The max is back ?
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From: Back in the green
The max is back ?
dopo la figuraccia del predecessore mi sembra il minimo
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From: Back in the green
si sta dando da fare molto dal punto di vista “mediatico”
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From: Back in the green
E sembra che la Boeing sia riuscita a “convincere “ il capo della FAA
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From: Back in the green
Letter to the Editor
Capt. “Sully” Sullenberger
New York Times Magazine
Published in print on October 13, 2019
In “What Really Brought Down the Boeing 737 MAX?” William Langewiesche draws the conclusion that the pilots are primarily to blame for the fatal crashes of
Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian 302. In resurrecting this age-old aviation canard, Langewiesche minimizes the fatal design flaws and certification failures that precipitated those tragedies, and still pose a threat to the flying public. I have long stated, as he does note, that pilots must be capable of absolute mastery of the aircraft and the situation at all times, a concept pilots call airmanship. Inadequate pilot training and insufficient pilot experience are problems worldwide, but they do not excuse the fatally flawed design of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) that was a death trap. As one of the few pilots who have lived to tell about being in the left seat of an airliner when things went horribly wrong, with seconds to react, I know a thing or two about overcoming an unimagined crisis. I am also one of the few who have flown a Boeing 737 MAX Level D full motion simulator, replicating both accident flights multiple times. I know firsthand the challenges the pilots on the doomed accident flights faced, and how wrong it is to blame them for not being able to compensate for such a pernicious and deadly design. These emergencies did not present as a classic runaway stabilizer problem, but initially as ambiguous unreliable airspeed and altitude situations, masking MCAS. The MCAS design should never have been approved, not by Boeing, and not by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The National Transportation Safety Board has found that Boeing made faulty assumptions both about the capability of the aircraft design to withstand damage or failure, and the level of human performance possible once the failures began to cascade. Where Boeing failed, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) should have stepped in to regulate but it failed to do so. Lessons from accidents are bought in blood and we must seek all the answers to prevent the next one. We need to fix all the flaws in the current system — corporate governance, regulatory oversight, aircraft maintenance, and yes, pilot training and experience. Only then can we ensure the safety of everyone who flies.
-Capt. “Sully” Sullenberger
Capt. “Sully” Sullenberger
New York Times Magazine
Published in print on October 13, 2019
In “What Really Brought Down the Boeing 737 MAX?” William Langewiesche draws the conclusion that the pilots are primarily to blame for the fatal crashes of
Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian 302. In resurrecting this age-old aviation canard, Langewiesche minimizes the fatal design flaws and certification failures that precipitated those tragedies, and still pose a threat to the flying public. I have long stated, as he does note, that pilots must be capable of absolute mastery of the aircraft and the situation at all times, a concept pilots call airmanship. Inadequate pilot training and insufficient pilot experience are problems worldwide, but they do not excuse the fatally flawed design of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) that was a death trap. As one of the few pilots who have lived to tell about being in the left seat of an airliner when things went horribly wrong, with seconds to react, I know a thing or two about overcoming an unimagined crisis. I am also one of the few who have flown a Boeing 737 MAX Level D full motion simulator, replicating both accident flights multiple times. I know firsthand the challenges the pilots on the doomed accident flights faced, and how wrong it is to blame them for not being able to compensate for such a pernicious and deadly design. These emergencies did not present as a classic runaway stabilizer problem, but initially as ambiguous unreliable airspeed and altitude situations, masking MCAS. The MCAS design should never have been approved, not by Boeing, and not by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The National Transportation Safety Board has found that Boeing made faulty assumptions both about the capability of the aircraft design to withstand damage or failure, and the level of human performance possible once the failures began to cascade. Where Boeing failed, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) should have stepped in to regulate but it failed to do so. Lessons from accidents are bought in blood and we must seek all the answers to prevent the next one. We need to fix all the flaws in the current system — corporate governance, regulatory oversight, aircraft maintenance, and yes, pilot training and experience. Only then can we ensure the safety of everyone who flies.
-Capt. “Sully” Sullenberger
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From: BLQ
Ma vaaa! Guarda che bastava che applicassero i memory items per unreliable speed e togliessero motore.
Ora c’è solo da sperare che gli astronauti abbiano la magnanimità di scendere dal loro pianeta e di condividere un po’ della loro conoscenza tecnica con noi poveri mortali ... aspettiamo fiduciosi!
Ora c’è solo da sperare che gli astronauti abbiano la magnanimità di scendere dal loro pianeta e di condividere un po’ della loro conoscenza tecnica con noi poveri mortali ... aspettiamo fiduciosi!
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From: Aldebaran
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From: Back in the green
riguardo al final report Lion Air
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From: BLQ
Gli stessi investigatori mi sembrano piuttosto perplessi:
* The LNI043 flight crew decision to continue with stick shaker active is not common in comparison to previous events of erroneous stick shaker. When combined with the runaway stabilizer situation recognized by the flight crew, the decision to continue was highly unusual.*
Di fatto comunque, al netto di tutte le omissioni e degli errori procedurali commessi, mi sembra che la frase più inquietante sia questa:
*"The aircraft design should not have allowed this situation."* *
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From: BLQ
Joined: Sep 2007
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From: BLQ
Rapporto finale sul MAX della commissione trasporti del congresso degli Stati Uniti. Buona lettura.
https://transportation.house.gov/imo...%20Release.pdf
https://transportation.house.gov/imo...%20Release.pdf
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From: Here
Rapporto finale sul MAX della commissione trasporti del congresso degli Stati Uniti. Buona lettura.
https://transportation.house.gov/imo...%20Release.pdf
https://transportation.house.gov/imo...%20Release.pdf
Last edited by Flapsupbedsdown; 17th September 2020 at 14:39.
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From: Back in the green
cambiati vertici Boeing cambiato vertici FAA
che altro fare ? Il fatto della meticolosità dei test fatti sul Max negli ultimi 2 anni dimostra che si vuole , anche più del dovuto forse , dare risalto a questa attività di controllo di FAA su Boeing
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From: Required field missing
200+ pagine? Aspetterò un riassuntino da qualcuno più intelligente e ben disposto, ma cinicamente ho il presentimento che il sunto sia: non anteporre il profitto alla sicurezza, che in parole povere è il safety first ribaltato, ossia un concetto veramente innovativo, che sicuramente prima del Max era a tutti sconosciuto... Ora via a fare un bel ripulisti, fino alla prossima ricaduta ovviamente. Intanto le 900 ore annue con giorni in fila di turni da 12 ore rimangono (con il Covid fai un'ora al mese, ma è un'altra storia questa) e compagnie che dicono di voler usare i giorni di malattia come criteri per decidere chi licenziare. Ma lì non c'é mica il Mcas, quindi tutto tranquillo. Safety first. Ahh, caro vecchio capitalismo
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From: Required field missing
Ho visto (dopo che mi era stata consigliata) la serie sul Challenger. Finanziamenti, tempri agli sgoccioli, immagine, pressioni. Forse una ricostruzione non proprio tecnica (le mie conoscenze di spazio si limitano all'orsa maggiore e al Galaxi Express 999) ma che dire, mi ha ricordato il Max. Si è appreso molto in queste decadi
