'Scathing' report on BA Maintenance practices
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AMF, I think I understand what you say, but.
Like for Like, Pilots and Cabin Crew work one aircraft at a time, some Pilots only work on one type of Aircraft for a period of time.
Engineers can work many Aircraft and Aircraft types in a single shift.
Managers can overload work on Engineers, eg, due sickness, you will cover 8 Aircrafts in the next 3 hours instead of 4, this system can't be applied to Pilots and Cabin Crew.
Engineers hours and shifts are not well regulated.
My view, at present Engineers do a good job in changing times and Aircrafts are very safe even when all is not well and correct, but when the numbers are right, Engineers will be regulated like others in the Airline Trade.
Interested to know more of that stab jack problem you talk about....
Like for Like, Pilots and Cabin Crew work one aircraft at a time, some Pilots only work on one type of Aircraft for a period of time.
Engineers can work many Aircraft and Aircraft types in a single shift.
Managers can overload work on Engineers, eg, due sickness, you will cover 8 Aircrafts in the next 3 hours instead of 4, this system can't be applied to Pilots and Cabin Crew.
Engineers hours and shifts are not well regulated.
My view, at present Engineers do a good job in changing times and Aircrafts are very safe even when all is not well and correct, but when the numbers are right, Engineers will be regulated like others in the Airline Trade.
Interested to know more of that stab jack problem you talk about....
Autoglide, at the risk of this post and me being banned by the moderators here, I am going to say that if your attitude is typical of BA, as evidenced by the quote below, the your AOC should be pulled immediately. I am deadly serious.
"the Engineers wouldn't have time to talk to you and in any case they could be diferent people day to day as line/hangar workloads alter and they are picking up where others left off. Ah, the myth of the LAE in control of the check, must have been in some bygone era. You also wouldn't have time to all those differing paperwork tasks - because there's too much. "
Your entire maintenance system is based on the assumption that the LAE is in control of the check. If this is not the case, you are in breach of your own maintenance system manual.
You cannot argue "cosi fan tutti" - (everyone does it) with regard to maintenance irregularities. If you try to argue that then, by implication, you are admitting that you cannot comply with your own MSM and your AOC should be pulled immediately.
My evidence for this is again the Ansett ATSB report referenced earlier. Sooner or later your maintenance culture is going to allow swiiss cheese holes to line up. In Ansett's case, cracks in the B767 pylons and tailplane attachments were either missed or ignored due to a maintenance workforce that had been "pruned" (no pun intended) to the bone.
For a start, in my day, successive shifts deliberately overlapped by an hour so that there was a deliberate "hand over" of work rather than picking up where others left off". In fact the very use of this phrase enrages me to the point where I will never fly BA again.
To put it another way, what sort of cretin are you if you think "picking up where others left off" is good enough? You make me want to throw up!
And Danny if you think this is going too far, then too bad, because it's true.
"the Engineers wouldn't have time to talk to you and in any case they could be diferent people day to day as line/hangar workloads alter and they are picking up where others left off. Ah, the myth of the LAE in control of the check, must have been in some bygone era. You also wouldn't have time to all those differing paperwork tasks - because there's too much. "
Your entire maintenance system is based on the assumption that the LAE is in control of the check. If this is not the case, you are in breach of your own maintenance system manual.
You cannot argue "cosi fan tutti" - (everyone does it) with regard to maintenance irregularities. If you try to argue that then, by implication, you are admitting that you cannot comply with your own MSM and your AOC should be pulled immediately.
My evidence for this is again the Ansett ATSB report referenced earlier. Sooner or later your maintenance culture is going to allow swiiss cheese holes to line up. In Ansett's case, cracks in the B767 pylons and tailplane attachments were either missed or ignored due to a maintenance workforce that had been "pruned" (no pun intended) to the bone.
For a start, in my day, successive shifts deliberately overlapped by an hour so that there was a deliberate "hand over" of work rather than picking up where others left off". In fact the very use of this phrase enrages me to the point where I will never fly BA again.
To put it another way, what sort of cretin are you if you think "picking up where others left off" is good enough? You make me want to throw up!
And Danny if you think this is going too far, then too bad, because it's true.
Sunfish,
You are now understanding the problem.
BA's management deliberately altered shift patterns so that an overlap became impossible.
Now, 12hr shifts start and finish on the dot with no overlap. Also, as management refuse to pay OT for extended hours (in some areas) engineers go home on the dot too.
So what happens? You get a scribbled written handover which tries to describe 12hrs of troublshooting and checks. Not good.
Me too!
Unfortunately in the current climate engineers can't do anything about it. If I complain to my employer I will be overlooked for further training/promotion. The CAA refuse to tackle the issue. CHIRP is ineffective and the general public are not interested.
If BA flt crew are THAT interested in the servicability of their aircraft I suggest they take a good look at the hangars and line mantenance operations. YOU WILL BE SHOCKED!
Pilots and CC would not and do not work under such conditions. Good luck to them. They will need it!!
You are now understanding the problem.
BA's management deliberately altered shift patterns so that an overlap became impossible.
Now, 12hr shifts start and finish on the dot with no overlap. Also, as management refuse to pay OT for extended hours (in some areas) engineers go home on the dot too.
