FAA bans visual approaches by foreign airlines at San Francisco airport
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For a major airport like SFO to take away the ILS and the PAPI at the same time is questionable to say the least.
So what now, no approaches to non-ILS runways? Sorry Arfur, I still think a professional aviator should not put the aircraft and crew at higher risk when flying a visual maneuver in severe clear.
Enough is enough, the system is broken when professional pilots can not fly such a maneuver. What if the next Asiana accident is exactly the same, but from a coupled ILS approach where there is an AP malfunction?
This was one of the many "canary in the coal-mine" accidents that are trying to shake our industry into fixing the problem. Even though there was a tragic loss of life, I am afraid it has not been enough of a slap in the face to the industry
Squak
Of course I agree with you that we should all be able to do a visual. I feel very confident that I could do one on a nice day anywhere you like. Fact is when our finest aviators (Training supremo's) delivered 744's to Kemble in UK for the aircraft to be broken up, they did a couple of hours of practice in the sim prior to carrying out a non ILS, non PAPI visual approach.
SFO has several runways that have ILS - just use those for goodness sake.
Of course I agree with you that we should all be able to do a visual. I feel very confident that I could do one on a nice day anywhere you like. Fact is when our finest aviators (Training supremo's) delivered 744's to Kemble in UK for the aircraft to be broken up, they did a couple of hours of practice in the sim prior to carrying out a non ILS, non PAPI visual approach.
SFO has several runways that have ILS - just use those for goodness sake.
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Some of the new widebodies aren't even fitted with NDB
Regarding ILSs at SFO... Sure, when the wind is 280/15, landings are on 28L and 28R, and departures are on 1L and 1R, try asking for the ILS 19L. I'm sure you'll get it!
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It's a VERY bad idea
I think it's a VERY bad idea from a regulatory agency and a complete knee jerk reaction to prohibit visual approaches into SFO. A crew can always refuse a visual approach--or even request a tailored approach into SFO--OR request an instrument approach for that matter. For a regulatory agency to do this as a knee jerk reaction to bad piloting and CRM solves nothing.
One cannot make the assertion that had the ILS been in service it would have prevented the accident. People screw up ILSs too. Anything can be screwed up if one tries hard enough.
One could certainly screw up an instrument approach and then exacerbate the situation by (in violation of many existing policies already) refusing to do a mandatory go-around from an unstable approach--as may well have been the case in this accident.
It wouldn't hurt to try to avoid the slam dunks and the high profile of the quiet bridge visual and this certainly could be improved. But that would be solved not by prohibiting visuals for foreign carriers but by guidance to the controllers and a re-write of the plate--it's a solution on THEIR end.
In any case, through LNAV and VNAV the 777 crew--even with ILS and PAPI out--ON a visual approach clearance can select the ILS and runway to the top with the appropriate inbound course, execute within 25 NM of the runway, and the FMS/aircraft will build its OWN stabilized 3 degree glide path course to the runway. Alls need to be done is configure sensibly, manage energy, select VNAV, and (if intercepting from above which is the most common condition) the aircraft will go from VNAV SPD into VNAV PTH when the correct glideslope is intercepted. The autothrottles will also go from HLD to SPD when doing this and would have prevented this accident. F/D commands can actually be used in pitch down to flare height if this is done, and the aircraft will level off and not go below the glide path if it's below.
One cannot make the assertion that had the ILS been in service it would have prevented the accident. People screw up ILSs too. Anything can be screwed up if one tries hard enough.
One could certainly screw up an instrument approach and then exacerbate the situation by (in violation of many existing policies already) refusing to do a mandatory go-around from an unstable approach--as may well have been the case in this accident.
It wouldn't hurt to try to avoid the slam dunks and the high profile of the quiet bridge visual and this certainly could be improved. But that would be solved not by prohibiting visuals for foreign carriers but by guidance to the controllers and a re-write of the plate--it's a solution on THEIR end.
In any case, through LNAV and VNAV the 777 crew--even with ILS and PAPI out--ON a visual approach clearance can select the ILS and runway to the top with the appropriate inbound course, execute within 25 NM of the runway, and the FMS/aircraft will build its OWN stabilized 3 degree glide path course to the runway. Alls need to be done is configure sensibly, manage energy, select VNAV, and (if intercepting from above which is the most common condition) the aircraft will go from VNAV SPD into VNAV PTH when the correct glideslope is intercepted. The autothrottles will also go from HLD to SPD when doing this and would have prevented this accident. F/D commands can actually be used in pitch down to flare height if this is done, and the aircraft will level off and not go below the glide path if it's below.
Last edited by Shep69; 10th Aug 2013 at 13:57.
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Interesting
Shep you say:
Fair enough. Later on however, when describing what could be done approach-wise, you say:
Just curious how you can make that assertion?
STP
One cannot make the assertion that had the ILS been in service it would have prevented the accident. People screw up ILSs too. Anything can be screwed up if one tries hard enough.
The autothrottles will also go from HLD to SPD when doing this and would have prevented this accident.
STP
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^ When the Rwy is selected to the top with inbnd course selected (and within 25NM track miles of the RWY waypoint) and executed the a/c FMS will draw a 3 degree glide path to the the runway. This works for ANY coded ILS approach irrespective of ground equipment status and provides continuous omnidirectional pitch guidance to the runway in VNAV from the a/c FMS. Once the a/c intercepts the g/s it will track and follow it if inbound, or will level off if not (or initially below a 3 degree GP).
The videos I've seen animating the accident have shown the accident a/c as going from high on profile and somewhat fast to low and very slow.
