Pontius Navigator

Dick Dolman have a look at your PM.

Brian Young

.........that it's Doleman. A Dolman is a Turkish robe open at the front. Oddly enough I have seen Dick wearing such a thing on more than one occasion!

Brian Young

Just remembered. It was a dishdash Dick wore (probably still does), not a dolman.

Brian

FJJP

I may have missed the reference to it, but before a court matrial takes place, there must be a summary or abstract of evidence. This is usually a mini-inquiry, where witnesses are interviewed and then the DLS decides what charges should be brought and whether or not to proceed with a court.

Has anyone seen the summary or abstract paperwork?

I cannot believe that a CM was started during a BoI. I have never heard of this happening at any time since I joined in the mid-60s. Is this the first time? If so, was it an almighty screw-up? The whole administration of the legal side of this incident, never mind the procedings, stinks to high heaven. It strikes me that the terms 'indecent haste' and 'fall guy' should be seriously considered.

cazatou

FJJP

Although it is now more than 10 years since I took Redundancy I think I may be able to provide an insight.

A BOI/ Unit Inquiry is an administrative procedure to investigate and make recommendations following an accident or incident. Evidence is taken on oath so that it can be used in subsequent disciplinary proceedings if these are deemed necessary.

If the BOI uncovers evidence which indicates that a trial (either by Civil Courts or by Courts Martial) may become necessary the Inquiry will be suspended until such time as a decision is reached by DLS. If DLS decides a trial is required then the Inquiry will be held in abeyance until after the trial.

Even if an aquittal is the result of any Court proceedings it is still possible for the BOI to find negligence in regard to the actions of personnel involved.

FJJP

cazatou,

I see the point you are making - as happened in this case. However, if during a BoI the president considers that legal procedings may result, he formally warns those involved. Thereafter, the individual is permitted legal representation and can cross-examine witnesses through the president. I would consider it highly unusual [and I have never heard of it happening before], that legal procedings were instigated before the board has reached a conclusion.

The point I make about CM procedings is that a summary or abstract of evidence is FORMALLY conducted before each CM. I merely query in this case why there has been no mention of either throughout this thread. It may well be relevant, considering the mess that both procedings seem to have made of witness evidence.

drunkenwasp

cazatou

Not quite - a BOI is indeed an administrative procedure (same for UI) and cannot be used for disciplinary action (in theory). Evidence is taken under oath to ensure accuracy and truth - not for subsequent investigative action. Again referring to the case that I was involved with, the BOI decided at an early stage that criminal action might have taken place (negligence) so, in consultation with the RAF legal services, they halted the BOI and handed the investigation to the police. A RAFP SB investigation took place and they forwarded their report (recommending a prosecution in fact). Fortunately, the legal services (in conjunction, as I recall, with the CPS) decided that there was no case to answer - at which point the BOI re-commenced.

There were a number of contentious issues which, I believe, cross-over into the case in hand. Firstly, the BOI made the decision to call in the RAFP early on in the inquiry - long before any proper or detailed evidence had been presented. The BOI (with the legal services) recommendation was not that the RAFP investigate the whole matter, just the actions of my Sergeant. Thus, by any manner, they were pre-judging the issue.

When the decision was made not to prosecute, the same BOI member were re-instated to continue the investigation - this was wholly unfair because their impartiality was open to question. The rest, as they say is history.

Therefore, from my experience, BOIs can and do pre-empt and recommend police investigation, based on , IMHO, a basic knowledge of the case in hand and at far too early a stage. I must point out, I don't know if this is what happened in the F15 BOI - just that it does happen

SASless

I question any system of ATC that allow a controller to issue a descent clearance below a known safe altitude for that location...and not be held liable for the maintenance of clearance from terrain/obstacles.

You can argue RIS/RAS/Radar Control till you are blue in the face but the old saying about "The amount of time and effort you have to spend proving there is no problem only confirms the magnitude of the problem" applies here.

Simply put....if that clearance to 4000 feet had not been given (2500 feet below the minimum safe altitude) (1700 feet below the pilots planned safe altitude)...in all liklihood the flight may not have hit the hill. With absolute certainty....if the clearance had been to go no lower than 6500 feet....the accident would not have occurred.

The 6500 foot altitude was known...it was SOP for Radar Control....what the fecking difference does it make whether the alititude clearance given is part of RIS/RAS or Radar Control?

If this controller's conscience is bothering him....he holds some blame and rightfully so in my book.