So what happens? You get a scribbled written handover which tries to describe 12hrs of troublshooting and checks. Not good.
To put it another way, what sort of cretin are you if you think "picking up where others left off" is good enough? You make me want to throw up!
Unfortunately in the current climate engineers can't do anything about it. If I complain to my employer I will be overlooked for further training/promotion. The CAA refuse to tackle the issue. CHIRP is ineffective and the general public are not interested.
If BA flt crew are THAT interested in the servicability of their aircraft I suggest they take a good look at the hangars and line mantenance operations. YOU WILL BE SHOCKED!
Pilots and CC would not and do not work under such conditions. Good luck to them. They will need it!!
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Joetom,
Reference for the accident report:
NTSB NYC00MA048
IAI 1124A, Registration N50PL
December 12, 1999
Gouldsboro, PA, USA
Most pertinent to this discussion would the investigators' reports generated by the accounts given to them by the various engineers they interviewed who either worked on the horizontal stab actuator assembly, were in a position to see the assembly being worked on, saw who might be working on the assembly or in the vicinity, and the usual mx paperwork trail to include job cards and billing records.
Draw your own conclusions, but my observation and question is this;
Any complex system depends to some degree on fundamentals. Nuclear power plants and power grids have a human element, but the ultra-high degree of mechanical reliablility of a few fundamental things such as sensors and indicators the humans in that system use for its operation that results in redundancy, brace the system for most contingencies. In fact, they are integral to the contingency.
For example, if the very last line of defense for a imminent meltdown after all the other complex options are exhausted is flooding the pile by some guy walking over to, and manually opening, a valve directly by hand, what happens if this last-resort valve handle breaks off in his hand? What if he has a heart attack at that very moment? We don't really think about that...we almost assume it won't because of such low probability. That's the root flaw in any system. Infintesimily small to be sure, but a weak point nontheless, because even though that valve has been functionally tested and replaced at routine interval a hundred or thousand times before, there is no 100% gaurantee it will work in the situation when you actually need it.
Yet, we come to a point where we depend on...alsmost assume the device's reliability because of it's simplicity within a larger complex endeavor, and it's a one-step process. Those attributes prompted us to place that mechanical device in the system where it's at in the first place. And it works very well.
If you buy a set of quality tools, every time you set an open-end wrench to apply force do you wonder if it will break in your hand? Of course not, because even though it is a remote possiblity, the simplicity and proven dependability makes it almost fundamental. You calibrate torque wrenches don't you?..don't you end up trusting the device you calibrate them with?
But other complex systems, such as aircraft carrier ops or aircraft mx inspections/inspecting and organizing work, involve humans (and thus "human factors") to a much larger degree. These systems depend primarily on human activity to function at all levels. There's no 99.99999% reliable switch to flip or valve to open that control a computers or a wrench-wielding robot that does the job, or more importantly, provide a last line of defense against failure of the primary functions. There's no simple mechanical backup to rely on. All you can do is try to assure a skill-level, maintain focus, and organize a series of warning triggers as assurance, and to alert if things aren't being done properly.
Unlike the first type of complex system, where very reliable machines do the work and humans are the stop-gap measure, in the latter, humans ARE the measure. That's just the nature of the profession and our tasks.
In response to this we've invented things like training, licensing, and certifications. Things that could be thought of as "calibrating" humans, perhaps. But unlike a mechanical device, every single one of these aspects involves, at it's foundation, human individuals' self-regulating to the higher standard of what we certify we are, in order for others to trust us in our work.
Integrity in one's own work...focusing on it, organizing it, never making assumptions...things that make one a "professional"....are the root that holds a necessarily human-dependent complex system upright, as opposed to a simple and ultra-reliable mechanics the nuclear plant operator has under his finger.
It's tempting to blame all failures on "management" in a human-dependent system, and many times they can be to blame in part. Devise a perfect system of any type and you'll be a billionare tomorrow, or show me one where the humans working within don't think they have a better idea. I'm not aware of any.
But every day a professional dons a uniform or badge and chooses to go to work in that imperfect system is another day that has no place for assumptions or guesses at the root level. And if something goes awry, shuffling blame to the easiest, vaguest, target of all ("management") or not being forthcoming with investigtators will no nothing to improve the system that relies on the front line troops' integrity to function.
If a management overworks you and you're fatigued...don't go to work. If they don't train you...refuse to work on something you aren't trained for. If you're hung over....call in sick. If, in your view, underpaid or demoralized to the point of not being able to focus on the task at hand....remove yourself from it and seek employment elsewhere. If the whole set-up is so systematically unsafe you wouldn't put your own family on the plane....blow the whistle.
We rely on you to make aicraft airworthy. Our lives are in your hands. The pax rely on us to not screw up, and trust they're sitting in a perfectly good airplane.
Management be damned, if we go to work, the buck stops with us.
Reference for the accident report:
NTSB NYC00MA048
IAI 1124A, Registration N50PL
December 12, 1999
Gouldsboro, PA, USA
Most pertinent to this discussion would the investigators' reports generated by the accounts given to them by the various engineers they interviewed who either worked on the horizontal stab actuator assembly, were in a position to see the assembly being worked on, saw who might be working on the assembly or in the vicinity, and the usual mx paperwork trail to include job cards and billing records.
