands, located in the distant South Atlantic Ocean, 8000 miles from Britain. Argentina had decided to force a solution for its long-standing dispute regarding the sovereignty over these islands.

In the 1982 Falkland Islands War between Britain and Argentina, the Royal Navy deployed two aircraft carriers – the old Hermes and the new Invincible. In addition to Sea Harrier combat aircraft and Seaking anti-submarine helicopters, these carriers also had a few experimental Seaking Airborne Early Warning (AEW) helicopters embarked.

Both carriers returned to Britain in mid-1982, unharmed by the Argentine Air Force’s missile-armed Mirages and Skyhawks because the carriers stayed out of their range, but having lost a number of Sea Harrier aircraft and pilots in combat.

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The analysis after the Falklands War established the Royal Navy’s need for:

• Instantly available carrier-borne aircraft to defend the fleet from missile-armed aircraft.

• Carrier-borne helicopters for Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)) and Airborne Early Warning (AEW)

Illustrious, the second ship of the Invincible class, commissioned in 1982. The third ship, Ark Royal, commissioned in 1985 after incorporating the improvements and modifications identified after the Falklands War.

A fourth ship, Ocean, after modification, was commissioned in 1998 exclusively as a helicopter carrier to meet NATO requirements

In 1985, Hermes renamed Viraat was bought by India.

Invincible was mothballed in 2005 for reactivation at short notice. Illustrious and Ark Royal are in service and are planned to decommission in 2012 and 2015 respectively on being replaced by new larger carriers.

Britain had started work in the mid 1980s on a design for the successors of its Invincible class carriers. After the Cold War ended in 1991 and the Russian threat receded, it took time to clarify the types of aircraft that future carriers would operate.

In 1999, Britain awarded assessment studies to two consortia, British and French, to submit designs for a carrier that would embark air groups of 30 to 40 Joint Strike Fighters that were then under development in America.

In 2002, Britain announced that its Navy and Air Force would operate the American STOVL F-35 B aircraft, and that its carriers would be large and conventionally propelled, adapted for STOVL operations and convertible for CATOBAR operations for the generation of aircraft after the F-35.

In 2003, the French design won the competition and a Carrier Alliance was formed between France and Britain to save on the high cost of designing and constructing a modern aircraft carrier. In March 2006, Britain and France signed an agreement to cooperate in the construction of three 58,000-ton aircraft carriers – two for Britain and one for France. These carriers would embark up to 45 of their respective latest-generation fighters and helicopters.

To minimise manpower costs, the Royal Navy aims to have a total complement of 1400 (800 to operate and maintain the ship and 600 to operate and maintain the air group) as against the 2,000 that a carrier of that size presently needs.

French Aircraft Carriers

In the 1960s, France had two aircraft carriers – Foch and Clemenceau. Planning for their replacement commenced in the 1970s. There was debate on whether aircraft carrier propulsion should be conventional or nuclear powered. Eventually, it was decided that despite the high cost, the next carrier should be nuclear propelled. Apart from the operational advantages, this would enable France’s warship industry to keep abreast of hi-tech propulsion design.

Construction of the 36,000-ton, nuclear powered aircraft carrier started in 1989 and completed in 1994. Unfortunately, a variety of technical problems delayed its entry into service. After aircraft trials, the flight deck had to be lengthened. There were unacceptable levels of vibrations. After the teething problems had been sorted out, she was formally commissioned in 2001 as Charles de Gaulle.

The problems experienced and the cost of construction and operating the ship dissuaded the French Navy from considering a second nuclear powered carrier.

Having decided not to build a nuclear propelled successor to the Charles de Gaulle, the French Navy awaited the outcome of the Anglo-French competition to design Britain’s aircraft carriers. With the formation of the Carrier Alliance in 2003, the possibility emerged of France sharing the British design for its next carrier.

In 2006, France and Britain reached an agreement to cooperate on the design of their future carriers. Reportedly, France agreed to pay Britain over £100 million for access to the British design.

The French design will be a variant of the British 58,000-ton design so as to operate French Rafale aircraft being navalised for carrier operations. It is likely to enter service around 2015 when the Charles de Gaulle will require a major refit and her nuclear reactors will be refuelled.

Chinese Aircraft Carriers

Varyag’s completion was interrupted due to Russia’s financial crisis in the 1990s. It was bought by the Chinese Navy. Equipment is now being acquired to make Varyag operational by 2010.

Earlier this year, a Hong Kong newspaper quoted a People’s Liberation Army Lt Gen as saying

“The Chinese Army will build an aircraft carrier and develop our own aircraft carrier fleet. An aircraft carrier is a very important tool for big countries defending their interests in the sea. China is a big country with a long shoreline. An aircraft carrier is necessary to defend our interests in the sea. The carrier fleet will not be complete for another three to five years.”

The newspaper added that aircraft for the carrier are either being built or completed and that China’s first aircraft carrier would be deployed in the South China Sea near the energy fuel supply route where warships are now deployed.

The military cooperation between Russia and China, combined with China’s experience in making Varyag operational (even if only as a carrier for training its pilots) makes it feasible for China’s first indigenous aircraft carrier to enter service in 2015/2020, not long after India’s indigenous aircraft carrier enters service.