Never mind the GCM or BOI, his real penance is knowing the role he did play in this.....and my heart goes out to him. We are all human and we all make mistakes. There were plenty of them made that day by several folks....and since....and before.

It would seem a slight change to the procedures used in the UK could prevent similar lapses in vectors and altitudes. If in radar contact and receiving any level of service....ATC should have the absolute requirement to offer only "SAFE" guidance to include altitudes.

It just defies imagination to believe a system could operate any other way.

If not in radar contact....offer canned safe altitudes that work for the area.

As to the AXIS flight's routing....what USAF/RAF pilot is going to admit he did not know exactly where he was while blasting around Low Level? Everyone takes and extra turn now and then when things start getting a bit dodgy.

Anyone really look up and see a low flying aircraft, do a spotters check, then note the time.....while hiking or skiiing? Third party eyewitnesses are notorious for being inaccurate about details. I would be surprised if at least one of them had not told investigators the aircraft's engine was sputtering as it passed over them.

Pontius Navigator

SASLess,
I was trained as a navigator to navigate the aircraft either to the overhead for a QDM approach or to an entry point where the aircraft would be guided in on an ACR7 azimuth only approach with procedural height clearance. TAPs was an unknown word only in the pilot's vocabulary.

Below transition altitude I was not employed as a vertical position consultant either as my altitmeter did not have a sub-scale.

That there was a technique to use an altimeter without a sub-scale for terrain avoidance was never explained and probably beyond the skill of several of our nav instructors at the time (apologies if I am wrong).

A little later, in the real world, we would even do internal radar approaches down to decision at about 500 feet. Even when we were not doing the approach we would monitor the ATC, not least in case of radio failure. Any clearance, en route or terminal was always checked to see that it was safe.

If given a clearance below safety altitude, when IMC, we would not penetrate unless on an approach to an airfield under positive control. The corollary was we would not accept a controlled approach into the ground away from an airfield. While the PK of the ground is 1 the risk is not shared equally.

SASless

Two responses that avoid the question...why should an ATC system have no liability for passing unsafe information?

I am well aware of the UK system....have flown there for years....and have done my own radar approaches....and did so on your license...not an American license.

KENNYR

I do not think that getting into pi**ing matches will help the situation. Lets concentrate on the facts. The main fact is, irrespective of any advisory instruction given by the controller in question, the crew of the receiving aircraft has the ultimate decision whether to accept the ADVISORY information given or reject it. The crews of the aircraft accepted the information and paid the ultimate price. It surely cannot fall on the controllers head if the crews accepted it.

The point that I find so hard to accept is the Courts Martial unwillingness to accept the eye-witness reports, even though they were quite definite in what they saw.

Johnwil

The principal issue is not whether the advice to the F15s to descend to 4,000 feet was acceptable ATC procedure but whether this advice caused or contributed to the crash.
The overwhelming evidence from the GCM was that the ATCOs advice to the F15s to descend to 4,000 feet had no bearing on their crashing. The GCM evidence includes the following points.
* The F15s descended from 7200 feet at a rate of up to 4,000 feet per minute. The prosecution's expert witness from the USAF, Major Scott Chamberlain, accepted that this rate of descent suggested that the pilots could probably see the ground. No experienced pilot would be expected to descend at this rate through cloud when unable to see the ground.
* The three radar plots - from Aberdeen, Allens Hill and Lowther Hill -collectively indicated that the jets were transiting to the west of Ben MacDui's summit. The BOI adviser who analysed the Allens Hill plot, the latest one, could think of no possible manoeuvre that would take the F15s from the last radar position to the crash site. To overcome this obstacle he invented a plot that fitted in with the direct descent hypothesis.
* The RAF Tornados were flying in the area about 45 minutes before the F15s. They decided to perform a 360 degree turn due to the prevailing weather conditions and then to transit the Lairig Ghru. If making a 360 degree turn was appropriate action for the Tornados why should the F15s not have done something similar ? Major Chamberlain accepted this was possible.
* The Tornados were in a two mile trail. All the eye witnesses described the jets as being close together. It is absurd to maintain that the eye witnesses saw Tornados. There are only two credible points of view on this. Either the five witnesses saw low flying F15s or they were collectively lying or deluded.
The definitve summary of the evdence is Michael Jones's concluding statement to the GCM. This can be found in summary on the " F 15 Court Martial updates " thread messages 9 and 10.

CBrough

Deliverance: * How does that avoid the question? The fact is a RIS a useful service below SALT. It was a useful reminder that ATC are there to help, but the buck stops with the crew, however unfortunate.

