Benalla six dead and $5,000 VOR reward

[Dick Smith]

SM4 Pirate, it was obvious that the pilot was well off course when above FL110 – in very good radar coverage. That is when the pilot could have been told that he was heading well away from the GPS approach, and that is when there is a chance that the accident could have been prevented – it is as simple as that.

[ForkTailedDrKiller]

Dick

On further reflection, you are indeed correct. When queried on my tracking by ATC, I have been in Class E airspace not Class G.

Dr

[SM4 Pirate]

...it was obvious that the pilot was well off course when above FL110

To who? In hindsight, yes, agreed, after plotting it out; but at the time what were the controllers (the three sectors involved (WOL, BLA and HUM) = three alerts) using to assess this "obvious" deviation from track? This has nothing to do with using the radar "correctly".

As far as I know the GPS RNAV/GNSS points were not in the data set at the time, so rerouting it to accurately describe the RAM corridor wasn't an option; thus the only reference point was the navaid/aerodrome; where the aircraft was not going; probably hence no advice to the PIC.

This probably has everything to do with a pilot being below the MSA still in a white/grey/black puffy lump of clag; yes the BLA GPS RNAV can get you lower than the MSA of 3500 within 10NM; but we all know you have to be on the damn thing.

From my untrained eye and from memory the aircraft appears to have gone to EE not ED; but flown the approach as if going to/from ED; sorry I have this all wrong.

Dr, You will get advice from ATCs , about being in RAM in G too, in radar coverage, IFR, when you aren't on the CTAF, and your diversion from track is unexpected; the same RAM rules apply to all classes of airspace; ie there are only one set of rules.

[En-Rooter]

Dick.......Dood,

You are looking for an expert in airspace design, I'm the first to admit that I'm not that.

I have however been working this sector for a number of years. AND I AM TELLING YOU THAT THE RADAR COVERAGE IN THIS AREA IS CRAP! Why can you not accept my word on this? Do you think I am lieing?

Saabs are routinely lost (momentarily) at levels up to F120 out of YMAY to YMML.

I do have reservations about working E airspace, but only in areas where radar coverage is crap. Give me the radar coverage, the staffing (we have been understaffed on this group for at least 5 or 6 years) and the appropriate training and I will do it without complaint!

You also need to educate VFR acft on the implications of their transponder limitations and for christ sake stop them from navigating on IFR tracks.

Regards,

ROOTER.

[gaunty]

How are we to know the difference? Well it appears that any VORs that are against NAS are “real” and any VORs which explain how NAS works so well in the United States and could work well here, are “fake.”

well I guess if you want to take that argument to its logical extension ipso facto you should not quote the VOR in any form to support your agenda of the day.

I doubt that there is anyone in Australia, or the world for that matter, watching or paticipating in the VOR NAS debate who wasn't able to work out what was and wasn't "fake".

And allegations of intimidation of staff by Airservices coming from you is really cute don't you think

There are some very sound and very well proven reasons why many PPRuNers choose to remain anonymous, notwithstanding the accuracy and rationality of their posts and it has very little to do with the likely actions of their employers.

[ShockWave]

Dick,
I agree with the fact that if the pilot had been advised of his track error the accident could have been avoided. I say could not would. Obviously some very bad errors were made or equipment failures caused this accident.

In the end though you just can not fly below your msa without being absolutely sure of where you are and you can't be sure unless you have multiple sources of information. If ATC have radar that is one possible source, so is a DME, VOR, NDB, IRS etc.
I have flown too many Radar controlled airports around the world where I still don't descend below the MSA until I am sure of where I am, and not simply by the controllers advice. It is the only way to stay alive in this job.

I feel that to connect the need for more class E airspace to this accident is a bit of a stretch. There are a lot more things that can be done to prevent a repeat of this kind of accident that would be of more benefit before calling for more E airspace.

We can't positively control the whole of Australia by radar so the focus for this accident and for other remote areas needs to be on procedures, training and equipment required on board IFR aircraft.

Will class E airspce help? I don't know, but I do belive that it probably isn't the best way of preventing the above type of accidents.
Cheers.

[Pass-A-Frozo]

In the end though you just can not fly below your msa without being absolutely sure of where you are and you can't be sure unless you have multiple sources of information. If ATC have radar that is one possible source, so is a DME, VOR, NDB, IRS etc.
I have flown too many Radar controlled airports around the world where I still don't descend below the MSA until I am sure of where I am, and not simply by the controllers advice. It is the only way to stay alive in this job.

Sound advice. The Radar Terrain Clearance charts that RAAF AIS provide should be available to all. I've been on one flight when we were vectored below the alt displayed on chart. After questioning the controller we were promptly cleared to the correct alt.

[Capn Bloggs]

Just as with the Wheat Board, it will all come out one day and be exposed - you wait and see.