Indian Aircraft Carriers

Gorshkov-Vikramaditya

In 1995, Russia offered to sell the 44,500 ton Gorshkov to India. After extensive evaluations and negotiations, contracts were signed in 2004 for Gorshkov’s modernisation-tropicalisation-hull and machinery-refit and for her air group of Russian combat aircraft and helicopters.

As was done for the first aircraft carrier Vikrant between 1956 and 1961 and as was done for the second carrier Viraat between 1985 and 1987, the Gorshkov is undergoing an extensive modernisation and tropicalisation refit in Russia before she is inducted into the Navy.

After this refit, the fifteen-year -old Gorshkov will serve for another two to three decades. During this period, the present aircraft carrier Viraat will phase out and be replaced by the first indigenous aircraft carrier.

Gorshkov is expected to enter service in 2008 as INS Vikramaditya.

Gorshkov’s air group will comprise:-

• MIG 29 K combat aircraft armed with the latest air-to-air, anti-ship and air-to-surface precision guided homing missiles. This aircraft will take-off from the ski jump in the forward part of the flight deck and be recovered by tail hooks catching arrestor wires in the rear part of the flight deck.

• Kamov 27 anti-submarine helicopters.

• Kamov 31 airborne early warning helicopters.

• Indigenous Dhruv and Chetak SAR helicopters.

The Indigenous Air Defence Ship (ADS) Project

The project for an indigenous aircraft carrier took shape in 1979. In the 1980s, a concept study by France’s DCN, assisted by a team of Indian Naval architects, evolved designs for a 25,000 ton catapult version and a ski jump version. The study also confirmed that the carrier could be built in the Cochin Shipyard. Financial constraints precluded sanction for a carrier of this size and the next few years were spent in juggling designs for a smaller carrier. The grey area was the type and number of aircraft that the ADS would operate.

In the mid-1990s, Russia offered India the Gorshkov along with the carrier-borne version of the land-based MIG 29 aircraft that the Air Force had already inducted. Meanwhile, development had also commenced of the navalised, carrier-borne version of the indigenous land-based Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) being developed for the Air Force.

The types of combat aircraft that would fly from the ADS now became clear – the British V/STOL Sea Harriers (after Viraat decommissioned), the Russian STOBAR MIG 29 Ks (being inducted with the Gorshkov) and the navalised LCAs (when developed).

The staff requirements were finalised in 1999 for a gas turbine propelled, 28-knot, 37,000-ton carrier with an angled deck and a ski jump, to operate an air group of 30 combat aircraft and helicopters and manned by 1400 personnel.

Approval was accorded in 2003. Cochin Shipyard commenced construction in 2005. The nomenclature of the project changed from Air Defence Ship (ADS) to Indigenous Aircraft Carrier(IAC).

The IAC is expected to enter service by 2013.

[Occasional Aviator]

Oldnotbold -

I don't think that there's anything in your previous two posts that is new or has not been posted to this forum before. I can only conclude that you were trying to post lots of text to move Malcolm Davis' arguments off the last page.....

[oldnotbold]

That might be true if:

A) I knew who Malcom Davis was.

B) I did not know, for a certainty, that a balanced Royal Navy, including Carrier Air, was` not a totally good thing for the British Armed Forces generally, and indeed for UK.

C) you might read the article -including the obvious errors- and reflect that India (a nation UK gives aid to, because it is so poor) will soon have three Aircraft Carriers, while we in UK argue about having one or two, despite their obvious, and well proven, advantages in Defence terms.

[ORAC]

a balanced Royal Navy, including Carrier Air, was` not a totally good thing for the British Armed Forces

1. I would argue that the funds are not available to provide such a balanced navy. We can either afford a Navy with sufficient frigates for the guard force and other world wide missions we wish to cover, along with an amphibious force to support the Royal Marines; or we can support a CBG with the vast majority of the rest of the Navy defending it at the cost - as seems likely given the leaks in the press today - the amphibious force and future frigates.

Worse, if we only have one, it becomes an irreplacable asset which becomes impossible to place in harms way in littoral waters and, without any organic AAR assets, unable to contribute effectively to anything except operations around the ship. What could be described as a self-sucking hind tit...

2. India is a large expanding country with a population of over a billion, a GDP expected to overtake that of the UK between 2020-25. It also has a neighbour, China, with whom it shares a land border and waters which China is increasingly claiming as it own - and a known programme to build up a carrier force to challenge the dominance of the USN in the region.

In simple terms, India has a maritime threat where their possession of a carrier force is both logical, and increasingly affordable. The UK has no such enemy and an economy going in the opposite direction.

[Occasional Aviator]

A) Dr malcolm Davis is a defence academic who has a long-standing association with UK defence. That you don't know who he is tells me something about you.....

B) I agree that a balanced Royal Navy is a thoroughly good thing for the UK to have. Dr Davis' point was partly that under current funding pressures, a balanced Royal Navy including carrier air may be unachievable - how much do you have to hollow out of your core capability to afford the totemic carriers? I also happen to believe that we need a balanced force as a whole. I agree thoroughly that carriers are a uniquely useful defence capability which allows you to do things that many other nations can't - but taking the wider view, is is worth hollowing out the nation's overall air power capabilities to provide a limited amount of air power for the fleet? These are the choices we're faced with.

C) I have read the article, both in the journal and online when it was posted here previously. I, and most contribuors here, know that India is buying carriers. It's old news and I can't see what that contributes to the debate at this stage.