Go Back  PPRuNe Forums > Aircrew Forums > Military Aviation
Reload this Page >

The other E.E. classic, the Canberra. (Merged 23rd July '04)

Wikiposts
Search
Military Aviation A forum for the professionals who fly military hardware. Also for the backroom boys and girls who support the flying and maintain the equipment, and without whom nothing would ever leave the ground. All armies, navies and air forces of the world equally welcome here.

The other E.E. classic, the Canberra. (Merged 23rd July '04)

Thread Tools
 
Search this Thread
 
Old 2nd Mar 2004, 17:46
  #41 (permalink)  

Nemesis of the Proot Dynasty
 
Join Date: Feb 2003
Location: Somewhere in Hampshire
Posts: 289
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Recall an incident whilst I was at Akrotiri in 1965/66 on TASF (which was situated right at the end of the runway). I was sitting in the cockpit carrying out a turnround on a Lyneham Britannia, when I saw a pair of B(I)8s taking off. Three or four hundred yards before they got to us and were then at about 80/100 feet, the trail aircraft suddenly started yawing rapidly from side to side. Realising it was not likely to stay in the air, I and a colleague rushed back to the door (in case the damn thing came our way – at one point, it was facing directly at the Britannia!), to see the trail aircraft heading rapidly for the ground (albeit in almost horizontal flight). Two hundred yards after it passed the end of the runway, it hit the ground fairly heavily and slid for another three or four hundred yards across the scrub, taking with it the landing light poles and shedding bits of structure. We got to it just as the crew got out, shaken, but none the worse for their experience, but all of us were quickly covered in a layer of yellow dust. Once the crash crew arrived, we went back to the line hut.

Twenty minutes later, I was told by my shift boss, to go out and put the undercarriage locks in place. I explained to him, that this would be slightly difficult, since the starboard main u/c was about two hundred yards behind the aircraft, the port u/c had collapsed completely and the nose wheel bay had taken a direct hit by a light pole. He was adamant that I did as I was told! So off I trudged with said u/c locks to join the rest of the (by then) sightseers. I still remember the ribbing I got for fitting a lock to the undercarriage, which was laying in glorious isolation in the sand, way behind the wreck!!

I believe the resultant enquiry blamed the pilot (the squadron boss) for flying too close to the efflux of the lead aircraft and flaming out the port engine.
Lukeafb1 is offline  
Old 2nd Mar 2004, 17:56
  #42 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Feb 2003
Location: Scotland
Age: 77
Posts: 496
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like on 1 Post
Pindi - Never had, or heard of, a runaway in my 3 tours on them ('75-'88, interrupted by CFS). So how would you define a "Cure"?
keithl is offline  
Old 2nd Mar 2004, 21:17
  #43 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Dec 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 737
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Lukeafb1

Good heavens! Riggers reunited @ Pprune!

I was working in the bomb bay of the next aircraft along and (as in the T17 ejection) thought the Russians were coming and banged my head on the roof of the bomb bay.

Check your PM's later tonight (I haven't written it yet) as one of my future stories was going to be the rigger who cut his finger off on the nose u/c banana link. And that would have been your team! Could have been you?

SPHLC
SirPeterHardingsLovechild is offline  
Old 2nd Mar 2004, 23:18
  #44 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Sep 2000
Location: Over there, behind that tree.
Posts: 581
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Pindi - the DP switch was the cure, that plus revised actuator stops and improvements in wiring integrity. At the time, the RAF/MoD blamed EE for bad design of the tailplane trim system, even though the design had been, in Bee Beamont's words -. . . investigated, approved and authorised by many tiers of officials. . . in the Ministry of Supply. The trouble was essentially mechanical in that the original SP trim switch could "stick on" causing the actuator to run to full travel even after the pilot had released the switch.

This is not to say that this "reason" was not given for future accidents but I seem to recall that the fixed, vertical tab on the back of the elevator could also give a similar effect if it had been bent or hand-filed to a wrong dimension. As this "job" was usually done after a 2nd line servicing I didn't have a lot of experience with it, maybe Luke or Love-Child can clarify.