Draw your own conclusions, but my observation and question is this;
Any complex system depends to some degree on fundamentals. Nuclear power plants and power grids have a human element, but the ultra-high degree of mechanical reliablility of a few fundamental things such as sensors and indicators the humans in that system use for its operation that results in redundancy, brace the system for most contingencies. In fact, they are integral to the contingency.
For example, if the very last line of defense for a imminent meltdown after all the other complex options are exhausted is flooding the pile by some guy walking over to, and manually opening, a valve directly by hand, what happens if this last-resort valve handle breaks off in his hand? What if he has a heart attack at that very moment? We don't really think about that...we almost assume it won't because of such low probability. That's the root flaw in any system. Infintesimily small to be sure, but a weak point nontheless, because even though that valve has been functionally tested and replaced at routine interval a hundred or thousand times before, there is no 100% gaurantee it will work in the situation when you actually need it.
Yet, we come to a point where we depend on...alsmost assume the device's reliability because of it's simplicity within a larger complex endeavor, and it's a one-step process. Those attributes prompted us to place that mechanical device in the system where it's at in the first place. And it works very well.
If you buy a set of quality tools, every time you set an open-end wrench to apply force do you wonder if it will break in your hand? Of course not, because even though it is a remote possiblity, the simplicity and proven dependability makes it almost fundamental. You calibrate torque wrenches don't you?..don't you end up trusting the device you calibrate them with?
But other complex systems, such as aircraft carrier ops or aircraft mx inspections/inspecting and organizing work, involve humans (and thus "human factors") to a much larger degree. These systems depend primarily on human activity to function at all levels. There's no 99.99999% reliable switch to flip or valve to open that control a computers or a wrench-wielding robot that does the job, or more importantly, provide a last line of defense against failure of the primary functions. There's no simple mechanical backup to rely on. All you can do is try to assure a skill-level, maintain focus, and organize a series of warning triggers as assurance, and to alert if things aren't being done properly.
Unlike the first type of complex system, where very reliable machines do the work and humans are the stop-gap measure, in the latter, humans ARE the measure. That's just the nature of the profession and our tasks.
In response to this we've invented things like training, licensing, and certifications. Things that could be thought of as "calibrating" humans, perhaps. But unlike a mechanical device, every single one of these aspects involves, at it's foundation, human individuals' self-regulating to the higher standard of what we certify we are, in order for others to trust us in our work.
Integrity in one's own work...focusing on it, organizing it, never making assumptions...things that make one a "professional"....are the root that holds a necessarily human-dependent complex system upright, as opposed to a simple and ultra-reliable mechanics the nuclear plant operator has under his finger.
It's tempting to blame all failures on "management" in a human-dependent system, and many times they can be to blame in part. Devise a perfect system of any type and you'll be a billionare tomorrow, or show me one where the humans working within don't think they have a better idea. I'm not aware of any.
But every day a professional dons a uniform or badge and chooses to go to work in that imperfect system is another day that has no place for assumptions or guesses at the root level. And if something goes awry, shuffling blame to the easiest, vaguest, target of all ("management") or not being forthcoming with investigtators will no nothing to improve the system that relies on the front line troops' integrity to function.
If a management overworks you and you're fatigued...don't go to work. If they don't train you...refuse to work on something you aren't trained for. If you're hung over....call in sick. If, in your view, underpaid or demoralized to the point of not being able to focus on the task at hand....remove yourself from it and seek employment elsewhere. If the whole set-up is so systematically unsafe you wouldn't put your own family on the plane....blow the whistle.
We rely on you to make aicraft airworthy. Our lives are in your hands. The pax rely on us to not screw up, and trust they're sitting in a perfectly good airplane.
Management be damned, if we go to work, the buck stops with us.
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Sunfish,
I didn't say I agreed with it, try reading my post, to comment on something you haven't read properly is certainly, to use your own terms, cretinous.
Also I don't work for BA, I have in the past as a contractor, and to be honest they are still one of the best outfits around despite their 'challenges'. This is why I object to all the armchair maintenance experts wittering on about the ideal world of aircraft maintenance and commenting on the professionalism of the people there. Aircraft maintenance Engineers do a good, professional job in spite of the environment/ethos they are immersed in.
AMF:
I agree with your view on professionalism, I never argued against it, what i am saying is that even with the most highly professional people things can still go wrong if insufficient systems/safeguards are not in place, that may be something we'll never agree on. Thing is though, you can't just leave if you don't like the way things are run - not enough jobs, whistle blowing? Been done, doesn't work. You end up doing something in-between, and just do your best.
I didn't say I agreed with it, try reading my post, to comment on something you haven't read properly is certainly, to use your own terms, cretinous.
Also I don't work for BA, I have in the past as a contractor, and to be honest they are still one of the best outfits around despite their 'challenges'. This is why I object to all the armchair maintenance experts wittering on about the ideal world of aircraft maintenance and commenting on the professionalism of the people there. Aircraft maintenance Engineers do a good, professional job in spite of the environment/ethos they are immersed in.
