Don,

You wouldn't ask yourself or speak out loud why ATC is "keeping" you from descending when the traffic he talks about is already above you? No alarm bells?

Disregard my last, you guys are perfect and awesome. All 5s all the time...

777 I don't know what they heard nor what they did. How can I make any comment without knowing any of the details. All I have heard is that youtube clip, which does not fully represent what was heard on that flight deck.
I think there are enough muppets in the fleet office that jump to conclusions without me having to do so.

Poor SA by both crews and ATC. Regardless of what they could or could not hear from ATC, both crews clearly heard each others transmissions and both missed until it was almost too late.
What happened to the 3000' separation that they used to provide for the passing A/C's? What happened to the outbound radial the departing aircraft use to follow?

This is too similar to places like China, Russia, Spain, France, etc., speaking non-english to other aircraft because now I have no idea what THEY are doing.:mad:

They're both removed from roster, so it made it its way to management one way or another..

Don, you're certainly doing the honorable thing by wanting to wait for the full picture and only then act or speak. But isn't this exactly our problem? Aren't we operating daily in that uncertain mist without that aftermath clarity? Isn't that what we are constantly facing and trying to mitigate? Isn't that what we are in the cockpit for: Not waiting for clarity, but creating it?

I re-listened to the tape and, unfortunately, still get the impression of a lot of complacency, if not incompetence. No challenge, no reconfirmation. Even as the other aircraft reported avoiding action, which must have been on the frequency both aircraft were on, there was no query about anything. Our flight simply continued in silence.

Even if there are multiple frequencies, changes and two ACCs involved, there needs to be more attentiveness. That lonely blip that comes at us is trained so many times in the sim, with querying ATC etc. etc., which makes the silence in this incident quite worrying.

(Nothing to do with pretending to be awesome, sourpuss-mos)

Wow you must be a genius. How do you know what was HEARD on the flight deck of either aircraft?

I'm scratch my head every week when I read the ASRs - who are these guys "couldn't get level 400 so stayed at 380"

Then you come on here and you have widespread judgment on SA while non of you have the information on the 'situation'.

Such one dimensional conclusions - is baffling.

Maybe you are right but maybe...

They were dealing with a tech issue
Heard something on guard
Were on to Med link
Had a headset issue
Had a door buzzzer go off
Had a call from the back
Had static on their radio
Had the other guy in toilet with diarrhea

I mean I don't know

And neither do you !

What a fcukong emabarrasment we are...

Sorry to say it "fli" but the recording has pilot error written all over it.

Wrong read-back of cleared level.

Query from ATC as to passing current level and standby for further descent after passing the Air Seychelles at FL 370.

Didn't they see the TCAS inbound threat and wonder why the traffic was becoming a likely threat and not query it?

(It worries me in the transcript that Mauritius ATC was willing to "drop" the incident if Air Seychelles was).

Just a few observations from the crewroom bar here.

Stay safe, everyone is watching YOU!!

J

ATC were probably prepared to drop it because they aren't blameless either- they missed the incorrect readback. As usual, it takes more than one hole in the cheese.

Maybe that is why he asked what their readback altitude was. Then discovered that they didn't catch it.

Fair play to the Seychelles crew, turning to avoid visually acquired traffic.

There are those who would insist on sitting and waiting for TCAS to instruct them to avoid the big aeroplane getting bigger in the windscreen, rather than be pro-active and take appropriate action.

Just like the realistic TCAS scenarios in the sim where we are told to fly straight at the other traffic heh?

No no cobber, back at Ansett we operated in such busy airspace mate you could neva tell which one you were avoidin maaate.
Reading between the lines, is the 380 so unsophisticated that this TCAS target wasn't viewable within 40nm or so?
Not the crews finest hour for sure, but as an observation it's another chicken returning home to roost with respect to training, threat analysis and worst of all situational awareness, I'm glad I'm long out of it now.

Wiz,

That is what the company has been beating out of crew for years...basic airmanship. I think you're 100% correct, I'll bet more than 80% would sit there and watch it come head on. What ever did pilots do before TCAS?

Its also most likely why it was only a TA (as heard in the recording) VS an RA which can be evidenced by the altitude data in the radar 24 data.

Fliion,

Not sure what your going on about and why... All of the excuses you posted are meaningless. What is clear from the evidence posted so far is that there were many mistakes made as a whole, both by crew and ATC not to mention a lack of SA. I'm sure there will be more facts come to light as the investigation progresses. Embarrassment? Re-read your post.

Just a few days after JA's letter too. Any guesses what changes will come to the OM-A?

Outlaw, sadly the changes that the future eventually holds will be removing the inevitable weak link that sits in the cockpit. The more mistakes that pilots make, the more the engineers and airlines are keen to remove us as a hole in the cheese.

Aviation to me appears to be regressing in safety as some pilots are tending to become increasingly more and more relaxed in their duties. I know I am going to watch for the inbound flak, but I am sorry to say that the standards of a lot of people I fly with these days is nothing too often that I am particularly proud to watch and applause.

J

I can't say I disagree as a whole. 30+ years in the business has shown me a few things along the way.

Some pilots have a firm grasp on the non-esseentials, can recite the SOP at nauseam but can't calculate a descent in their heads or do basic math with regard to ZFW changes etc. It's become a "Book" industry as lawyers and managers alike want it all in a book so they can hang you with it when a mistake is made.

In my generation, newcomers went through a long period of "seasoning" before they could even consider a left seat, it was a result of the long times to command. Sitting beside some of these grumpy old bastards at the time was a pain in the backside but they taught us a lot of the good stuff that you just can't get from a book.

Its been my observation during the past 20 years that the casualties of the modern cockpit is airmanship, cockpit discipline, over reliance on automation and general experience.

There was a time when aircraft flew VOR radials out of and into airports, altimeters where less accurate, there was no TCAS and no websites with live ATC for everyone to listen to. This case might not have ever made it to any manager in the past but as was posted earlier, we operate in a glass bubble today. For all we know PPRUNE might have been management's first indication that this event happened!

However, they share in some of the blame in the decline as well. Higher monthly hours mean controlled rest in the flight deck which removes redundancy when operating with one pilot. The lack of a pilot union is another reduction in safety as there is no channeled input from the pilot group to share information in a unbiased manner.

Nice haughty bar conversation starter but the FACTS do not bear this out.

Aviation is getting safer every year.

https://www.icao.int/safety/iStars/P...tatistics.aspx

It seems to me that you may have mis-read the "FACTS".

At a glance, the accident rate has gone up since 2015 after riding a decreasing trend.

The accident rate has increased but the fatality rate has decreased.

Amen to Outlaw and Jack, same goes to Wiz and ....... yes, White Knight!

Question now is, how can this be fixed?