Luke and SPHLC
Good tales blokes, as yet another Canberra rigger I can empathise with everything you say.

Luke
Glad you picked up on the Lady be Good thing. Here's a shot of that nav target from a 14 Sqn B(I)8.



Pic taken by Jim Sewell, 14 Sqn pilot.
Beeayeate is offline  
Old 3rd Mar 2004, 08:39
  #45 (permalink)  
Roghead
Guest
 
Posts: n/a
OK Guys, what do you know about the macrolan screen fitted to the Laarbruch BI8's in the early 70's.
 
Old 3rd Mar 2004, 08:46
  #46 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Sep 2000
Location: Over there, behind that tree.
Posts: 581
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
To stop the crate of Keo sliding about in the nose? Go on then Roghead, tell us. I don't know because my B(I)8 days ended in 1965.

Edited to say . . .
Look at this, four pages! Good one troops.
Beeayeate is offline  
Old 3rd Mar 2004, 18:47
  #47 (permalink)  

Nemesis of the Proot Dynasty
 
Join Date: Feb 2003
Location: Somewhere in Hampshire
Posts: 289
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
SPHLC,

Just checked and I still have all my fingers. Worst accident I had was grabbing a T4 pitot head which the driver had forgotten to switch off. Still have the scars on my left hand to prove it!!
Lukeafb1 is offline  
Old 3rd Mar 2004, 19:41
  #48 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Feb 2002
Location: (LFA 7a)
Age: 64
Posts: 738
Received 9 Likes on 5 Posts
THE CANBERRA IS WELL KNOWN FOR HOLDING MANY RECORDS. HERE'S ONE NOT MANY MIGHT KNOW ABOUT:

The 3rd of May 1966 was a sunny morning as the crew of Canberra B2, WH857 was flying on an Electronic Counter Measures Training flight. Soon after launch a piece of mission required equipment failed rendering the mission incomplete. To get some value out of the flight, the pilot decided to carry out a simulated engine out approach. They began the radar controlled letdown and were soon approaching the field. Flt. LT. Ken Topaz, the Air Electronics officer on board picks up the story:

"Once we had settled down onto the radar approach I busied myself with my pre-landing checks, making sure that all my equipment was shut down correctly, this procedure which also entailed my tightening my harness for landing usually took about a couple of minutes.

I heard the radar controller announce "you are one mile from touch down, look ahead and land" this was standard patter. At this point the navigator who was sitting close by on my left drew my attention to the air speed indicator which was reading 85 knots and falling rapidly (at this weight we should have been doing about 110 knots. Nothing was said because at the same time the pilot applied full power to both engines very rapidly, I was looking forward and saw the RPM gauges winding up, but the starboard engine (which had been set to zero thrust for the asymmetric practice) must have flamed out as the RPM unwound. The aircraft, which was very low by this time, rolled very rapidly to starboard and then flicked back to port, the port wingtip struck the ground as the aircraft rolled almost vertical, cart wheeled and destroyed itself just to the left of the main runway.

Between the time that the wingtip hit and the nose of the Canberra struck the ground, both the navigator and I ejected (again not a word was said!) As the ejector seats in the rear of the Canberra are side by side the seats are angled slightly to ensure that the seats separate as they leave the aircraft. The navigator being on the port side effectively ejected into the ground and died shortly after. Myself, being on the starboard had a degree of upward motion and separated from the seat (at what height no one knows but speculation is about 20 feet) Although not fully conscious due to the acceleration of the seat, I was immediately fully aware as I hit the ground. It would appear that I landed on my feet with absolutely no forward motion whatsoever as I was able to stop myself toppling with just one hand on the ground on which I now found myself sitting, or rather on my still fully packed parachute.

The precise time of impact was 10:44 as the first thing I did was look at my watch, seems strange but it seemed important at the time.

The first person on the scene was my Squadron Commander who appeared out of the smoke, he paused for a moment and then ran past me, I didn't realise that the Navigator was just behind me and obviously looking a lot worse than I did. The next person was the Station Dentist, who had been driving around the peri track, he appeared on the scene waving a knife with which, despite my protestations about the destruction of government property, he proceeded to use to cut me out of my harness. "I've been carrying this thing for years," he said, "and am determined to use it now!" As you can see from the cut cords on the parachute he did a good job.