AMF:
I agree with your view on professionalism, I never argued against it, what i am saying is that even with the most highly professional people things can still go wrong if insufficient systems/safeguards are not in place, that may be something we'll never agree on. Thing is though, you can't just leave if you don't like the way things are run - not enough jobs, whistle blowing? Been done, doesn't work. You end up doing something in-between, and just do your best.
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Reading some of the posts on this forum I am somewhat disheartend. As an ex BA engineer, now a first officer for Ryanair I can honestly say that the standard of maintenance at both companies is very high. You only have to go contracting for a while as a B1 to see some low standards.
As most of you write the role of the LAE or B1 holder has slowly been watered down until only a handfull are required to keep an operation running legally. Its about time that engineers got their just rewards and with the lack of new blood entering the industry, it should be soon. Please let us stop this low cost v flag carrier arguement. BA should also kick out the dead wood on the shop floor. Too many people just turn up for the money and they would not last two minutes elsewhere. Also there are loads of B1 guys at Ryanair ! Where did you get the figure 2 from ? Thin air....
As most of you write the role of the LAE or B1 holder has slowly been watered down until only a handfull are required to keep an operation running legally. Its about time that engineers got their just rewards and with the lack of new blood entering the industry, it should be soon. Please let us stop this low cost v flag carrier arguement. BA should also kick out the dead wood on the shop floor. Too many people just turn up for the money and they would not last two minutes elsewhere. Also there are loads of B1 guys at Ryanair ! Where did you get the figure 2 from ? Thin air....
Paxing All Over The World
Pax speaking: From the outset of this thread, it all sounds like routine commercial life in 1990s/2000 UK. That is to say, everything being cut back until somehting breaks. As yet, BA have not had anything break. My guess is that the recent difficulty experienced at the Buncefield Depot will fall into the same category.
All the comments about the way in which BA maintenance staff now have no paid hand-over time and have to work on multiple a/c at the same time, indicates one thing. That corners are being cut. I have seen engineering resources cut in the same way, with staff having to chase all over the place to meet the statistics. In those cases they were fortunate that - if it all went wrong and the boxes stopped working - the boxes would still be sitting comfortably on the ground [Telephone exchanges, if you were wondering]
For any company the law of averages will catch up with them. Think of Herald of Free Enterprise as but one example: Staff were complacent AND senior staff had been asking mgmt for CCTV and warning lights on the Bridge to signal the status of the bow and stern doors. Mgmt had refused and folks got complacent.
This led to the following act of Parliament:
Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
The UK's Public Interest Disclosure Act provides a framework of legal protection for individuals who disclose information so as to expose malpractice and matters of similar concern. In the vernacular, it protects whistleblowers from victimisation and dismissal.
The Act received Royal Assent on 2 July 1998 and came into effect a year later in 1999; need for such protection became evident from enquiries into disasters and crimes such as the 1987 capsise of the Herald of Free Enterprise, the 1988 Clapham Junction rail crash, and the 1991 Bank of Credit and Commerce International scandal. In each, employees could have prevented the occurrence had they felt that they would have received any support in raising allegations.
The scope of the Act extends to the raising of "genuine concerns about crime, civil offences (including negligence, breach of contract, breach of administrative law), miscarriage of justice, danger to health and safety or the environment and the cover up of any of these" and extends to all employees in almost all professions; some, such as the army, are excluded.
Protection in the event of infractions by employers is available through the industrial tribunal system; remedies include unlimited financial compensation and orders requiring companies to retain the employee in his or her job.
The time will come for some folks in the Airline biz to think about using it.
All the comments about the way in which BA maintenance staff now have no paid hand-over time and have to work on multiple a/c at the same time, indicates one thing. That corners are being cut. I have seen engineering resources cut in the same way, with staff having to chase all over the place to meet the statistics. In those cases they were fortunate that - if it all went wrong and the boxes stopped working - the boxes would still be sitting comfortably on the ground [Telephone exchanges, if you were wondering]
For any company the law of averages will catch up with them. Think of Herald of Free Enterprise as but one example: Staff were complacent AND senior staff had been asking mgmt for CCTV and warning lights on the Bridge to signal the status of the bow and stern doors. Mgmt had refused and folks got complacent.
After a public inquiry into the sinking in July 1987, Britain's Lord Justice Sheen published a report that castigated Townsend Thoresen, the ship's owners as part of the P&O Group, and identified a "disease of sloppiness" and negligence at every level of the corporation's hierarchy, thus proving that private entreprise cannot be trusted in matters of public security and need to be strongly monitored by regulating authorities.
Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
The UK's Public Interest Disclosure Act provides a framework of legal protection for individuals who disclose information so as to expose malpractice and matters of similar concern. In the vernacular, it protects whistleblowers from victimisation and dismissal.
The Act received Royal Assent on 2 July 1998 and came into effect a year later in 1999; need for such protection became evident from enquiries into disasters and crimes such as the 1987 capsise of the Herald of Free Enterprise, the 1988 Clapham Junction rail crash, and the 1991 Bank of Credit and Commerce International scandal. In each, employees could have prevented the occurrence had they felt that they would have received any support in raising allegations.
The scope of the Act extends to the raising of "genuine concerns about crime, civil offences (including negligence, breach of contract, breach of administrative law), miscarriage of justice, danger to health and safety or the environment and the cover up of any of these" and extends to all employees in almost all professions; some, such as the army, are excluded.