I agree with you. I have, on many occasions, taken a RIS below safety altitude, but only VMC; I would be foolish to accept such a service IMC. I would never descend IMC with a RIS, and I would never descend below my own safety altitude whilst IMC without first informing the ATC agency of my flight conditions. Then it would be up to me to request a suitable service to permit the sortie to continue, or curtail the mission.

The information passed by the ATC officer is just that!!....INFORMATION. That information could then be used to deconflict with any other traffic in the vicinity, it would not allow me to abstain from my terrain/obstacle clearance responsibility.

Deliverance: * There are so many what ifs in this case. Were they VMC? Did the controller think they were VMC? They were on a RIS.

As for whether they were VMC, we can conclude one fact with a high degree of confidence......they were VMC at some point before CFIT, as per the eye-witness accounts.

from Johnwil: * The Tornados were in a two mile trail. All the eye witnesses described the jets as being close together. It is absurd to maintain that the eye witnesses saw Tornados. There are only two credible points of view on this. Either the five witnesses saw low flying F15s or they were collectively lying or deluded.

Deliverance: * Could they see the ground but not the horizon?

It is quite possible they could see the ground, but not the horizon. We will never know how compelling the visual illusion may have been.

Deliverance: * I for one think they could not have been intentionally flying at low-level, nobody would fly low-level in close formation. As for eye-witnesses, how many noise complainers get the aircraft type correct?

I am sure that 2-mile trail could never be misinterpreted as close formation. However, whilst manoeuvring during a low-level entry, the wingman may have been close enough to be observed as "close formation" whilst giving his leader enough room to navigate freely around the weather without fear of hitting his wingman. I am not familiar with USAF formation SOPs, but it this would appear to be a likely explanation.

I am not privy to statistics of complainers' aircraft recognition abilities however, I'm sure these people would be a little miffed to hear their evidence dismissed based on their ability to count. TWO TAILS…ONE plus ONE is TWO. CLOSE FORMATION….NOT 2 miles from each other. I am sure they have been questioned on what they observed, and they understand the gravity of the situation. Give these people SOME credibility. Anything less would credit them with a monkey-like level of intelligence.

gumbyswa

Your putting words in my mouth John, I said in answer to the question "could they have seen the ground", I said "that was possible", I also said "it was not probable", additionally, the descent rate "was just fine for the conditions, AND, that they slowed the descent to level at 4000'". Same for the 360 turn and flying willy nilly down low for unknown minutes WITHOUT enough gas to get back to the point with the gas they had on impact. I said anything is possible, like monkeys flying out my butt, but it's not probable.

Please don't take this response wrong, I do not hold Spot chargable, my last comment to him was hoping this whole thing ended and he could get on with his life, evidently not. That is a shame and it is wrong.

So i would like you casual observers to get two things straight, it was not pilot error, and it was not controller error. Thats all I am saying for right now.

How is Spot? Whats his future look like, what can I do to help, oh, i have some info he may want.

Scott Chamberlain, Maj (Ret) USAF
First Officer Southwest Airlines

gumbyswa

You are exactly correct sir, this is something that the defence tried to show how poorly the pilots were flying. It is also the same 6 seconds used to show enough time for the manuever to low level. Not. What it does show is that for the last six seconds they were level, like at the time of impact.

matkat

Scott check Your PMs Please
DM

gumbyswa

I just completed a cursory review of the BOI report and am concerned it notes in numerous locations a reference to the term "Cloudbreak". Where in any MOD, RAF, ATC, ICAO document is this defined? From my research, it is not a defined procedure nor technique. Does anybody know of it's origin? I think I do but I'll wait for replies. Thanks.

Scott

BEagle

I vaguely recall a 'cloudbreak' procedure of about 20-30 years ago. It was a way of descending through overcast cloud to VMC below, but never below Safety Altitude. You called the ATCRU, identification was then established either through SSR or via 'Identification Turns', then you descended as advised to VMC.

A bit Stone Age, but it worked back then..... However, surely it disappeared when RIS/RAS came in?

nigegilb

Forgive me for intruding here but I used to be an ATCO at SCATCC (Mil). Cloudbreak was a term used quite frequently. Few cobwebs here but I recall it just meant a pilot wanted a radar service as low as we could take him, til he got VMC below. Remember, the radar heads at an ATC Centre are dotted around the country. I cannot remember if we used a sector safe altitude like you might see on a radar vector chart or the emergency safe altitude. Seem to remember that USAF often used the term.

gumbyswa

thanks, i think you are correct, it is outdated, undocumented, why then did the BOI reference it and not define it???