I suppose I must have been in shock, but at no time did I feel any pain and the worst part of the incident was the ride in a rather bumpy ambulance to the R.A.F.Hospital at Ely, it seemed to take an awfully long time.

The pilot had stayed with the aircraft and was killed instantly in the wreck.

I sustained two broken ankles, a broken right hip joint, a fractured pelvis and minor damage to my spine. After about 18 months of hospitalisation and rehabilitation I returned to flying, albeit I was banned from further aircraft fitted with ejector seats. "

So, in this case the Martin-Baker Mk. 1CN ejection seat did function far beyond what it was designed for, which was a minimum ejection altitude of 1000 feet and a minimum airspeed of 125 knots. It gave Flt. LT. Ken Topaz a chance at life. These cases are extremely rare, and rarer still are the ones without injury. The case for the Navigator was complicated by his drogue chute becoming entangled with the jettisoned hatch cover. In Flt. LT. Topaz's case, the majority of his forward velocity was cancelled by the catapult stroke of the seat.
jimgriff is online now  
Old 3rd Mar 2004, 22:11
  #49 (permalink)  

Yes, Him
 
Join Date: Aug 1999
Location: West Sussex, UK
Posts: 2,689
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Lucky(?) man.
Not all were so fortunate.

I saw a 3Sqn B(I).8 go in from a [real] asymmetric go around attempt at Akrotiri, pilot/nav and an SAC Squipper along for the ride all killed. Just before Christmas 1970, XM267. I think it was the last day of the APC det.

I still sometimes dream about it and still feel uncomfortable if I see a Canberra head on.
Gainesy is offline  
Old 4th Mar 2004, 02:55
  #50 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Nov 2002
Location: UK, North Riding
Posts: 31
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Beeayate.


I remember the B2s being grounded for the fitting of the twin pole switch in the Spring of 1956. However, I see from my log book that I flew a number of air tests for the 2107 Mod on several of the Squadron aircraft ( 4 times in one day on one of them) in early 1958. It puzzles me, if the design authority had full confidence in twin pole switch as a cure for the problem, what lay behind the implementation of Mod 2107 some 18 months later. Any ideas?

There were 3 of these incidents that I know of, all in the period 1954-56 but I never heard of one after that.
Pindi is offline  
Old 4th Mar 2004, 07:16
  #51 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Sep 2000
Location: Over there, behind that tree.
Posts: 581
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Pindi

Although the switch was considered as the solution, as I understand it there was a series of wiring changes as well as revised actuator stops. I would think that EE (and MoD, et al) were satisfied that the problem had been solved.

As for Mod 2107, don't have any background on this so won't speculate, sorry. I understand there were many mods in the early days in the RAF that involved the flying controls and tailplane.
Beeayeate is offline  
Old 4th Mar 2004, 11:42
  #52 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Oct 2003
Location: Canberra Australia
Posts: 1,300
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Intrepid Display Flying

From Memoirs

September 1962 saw more display practice in a Canberra which somehow had become my task by default. No one else was inclined to fly the manoeuvres which I had developed for the Canberra at light weight. This particular year was to take on some different developments. A few days before the display date of 17 September, a Squadron of USAF B57s had arrived from the USA. The Commanding Officer, Colonel Tom Aldrich, was allocated a house on the base and became a neighbour and close friend. His squadron of aircraft were based at Avalon whilst his personnel were housed at Laverton. USAF U2s had already been operating from Laverton for some two years conducting upper air sampling. The B57s were to extend this research. Colonel Aldrich readily agreed to place two of his B57s on static display at Laverton for the air display.

The B57s had marked across their tails in large letters WEATHER to show their Weather Reconnaissance Role. In view of the America's Cup yacht races, then in progress in the USA between The US's WEATHERLY and Australia's GRETEL, enterprising RAAF airmen got to work overnight and neatly painted an appended LY to WEATHER on the B57s and GRETEL across the tail of the Canberra on static display next to the B57. This was a great crowd pleaser.