You can say that again, Sunshine. And you had better have a padded bottom, 'cause it's gunna be whacked hard.

PS: Answer the question.

[Spodman]

I mistakenly thought that after this terrible accident that there would be a quick move to utilise the radar properly in this area – i.e. introduce new procedures or Class E airspace. Of course, this has not happened.

Prior to this crash not all RNAV approach points were available to ATC to insert into flight plans, so if a flight was cleared direct to such a point in E airspace or a pilot advised he was doing so in G airspace we would just expect him to be up to 15 NM away from his planned route. Now the points have been defined and it has been indicated to ATC that we must monitor tracking and advise discrepancies, regardless of the class of airspace.

Of course, this has not happened.

Of course, you have got it wrong again.

The ATSB report makes it quite clear the controller WAS monitoring the track of the aircraft, he was just confused about which point the flight was heading for. Despite the points not being defined the discrepancy WAS noted, but the when the ATC weighed the probabilities of he or the GPS being wrong he decided he must have got it wrong. We all know better now.

My name is in my profile if anybody cares, don't see how it is relevant though, I have no ambitions to become a media tart.

[Will964]

it was obvious that the pilot was well off course when above FL110 – in very good radar coverage. That is when the pilot could have been told that he was heading well away from the GPS approach, and that is when there is a chance that the accident could have been prevented – it is as simple as that.

Really? Could it have been prevented if the radio altimeter, which was fitted to this aircraft, had not been disabled by the pilot?

Whilst ATC monitoring of IFR tracks forms part of the system's defences, surely the final defence layer in the prevention of a CFIT should lie in the use of airborne technologies. In this case those technologies were knowingly disabled and so this final defence was breeched and the accident was allowed to occur. To pin-point the ATC's role in this accident as the 'make or break' point is misleading and is in direct conflict with the systemic approach to accident causation.

[tobzalp]

So in summary, the pilot flew the wrong way and hit a hill. ATC did not tell him and it is ATC's fault? The pilot made no error? User plays, user pays.

[019360]

I know one of the ATC guys on duty at the time. And any implied suggestion that he and others were smoking the odd cigarette, feet up on the console, oblivious to all but the heavy metal at FL 350 is cruel, wrong and just nasty.

And Dick.....most airlines, including mine...as part of our CRM training in the classroom, the simulator and on the line....tell pilots, Captains (yes this poor guy flying up near Benalla was a PIC) to listen to "that sick feeling that something is wrong". he was flying without GPWS, not even a Radio Alt (I think) in IMC relying solely on his version of a GPS plotted track. I know he didn't mean to get into this place but ultimately HE was PIC, not ATC whatever may or may not have fleetingly appeared on their screen.

[ForkTailedDrKiller]

While a comment from ATC to alert the pilot to the track error may have prevented this accident, ATC can not possibly be blamed for this tragedy. If the approach had been into somewhere remote like Coen, this debate would not be relevant. Equally a cross check on the position with a VFR portable GPS might have alterted the pilot to a problem.

IMHO the buck stops squarely with the PIC. Like most aviation accidents, the plugging of any one of a number of "holes in the cheese" would have prevented it.

I did my GPS/RNAV Appr rating with a Trimble GPS, and found it much more difficult to work with than the GNS430 that I now use.

I have gotten into the habit of navigating soley by reference to GPS, but as a result of this accident, I now try wherever possible to cross-reference my GPS position with a ground station or radar position at some point in the flight prior to flying a GPS/RNAV Appr.

The pilot's habit of pulling the circuit breaker on the radio altimeter is curious. I wish I had one, and if I did I would ensure that I used it appropriately where ever possible.

Although apparently not diectly relevant in this case, the fact that the GPS database was not current is also interesting.

Dr

[019360]

And with reference to "stand-alone" GPS approaches. Just to put them in perspective. At the airline level, my company which has operated 777s for 10 years has JUST received approval, with a number of caveats even then, for "stand alone" GPS approaches. We need that for ETOPS alternates like Midway.
And we have the mother of all nav systems to back up the two GPS systems. The ADIRU with its many IRS and fiber-optic standby back up IRUs would by itself be more accurate than almost all non-ILS approaches. And we have 2 active FMCs and all manner of cross-checks. On IRS alone we can navigate for 12 hours without any other updating.
And yes, I am old enough to remember the "old" days when we didn't have all that gear and you have to have positive ADF station passage, or passing over a VAR Marker (remember MONEA up near Mangalore and the "Z" marker at HBA? etc).
There's just no substitute for knowing where you are, as PIC, before you let down. If I ever have to go into Wake or Adak with one engine out, ATC will be the people I call on SATCOM after I land, not someone I expect ANY help from on the approach.

