It's a VERY bad idea
I think it's a VERY bad idea from a regulatory agency and a complete knee jerk reaction to prohibit visual approaches into SFO. A crew can always refuse a visual approach--or even request a tailored approach into SFO--OR request an instrument approach for that matter. For a regulatory agency to do this as a knee jerk reaction to bad piloting and CRM solves nothing.
One cannot make the assertion that had the ILS been in service it would have prevented the accident. People screw up ILSs too. Anything can be screwed up if one tries hard enough.
One could certainly screw up an instrument approach and then exacerbate the situation by (in violation of many existing policies already) refusing to do a mandatory go-around from an unstable approach--as may well have been the case in this accident.
It wouldn't hurt to try to avoid the slam dunks and the high profile of the quiet bridge visual and this certainly could be improved. But that would be solved not by prohibiting visuals for foreign carriers but by guidance to the controllers and a re-write of the plate--it's a solution on THEIR end.
In any case, through LNAV and VNAV the 777 crew--even with ILS and PAPI out--ON a visual approach clearance can select the ILS and runway to the top with the appropriate inbound course, execute within 25 NM of the runway, and the FMS/aircraft will build its OWN stabilized 3 degree glide path course to the runway. Alls need to be done is configure sensibly, manage energy, select VNAV, and (if intercepting from above which is the most common condition) the aircraft will go from VNAV SPD into VNAV PTH when the correct glideslope is intercepted. The autothrottles will also go from HLD to SPD when doing this and would have prevented this accident. F/D commands can actually be used in pitch down to flare height if this is done, and the aircraft will level off and not go below the glide path if it's below.
Last edited by Shep69; 10th Aug 2013 at 13:57.