The display on Sunday 17 September was a huge success and was of course attended by most of the B57 Squadron personnel. I soon found myself in detailed discussions of comparisons of the Canberra with its USAF copy during a party in the Mess that evening. The comparisons of performance and manoeuvring capabilities of these similar aircraft went on for some time between us RAAF pilots and the USAF pilots who all had much more flying experience on their aircraft than we were ever likely to accumulate on our Canberras. Ours were fitted with more powerful engines and the cockpits were much different. Theirs had fighter type canopies with crew members in tandem and their airframes were somewhat heavier. The USAF pilots, and our own squadron pilots, had never been permitted to perform aerobatics. They were rather impressed by the routine which I had evolved for the display.

My routine was to start the display, using an aircraft at light weight having minimum fuel, by lifting off the runway at a speed well below normal and immediately raising the undercarriage whilst holding down low. At the end of the 5000 ft runway I would have accelerated to a speed of about 220 Kts, at which point I would pull up sharply into a 30 degree climb whilst executing two barrel rolls at maximum roll rate to the left. By the time the aircraft was first inverted, I would still be accelerating at full power and climbing away at about 400 feet. After comfortably completing the two climbing barrel rolls, I would pull power back to idle whilst pulling up to the vertical to bleed off speed for a stall turn to the left into a vertically down attitude and a flattening turn as I came back over the airfield for a fairly slow and low steep turn. During the turn I would open the weapon bay doors to release a full load of air filled meteorological balloons. The balloons floated down onto the crowd much to the delight of all, particularly the children.

Following the release of the balloons I positioned for a short field landing using anti-skid maximum braking to stop the light aircraft in about 2000 feet on the 5,000 ft runway. Just before stoping I would have the engines accelerating to full power whilst holding on the hot brakes for about 10 seconds. The take-off could then be achieved in about another 2,000 feet leaving about 1,000 feet of unused runway. This performance even surprised experienced Canberra pilots. My fuel load was, by now, well down leaving just enough for the later flight in the last events of the display - the handicap pylon air race and a mass fly past, which I was to lead.

The air race was flown at 500 feet around significant ground marks all within view from the airfield. All aircraft types were assigned a speed to fly 5 laps and were assigned a particular time to roll on take-off. A handicapper in the tower assigned speed corrections on each lap aiming to bring all aircraft over an airfield finish line as close as possible to the same time. The air race became a popular feature of the Laverton displays. The race was also useful in getting all aircraft airborne for the finale - the mass fly past.

Two Canberras were to take part in the fly past and I wondered how I may be able to arrange for both to fly in the air race under different handicaps. I found that a single engined Canberra could be identified from the ground if an engine was closed down, allowed to cool and then made to stream unburnt fuel by opening the high pressure fuel valve and throttle.

I elected to fly the single engined Canberra in the air race following a normal two engined take-off. This was the same aircraft I had flown for the individual display and by now had low levels of fuel in its tanks. My assigned speed was 200 Kts. At this speed there was inadequate rudder to maintain balanced flight as I increased power to maintain speed while turning hard around the ground markers. I began by feeding fuel to both engines from the centre fuselage tank. The tightest turn in the race was between Laverton and Werribee and as I yawed the aircraft around this turn on the first lap the fuel in the tank must have been forced to one side away from the pick-up point for the immersed booster pump. Suddenly my only operating engine failed.

I pulled up to gain height for a dead stick landing attempt on to the airfield, declared an emergency and then started to sort through my other options. The obvious thing to do was to go for a relight on the other windmilling engine so I closed off its streaming fuel and waited a while for the fuel to blow clear. It then lit up as expected and my emergency was now over. I then joined in on the air-race again, cutting a corner to get back into my handicapped position. I now had the time to sort things out, recalling that I had seen a low pressure fuel warning light as the engine stopped. This gave me the clue I needed to deduce the reason for the engine failure. I then relit the "failed" engine which continued to perform as expected. So I then shut down the other engine again and started fuel streaming.