Protection in the event of infractions by employers is available through the industrial tribunal system; remedies include unlimited financial compensation and orders requiring companies to retain the employee in his or her job.
The time will come for some folks in the Airline biz to think about using it.
Autoglide. The only wittering going on is your own. I don't care how "professional" a maintenance engineer may be. If you are a professional, no matter how good you are, you can still be let down by a bad maintenance system.
That is the lesson of Ansett (read the report). The good folk at Ansett were working their @rses off and doing an excellent job, but if the paperwork isn't as professional as the engineers, then sooner or later someone is going to be provided with the wrong information, and then all the professionalism in the world isn't going to save you.
Next thing I suppose you'll tell me is that the receiving and issuing stores functions have been combined to save money. Now as a "professional" I'll bet you can tell it's a legitimate idea isn't it?
That is the lesson of Ansett (read the report). The good folk at Ansett were working their @rses off and doing an excellent job, but if the paperwork isn't as professional as the engineers, then sooner or later someone is going to be provided with the wrong information, and then all the professionalism in the world isn't going to save you.
Next thing I suppose you'll tell me is that the receiving and issuing stores functions have been combined to save money. Now as a "professional" I'll bet you can tell it's a legitimate idea isn't it?
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AMF,
Lots of info, thanks.
But you are correct, when the cheese holes line up, things will change. Will happon a few times me thinks.
But until change, The way Engineers are treated will keep having a great effect on Pilots and Cabin Crew doing their jobs with ease. (Pilots and Cabin Crew will get blame when things go wrong due to Engineers not fixing the Aircrafts)
As for the Stab Jack problem you mention, a sad story.
Was thinking of a Stab Jack accident beween SEA and SFO I think about 5/6 yrs ago, to save money, Lub was reduced and Stab Jack failed, all were lost I think.
An old saying, if you thinks, Engineering is costing many dollars, check out the cost of a Hull or two.????
Lots of info, thanks.
But you are correct, when the cheese holes line up, things will change. Will happon a few times me thinks.
But until change, The way Engineers are treated will keep having a great effect on Pilots and Cabin Crew doing their jobs with ease. (Pilots and Cabin Crew will get blame when things go wrong due to Engineers not fixing the Aircrafts)
As for the Stab Jack problem you mention, a sad story.
Was thinking of a Stab Jack accident beween SEA and SFO I think about 5/6 yrs ago, to save money, Lub was reduced and Stab Jack failed, all were lost I think.
An old saying, if you thinks, Engineering is costing many dollars, check out the cost of a Hull or two.????
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Hi all
1. AA DC-10 wrong engine change procedure
2. Air Alaska MD-83 Stab trim jackscrew fail
3. AirTransat A330 Wrong component modified and installed
on one engine.
There are much more maint. involved incidents throughout the jet age. In particular the Air Alaska report makes horrifying reading for the failures in their maintenance procedures. There is no excuse for this B.A. maint incident but I have seen worse in other places. Regulation of duty hours is a must for engineers we have the same responsibility as the Captain in relation to the safety of people and the machine If maint. make a mistake people can die, it's that simple. The bean counters choose not to see it this way as for them maint. is only a mundane necessity. Gradual erosion of the standards and the constant derating of the a/c engineer to semi-skilled status along with t's and c's all play as factors. If the same applied to pilots I wonder would we be reading "thats no excuse" Read some of the posts in relation to crew rosters!
Brgds
SB03
1. AA DC-10 wrong engine change procedure
2. Air Alaska MD-83 Stab trim jackscrew fail
3. AirTransat A330 Wrong component modified and installed
on one engine.
There are much more maint. involved incidents throughout the jet age. In particular the Air Alaska report makes horrifying reading for the failures in their maintenance procedures. There is no excuse for this B.A. maint incident but I have seen worse in other places. Regulation of duty hours is a must for engineers we have the same responsibility as the Captain in relation to the safety of people and the machine If maint. make a mistake people can die, it's that simple. The bean counters choose not to see it this way as for them maint. is only a mundane necessity. Gradual erosion of the standards and the constant derating of the a/c engineer to semi-skilled status along with t's and c's all play as factors. If the same applied to pilots I wonder would we be reading "thats no excuse" Read some of the posts in relation to crew rosters!
Brgds
SB03
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Sunfish
You are such a "Drama Queen"
Withdraw the AOC....I'll never fly BA again.....Ansett...."long after I'd left". I don't think.
Hovis...you have a personal axe to grind with BA. Best to vent it on the airmech website...but then you probably have.
B73.
Withdraw the AOC....I'll never fly BA again.....Ansett...."long after I'd left". I don't think.
Hovis...you have a personal axe to grind with BA. Best to vent it on the airmech website...but then you probably have.
B73.
CONGRATULATIONS BOAC73!
You have just proved my point.
Anyone starts to make a noise on this side of the industry and the old cliche comes out every time.....
I believe the chap at Alaskan who tried to blow the whistle was accused of the same thing.
Oh well, if you want to bury YOUR head in the sand.....
Merry Xmas.
You have just proved my point.