The aircraft will descend in HOLD/VNAV SPD until intercepting the glidepath and then transition to SPD/VNAV PTH. This happens irrespective of where the MCP is set (so long as it is initially set below the aircraft altitude and VNAV ALT isn't captured on the way down before setting the MAP alt--i.e. even if a carrier in violation of most SOPs and good operating practice would set MCP at zero or field elevation (instead of 1000 or 1500 AAL) the autothrottles would still engage in SPD mode and the pitch would maintain the glide path once the aircraft intercepted the glide path from above--the same thing will NOT happen in FLCH SPD--although in either mode if the pitch flight director is followed either manually or on autopilot the aircraft won't get slow because the F/D is commanding speed on elevator--in the case of FLCH it would get very low in the case of VNAV it won't because the path will be intercepted).
Is this foolproof ? No. Nothing is foolproof because fools are so damn clever. It won't work if the pilots manually override the autothrottles or if they leave the autothrottle arm switches off--and there are probably other ways one can crash an airplane if one is dedicated toward disregarding all aspects of basic airmanship. But it is a useful tool to provide a margin of safety on a visual approach and works whether or not the ILS is operational--so long as a coded approach for an ILS exists.
In any case, visual approaches and a regulatory agency banning visual approaches has nothing to do with enhancing safety or even this particular accident--if anything it's a training/SOP/CRM issue (to include why wasn't a G/A promptly initiated and called for by the other crew members when the approach became significantly destabilized at low altitude--and may never have been stable to begin with). Additionally, if the airline believes for some reason visual approaches present a unique hazard at a particular airfield or under certain conditions given their training level and equipment it is free to provide training toward this--or tell their pilots not to accept them.
The videos I've seen animating the accident have shown the accident a/c as going from high on profile and somewhat fast to low and very slow.
The aircraft will descend in HOLD/VNAV SPD until intercepting the glidepath and then transition to SPD/VNAV PTH. This happens irrespective of where the MCP is set (so long as it is initially set below the aircraft altitude and VNAV ALT isn't captured on the way down before setting the MAP alt--i.e. even if a carrier in violation of most SOPs and good operating practice would set MCP at zero or field elevation (instead of 1000 or 1500 AAL) the autothrottles would still engage in SPD mode and the pitch would maintain the glide path once the aircraft intercepted the glide path from above--the same thing will NOT happen in FLCH SPD--although in either mode if the pitch flight director is followed either manually or on autopilot the aircraft won't get slow because the F/D is commanding speed on elevator--in the case of FLCH it would get very low in the case of VNAV it won't because the path will be intercepted).
Is this foolproof ? No. Nothing is foolproof because fools are so damn clever. It won't work if the pilots manually override the autothrottles or if they leave the autothrottle arm switches off--and there are probably other ways one can crash an airplane if one is dedicated toward disregarding all aspects of basic airmanship. But it is a useful tool to provide a margin of safety on a visual approach and works whether or not the ILS is operational--so long as a coded approach for an ILS exists.
In any case, visual approaches and a regulatory agency banning visual approaches has nothing to do with enhancing safety or even this particular accident--if anything it's a training/SOP/CRM issue (to include why wasn't a G/A promptly initiated and called for by the other crew members when the approach became significantly destabilized at low altitude--and may never have been stable to begin with). Additionally, if the airline believes for some reason visual approaches present a unique hazard at a particular airfield or under certain conditions given their training level and equipment it is free to provide training toward this--or tell their pilots not to accept them.
Last edited by Shep69; 11th Aug 2013 at 04:29.
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Shep, Steve is very dry and to the point. I think what he meant was, "how can you make the assertion that if the autothrottles were in SPD the accident would not have happened?" Who knows what else might have happened. We all appreciate your very accurate and informative explanation of what should happen. True, even if the A/T were disengaged, following the F/D would have maintained speed, although the aircraft would have crashed in a much more nose-low attitude!
:-)
:-)
Last edited by ColonelAngus; 11th Aug 2013 at 15:13.
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RNAV approachs to all RWYs that have an ILS.
There should be RNAV approaches to all ILS equipped RWYs and SOPs should dictate that if an ILS (GS) is U/S then use the next best instrument approach should be used.
I've been flying for many years and grew up with visual approaches as the standard arrival procedure unless WX conditions dictated otherwise. However, times have changed, not all airlines allow pilots to practice visual approaches on CAVOK days, and not all international pilots operate consistently to the same airports. Therefore you can see how the Asiana, and now EVA, pilots got caught out. Also take into account pilot fatigue, due to long haul operations, when the human is operating at much less than normal capacity.
An RNAV should provide sufficient guidance to allow for stabilized approach criteria to a minima where visual take over happens in stabilized conditions.
But yes I do believe that the 3 times table needs to be emphasized and practiced mentally during pilot training, and without a calculator...
I've been flying for many years and grew up with visual approaches as the standard arrival procedure unless WX conditions dictated otherwise. However, times have changed, not all airlines allow pilots to practice visual approaches on CAVOK days, and not all international pilots operate consistently to the same airports. Therefore you can see how the Asiana, and now EVA, pilots got caught out. Also take into account pilot fatigue, due to long haul operations, when the human is operating at much less than normal capacity.
An RNAV should provide sufficient guidance to allow for stabilized approach criteria to a minima where visual take over happens in stabilized conditions.
But yes I do believe that the 3 times table needs to be emphasized and practiced mentally during pilot training, and without a calculator...
Last edited by Capt Groper; 11th Aug 2013 at 07:37.