Little did I know but a fire had been burning in its nacelle. A gap between the engine tail pipe and the jet pipe had allowed raw fuel to dribble down into the nacelle. This had not cleared before I went for the emergency relight and had been burning whilst I relit the other engine. Nor had the fire burned out before I started to feed more fuel from the streaming engine. I had not finished the next lap before I was presented with the dreaded glow of a fire warning light. I immediately closed down the streaming, pulled up again declaring another emergency and slowed to a lower speed before discharging the nacelle fire extinguisher. I was relieved when the fire warning light went out presuming that if there had been a fire then it had gone out. I had no desire to foul up the display with an emergency landing so I called off the emergency and rejoined the air race for the second time. The handicapper was now speaking with a frantic voice while I tried my best to exhibit a matter-of fact voice showing no further concern.

A passing Sabre pilot looked me over and reported no sign of fire remaining. I could not determine whether there had been a real fire so I determined not to restart the offending engine again.

We all completed the race in a mass scramble to the finish. I cannot recall which aircraft won. My mind was already working on what to do next. I had to stay on one engine and realised that I could achieve enough speed to still lead the fly-past. I also had to be the last to land else I would block the only runway useable. I did not want to divert to another airfield. The fly-past went according to plan - the landing sequence did not, as I came in tail-end charlie.

I had to close down on the runway and have the aircraft towed away. Inspection showed there had been a fierce brief fire which had caused some wing damage. The wing was removed and replaced. Geof Wilson, the navigator, knows all about adrenaline rush. He sat on his hands for a few days to stop them shaking and even volunteered to fly with me again. I would like to hear the story again as he now tells it.
Milt is offline  
Old 4th Mar 2004, 18:21
  #53 (permalink)  
Roghead
Guest
 
Posts: n/a
Not an unreasonable idea Beeayeate, however we stashed the keo in the bomb bay along with all the other goodies, making a mental note not to use the bomb doors as an auxilliary air brake during the run and break. A few stories on that, by the way, some of which have already been posted!


Macrolan screens were fitted behind the nose cone of the 2ATAF Bi8's(possibly other marks subsequently) due to the bird strike risk and the potential serious injury risk to the navigator in the prone position should the bird penetrate the nose cone. One could be excused thinking that it was a typical botched job/botched thinking exercise "typical" of the ideas coming from Command, and despite the irrefutable and sad history of such birdstrikes and the loss of eyes/serious facial injury which had occurred over several years the idea did not meet with universal approval from the navigators.It was considered that the screen, which was easily scratched, would limit the view from the front, would certainly impede the vertical view ( therefore seriously limit the infamous "spot on ground" or SOG bombing method - a method which gave the Bi8's many victories in competitions) and any way the a/c's going out of service soon.
So, one aircraft was fitted and off it went on the first trial...... you've now guessed the result ...... a bird came through the front, the navigator was covered in blood and feathers, the screen was shifted backwards but otherwise unbroken, but no personnel damage was sustained.
All aircraft were fitted with the screen within the week. A great result!
 
Old 4th Mar 2004, 19:22
  #54 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Sep 2000
Location: Over there, behind that tree.
Posts: 581
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Roghead
Sound idea I guess, can see how the navs would have complained initially though. After squirming up into the nose you had a great view of the outside world and could judge your camera shots better.

Have a picture of a bird strike on the nose glazing of a B(I)8 which shows the damage that can be done. Not a pretty sight inside either.

Yes, panniers were used for "stuff" but we also tended to carry crates of Keo in the nose. In fact that's how I managed to first screw up my back, by trying to lift one out in the restricted kneeling position.

Milt
Top tale. In an Oz Canberra? Recall the number?
Beeayeate is offline  
Old 5th Mar 2004, 13:48
  #55 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Oct 2003
Location: Canberra Australia
Posts: 1,300
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
For Beeayeate

The Oz Canberra was A84-248.

It was one of the fleet of flight test aircraft we had at the Oz Test Centre called Aircraft Research and Developmen Unit.

248 was instrumented with all of that orange stuff signifying flight test useage.

The Oz Canberras all ended up with that double pole isolating switch isolating power to the elevator trim system.

Took 248 to Darwin/Tropics once to flight test a water cooled flying suit at low level high humidity conditions. Suit had lots of fine tubing throughout connected to a mini pump circulating iced water. Worked fine.