Anyone starts to make a noise on this side of the industry and the old cliche comes out every time.....
....you have a personal axe to grind with BA....
I believe the chap at Alaskan who tried to blow the whistle was accused of the same thing.
Oh well, if you want to bury YOUR head in the sand.....
Merry Xmas.
Cunning Artificer
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There was once a time when LAE's held only type rated licences. There were no LWTRs and company approvals only covered the Certificate of Compliance (e.g. CRS). The licence authorised the holder to certify all levels of maintenance although, for most maintenance activity, the LAE used his company approval, granted on the basis of his licence. Every once in a while the crunch came, when it was necessary to issue a "Certificate of Maintenance" - signed using the individual's licence number not the company approval, which didn't cover the C of M process.
Then it was decided that, under MSG2, aircraft maintenance had become too complex for an individual to be able to issue the C of M and the CMR was invented, theoretically monitored by the whole maintenance system itself. Theory aside, in practice the Maintenance Review is conducted by an individual QAE who issues the CMR when he's done. So, its just the same as issuing a C of M, except that now its done under company approval by a company servant instead of a maintenance supervisor exercising the privileges of his own, personal licence.
Did the supervisor have true independence in signing the C of M? Of course not - he still needed a job! But his independence of the company approval did make a big difference to the way the company organised its maintenance. That was why the airlines were so eager to get rid of the C of M and type ratings.
So, after nearly 30 years since his disappearance the maintenance supervisor is to make his return? Not before time, I say...
Then it was decided that, under MSG2, aircraft maintenance had become too complex for an individual to be able to issue the C of M and the CMR was invented, theoretically monitored by the whole maintenance system itself. Theory aside, in practice the Maintenance Review is conducted by an individual QAE who issues the CMR when he's done. So, its just the same as issuing a C of M, except that now its done under company approval by a company servant instead of a maintenance supervisor exercising the privileges of his own, personal licence.
Did the supervisor have true independence in signing the C of M? Of course not - he still needed a job! But his independence of the company approval did make a big difference to the way the company organised its maintenance. That was why the airlines were so eager to get rid of the C of M and type ratings.
So, after nearly 30 years since his disappearance the maintenance supervisor is to make his return? Not before time, I say...
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I seem to be aware that 60% plus of accidents are attributable to Pilot error and 18% to maintenance. These are both too high IMHO. I wonder if any fellow BA engineers would agree with me when I say trying to work to BA Proceedures as they are written is neigh on impossible!
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>>>I was told that the reason that a former head of Engineering/Technical (CM) left BA was due to his belief that this culture could not be changed before a serious incident occured<<<
I worked directly for CM who was breath of fresh air for many of us in Flt Ops. He understood and set perfectly clear safety and commercial targets which, for want of a technical term, drove members of the recently demoted Leadership Team bananas - i.e. how could CM possibly manage or understand 'our' pilots. Traditionalist members of The Board caved in to old-school lobbying and CM, as talented people tend, wandered off to greener pastures. A great loss and just the man needed now.
I worked directly for CM who was breath of fresh air for many of us in Flt Ops. He understood and set perfectly clear safety and commercial targets which, for want of a technical term, drove members of the recently demoted Leadership Team bananas - i.e. how could CM possibly manage or understand 'our' pilots. Traditionalist members of The Board caved in to old-school lobbying and CM, as talented people tend, wandered off to greener pastures. A great loss and just the man needed now.
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Re: 'Scathing' report on BA Maintenance practices
It seems to have made the front page ---at last. Better this way though than the headlines nobody wants to see I suggest.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/section/0,,2086,00.html
The only inaccuracy I can see is numerical They got missed out a 1 on the timescale they propose. Shame they didn't comment further on some of the other relevant issues raised on this topic--such as intimidation, bullying and victimisation for example----and the culture overall.
And NO BOAC 73, I don't have an axe to grind ( I say this because you seemingly assume that any criticism is unwarranted and not valid per se ) just simply pointing out the obvious flaws in a once world class organisation as I said before and which are clearly evident to most observers, internal or external. Maybe you should open your mind a little hmmm?
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/section/0,,2086,00.html
The only inaccuracy I can see is numerical They got missed out a 1 on the timescale they propose. Shame they didn't comment further on some of the other relevant issues raised on this topic--such as intimidation, bullying and victimisation for example----and the culture overall.
And NO BOAC 73, I don't have an axe to grind ( I say this because you seemingly assume that any criticism is unwarranted and not valid per se ) just simply pointing out the obvious flaws in a once world class organisation as I said before and which are clearly evident to most observers, internal or external. Maybe you should open your mind a little hmmm?
Re: 'Scathing' report on BA Maintenance practices
From today's "Australian". Someone must be reading Pprune.
Cracks appear in British airline safety
Steve Creedy, Aviation writer
January 02, 2006
A STRING of midair incidents involving British Airways, one of the three European airlines servicing Australia, has raised questions about widespread safety problems at the airline.
A report by Britain's Air Accident Investigation Branch found BA jets suffered mid-air failures because of "systemic" problems with the carrier's maintenance.
After inquiries into four mid-air incidents, investigators said safety problems could be "widespread within the organisation", The Sunday Times newspaper in London revealed yesterday.