[Dick Smith]

SM4 Pirate, you state:

As far as I know the GPS RNAV/GNSS points were not in the data set at the time

I believe the Echo Delta waypoint was in the Airservices database. How else could the aircraft be cleared to track to Echo Delta, and how could the air traffic controller call the pilot and say that he was 65 miles from Echo Delta?

Gaunty, you falsely added words to the VOR posting of 27 April to give PPRuNers a completely different view. In the original post VOR did not add the words “quoted above.” VOR was referring to recent content, and if you go back and look at the history it is obvious that VOR was referring to posts other than the one that I have quoted.

Why ever would VOR be removed from the “roster of participants” for stating the facts about the US airspace system as I have quoted in the first post on this thread?

ShockWave, you state:

There are a lot more things that can be done to prevent a repeat of this kind of accident that would be of more benefit before calling for more E airspace.

And then you state:

Will class E airspace help? I don't know

In fact, if you look at my initial posting I made it very clear (when I said the radar use should be maximised) that the only alternative was not just Class E airspace. I said:

… introduce new procedures or Class E airspace.

Nothing could be clearer.

Just so everyone understands – in Class G airspace there is no regulatory responsibility for the controller in relation to LSA/MSA because the controller does not know if the pilot is visual. Under NAS the pilot must report visual or on the approach, and it is a very much more disciplined system where the responsibility is clearly shared between the controller and the pilot in a more definite way.

Spodman, you state:

Prior to this crash not all RNAV approach points were available to ATC to insert into flight plans

If this is so, it is outrageous. You can buy a complete Jeppesen database for about $150. Are you suggesting that this had never been installed in the TAAATS system? However as stated above, in relation to this accident, the initial approach fix Echo Delta was in the TAAATS database.

[gaunty]

Gaunty, you falsely added words to the VOR posting of 27 April to give PPRuNers a completely different view. In the original post VOR did not add the words “quoted above.” VOR was referring to recent content, and if you go back and look at the history it is obvious that VOR was referring to posts other than the one that I have quoted.

Why ever would VOR be removed from the “roster of participants” for stating the facts about the US airspace system as I have quoted in the first post on this thread?

Is that the best you can do ??

I added “quoted above.” to, hopefully point to the post you quoted at the beginning of the thread, there was never any intent to to give PPRuNers a completely view, most of them are capable of distinguishing the proverbial from shinola.

I'll back my record for rational and consistent argument around here against yours any day.

And for the lazy ones around here, here is the full thread, I recall it well and it seems pretty clear to me what's happened. But then what would I know.

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthr...tates+Practice

In the meantime I'm back to doing something useful, like actually progressing the state of the GA industry instead of frightening the bejeesus out of the callow chattering class and gormless gapers.

[Dick Smith]

Coral, it has nothing to do with grandstanding. It is all about preventing unnecessary deaths.

I do like to see that the available safety dollar is spent where it is most effective. I haven’t said that we have to have Class E airspace at Benalla. I have made it clear that if we introduce better procedures we can benefit from the use of radar.

If you question my real motivation possibly you are judging me on what you would do in similar circumstances – that is not sensible. I have one interest and that is having the highest possible safety and participation rates in aviation.

[SM4 Pirate]

I believe the Echo Delta waypoint was in the Airservices database. How else could the aircraft be cleared to track to Echo Delta, and how could the air traffic controller call the pilot and say that he was 65 miles from Echo Delta?

Point one regarding the clearance, in the same manner that you clear an aircraft for a holding pattern, an NDB let down, a weather diversion; you use your experience and knowledge to facilitate the arrival as requested; you don't need to know "exactly" where a point is to clear an aircraft to it. When separating you then "add on for mum". If ED was in CTA then you're probably right re the clearance, but it wasn't.

Point two, run the distance measuring tool from the aid to the aircraft and then subtract the distance from the aid to the tracking point. ie 80-15 = 65; or something like that. They got the chart info from the menu in AAARDS (which is a computer monitor adjacent to the dispaly; but not on the display, if it was available, where we have our RAPIC) or from opening the DAP East like everybody else.

I absolutely support the increase in safety participation; unfortunately to suggest it's simple and won't cost serious dollars, is outrageous; please don't quote whilloughby report figures; nobody with more than $3.50 in the bank can see the logic behind that one; unless it's millions more than $3.50.

[Canary51]

Check facts!

It is the PIC who is asked for his TOD and replies with 65 NM to Echo Delta. The controllers subsequently use that report in coordination. Nowhere in the transcript do the controllers refer to a distance to run a waypoint, other than by reference to a pilot’s report.

[Chris Higgins]

Dick,

Somewhere along the line we need to get back to better pilot training and cockpit disciplines before we start asking controllers to fly the aircraft for us.

We know that this discussion centres around improving the NAS, but you're going about it the wrong way mate!