Suit was being developed for astronaut use by UK boffins.

Must pull a few more unusual Oz Canberra stories from the memoirs.
Milt is offline  
Old 5th Mar 2004, 17:51
  #56 (permalink)  

Do a Hover - it avoids G
 
Join Date: Oct 1999
Location: Chichester West Sussex UK
Age: 91
Posts: 2,206
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Milt

Great story. Keep them coming. It is amazing what can be done with a stick and a rudder (well yoke in your case) plus an appreciation of what you are up to. Bee would have been proud of you!

Regards

John
John Farley is offline  
Old 5th Mar 2004, 23:48
  #57 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Sep 2002
Location: Lincs
Posts: 65
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Canberras

PR7s had Makralon screens in the late 60s. We soon got used to them, after our initial reservations. I seem to remember they were introduced after Bruce Manning took a bird in the face, losing an eye in the process.

The problem with the panniers that were fitted to our PR7s was that they didn't have lids, so you didn't have to lose the pannier itself to lose the contents - you only had to open the flare doors. I know of one crew who dumped the contents of theirs in the Med in a rapid descent to Akrotiri, just to the east of Point Marion. One pilot managed to lose some sheepskin rugs on a dark and dirty night on recovery to Wildenrath. I can confirm that one since I was sitting about 4 feet behind him!

The recce equivalent of the "Lady Be Good" navex was to find Rockall. Guess what they found when they got there?

There was the story of the pilot (81Sqn?) who, whilst en-route to Darwin (I think), had the "snatch unit" (designed to "snatch" the control column forward as part of the ejection sequence) operate on him. I believe that he recovered the aircraft using the tail trim and got an AFC for his troubles.
kitwe is offline  
Old 6th Mar 2004, 08:08
  #58 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Sep 2000
Location: Over there, behind that tree.
Posts: 581
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
The Canberra Strike Sqns in Germany were, as you all know, tasked with instant sunshine missions - Mission One.

An ex-B(I)8 nav from the early days of this tasking . . .

Well remember the taceval circuses - especially the American release officers (with 59 they were SAC crews on a rest tour) who failed completely to understand the RAF/Brit approach to drama, straight into banter mode. Although we passed the first taceval with flying colours the US release officers obviously made some comment re 'our attitude' up their line of command. Shortly afterwards a delegation from some US Senate Select committee descended on us to verify that we were indeed suitable to be trusted with their big bangers. The crews were all addressed by one of the delegation who stunned the "Boss"by asking what procedures he had in place to handle the high levels of stress induced by our tremendous responsibilities and the real likelihood that, I quote, "'Mission One' might not lead to a mission two". The CO was quite stuck for answer, as he had certainly never considered the problem, and took the only way out - 'We all get pissed on a Friday night and the Boss pays for it'. The senate man then asked the the "Boss" what his mission profile was - John, again, professional to the last - 'Reckon that if we cruise climb with full tips we can just make Kenya - of course, we would have to dump the 'shape' on the way - no more than the bloody Frogs deserve!' To our shame we became quite hilarious with even wilder 'mission profiles' being offered - the committee crept away next day and John collected three extra duty officer stints. The release officers never did understand us, can't think why.
Beeayeate is offline  
Old 6th Mar 2004, 21:45
  #59 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2004
Location: UK
Posts: 3
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Canberras at Binbrook 1954

pliades and Pindi

Were either of you stationed at Binbrook in 1954 - I am interested as my father was killed in a Canberra take-off crash at Binbrook on 2 April 1954 - any information would be very gratefully received.
andymate is offline  
Old 6th Mar 2004, 22:12
  #60 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Sep 2000
Location: Over there, behind that tree.
Posts: 581
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Andymate

Sorry about your father.

Bare details . . .

Canberra B.2, WF891, of 12 Sqn crashed when an engine failed on take-off. Aircraft hit the GCA vehicle. Binbrook. 2/4/1954.
Beeayeate is offline  


Contact Us - Archive - Advertising - Cookie Policy - Privacy Statement - Terms of Service

Copyright © 2024 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.