Investigators warned that shoddy work practices appeared to be accepted as the norm by some BA maintenance staff.
The newspaper listed a series of incidents, including a door that ripped off a Boeing 777 at 6000 feet.
The door gouged the plane's fuselage and narrowly missed a couple walking below when it hit the ground.
In another incident, fuel gushed out of a plane that had just taken off from Heathrow Airport, leaving a two-kilometre vapour trail, because screws and a cap that should have plugged a hole were left inside the tank.
And the pilots of a Boeing 757 were forced to put on oxygen masks and land as their cabin filled with oil fumes. It was later confirmed that engineers put too much oil in the jet.
Maintenance workers in late 2003 also forgot to properly reattach two wing panels on a Paris-bound Boeing 757 that then responded abnormally to the flight controls.
As the captain prepared to land and the autopilot was disconnected, the plane started drifting to the right, forcing the pilot to take corrective action.
And investigators said the failure to check the wing panels were installed did not appear to be an isolated incident.
"Ineffective supervision of maintenance staff had allowed working practices to develop that had compromised the level of airworthiness control and had become accepted as the norm," they said.
"Maintenance errors were not the result of wilful negligence, or any desire to perform a less-than-satisfactory job, but the result of a combination of systemic issues that had increased the probability of an error being committed."
The criticism from the AAIB is unprecedented for an airline that has claimed a reputation for having one of the best-maintained fleets in the world.
Although BA has recently relied increasingly on codeshare flights with Qantas to get its passengers to and from Australia, it still flies its own planes to Melbourne and Sydney.
A spokesman for the Civil Aviation Safety Authority said yesterday the Australian regulator was unaware of the report and was unlikely to take action.
He said CASA would leave any action to the British regulator, which it recognised as the competent authority.
A Qantas spokeswoman could not say whether the airline had work done on its aircraft by British Airways Engineering, BA's maintenance section.
However, BA told The Sunday Times it took the safety report "very seriously" and had addressed the problems in its maintenance processes.
"British Airways prides itself on safety and recognises that we are always ready to learn from incidents and encourage open transparent reporting," said the airline's head of safety, Captain Rod Young.
The airline now has only 6000 engineers, compared with 9500 in 1995, despite its fleet remaining at a similar size to 10 years ago, with 288 aircraft.
Cracks appear in British airline safety
Steve Creedy, Aviation writer
January 02, 2006
A STRING of midair incidents involving British Airways, one of the three European airlines servicing Australia, has raised questions about widespread safety problems at the airline.
A report by Britain's Air Accident Investigation Branch found BA jets suffered mid-air failures because of "systemic" problems with the carrier's maintenance.
After inquiries into four mid-air incidents, investigators said safety problems could be "widespread within the organisation", The Sunday Times newspaper in London revealed yesterday.
Investigators warned that shoddy work practices appeared to be accepted as the norm by some BA maintenance staff.
The newspaper listed a series of incidents, including a door that ripped off a Boeing 777 at 6000 feet.
The door gouged the plane's fuselage and narrowly missed a couple walking below when it hit the ground.
In another incident, fuel gushed out of a plane that had just taken off from Heathrow Airport, leaving a two-kilometre vapour trail, because screws and a cap that should have plugged a hole were left inside the tank.
And the pilots of a Boeing 757 were forced to put on oxygen masks and land as their cabin filled with oil fumes. It was later confirmed that engineers put too much oil in the jet.
Maintenance workers in late 2003 also forgot to properly reattach two wing panels on a Paris-bound Boeing 757 that then responded abnormally to the flight controls.
As the captain prepared to land and the autopilot was disconnected, the plane started drifting to the right, forcing the pilot to take corrective action.
And investigators said the failure to check the wing panels were installed did not appear to be an isolated incident.
"Ineffective supervision of maintenance staff had allowed working practices to develop that had compromised the level of airworthiness control and had become accepted as the norm," they said.
"Maintenance errors were not the result of wilful negligence, or any desire to perform a less-than-satisfactory job, but the result of a combination of systemic issues that had increased the probability of an error being committed."
The criticism from the AAIB is unprecedented for an airline that has claimed a reputation for having one of the best-maintained fleets in the world.
Although BA has recently relied increasingly on codeshare flights with Qantas to get its passengers to and from Australia, it still flies its own planes to Melbourne and Sydney.
A spokesman for the Civil Aviation Safety Authority said yesterday the Australian regulator was unaware of the report and was unlikely to take action.
He said CASA would leave any action to the British regulator, which it recognised as the competent authority.
A Qantas spokeswoman could not say whether the airline had work done on its aircraft by British Airways Engineering, BA's maintenance section.
However, BA told The Sunday Times it took the safety report "very seriously" and had addressed the problems in its maintenance processes.
"British Airways prides itself on safety and recognises that we are always ready to learn from incidents and encourage open transparent reporting," said the airline's head of safety, Captain Rod Young.
The airline now has only 6000 engineers, compared with 9500 in 1995, despite its fleet remaining at a similar size to 10 years ago, with 288 aircraft.
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Re: 'Scathing' report on BA Maintenance practices
There is an interesting post on the airmech site which, if true and I would state here that I am not questioning the integrity of the poster for one minute, far from it in fact, that really does summate matters and also shows a very negative approach to Flight Safety.
The poster states that the technician involved was swiftly punished and still is being so---quelle surprise !--despite co-operating fully.
Now, I have to admit I am slightly old fashoned here. To me, one of the central tenents of Flight Safety is this. We are all human and therefore fallible. We make mistakes. However, if we make a mistake, admit it and rectify the problem, plus analyse how the mistake occurred in the first place, then why, oh why ( other than cover their own ineptitude and prove how "strong" they are as "managers" ) do those whose job titles define them as "managers" have to launch into disciplinary actions against an individual(s) when they have admitted the mistake----which, as I say,to me defeats the whole objective and ethos of Flight Safety.
In contrast of course, are those who are simply blase about matters and their errors and cannot, or will not, even consider they have made an error. Even then, I suggest that disciplinary action should be the last resort given that once you go down that road, as a manager you have clearly failed in your role anyway.
As for the case in point--well the knee jerk reaction of punishment neatly encapsulates the many problems that currently seem to be endemic within the organisation--to me at least.
The poster states that the technician involved was swiftly punished and still is being so---quelle surprise !--despite co-operating fully.
Now, I have to admit I am slightly old fashoned here. To me, one of the central tenents of Flight Safety is this. We are all human and therefore fallible. We make mistakes. However, if we make a mistake, admit it and rectify the problem, plus analyse how the mistake occurred in the first place, then why, oh why ( other than cover their own ineptitude and prove how "strong" they are as "managers" ) do those whose job titles define them as "managers" have to launch into disciplinary actions against an individual(s) when they have admitted the mistake----which, as I say,to me defeats the whole objective and ethos of Flight Safety.
In contrast of course, are those who are simply blase about matters and their errors and cannot, or will not, even consider they have made an error. Even then, I suggest that disciplinary action should be the last resort given that once you go down that road, as a manager you have clearly failed in your role anyway.
As for the case in point--well the knee jerk reaction of punishment neatly encapsulates the many problems that currently seem to be endemic within the organisation--to me at least.
Last edited by Krystal n chips; 2nd Jan 2006 at 14:58.
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Re: 'Scathing' report on BA Maintenance practices
K&C,
I find it very sad that you are prepared to take all the rubbish you have read on here, in the Times and on airmech as gospel.
Only last month we passed a CAA audit.
I say to anyone on here....if you have any serious doubts about the integrity of BA Engineering you should do something about it.
Those of you who are proffesionals within the industry will know what action is availble for you to take.
B73.
I find it very sad that you are prepared to take all the rubbish you have read on here, in the Times and on airmech as gospel.
Only last month we passed a CAA audit.
I say to anyone on here....if you have any serious doubts about the integrity of BA Engineering you should do something about it.
Those of you who are proffesionals within the industry will know what action is availble for you to take.
B73.
Last edited by BOAC73; 2nd Jan 2006 at 16:43.
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Re: 'Scathing' report on BA Maintenance practices
BOAC 73
May I, politely, suggest you read my last post again--this time in detail--and then review your comments. May I further suggest you also take the time to read the other posts on this topic, again, in detail, and then, possibly, you will grasp the relevance of the comments / observations and, heaven forbid, criticism of BA Engineering.
For you information, the article in the Sunday Times is, had you bother to read it, a compilation of events which are all readily available in the public domain. The fact it was the lead story on Sunday may have escaped your attention I feel. As for the airmech site, well I have know way of telling here, but, and it is a relevant but, given that I probably know considerably more about the system than yourself (but not the case that produced this thread though ) then shall we say I have no reason to doubt the integrity of the poster or, far more pertinently, the comments made.
BOAC 73---that's an interesting handle--the year you joined perhaps as a BOAC apprentice ? and,if so, may I politely ask once again, what exactly is your discipline please?. You see, and here I would like to make an analogy rather than a speculation, you remind me of a very good Giles cartoon c1945. It shows a group of scruffy GI's slouching through Berlin but at the back are two very smart GI's marching in step. The caption shows two MP's one saying to the other "Y'now, there's something very un American about you two guys at the rear".
May I, politely, suggest you read my last post again--this time in detail--and then review your comments. May I further suggest you also take the time to read the other posts on this topic, again, in detail, and then, possibly, you will grasp the relevance of the comments / observations and, heaven forbid, criticism of BA Engineering.
For you information, the article in the Sunday Times is, had you bother to read it, a compilation of events which are all readily available in the public domain. The fact it was the lead story on Sunday may have escaped your attention I feel. As for the airmech site, well I have know way of telling here, but, and it is a relevant but, given that I probably know considerably more about the system than yourself (but not the case that produced this thread though ) then shall we say I have no reason to doubt the integrity of the poster or, far more pertinently, the comments made.
BOAC 73---that's an interesting handle--the year you joined perhaps as a BOAC apprentice ? and,if so, may I politely ask once again, what exactly is your discipline please?. You see, and here I would like to make an analogy rather than a speculation, you remind me of a very good Giles cartoon c1945. It shows a group of scruffy GI's slouching through Berlin but at the back are two very smart GI's marching in step. The caption shows two MP's one saying to the other "Y'now, there's something very un American about you two guys at the rear".